State v. School Employees Retirement System, 07ap-486 (6-10-2008)

2008 Ohio 2798
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 10, 2008
DocketNo. 07AP-486.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2008 Ohio 2798 (State v. School Employees Retirement System, 07ap-486 (6-10-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. School Employees Retirement System, 07ap-486 (6-10-2008), 2008 Ohio 2798 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Barbara Marchiano, commenced this original action in mandamus seeking an order compelling respondent, School Employees Retirement System ("SERS"), to vacate its decision denying her disability retirement and to enter an order compelling SERS to grant her request for disability retirement.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ. R. 53 and Loc. R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) Relying upon State ex rel. Woods v. Oak Hill CommunityMed. Ctr. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 459, and State ex *Page 2 rel. Lecklider v. School Emp. Retirement Sys., 104 Ohio St.3d 271,2004-Ohio-6586 at ¶ 23, the magistrate noted that there is nothing in either the governing statutes or rules that require SERS or the members of the Medical Advisory Committee ("MAC") to state the basis for its denial of disability retirement. The magistrate also rejected relator's challenges to Dr. Hawkins' report. The magistrate found that Dr. Hawkins' report constituted some evidence upon which SERS could rely in denying relator disability retirement. Therefore, the magistrate has recommended that we deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus.

{¶ 3} Relator has filed eight separate objections to the magistrate's decision. In her first objection, relator contends that the magistrate erred in denying her discovery. We disagree.

{¶ 4} Relator is not entitled to discovery because the sole issue for determination in this mandamus action is whether SERS abused its discretion when it denied relator's disability application. State exrel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130,133 (determination of whether applicant is entitled to disability retirement is subject to mandamus review, which may be utilized to correct an abuse of discretion in the proceedings below). That determination is limited to the information contained in the record. Therefore, we overrule relator's first objection.

{¶ 5} In her second objection, relator contends that the magistrate erred by refusing to require SERS to explain the basis for its decision. Again, we disagree.

{¶ 6} The magistrate correctly relied upon our prior decision inState ex rel. Copeland v. SERS (Aug. 5, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1173, for the proposition that nothing in the governing statutes or rules require SERS or the members of the MAC to explain the basis for the denial of disability retirement. This proposition of law was *Page 3 expressly adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Pipolyv. STRS, 1995 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, at ¶ 20; see, also,State ex rel. Woods, supra; State ex rel. Lecklider, supra. Therefore, we overrule relator's second objection.

{¶ 7} In her third objection, relator asserts that the magistrate erred by concluding there is some evidence to support SERS' decision. Essentially, relator challenges the application of the "some evidence" standard to this mandamus action. Relator asserts that this court should review a SERS decision to determine whether the decision is "reasonable in light of the evidence." However, we cannot simply disregard the applicable standard articulated by the Supreme Court of Ohio inKinsey v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police Firemen's Disability PensionFund (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 224, 226. In Kinsey, the court held that mandamus relief must be denied when there is "some evidence" to support the retirement system's decision. When there is some evidence to support the decision, the retirement system has not abused its discretion.

{¶ 8} Here, the magistrate applied the correct standard and did not err in finding that Dr. Hawkins' report constituted some evidence supporting SERS' decision. Therefore, we overrule relator's third objection.

{¶ 9} In her fourth and fifth objections, relator contends that the magistrate erred by concluding that SERS considered all the evidence presented. We disagree.

{¶ 10} Other than the simple fact that relator disagrees with SERS' decision, relator points to nothing in the record that suggests that SERS failed to fully and fairly consider all the evidence in the record. As SERS points out, it reached its determination after receiving the report of the MAC, which is required to review all evidence and information submitted before making a recommendation. Ohio Admin. Code 3309-1-40(F). We note that after originally reviewing all the medical *Page 4 evidence, the MAC determined that additional medical evidence was necessary before it could submit its report. Relator's assertion that SERS failed to consider all the evidence is without merit. Therefore, we overrule relator's fourth and fifth objections.

{¶ 11} Relator contends in her sixth objection that the magistrate erred by concluding that relator waived her right to challenge Dr. Hawkins' independence by failing to raise this issue before the SERS board. Relator asserts that she challenged Dr. Hawkins' independence in a pre-hearing submission and in the hearing before the board. After reviewing the portions of the record relied upon by relator, we agree with the magistrate's finding that relator never argued that Dr. Hawkins was not an independent medical examiner due to a financial or other compromising relationship with SERS. Nor does the record support a challenge to Dr. Hawkins' independence on these grounds. Accordingly, we overrule relator's sixth objection.

{¶ 12} Relator contends in her seventh and eighth objections that the magistrate erred in concluding that Dr. Hawkins was competent to express an opinion on the necessity of pain medication for relator and that his opinion was unequivocal. We disagree.

{¶ 13} First, as SERS points out, Dr. Hawkins did not offer an opinion on the necessity of pain medication for relator. Rather, he opined that the medications were impeding any ability to accurately determine if there was an underlying disabling condition because the medications were causing relator's cognitive dysfunction and depressed mood. The record does not support relator's assertion that Dr. Hawkins was not competent to express this opinion. Essentially, relator wants this court to reweigh the medical evidence. That is not our role in mandamus. Therefore, we find relator's argument unpersuasive. *Page 5

{¶ 14} Second, Dr. Hawkins' opinion is not equivocal. He stated that the cognitive dysfunction relator was experiencing would likely prevent her from performing her duties as an instructional aide. He also opined that the cognitive dysfunction was caused by the medications she was taking. Lastly, he opined that if relator stopped taking the medications (which was relator's desire), the cognitive dysfunction would cease and relator could perform the duties of an instructional aide.

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Related

State ex rel. Moorhead v. Bd. of Ohio Hwy. Patrol Retirement Sys.
2014 Ohio 2499 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2014)
State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Employees Retirement System
902 N.E.2d 953 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2009)
Davis v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 08ap-214 (9-18-2008)
2008 Ohio 4719 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 2798, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-school-employees-retirement-system-07ap-486-6-10-2008-ohioctapp-2008.