[Cite as State v. Sexton, 2025-Ohio-718.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240274 TRIAL NO. B-2202985 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : OPINION JOHNATHAN SEXTON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 5, 2025
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Ravert J. Clark, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Johnathan Sexton appeals his convictions on two
counts of felonious assault following a jury trial. Sexton argues that the weight of the
evidence presented at trial established that he acted in self-defense when he wielded a
landscaping machete against his neighbor. Sexton alternatively avers that the trial
court erred in failing to merge the two counts for purposes of sentencing as allied
offenses of similar import. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand the cause to the trial court.
Factual History
{¶2} The incident underlying the charges occurred in Colerain Township in
the late afternoon hours of June 22, 2022. Sexton and his girlfriend had moved into a
house on Poole Road about two to three months prior. The couple lived two doors
down from their neighbor. Sexton and the neighbor did not know one another and
had never met prior to the incident.
{¶3} The neighbor had recently rescued a white, six-month-old pit bull
named Hank. When the dog escaped from the neighbor’s backyard around 5:00 p.m.
on the day in question, the neighbor gave chase. Surveillance video from two nearby
properties showed the neighbor pursuing the dog, albeit slowly. The neighbor
explained at trial that his left-side mobility had been somewhat hampered by a stroke
he suffered nearly two years earlier.
{¶4} What happened next was the subject of dispute at trial.
A. The Neighbor’s Version of Events
{¶5} After finally getting ahold of Hank, the neighbor held the dog by the
collar and crossed through Sexton’s front yard on his way back home. Sexton came
out of the house and asked what the neighbor was doing on the property. The neighbor
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explained that he was retrieving his dog. At that point, Hank got “spooked” by Sexton
and ran off again, jumping into the open driver’s side door of Sexton’s Ford F-150 in
the driveway.
{¶6} The neighbor verbally attempted to coax Hank out of the truck.
According to the neighbor, Sexton came up behind him and reached into the truck,
grabbing Hank by the collar. Sexton ended up pulling the collar off while
unsuccessfully trying to remove the dog. One of the photographic exhibits at trial
depicted a dog collar on the ground immediately beneath the open driver’s side door
of the truck.
{¶7} The neighbor testified that Sexton made a comment about retrieving his
gun and shooting the dog. The neighbor told him to go ahead. According to the
neighbor, Sexton retorted, “[M]aybe I will get something for you,” and the neighbor
replied, “[D]o what you got to do.” Sexton went into his house while the neighbor
continued trying to coax the dog out of the truck.
{¶8} The neighbor maintained he was standing in the driveway when Sexton
approached from behind and said he “had something for” the neighbor. According to
the neighbor, Sexton struck him on the back of the neck twice with a heavy item and
once on the arm near his right wrist. That item turned out to be a landscaping
machete. The neighbor fell to the ground. He was bloodied but remained conscious.
{¶9} The police arrived a short time later. The neighbor was transported by
ambulance to a hospital for medical attention. He suffered deep gashes on his neck
and arm, a fractured spine, and a broken wrist. Treatment included 64 stitches to the
back of his neck and two surgeries on his arm.
B. Sexton’s Version of Events
{¶10} Sexton offered a very different narrative. Earlier on the day in question,
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he and his girlfriend did some landscaping work for a different person in the
neighborhood. They arrived home around 4:00 p.m. in the midst of a heavy
downpour. Sexton parked his truck in the driveway and left his phone and wallet on
top of the closed center console to keep them from getting wet. He maintained that he
closed the driver’s side door of the truck before sprinting for the house.
{¶11} Sexton showered, dressed, and laid down on the couch for about an hour
while the thunderstorm continued. When the rain began to subside, he decided to go
to his father’s house to print off some tickets. According to Sexton, he walked out the
front door and noticed the dome light inside the truck was illuminated and the driver’s
side door was open. That was when he saw a man he did not know (the neighbor)
standing in the open doorway of the truck. Sexton maintained there was no dog in
sight.
{¶12} Sexton confronted the neighbor and demanded to know what he was
doing. The neighbor replied something like “what are you going to do about it?”
Sexton could see that the lid to the center console was standing open. He remembered
he had left it closed with his wallet and cell phone on top. Photographs admitted at
trial showed Sexton’s wallet laying on the driver’s seat and his cell phone laying on the
rocker board in the open driver’s side doorway.
{¶13} According to Sexton, the neighbor reached into the truck and picked up
a pouch Sexton stored in the center console. The pouch held a flashlight and pliers
and bore a pocketknife clipped to the outside. Sexton testified he believed the
neighbor was about to get physical and he feared being cut or stabbed. In response,
Sexton retrieved a machete sitting atop a nearby box and walked back over to the truck.
He told the neighbor to leave, but the neighbor refused. According to Sexton, the
neighbor said something like “go ahead and try.” The neighbor held the pouch in his
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right hand and made to remove the knife with his left hand as he stepped forward.
{¶14} Sexton testified that he told the neighbor to stop and, when the neighbor
refused, he struck the man with the machete. The blow landed near the neighbor’s
right wrist, disarming him of the pouch. The neighbor then lunged at or fell toward
Sexton. Sexton stumbled backward and began losing his footing in the wet grass. He
struck the neighbor a second time on the back to halt the man’s progress. Sexton
maintained he was still in fear for his life and totally unaware of the neighbor’s left-
side weakness from the stroke for the duration of their encounter.
{¶15} The neighbor fell to the ground. Sexton testified that the dog
approached for the first time after the confrontation was over and bit or scratched him
on the arm. He shoved the dog away. Sexton then picked up the pouch to which the
closed pocketknife remained clipped and tossed it toward the truck cab. His purpose
in doing so was to remove the weapon from the neighbor’s reach. Sexton then ran
inside and told his girlfriend to call 9-1-1. He went back outside to keep an eye on the
neighbor until the police arrived. Sexton cooperated with the police both on scene and
at the police station.
Procedural History
{¶16} Sexton was indicted on two counts of felonious assault in violation of
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2), both felonies of the second degree. The jury rendered
guilty verdicts on both counts. Sexton was sentenced to an indefinite prison term of
three to four and a half years on the first count and a concurrent three-year term on
the second count. He now appeals.
Analysis
{¶17} Sexton raises two assignments of error on appeal. The first assignment
contests the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions. The second assignment
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challenges the trial court’s failure to merge the two felonious assault offenses for
purposes of sentencing.
A. Self-Defense
{¶18} Sexton maintains the manifest weight of the evidence established that
he acted in self-defense, thereby negating his criminal liability for felonious assault.
{¶19} The offense of felonious assault is proscribed by R.C. 2903.11. The
statute provides in pertinent part that no person shall knowingly cause serious
physical harm to another or cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly
weapon. R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2). At trial, Sexton admitted that he knowingly
inflicted serious physical harm upon the neighbor by use of a deadly weapon, i.e., a
machete. He does not dispute as much on appeal. Rather, Sexton maintains that the
manifest weight of the evidence supports that he acted in self-defense.
1. Standard of Review
{¶20} For self-defense claims, reviewing courts conduct a manifest weight
analysis to determine whether the State met its burden of persuasion. State v.
Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. Distinct from sufficiency review, a manifest weight
inquiry requires us to assess whether the trier of fact created a manifest miscarriage
of justice in resolving conflicts in the evidence. State v. Yeban, 2024-Ohio-2545, ¶ 57
(1st Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387 (1997).
{¶21} We afford substantial deference to the credibility determinations of the
trier of fact because the trier directly observes the witnesses during the proceedings.
See State v. Glover, 2019-Ohio-5211, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.), quoting Barberton v. Jenney,
2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20. Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is warranted
“only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
2. The Law on Self-Defense in a Deadly Force Case
{¶22} The elements of a self-defense claim in a deadly force case are (1) the
defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) the
defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm and his only means of escape was in the use of similar force, and (3) the
defendant did not violate any duty to retreat. Messenger at ¶ 14, quoting State v.
Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24 (2002).
{¶23} Under Ohio’s current burden-shifting scheme, the defendant must first
produce evidence that tends to support that he acted in self-defense. R.C.
2901.05(B)(1). Once the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to
the State to disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.; see State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4976, ¶ 49 (1st Dist.). The trial court
provided the jury with a self-defense instruction, meaning the court concluded that
Sexton presented adequate evidence to carry his initial burden of production. See
State v. Mitchell, 2023-Ohio-2604, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), citing Messenger, 2022-Ohio-
4562, at ¶ 26. We therefore scrutinize whether the weight of the evidence supports
that the State met its reciprocal burden to disprove at least one of the elements beyond
a reasonable doubt.
3. Analysis of the Elements of Sexton’s Self-Defense Claim
{¶24} For ease of analysis, the elements will be addressed slightly out of order.
a. Duty to retreat
{¶25} To reiterate, the third prong of a successful self-defense claim involving
deadly force mandates that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or
otherwise avoid the danger. See Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 14. Ohio’s recent
“stand your ground” law dispenses with this requirement where the defendant was in
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a place he lawfully had a right to be. See Mitchell at ¶ 17, citing R.C. 2901.09(B).
Because Sexton lawfully had a right to be on his own property, he had no duty to retreat
under Ohio law.
b. Not at fault
{¶26} The first prong of any successful self-defense claim requires that the
defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the disturbance. See
Messenger at ¶ 14. “The ‘not at fault’ requirement [ ] means that the defendant must
not have been the first aggressor in the incident.” State v. Turner, 2007-Ohio-1346,
¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74 (1979).
{¶27} The jury was presented with radically different versions of how the
altercation in this case unfolded. Sexton portrayed the neighbor as the initial
aggressor and vice versa. The jury was tasked with assessing the credibility of their
respective narratives. See State v. Olsen, 2023-Ohio-2254, ¶ 57 (11th Dist.) (observing,
“[a] self-defense claim is generally an issue of credibility”). The guilty verdicts suggest
that the jury afforded greater weight to the neighbor’s version portraying Sexton as the
initial aggressor. On the record before us, we cannot say the jury went astray in its
assessment.
{¶28} The record contains objective evidence corroborating the neighbor’s
portrayal of the events leading up to the confrontation. The neighbor testified that he
ended up traversing Sexton’s yard on the day in question after his dog escaped his own
unfenced backyard a few doors down. An outdoor video camera at a private residence
in the neighborhood recorded the neighbor walking between two houses while
gesturing towards the dog with his right arm. The dog, which was wearing a collar at
the time, continued to run from him. Consistent with his self-described left-side
weakness from the stroke, the neighbor walked rather than ran after the dog and held
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his left arm slightly crooked at his side.
{¶29} Footage from another outdoor camera at a nearby landscaping business
depicted the intersection of Poole Road and Cheviot Road. The neighbor could be seen
attempting to corral the dog while a third party approached and tried to help. All the
while the dog continued to run around, in and out of the camera frame. Both videos
supported that Hank had gotten loose and was running about while the neighbor
crossed through multiple yards trying to catch the dog. This was further supported by
testimony from a State’s witness who said she observed a man on the day in question
walking outside towards Cheviot Road with an unleashed dog.
{¶30} At trial, the neighbor testified that Hank jumped into the open truck
door as they crossed through Sexton’s yard. He maintained the dog was climbing
around inside the truck while he verbally tried to coax the dog out. Photographs
depicting muddy paw prints on the seats and floormats and showing the wallet and
cell phone lying askew coincided with Hank having run amok inside the vehicle.
{¶31} According to the neighbor, Sexton reached into the truck, grabbed Hank
by the collar, and ended up pulling the collar off the dog. Sexton, on the other hand,
denied leaving the truck door open, pulling the collar off the dog, or even seeing the
dog until after the confrontation with the neighbor was over. Again, the evidence
weighs in favor of the neighbor’s version of events. Photographs admitted at trial
depicted white hairs on the front seat in addition to the muddy paw prints on the seats
and floormats throughout. While the dog could have jumped into the truck after the
scuffle was over, the jury believed the neighbor. The record supports this assessment.
{¶32} Sexton maintained Hank made his first appearance only after Sexton
and the neighbor physically clashed. Sexton expressly testified on direct examination
that there was no dog in sight when he first saw the neighbor ostensibly rummaging
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through the truck. But Sexton made an important statement in his testimony just a
moment later:
Q. Now, when you first confront him, do you even see
a dog at that point in time?
A. No.
Q. So when he tells you, you know, what are you
going to do about it, something to that effect, then
what happens?
A. I said, man, you are going to get out of my truck, you
know, get him out of here. And he wouldn’t do that.
(Emphasis added.) Read in context, the italicized “him” appears to refer to the dog.
This lends strong credence to the neighbor’s version of events. The fact that the collar
was found lying directly beneath the driver’s side door of the truck further
corroborated that the dog was in the truck and the collar came off when Sexton
forcefully attempted to remove the wayward animal.
{¶33} While a pocketknife undoubtedly qualifies as a deadly weapon, the state
of the pocketknife at the scene further suggests the neighbor was not the initial
aggressor. Detective Chris Cullman of the Colerain Township Police Department
explained that the pocketknife contained a mechanism which locked the blade into
place once deployed. And Officer Mike Stockmeier confirmed that the pouch to which
the knife was clipped was found lying on the ground outside the truck. The knife was
still firmly clipped to the pouch, not dangling, and the blade remained collapsed.
These facts tend to contradict Sexton’s insistence that the neighbor tried to use the
knife against him.
{¶34} Sexton’s appellate brief highlights several weaknesses in the State’s case
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in an attempt to discredit the neighbor’s narrative. For one, Sexton testified that he
closed the driver’s side door to the truck when he ran inside the house during the
downpour. He also stated that he left his phone and wallet on top of the closed center
console to keep them from getting wet. He further maintained that the pouch
containing the knife was secured inside the closed center console. Admittedly, it is not
entirely believable that Sexton left the door to his truck standing open during a
thunderstorm. Nor is it likely that he left the console lid standing open. However,
these purported inconsistencies do not warrant the reversal of Sexton’s convictions.
{¶35} To be sure, “[w]hen evidence is amenable to more than one
construction, a reviewing court must give it the interpretation that is consistent with
the judgment.” State v. Jordan, 2022-Ohio-2566, ¶ 58 (1st Dist.), quoting In re J.C.,
2019-Ohio-4027, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.). The State offered an interpretation of the evidence
during closing arguments that indeed accords with the jury’s verdict. The assistant
prosecutor challenged the notion that Sexton left his wallet and cell phone unattended
and in plain view inside the truck for an hour simply because it was raining outside.
The prosecutor offered that Sexton went outside after the rainstorm, put the items in
the truck as he made to leave, forgot something, left the truck door open as he ran back
inside, and then came back out and encountered the neighbor and Hank.
{¶36} While closing arguments are not evidence, attorneys use them to
summarize the evidence and invite the trier of fact to draw certain conclusions
therefrom. See State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 338 (1995) (noting that opening
statements and closing arguments are not evidence); John F. Bushelman Constr. v.
Glacid Group, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2624, *9 (1st Dist. June 26, 1996) (referencing
the function of closing arguments). The jury was tasked with assessing the credibility
of the witnesses and was free to accept or reject any portion of the evidence and
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respective narratives offered by the parties. State v. Gasper, 2023-Ohio-1500, ¶ 75
(1st Dist.), citing State v. Fether, 2012-Ohio-892, ¶ 44 (5th Dist.). That, they did.
{¶37} On this record, we are not persuaded by Sexton’s contention that the
weight of the evidence supports that the neighbor was the initial aggressor. Even if we
were to find otherwise, we would not be inclined to reverse Sexton’s convictions. The
State need only disprove one element of a defendant’s self-defense claim in order to
defeat it. State v. Griffin, 2024-Ohio-4806, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.), citing Messenger, 2022-
Ohio-4562, at ¶ 50. And, as discussed next, Sexton’s self-defense claim unequivocally
fails on the bona fide belief prong.
c. Bona fide belief of death or serious harm
{¶38} The second element of a meritorious self-defense claim involving deadly
force requires that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm and his only means of escape was in the use of
corresponding force. See Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 14. This element entails
both objective and subjective considerations. State v. McDonald, 2023-Ohio-1987, ¶
21 (1st Dist.). As this court explained:
A defendant’s belief that [ ]he was in immediate danger
of death or great bodily harm must be objectively
reasonable, and the defendant must have an honest belief
that [ ]he sat in such danger. “[I]f the objective standard
is met, the jury must determine if, subjectively, this
particular defendant had an honest belief that [ ]he was
in imminent danger.” The state may disprove self-defense
by demonstrating that the defendant’s belief was not
objectively reasonable or that [ ]he did not have an honest
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
subjective belief that [ ]he faced imminent death or great
bodily harm.
Id., quoting State v. Wilson, 2022-Ohio-3801, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).
{¶39} Of note, “when lethal force is used in self-defense, the perceived threat
to the accused must be of death or great bodily harm.” Mitchell, 2023-Ohio-2604, at
¶ 25 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Sims, 2005-Ohio-5846, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Put another
way, the use of deadly force in self-defense must be reasonably proportionate to the
perceived threat—self-defense “is not available unless the defendant shows that the
force used to repel the danger was not more than the situation reasonably demanded.”
State v. Terry, 2023-Ohio-2074, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Johnson, 2009-Ohio-
3500, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). When the degree of force employed was so disproportionate
that it evinced an “unreasonable purpose to injure,” the defendant may not avail
himself of the affirmative defense of self-defense. Terry at ¶ 15, quoting State v.
Waller, 2016-Ohio-3077, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.).
{¶40} We turn first to the objective inquiry. Sexton and the neighbor were
strangers to one another. According to Sexton, he walked out of his house and was
confronted by a man rooting through his truck. He maintained that the neighbor
taunted him and refused to leave. He insisted he struck the neighbor with the machete
only after the neighbor picked up the pouch containing the pocketknife and advanced
on him. Sexton maintained he feared the neighbor would cut or stab him, causing
serious physical injury or death. He further insisted he delivered a second blow when
the neighbor fell into him because he was still in fear for his life at the time. Sexton
testified he felt shocked and stunned by the neighbor’s actions.
{¶41} The jury did not find Sexton’s narrative painting the neighbor as
threatening to be credible. See State v. Lawrence, 2023-Ohio-3419, ¶ 41 (11th Dist.),
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
quoting State v. Olsen, 2023-Ohio-2254, ¶ 57 (11th Dist.), and State v. Bentley, 2023-
Ohio-1792, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.) (emphasizing, “[a] self-defense claim is generally an issue
of credibility[, and] [d]isputes in credibility for the purposes of evaluating self-defense
are best resolved by the trier of fact”). The record supports that a reasonable
individual in Sexton’s position—an individual who comes out of his house and must
endure a stranger trying to get his dog out of the individual’s truck—would not have
been in fear for his life. The same conclusion follows even if the neighbor verbally
challenged Sexton or refused to leave Sexton’s property without his dog. This
conclusion is all the more supported by the neighbor’s physical limitations—he
suffered a stroke a few years prior to this incident that weakened his left side—and the
fact that the neighbor was older, smaller in stature, and noticeably more frail than
Sexton.
{¶42} Nor was the amount of force employed by Sexton justified. Sexton
testified that he stood 6’4” and weighed between 230 and 240 pounds at the time of
the incident. He estimated the neighbor stood 5’10” and weighed about 160 pounds.
Even if the neighbor did reach for the pouch containing the four-inch pocketknife,
Sexton’s use of the machete was disproportionate to any apparent danger. In his
testimony, Detective Stockmeier emphasized the discrepancy between the implements
involved or alleged to be involved. One has to be much closer in range to inflict harm
with a pocketknife versus a machete. Moreover, as stated, the pocketknife was still
clipped to the pouch and had not been opened. Accordingly, other than Sexton’s
allegation, there was no evidence supporting that the neighbor wielded the pocketknife
at all during the confrontation. Given these circumstances, the weight of the evidence
presented at trial reflects that Sexton did not have a bona fide belief that he faced death
or great bodily harm necessitating the use of lethal force in response.
14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶43} In sum, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences and
considering the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that the jury did not clearly
lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice in rejecting Sexton’s self-
defense claim and finding him guilty of felonious assault. Accordingly, we overrule
Sexton’s first assignment of error.
B. Allied Offenses of Similar Import
{¶44} In his second assignment of error, Sexton argues that the trial court
wrongly imposed sentences on both felonious assault counts rather than merging
them as allied offenses of similar import. The State concedes the error.
{¶45} Double jeopardy protections in both the United States and Ohio
Constitutions preclude multiple prosecutions or punishments for the same offense.
State v. Pendleton, 2020-Ohio-6833, ¶ 8. See Ohio Const., art. I, § 10; U.S. Const.,
amend. V; see also R.C. 2941.25. Pursuant to State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, a
defendant charged with multiple offenses may be convicted of all of them if any one of
the following is true (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import or
significance, (2) the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the offenses were
committed with separate animus or motivation. Id. at ¶ 31. Convictions do not merge
and separate sentences may be imposed where any of these three inquiries is answered
in the affirmative. Id.
{¶46} Sexton’s two counts of felonious assault were not dissimilar in import
or significance, were not committed separately, and did not contemplate separate
animi or motivations. Accordingly, as the State concedes, the offenses were subject to
merger, and Sexton could only be sentenced on one of the two counts. While the trial
court acknowledged the necessity of a single prison term, the court erred as a matter
of law by imposing two concurrent terms in place of merger. See State v. Williams,
15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
2016-Ohio-7658, ¶ 3 (ruling, “the imposition of concurrent sentences is not the
equivalent of merging allied offenses”); see also State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶
31 (noting in this context that, “even when the sentences are to be served concurrently,
a defendant is prejudiced by having more convictions than are authorized by law”).
{¶47} Accordingly, we sustain Sexton’s second assignment of error and
remand the matter for resentencing on one of the two counts. See Williams at ¶ 30.
The guilty findings on both counts of felonious assault remain intact. See State v.
Wilson, 2011-Ohio-2669, ¶ 15. On remand, the State should elect which count to
pursue upon resentencing. Williams at ¶ 30.
Conclusion
{¶48} Because the record contains credible evidence to support that Sexton
did not act in self-defense, we overrule his first assignment of error. Because the trial
court erred as a matter of law in imposing concurrent prison terms rather than
merging the two allied offenses, we sustain Sexton’s second assignment of error,
reverse the sentences, and remand the cause for resentencing.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
ZAYAS and BOCK, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.