State v. Seitz

384 S.W.3d 384, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 1357, 2012 WL 5235615
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 24, 2012
DocketNo. SD 31639
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 384 S.W.3d 384 (State v. Seitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Seitz, 384 S.W.3d 384, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 1357, 2012 WL 5235615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Michael L. Seitz (“Appellant”) was charged with, and found guilty in a trial to the court of, the class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated on January 21, 2010, in violation of section 577.010.1 In his sole point on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that Appellant was intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject Appellant’s challenge and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

At about 7:30 p.m., on January 21, 2010, Deputy Andrew Long with the Greene [386]*386County Sheriffs Office observed a black, GMC Denali, which was speeding, cross a center line on Farm Road 163 in Greene County. Deputy Long activated his siren and lights, stopped the vehicle, and asked Appellant, the driver and only individual in the vehicle, for his license and insurance. Appellant did not stop promptly after Deputy Long activated his siren and lights, but rather turned left off Farm Road 163 and continued driving for a short distance before finally coming to a stop. Appellant provided Deputy Long with his license, but had difficulty removing the license from his wallet; the deputy asked Appellant “if he had anything to drink that evening,” and Appellant replied “he wasn’t going to lie, that he had.”

Deputy Long returned to his patrol car, and requested that another officer come to his location. When he returned to Appellant’s vehicle, he stood “right up against” the driver’s door and smelled a “strong odor” of alcohol on Appellant’s breath. Appellant’s speech was “slurred” and his eyes were “watery” and “dilated.” Based on these observations, Deputy Long “believed [Appellant] was intoxicated.”

Deputy Long asked Appellant to step out of his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests. He administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test in front of Appellant’s vehicle with Appellant facing away from the lights on the patrol car and on Appellant’s vehicle. Deputy Long observed lack of smooth pursuit, sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation, and onset of “nystag-mus prior to a 45-degree angle” in both of Appellant’s eyes, for a score of six out of six on the test. Deputy Long then asked Appellant to move to a nearby sidewalk to complete a “walk and turn” test. In the course of preparing to take the walk and turn test, Appellant was “swaying and staggering” to the point Appellant “nearly fell over.” Appellant ultimately declined to complete the walk and turn test or take other field sobriety tests. Deputy Long then placed Appellant under arrest because he “believed [Appellant] was intoxicated.”

Appellant produced contrary evidence; his witnesses included an expert on intoxication levels and two witnesses from the night of the arrest. Appellant’s expert estimated Appellant’s blood alcohol content at the time he was stopped “to be between 0.053 to 0.063 percent ... within a reasonable degree of scientific certain[t]y.” The estimate was based on information provided by defense counsel that Appellant had three beers and two shots in the roughly two and a half hours before Appellant was stopped, and “[h]ad not eaten much.” The expert viewed the DVD of the stop, but the expert’s copy of the DVD did not include audio.

The bartender who waited on Appellant the night of the offense testified that Appellant had two shots and three beers over a three and a half to four hour period and also purchased two beers for Appellant’s female, business acquaintance. The business acquaintance testified that she had three beers that evening, and Appellant paid for two of the beers.

Following the trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated in a docket entry on September 12, 2011. The docket entry stated:

Judgment: Court reviews trial notes and video. Court as fact-finder assesses the credibility, degree of responsiveness, relationship, interest and consistency of the witnesses. Court notes the evidence of [Appellant’s] crossing the center line; delay in pulling over; admission of alcohol consumption; his manner of speech, behavior and refusals at the scene; and the other indications of impairment mentioned by the officer. Court also notes that [Appellant’s] evidence included his [387]*387admitted consumption of several alcoholic beverages of different types over as much as a four hour period. Court also notes [Appellant’s] expert did not review the entire police report nor the compelling audio portion of the video. The expert’s testimony was also wholly dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of [Appellant’s] report of his alcohol consumption provided long after the date of the incident. Court thus finds [Appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to count I.

Our Supreme Court has described our standard of review as follows:

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court limits its determination to whether a reasonable juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005). In so doing, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict. Id. As such, this Court will not weigh the evidence anew since “the fact-finder may believe all, some, or none of the testimony of a witness when considered with the facts, circumstances and other testimony in the case.” State v. Crawford, 68 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Mo. banc 2002).

State v. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Mo. banc 2008).

Section 577.010.1 provides “[a] person commits the crime of ‘driving while intoxicated’ if he operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated ... condition.” Section 577.001.3, RSMo Cum.Supp.2005, provides “a person is in an ‘intoxicated condition’ when he is under the influence of alcohol[.]” A person is under the influence of alcohol when “his use of alcohol impairs his ability to operate an automobile.” State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Mo. banc 2011).

The State is not required to establish an actual measure of a defendant’s blood alcohol content to prove the defendant was driving while intoxicated. State v. Adams, 163 S.W.3d 35, 37 (Mo.App. S.D.2005). “It is the fact, not the degree, of intoxication that is the significant issue to consider.” State v. Edwards, 280 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Mo.App. E.D.2009). And, in the absence of a chemical analysis showing a defendant’s blood alcohol content, the State may meet its burden of proof solely through the testimony of a witness who had a reasonable opportunity to observe the defendant. State v. Rose, 86 S.W.3d 90, 105 (Mo.App. W.D.2002); Edwards, 280 S.W.3d at 189 (“Intoxication may be proven by any witness who had a reasonable opportunity to observe Defendant’s physical condition.”).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
384 S.W.3d 384, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 1357, 2012 WL 5235615, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-seitz-moctapp-2012.