State v. Sbarbati

2024 Ohio 622
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 20, 2024
DocketCA2023-07-076
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2024 Ohio 622 (State v. Sbarbati) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Sbarbati, 2024 Ohio 622 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Sbarbati, 2024-Ohio-622.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2023-07-076

: OPINION - vs - 2/20/2024 :

LOUIS M. SBARBATI II, :

Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2022-08-1022

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Willa Concannon, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Repper-Pagan Law, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for appellant.

S. POWELL, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Louis M. Sbarbati II, appeals from his conviction in the Butler

County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to one count of second-degree

felony aggravated possession of drugs and one count of third-degree felony having Butler CA2023-07-076

weapons while under disability. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm Sbarbati's

conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On February 23, 2023, Sbarbati pled guilty to the two above-named felony

offenses, second-degree felony aggravated possession of drugs and third-degree felony

having weapons while under disability. Several months later, on June 23, 2023, the trial

court held a sentencing hearing where it sentenced Sbarbati to serve an indefinite prison

term of four to six years in prison on the aggravated possession of drugs offense, along

with a concurrent 36 months in prison for having weapons while under disability. The trial

court also imposed a mandatory postrelease control term of up to three years, but not

less than 18 months, for the aggravated possession of drugs offense, and an optional

postrelease control term of up to two years for having weapons while under disability.

This was in addition to the trial court ordering Sbarbati to pay a mandatory minimum fine

of $7,500 in accordance with R.C. 2929.18(B)(1).

Sbarbati's Appeal and Single Assignment of Error

{¶ 3} Sbarbati now appeals his conviction, raising one assignment of error for

review. Within his single assignment of error, Sbarbati has presented three issues for

this court's consideration. Within those three issues, Sbarbati challenges the trial court's

imposition of postrelease control, as well as the trial court's decision finding he had a

present or future ability to pay the mandatory minimum $7,500 fine. Sbarbati also alleges

that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We address each of these three

issues more fully below.

Sbarbati's First Issue Presented for Review

{¶ 4} Sbarbati initially argues the trial court erred by imposing a postrelease

control term for each of the two felony offenses that he had pled guilty, second-degree

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felony aggravated possession of drugs and third-degree felony having weapons while

under disability. To support this claim, Sbarbati cites R.C. 2967.28(G)(1), claiming that

statute "required the trial court to impose the one [postrelease control] term that expire[d]

last." However, based on its plain language, that is simply not what R.C. 2967.28(G)(1)

provides. Rather, R.C. 2967.28(G)(1) plainly states that, if an offender is simultaneously

subject to two periods of postrelease control, like Sbarbati was in this case, "the period of

supervision that expires last shall determine the length and form of supervision for all the

periods and the related sentences."

{¶ 5} Given the plain language of R.C. 2967.28(G)(1), the trial court did not err by

imposing a postrelease control term for each of the two felony offenses to which Sbarbati

pled guilty. See generally State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2021-CA-26, 2022-

Ohio-1346, ¶ 20. The trial court was instead required to impose both postrelease control

terms in accordance with R.C. 2967.28(B), which provides:

Each sentence to a prison term, other than a term of life imprisonment, for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by the parole board after the offender’s release from imprisonment.

Therefore, finding no merit to Sbarbati's argument raised herein, Sbarbati's first issue

presented for review lacks merit.

Sbarbati's Second Issue Presented for Review

{¶ 6} Sbarbati next argues the trial court erred by failing to consider and decide

whether he had a present or future ability to pay the mandatory minimum $7,500 fine

imposed in accordance with R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). We disagree.

{¶ 7} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) provides that before imposing a financial sanction,

-3- Butler CA2023-07-076

including a mandatory fine under R.C. 2929.18(B)(1), "the court shall consider the

offender's present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction or fine." "There are

no express factors that must be considered or specific findings that must be made

regarding the offender's ability to pay." State v. Derifield, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2020-

01-002, 2021-Ohio-1351, ¶ 51. "However, there must be some evidence in the record to

show that the trial court acted in accordance with the legislative mandate that it consider

the offender's present or future ability to pay." State v. Saracco-Rios, 12th Dist. Madison

Nos. CA2016-02-011 and CA2016-03-014, 2016-Ohio-7192, ¶ 10. "Compliance with

R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) can be shown through the trial court's use of a presentence

investigation report ('PSI'), which often provides financial and personal information of the

offender, in order to aid the trial court in making its determination." State v. Carriger, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2016-06-108, 2017-Ohio-1330, ¶ 11.

{¶ 8} In this case, trial court specifically stated within its judgment entry that it had

considered the record, the PSI generated in this case, which included Sbarbati's personal

and financial information, as well as "the defendant's present and future ability to pay the

amount of any sanction, fine or attorney's fees * * * " that had been imposed. "The

'consideration' requirement will be met if there is some evidence in the record to indicate

the trial court considered ability to pay." State v. McNeil, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2018-

09-115, 2019-Ohio-1200, ¶ 10. "A presentence-investigative report in the record, which

contains an offender's personal and financial information, is sufficient evidence to indicate

consideration." Id., citing State v. Dehner, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-12-090, 2013-

Ohio-3576, ¶ 47. Therefore, because the record in this case includes a PSI containing

Sbarbati's personal and financial information, something which the trial court explicitly

stated within its judgment entry that it had considered, the "consideration" requirement

set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) was clearly satisfied in this case. Accordingly, because

-4- Butler CA2023-07-076

the record is clear that the trial court considered Sbarbati's present and future ability to

pay the mandatory minimum $7,500 fine imposed upon him in accordance with R.C.

2929.18(B)(1), Sbarbati's second issue presented for review also lacks merit.

Sbarbati's Third Issue Presented for Review

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2024 Ohio 622, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-sbarbati-ohioctapp-2024.