State v. Shaw

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: May 1, 2003
• Docket: 2003-UP-304
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,

v.

Mark Anthony Shaw,        Appellant.

---

Appeal From Anderson County
John W. Kittredge, Circuit Court Judge

---

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-304
Submitted February 20, 2003 – Filed May 1, 2003   

---

AFFIRMED

---

Assistant Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, of Columbia; Druanne Dykes White, of Anderson; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Mark Anthony Shaw was indicted on one count of grand larceny and one count of second degree burglary by the Anderson County grand jury.  Following a jury trial, Shaw was found guilty of second degree burglary and petit larceny and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the burglary charge and ten years concurrent on the petit larceny conviction. Shaw appeals arguing the trial court erred in admitting his statement to the police because the evidence showed the statement was induced by the officer’s implied promise of leniency.   Shaw also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion and allowing the state to admit his prior burglary convictions when the uncontradicted evidence was that the burglary occurred at night, and as a result, the prior convictions were more prejudicial than probative.  

We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Issue one:  State v. McLeod, 303 S.C. 420, 423, 401 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Evans, 307 S.C. 477, 415 S.E.2d 816 (1992) (The trial court’s “determination of the voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed unless so manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law.”); State v. Franklin, 299 S.C. 133, 136,  382 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1989) (Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence is admissible in evidence.); State v. Peake, 291 S.C. 138, 139, 352 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1987)(“A statement induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise.”);  State v. Creech, 314 S.C. 76, 84, 441 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986)(“In making the determination, the trial judge should examine the totality of circumstances surrounding the utterance to determine whether the state has met its burden of proof so as to warrant admission of the confession.  Part of the State’s burden during this hearing is to prove that the statement was voluntary and taken in compliance with Miranda.”).  

Issue two: State v. Tucker, 319 S.C. 425, 428, 462 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1995) (The admission of evidence is within the trial judge’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion.);  State v. Cheatham, 349 S.C. 101, 109-10, 561 S.E.2d 618, 623 (Ct. App. 2002) (In a prosecution for first degree burglary, the defendant’s willingness to stipulate to one of two alternative elements of the crime, namely, the element requiring that alleged entry occurred at nighttime, does not preclude the State from offering evidence of an alternate element of the crime, namely, that defendant had a record of two or more convictions of burglary or housebreaking.); State v. Hamilton, 327 S.C. 440, 446-47, 486 S.E.2d 512, 515 (Ct. App. 1997) (Evidence of prior burglary or housebreaking convictions are properly admitted for the limited purpose of establishing  the elements of first-degree burglary.) 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., CURETON and GOOLSBY, JJ., concur.

---

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.