State v. Schoepp

554 N.W.2d 236, 204 Wis. 2d 266, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1088
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 29, 1996
Docket95-2249
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 554 N.W.2d 236 (State v. Schoepp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Schoepp, 554 N.W.2d 236, 204 Wis. 2d 266, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1088 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

DYKMAN, P.J. 1

This is an interlocutory appeal heard pursuant to § 809.50, Stats. Douglas D. Schoepp appeals from an order granting the State's motion to quash subpoenas issued by Schoepp to depose officers involved in his arrest. Schoepp argues that the rules of discovery provided by Chapter 804, Stats., apply to refusal proceedings instituted under § 343.305(9), Stats. We agree and therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

On January 29,1995, Lieutenant William Housley of the Madison Police Department arrested Schoepp for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to a city ordinance conforming *269 with § 346.63(l)(a), STATS. Housley read Schoepp the "informing the accused" form 2 and requested that Schoepp submit to a chemical blood alcohol test. 3 Schoepp allegedly refused to submit to the test, and Housley issued a notice of intent to revoke Schoepp's operating privilege. 4 Pursuant to § 343.305(9), STATS., Schoepp filed a demand for a refusal hearing.

Prior to the refusal hearing, Schoepp issued subpoenas for the deposition of the arresting officer and other police officers who were involved in his arrest and the events leading up to his alleged refusal to submit to chemical testing. The State moved the circuit court for an order quashing the subpoenas. The circuit court concluded that a defendant is not entitled to discovery prior to a refusal hearing and quashed Schoepp's subpoenas. Schoepp appeals.

*270 DISCUSSION

Schoepp argues that under § 801.01(2), STATS., the rules of discovery in Chapter 804, STATS., apply to refusal hearings. Section 801.01(2) provides: "Chapters 801 to 847 govern procedure and practice in circuit courts of this state in all civil actions and special proceedings whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity or of statutory origin except where different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule."

In determining whether the discovery procedures of Chapter 804, STATS., apply to refusal hearings, § 801.01(2), Stats., directs us to make two inquiries. First, we must determine whether refusal hearings are "civil actions" or "special proceedings." Second, we must determine whether the statutes prescribe different discovery procedures for refusal hearings.

In State v. Jakubowski, 61 Wis. 2d 220, 224 n.2, 212 N.W.2d 155, 157 (1973), the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that "a proceeding under sec. 343.305 is a special proceeding and must be so defined." The State does not take issue with this holding. We conclude that a refusal hearing is a special proceeding for purposes of § 801.01(2), STATS.

The State does argue, however, that there is a different statutory discovery procedure for refusal hearings, and therefore Chapter 804, Stats., does not apply to them. This is an issue of statutory construction and interpretation, which we review de novo. See DOR v. Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club, 111 Wis. 2d 571, 577, 331 N.W.2d 383, 386 (1983). First, we examine the language of the statutes to determine whether the language is clear or ambiguous. State v. Dwyer, 181 Wis. 2d 826, 836, 512 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Ct. *271 App. 1994). If the language is clear, we must give effect to its plain meaning. Id.

Section 343.305(9)(a), STATS., provides that ”[t]he officer shall issue a copy of the notice of intent to revoke the privilege to the person." 5 The State argues that the notice of intent to revoke provides the defendant with much of the information relevant in a refusal hearing, and therefore it provides a discovery procedure different than the procedure set forth in Chapter 804, STATS. The notice of intent to revoke, however, is akin to the summons and complaint requirements of Chapters 801 and 802, Stats., not the discovery procedures provided for in Chapter 804. And the issues Schoepp raises in this case go beyond the information given to him by the notice of intent to revoke.

*272 In most civil actions in Wisconsin, a summons and complaint must be served on the defendant. See §§ 801.11 and 801.14, Stats. The purpose of the complaint is to give notice of the nature of the claim. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1979). Likewise, the notice of intent to revoke gives a defendant notice of the allegations pursuant to which the State intends to revoke the defendant's operating privilege. Chapter 804, STATS., on the other hand, provides for depositions, interrogatories and other forms of discovery.

The plain language of § 801.01(2), Stats., provides that Chapter 804, STATS., governs practice in circuit courts in all special proceedings "except where different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule." Section 343.305, STATS., does not provide a different means for a defendant in a refusal hearing to obtain depositions, interrogatories and other discovery, nor does it provide that discovery is not available prior to refusal hearings. 6 Because the statutes do not provide different discovery procedures for refusal hearings, we conclude that the discovery procedures of Chapter 804 apply.

The State argues that it would be inconsistent with the purpose behind drunk driving laws to allow discovery prior to refusal hearings. 7 The Wisconsin *273 Supreme Court, however, has stated that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we are to ascertain the legislature's intent by construing the plain language of the statute. We are then not to look to the statute's scope, history, context, subject matter or purpose. UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-82, 548 N.W.2d 57, 60 (1996). We agree that discovery adds some time to a case. But § 801.01(2), Stats., is clear. We would have to ignore the supreme court's holding in UFE were we to adopt the State's argument. It is a legislative function to say that because of one statute's purpose, we will add language which simply does not now exist to another statute. This is an error correcting court. State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 394 N.W.2d 732, 735 (1986). What the State asks us to do is hardly error correcting.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Bausch
2014 WI App 12 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2013)
Village of Elm Grove v. Richard K. Brefka
2013 WI 54 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2013)
State v. Krause
2006 WI App 43 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2006)
State v. Griese
688 N.W.2d 783 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2004)
State v. Gautschi
2000 WI App 274 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2000)
State Public Service Commission v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc.
566 N.W.2d 496 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
554 N.W.2d 236, 204 Wis. 2d 266, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1088, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-schoepp-wisctapp-1996.