An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-305
Filed 5 November 2025
Union County, No. 22CR051062-890
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RYAN WILSON SHAW, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 9 July 2024 by Judge Matthew
Brian Smith in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11
September 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Emily Urch, for the State.
Joseph Gerber for Defendant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant Ryan Wilson Shaw appeals from judgments entered after a jury
found him guilty of driving while impaired (“DWI”) and failure to burn headlamps
(“FTBH”). Defendant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
counsel did not move to suppress evidence, and, alternatively, failed to object to
evidence admissibility. Defendant also argues the trial court incorrectly imposed jail STATE V. SHAW
Opinion of the Court
fees. We dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel arguments and hold there was
no error in the imposition of jail fees.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 3 April 2022, Defendant drove home from a party on his moped. The Union
County Sheriff’s deputy on patrol noticed Defendant driving without headlights
burning and pulled him over. The deputy observed Defendant’s unsteadiness and
slurred speech. Defendant acknowledged he had consumed three beers that night.
The on-patrol deputy then arrested Defendant and charged him with DWI and FTBH.
Later that night, the deputy transported Defendant to the county jail, where
Defendant was read his implied consent rights. When presented with the implied
consent form, Defendant refused to sign it. Following Defendant’s refusal, one of the
deputies wrote “refused” to indicate Defendant’s intent. Shortly afterward,
Defendant verbally consented to a blood draw. Consequently, a registered nurse, L.
Meed, drew Defendant’s blood. Defendant’s blood was then placed in an evidence
storage locker.
Fifteen days passed between the night of the blood draw to the blood’s arrival
at the crime lab. Expert analyst Stephanie Douthwaite conducted the analysis of the
blood sample on 27 May 2022. The blood test results revealed an alcohol
concentration of 0.26 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.
A jury found Defendant guilty of both DWI and FTBH. Judge Smith sentenced
Defendant to a twelve-month sentence in the Misdemeanant Confinement Program.
-2- STATE V. SHAW
The trial court judge suspended the sentence and ordered Defendant to complete
thirty months of supervised probation, serve an active ninety-day term in the custody
of the Union County Sheriff, and pay $3,600 in jail fees. Defendant timely appeals.
II. Analysis
Defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to move to suppress alleged illegally obtained evidence, or,
alternatively, because trial counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of evidence.
Additionally, Defendant claims the trial court erred in its imposition of jail fees.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed identically under both
federal and North Carolina law. State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562–63, 324 S.E.2d
241, 248 (1985). Defendant must demonstrate that (1) Defendant’s trial counsel’s
performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced Defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316,
626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (2006). In North Carolina, there is “a presumption that trial
counsel’s representation is . . . acceptable professional conduct.” State v. Roache, 358
N.C. 243, 280, 595 S.E.2d 381, 406 (2004) (citation omitted).
Trial counsel’s performance is deficient when counsel no longer qualifies as
“counsel” guaranteed by the United States Constitution because of counsel’s blatant
errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim demonstrates counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonable
-3- STATE V. SHAW
professional norms. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Allen, 360 N.C. at
316, 626 S.E.2d at 286.
To show trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced a defendant’s defense,
the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
case would have been different but for counsel’s mistakes. Allen, 360 N.C. at 316,
626 S.E.2d at 286. The probability must be substantial and sufficient to undermine
the original proceeding’s result. Id.; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).
When no additional investigation is required on the cold record, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is decided on the merits. State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166,
557 S.E.2d 500, 524 (2001). If the Court determines the claim is brought prematurely,
it will dismiss it without prejudice, allowing the defendant to pursue appropriate
relief. State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77, 122–23, 604 S.E.2d 850, 881 (2004).
When a defendant’s arguments “‘concern potential questions of trial strategy
and counsel’s impressions, an evidentiary hearing available through a motion for
appropriate relief is the procedure to conclusively determine these issues.’” State v.
Allen, 262 N.C. App. 284, 286, 821 S.E.2d 860, 861 (2018) (citation omitted). This
Court cannot know “‘whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel
had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel’s alternatives were
even worse.’” State v. Jones, 176 N.C. App. 678, 688, 627 S.E.2d 265, 271 (2006)
(citation omitted). If a record fails to provide sufficient information to indicate
whether a trial counsel’s decision was the result of trial strategy, the Court of Appeals
-4- STATE V. SHAW
should refrain from direct review. State v. Berry, 235 N.C. App. 496, 505, 761 S.E.2d
700, 706 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 368 N.C. 90, 773 S.E.2d 54 (2015). When a
defendant alleges an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsel’s failure to
move to suppress evidence, it is nearly impossible to make a meaningful prejudicial
review because this Court “would have to hold, at least implicitly, that there was no
legitimate possibility that additional relevant evidence would have been elicited had
a suppression hearing been conducted.” State v. Rivera, 264 N.C. App. 525, 536, 826
S.E.2d 511, 519 (2019).
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-305
Filed 5 November 2025
Union County, No. 22CR051062-890
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RYAN WILSON SHAW, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 9 July 2024 by Judge Matthew
Brian Smith in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11
September 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Emily Urch, for the State.
Joseph Gerber for Defendant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant Ryan Wilson Shaw appeals from judgments entered after a jury
found him guilty of driving while impaired (“DWI”) and failure to burn headlamps
(“FTBH”). Defendant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
counsel did not move to suppress evidence, and, alternatively, failed to object to
evidence admissibility. Defendant also argues the trial court incorrectly imposed jail STATE V. SHAW
Opinion of the Court
fees. We dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel arguments and hold there was
no error in the imposition of jail fees.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 3 April 2022, Defendant drove home from a party on his moped. The Union
County Sheriff’s deputy on patrol noticed Defendant driving without headlights
burning and pulled him over. The deputy observed Defendant’s unsteadiness and
slurred speech. Defendant acknowledged he had consumed three beers that night.
The on-patrol deputy then arrested Defendant and charged him with DWI and FTBH.
Later that night, the deputy transported Defendant to the county jail, where
Defendant was read his implied consent rights. When presented with the implied
consent form, Defendant refused to sign it. Following Defendant’s refusal, one of the
deputies wrote “refused” to indicate Defendant’s intent. Shortly afterward,
Defendant verbally consented to a blood draw. Consequently, a registered nurse, L.
Meed, drew Defendant’s blood. Defendant’s blood was then placed in an evidence
storage locker.
Fifteen days passed between the night of the blood draw to the blood’s arrival
at the crime lab. Expert analyst Stephanie Douthwaite conducted the analysis of the
blood sample on 27 May 2022. The blood test results revealed an alcohol
concentration of 0.26 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.
A jury found Defendant guilty of both DWI and FTBH. Judge Smith sentenced
Defendant to a twelve-month sentence in the Misdemeanant Confinement Program.
-2- STATE V. SHAW
The trial court judge suspended the sentence and ordered Defendant to complete
thirty months of supervised probation, serve an active ninety-day term in the custody
of the Union County Sheriff, and pay $3,600 in jail fees. Defendant timely appeals.
II. Analysis
Defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to move to suppress alleged illegally obtained evidence, or,
alternatively, because trial counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of evidence.
Additionally, Defendant claims the trial court erred in its imposition of jail fees.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed identically under both
federal and North Carolina law. State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562–63, 324 S.E.2d
241, 248 (1985). Defendant must demonstrate that (1) Defendant’s trial counsel’s
performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced Defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316,
626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (2006). In North Carolina, there is “a presumption that trial
counsel’s representation is . . . acceptable professional conduct.” State v. Roache, 358
N.C. 243, 280, 595 S.E.2d 381, 406 (2004) (citation omitted).
Trial counsel’s performance is deficient when counsel no longer qualifies as
“counsel” guaranteed by the United States Constitution because of counsel’s blatant
errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim demonstrates counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonable
-3- STATE V. SHAW
professional norms. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Allen, 360 N.C. at
316, 626 S.E.2d at 286.
To show trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced a defendant’s defense,
the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
case would have been different but for counsel’s mistakes. Allen, 360 N.C. at 316,
626 S.E.2d at 286. The probability must be substantial and sufficient to undermine
the original proceeding’s result. Id.; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).
When no additional investigation is required on the cold record, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is decided on the merits. State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166,
557 S.E.2d 500, 524 (2001). If the Court determines the claim is brought prematurely,
it will dismiss it without prejudice, allowing the defendant to pursue appropriate
relief. State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77, 122–23, 604 S.E.2d 850, 881 (2004).
When a defendant’s arguments “‘concern potential questions of trial strategy
and counsel’s impressions, an evidentiary hearing available through a motion for
appropriate relief is the procedure to conclusively determine these issues.’” State v.
Allen, 262 N.C. App. 284, 286, 821 S.E.2d 860, 861 (2018) (citation omitted). This
Court cannot know “‘whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel
had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel’s alternatives were
even worse.’” State v. Jones, 176 N.C. App. 678, 688, 627 S.E.2d 265, 271 (2006)
(citation omitted). If a record fails to provide sufficient information to indicate
whether a trial counsel’s decision was the result of trial strategy, the Court of Appeals
-4- STATE V. SHAW
should refrain from direct review. State v. Berry, 235 N.C. App. 496, 505, 761 S.E.2d
700, 706 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 368 N.C. 90, 773 S.E.2d 54 (2015). When a
defendant alleges an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsel’s failure to
move to suppress evidence, it is nearly impossible to make a meaningful prejudicial
review because this Court “would have to hold, at least implicitly, that there was no
legitimate possibility that additional relevant evidence would have been elicited had
a suppression hearing been conducted.” State v. Rivera, 264 N.C. App. 525, 536, 826
S.E.2d 511, 519 (2019). This Court can only infer as to additional evidence that may
have been elicited at a suppression hearing. Id. at 539, 826 S.E.2d at 521.
Additionally, when Defendant makes a constitutional challenge, such as a Fourth
Amendment violation, a direct review by this Court is not appropriate where the issue
has not been litigated at a suppression hearing. Id. at 537, 826 S.E.2d at 519–20.
Here, the record is not yet “cold.” Both bases for Defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are rooted in questions of trial strategy.
Defendant allegedly received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to move to suppress evidence of blood test results. However, this Court
cannot predict what may have occurred had there been a suppression hearing
concerning the alleged Fourth Amendment violation of Defendant’s blood
withdrawal. Consequently, it would be unfeasible for this Court to make a
meaningful review of prejudice. Furthermore, as the motion to suppress turns on a
Fourth Amendment violation, this Court should refrain from direct review of the
-5- STATE V. SHAW
issue because it has not been litigated. Therefore, we hold Defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is premature and dismiss it without prejudice so
Defendant may pursue the claim upon a motion for appropriate relief.
Defendant alternatively argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his trial counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of his blood test results
for adequate foundation. The record does not indicate whether trial counsel’s decision
to refrain from challenging the blood test results’ admissibility was a result of trial
strategy. Thus, we are unable to assess this question. More information is necessary
to properly assess Defendant’s alternative argument. Accordingly, we dismiss
Defendant’s additional ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice.
B. Imposition of Jail Fees
Defendant asserts the $3,600 jail fee was a clerical error because Defendant’s
sentence was not an active sentence.
This Court handles issues involving alleged incorrect jail fees on direct appeal.
State v. Rowe, 231 N.C. App. 462, 471, 752 S.E.2d 223, 229 (2013). Individuals
“ordered to pay jail fees pursuant to a probationary sentence” are liable to pay the
per diem rate set by the North Carolina General Assembly. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-313
(2023). Jail fees are only awarded in conjunction with a probationary sentence when
there is some element of jail time involved, as well. Rowe, 231 N.C. App. at 472, 752
S.E.2d at 230. The rate may not exceed $40 per day per prisoner. S.L. 2017-57 §
16C.2.
-6- STATE V. SHAW
Here, the trial court judge sentenced Defendant to a term of twelve months in
the Misdemeanant Confinement Program, but also suspended the sentence, placed
Defendant on supervised probation for thirty months, and ordered Defendant to serve
an active term of ninety days and to pay jail fees. Thus, Defendant had a
probationary sentence with an element of active jail time. Therefore, jails fees may
be awarded here. The jail fee of $3,600 divided by ninety days equals $40 per day,
which satisfies the rate constraint established by the General Assembly. We hold
that this was not a clerical error.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, both Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
dismissed without prejudice. We also hold that there was no error as to the
imposition of jail fees imposed on Defendant.
NO ERROR IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
Judges HAMPSON and WOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
-7-