State v. Schaffer

2025 Ohio 1494

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 28, 2025
• Docket: CA2024-06-041
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Schaffer, 2025-Ohio-1494.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2024-06-041

: OPINION - vs - 4/28/2025 :

JENNIFER SCHAFFER, :

Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 23CR41031

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Johnna M. Shia, for appellant.

PIPER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Jennifer Schaffer, appeals her conviction in the Warren County

Court of Common Pleas after a jury found her guilty of one count of illegal conveyance of

drugs into a detention facility, one count of illegal conveyance of communications devices

into a detention facility, two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs, one count of

trafficking in drugs, one count of trafficking in marijuana, and one count of possession of

criminal tools. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm Schaffer's conviction in part, Warren CA2024-06-041

reverse Schaffer's conviction in part, and remand this matter to the trial court for the

limited purpose of resentencing.

{¶ 2} On October 2, 2023, the Warren County Grand Jury returned a multi-count

indictment charging Shaffer with, among others, the six above-named offenses. The

charges arose after it was alleged Schaffer was involved in the conveyance of drugs and

cellphones into a detention facility located within Warren County, Ohio on August 31,

2022. Schaffer pled not guilty and was subsequently released on her own recognizance.

{¶ 3} On June 7, 2024, the state moved to amend the date of the offenses set

forth in the indictment from a date specific, August 31, 2022, to instead cover all 31 days

in August, from August 1, 2022 through August 31, 2022. Schaffer did not object to this

amendment. The trial court granted the state's motion on June 13, 2024.

{¶ 4} The state also requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the theory of

complicity at Shaffer's trial. Just as with the state's motion to amend, Shaffer did not object

to the trial court providing the jury with an instruction on complicity. The matter then

proceeded to a two-day jury trial.

{¶ 5} During trial, the jury heard testimony from a total of four witnesses offered

by the state. These four witnesses testified and provided evidence that implicated

Schaffer in the six above-named offenses. This included one witness specifically testifying

that, based on his investigation into the matter, he believed it was Shaffer who had

packaged the drugs and cellphones that were later discovered inside the Warren County

detention facility.

{¶ 6} Schaffer testified in her own defense claiming she had no knowledge that

the packages being conveyed into the Warren County detention facility contained not only

cellphones, but also drugs. Following deliberations, the jury returned verdicts finding

Schaffer guilty on all six offenses.

-2- Warren CA2024-06-041

{¶ 7} On June 26, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing where it

sentenced Schaffer to serve a total, aggregate sentence of five years in prison. This

included the imposition of consecutive sentences. The next day, June 27, 2024, Schaffer

filed a notice of appeal. Following briefing, on March 19, 2025, Schaffer's appeal was

submitted to this court for consideration. Schaffer's appeal now properly before this court

for decision, Schaffer has raised three assignments of error for review.

{¶ 8} Assignment of Error No. 1:

{¶ 9} SCHAFFER'S INDICTMENT WAS INSUFFICIENT AND VIOLATED HER

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

{¶ 10} In her first assignment of error, Schaffer argues the trial court erred by

amending the indictment to include a "30-day time span" and by instructing the jury on a

"theory of complicity." This is because, according to Schaffer, such an amendment,

combined with a complicity instruction, changed the "substance of the offenses" from her

being the "principal offender to convey illegal contraband" to her "merely taking some part

in committing the offenses within a 30-day time frame," thereby prejudicing her defense

at trial. We disagree.

{¶ 11} As noted above, Schaffer did not object to the trial court amending the

indictment to include a "30-day time span." Schaffer also did not object to the trial court

instructing the jury on a "theory of complicity." Schaffer, therefore, waived all but plain

error on appeal. State v. Stodgel, 2013-Ohio-1109, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). Pursuant to Crim.R.

52(B), "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they

were not brought to the attention of the court." "An error does not rise to the level of a

plain error unless, but for the error, the outcome would have been different." State v.

Tolliver, 2025-Ohio-132, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). "Notice of plain error is taken with the utmost

caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of

-3- Warren CA2024-06-041

justice." State v. Burson, 2025-499, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 12} Crim.R. 7(D) provides that a trial court may amend an indictment any time

before, during, or after a trial to correct "any defect, imperfection, or omission in form or

substance, or [to conform to] any variance with the evidence, provided no change is made

in the name or identity of the crime charged." "Determining whether the 'name' of a crime

is changed is a relatively simple proposition." Stodgel at ¶ 22. "Where the 'name' of the

crime remains the same, even after amendment, there is no violation of Crim.R. 7(D)

regarding that prohibition." State v. Craft, 2009-Ohio-675, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.). "On the other

hand, an inquiry into whether the 'identity' of a crime has been changed requires a more

searching analysis." Stodgel, 2013-Ohio-1109. "If an amendment changes the penalty or

degree of the charged offense, it changes the identity of the offense and is not permitted

by Crim.R. 7(D)." State v. Bradley, 2017-Ohio-7121, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). "The rule ensures

that a defendant will not be 'surprised' by a new charge." Id.

{¶ 13} Here, as it relates to the "30-day time span" amendment, the amendment

added no new language to the indictment, nor did it add any additional elements that the

state was required to prove. The amendment merely changed the date on which the

offenses were alleged to have occurred. This does not constitute a change to the name

or identity of the crimes charged. See, e.g. State v. Collinsworth, 2004-Ohio-5902, ¶ 24

(12th Dist.) ("Because the dates and times of the offenses alleged in this case are not

essential elements of the crimes charged, the amendment to the indictment did not violate

the requirements of Crim.R. 7. We find then, as a matter of law, that changing the dates

of the offenses from 1997 to 1996 made no change to the name or identity of the crime

with which appellant was charged."); State v. Hibbard, 2003-Ohio-707, ¶ 46-49 (12th

Dist.) (amending an indictment to reflect that the offenses occurred on different dates than

what was originally alleged in the indictment was not violative of Crim.R. 7[D] because

-4- Warren CA2024-06-041

the amendment did not alter the name or identity of the crimes charged); see also State

v. Randazzo, 2002-Ohio-2250, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.) ("the indictment merely changed the date

of the offense. It, in no way, altered the name or identity of the crime charged . . . .").

{¶ 14} Furthermore, as it relates to the "theory of complicity" instruction the trial

court provided to the jury, no error occurred. We have rejected this exact argument before

and do so again in this case. See, e.g., State v. Tumbleson, 105 Ohio App.3d 693, 697

(12th Dist.1995) ("Crim.R. 7[D] allows the court to amend an indictment at any time

before, during or after trial as long as no change is made in the name or identity of the

crime charged. In this case, appellant was indicted for aggravated robbery as a principal

offender but the court advised the jury that he could be found guilty of complicity to commit

aggravated robbery. The name and identity of the crime charged, aggravated robbery,

did not change. Therefore, we find no violation of Crim.R. 7[D].").

{¶ 15} In so holding, we note that Schaffer failed to establish that she was

prejudiced or in any way misled by the amendment to the indictment. The same holds

true as it relates to the trial court's "theory of complicity" jury instruction. The original

indictment informed Schaffer of all the alleged facts and all the elements of the offenses

charged. Therefore, Schaffer received adequate notice of the charged offenses and had

the opportunity to defend herself against those charges at trial. Accordingly, the trial court

did not err, plain or otherwise, and Schaffer's first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 16} Assignment of Error No. 2:

{¶ 17} SCHAFFER'S CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE NOR THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶ 18} In her second assignment of error, Schaffer argues her conviction for one

count of illegal conveyance of drugs into a detention facility, two counts of aggravated

trafficking in drugs, one count of trafficking in drugs, and one count of trafficking in

-5- Warren CA2024-06-041

marijuana were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest

weight of the evidence.1 To support this claim, Shaffer argues that "[t]here was no

evidence that [she] knew about the drugs, delivered the drugs, packaged the drugs, nor

assisted anyone to convey the drugs." However, as a simple review of the record reveals,

Schaffer's argument is based solely on her own self-serving testimony elicited at trial. The

jury clearly found Schaffer's testimony lacked credibility, whereas the state's four

witnesses did not. This was not error "for it is well established that the jury, as the trier of

fact, was free to believe all, part, or none of each witnesses' testimony who appears

before it." State v. Cast, 2022-Ohio-3967, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 19} "We must defer to the jury's determinations of the witnesses' credibility."

State v. Reed, 2023-Ohio-878, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.). "This is why a conviction is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury chose to believe the

testimony and evidence presented by the state as opposed to what was presented by the

accused." State v. Nkoyi, 2024-Ohio-3144, ¶ 40 (12th Dist.). Rather, it is only in

extraordinary circumstances where the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor

of acquittal will this court overturn a conviction on manifest weight of the evidence

grounds. State v. Ridenour, 2023-Ohio-2713, ¶ 50 (12th Dist.). This is not one of those

extraordinary cases where the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of

acquittal. Therefore, because a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the

evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency, State v. Thompson, 2024-

Ohio-2112, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), Schaffer's second assignment of error also lacks merit and

is overruled.

{¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 3:

1. Schaffer does not challenge her conviction for single counts of illegal conveyance of communications devices into a detention facility or possession of criminal tools.

-6- Warren CA2024-06-041

{¶ 21} THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WAS CONTRARY

TO LAW AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

{¶ 22} In her third assignment of error, Schaffer argues the trial court erred by

imposing consecutive sentences in this case. Specifically, Schaffer argues the trial court's

imposition of consecutive sentences was error because the trial court failed to make the

necessary consecutive sentence findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at her

sentencing hearing. The state concedes, and we agree, that the trial court erred in this

regard.

{¶ 23} "When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required

findings as part of the sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the offender

and to defense counsel." State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. The imposition of

consecutive sentences in this case was therefore contrary to law and must be reversed

and remanded for resentencing. State v. Volz, 2022-Ohio-4134, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). This

holds true even though the trial court's sentencing entry contains the requisite findings for

"Ohio law is clear that the findings must be made at the sentencing hearing as well as in

the sentencing entry." State v. Ward, 2024-Ohio-2858, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). Accordingly,

finding merit to Schaffer's argument raised herein, Schaffer's third assignment of error is

sustained.

{¶ 24} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this case is remanded for

the limited purpose of resentencing.

BYRNE, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.

-7-