State v. Saunders

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 25 CA 27
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Saunders, 2026-Ohio-1496.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 25 CA 27

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Guernsey County, Case No. 25 CR 62 MICHELLE SAUNDERS, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment: April 23, 2026

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Mark A. Perlaky (Assistant Guernsey County Prosecuting Attorney), Cambridge, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Michael G. Groh, Cambridge, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Defendant Michelle Saunders challenges her convictions on two drug-

related felony charges, arguing that her guilty pleas to the charges should be undone

because the trial judge did not inform her during the plea-change hearing that any prison

terms in this case could be imposed consecutively to another county’s prison terms that

she was already serving. Because that issue is not one that the trial judge had an

obligation to address at a plea-change hearing, we affirm the judgment in Saunders’s case.

The Key Facts

{¶2} When Saunders pled guilty to two second-degree-felony drug charges in this

Guernsey County case, she was already serving prison terms for several Union County

convictions unrelated to the charges in this case. At the plea-change hearing in this case,

the trial judge advised Saunders that any prison terms in this case could be imposed by

the judge consecutively to each other. The trial judge did not, however, advise Saunders that any prison terms in this case could be imposed by the judge consecutively to the

Union County prison terms that she was already serving.

{¶3} After the plea-change hearing, the judge did impose consecutive prison

terms on the two charges in this case, and the judge also ordered that Saunders serve the

prison terms in this case consecutively to her Union County sentences. Saunders now

appeals.

The Trial Court Was Not Obligated to Advise Saunders That Her Sentences in this Case Could Be Imposed Consecutively to Her Sentences in a Different Case from a Different County

{¶4} In her only assignment of error, Saunders contends that her guilty plea was

not made in the requisite knowing, intelligent, and voluntary way because the trial court

did not advise her that the sentences in this Guernsey County case could be imposed

consecutively to the Union County sentences that she was serving at the time. We decline

to embrace that argument.

{¶5} Before accepting a felony guilty or no-contest plea, a trial court must

determine that the defendant understands the charges as well as the “maximum penalty

involved.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). This is a nonconstitutional requirement, demanding only

substantial — rather than strict — compliance. State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 14. A

trial court satisfies this obligation by advising the defendant of the maximum sentence for

each individual offense to which the plea is entered. State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130,

133 (1988).

{¶6} Except when the trial court must impose a consecutive sentence — as is true

under R.C. 2921.331(D) for some failure-to-comply offenses and of course for R.C.

Chapter 2941 firearm specifications — a trial judge at a plea-change hearing need not

advise a defendant of the possibility that consecutive sentences may be imposed. Id. See also State v. Inkton, 2026-Ohio-347, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (“Under Ohio law, there is no

requirement for the trial court to advise of the possibility that each individual sentence

may be imposed consecutively”) (quotations omitted); State v. Whitman, 2021-Ohio-

4510, ¶ 32 (6th Dist.) (“Because the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences

was discretionary, the trial court was not required to inform appellant that it could order

him to serve any sentences imposed consecutively rather than concurrently”).

{¶7} Even so, Saunders points to a Supreme Court decision — State v. Bishop,

2018-Ohio-5132 — for the proposition that a trial judge is required to notify a defendant

of any consecutive-sentencing possibility before accepting a guilty plea. We are not

persuaded, though, by the connection that Saunders tries to draw between that case and

this one.

{¶8} Bishop addressed a different question: Must a criminal defendant who is

under post-release-control supervision for a prior felony conviction be advised, during a

plea-change hearing in a new felony case, that the trial court could, under R.C. 2929.141,

“terminate his existing postrelease control and . . . impose a consecutive prison sentence

for the postrelease-control violation[?]” Bishop at ¶ 1 (describing the certified question

in that case) (brackets omitted). Notably in that case, the Supreme Court was unable to

craft a majority opinion and instead issued a three-justice plurality opinion, with Justice

DeWine concurring in judgment only.

{¶9} According to the plurality opinion in Bishop, “a criminal defendant on

postrelease control for a prior felony” should be told at a plea-change hearing that

a consecutive prison sentence under R.C. 2929.141(A) is possible. Id. at ¶ 21. Yet

whatever force that plurality opinion carries in similar circumstances, we readily conclude

that it has no relevance to this case, given that Saunders was in prison rather than under post-release-control supervision when she entered her guilty pleas. Our court and others

have already held that the view embraced by the plurality in Bishop holds no sway in cases

like this one where the defendant was not under post-release-control supervision. See,

e.g., State v. Ellis, 2020-Ohio-1130, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.) (“where post-release control is not a

consideration, the concerns expressed in Bishop do not apply, and Johnson does not

require a defendant be advised of the possibility of consecutive sentences”); State v.

Novoa, 2021-Ohio-3585, ¶ 25 (7th Dist.) (“because postrelease control was not a

consideration in this matter, the plurality holding in Bishop is inapplicable here”); State

v. Roberts, 2019-Ohio-4393, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.) (“because postrelease control was not a

consideration, the concerns expressed in the plurality opinion in Bishop do not apply in

this case”).

{¶10} Saunders presses us to adopt the view that a trial judge — during a plea-

change hearing in a felony case — must explain to an already-incarcerated defendant that

any prison terms that must or might be imposed for the offense or offenses at issue in the

plea change could be imposed consecutively to any prison sentences the defendant is

already serving. That approach might very well be a sound one for the most thorough of

trial judges to embrace, but nothing in Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) requires us to undo a

plea change where that approach was not followed. As the Supreme Court in Johnson

observed, calculating potential sentences and explaining their interplay to the defendant

is a job that falls to competent defense counsel rather than one that trial judges must

undertake during plea-change hearings. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d at 134.

{¶11} Because the trial court complied with Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a), Saunders’s

sole assignment of error is overruled. {¶12} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Court of Common

Pleas of Guernsey County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Michelle

Saunders.

By: Gormley, J.;

Baldwin, P.J. and

Popham, J. concur.