State v. Sargent

100 P.2d 20, 2 Wash. 2d 190
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 6, 1940
DocketNo. 27718.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 100 P.2d 20 (State v. Sargent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Sargent, 100 P.2d 20, 2 Wash. 2d 190 (Wash. 1940).

Opinions

Robinson, J.

The appellant was convicted of larceny as defined in Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2601 [P. C. § 8944], subd. (2). He contends on appeal (1) that the information did not charge a crime; and (2) that, in any event, the state’s evidence was not sufficient to prove the allegations of the information. The applicable portions of § 2601 read as follows:

“Larceny. Every person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the owner thereof— . . .
“(2) Shall obtain from the owner or another the possession of or title to any property, real or personal, by color or aid of any order for the payment or delivery of property or money or any check or draft, knowing that the maker or drawer of such order, check or draft was not authorized or entitled to make or draw the same, or by color or aid of any fraudulent or false representation, personation or pretense or by any false token or writing or by any trick, device, bunco game or fortune-telling; or . . .
“Steals such property and shall be guilty of larceny.”

The charging part of the information reads as follows:

“That the said defendant, B. W. Sargent, in the county of Spokane, state of Washington, on or about the 2nd day of July, 1935, then and there being, did *192 then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to deprive and defraud the owner thereof, obtain from James E. Marion personal property, to-wit: 50,000 shares of Independence Lead Mining stock, of the value of $4500, and the property of and belonging to the said James E. Marion, by color and aid of certain false and fraudulent representations and pretenses, to-wit: by then and there representing and pretending that the Sunshine mining vein was within 400 feet of the Globe Silver Property, and that a strong financial company in New York had agreed to take a large block of Globe Silver stock, and that if the said James E. Marion would exchange his 50,000 shares of Independence Lead Stock for 50,000 shares Globe Silver stock, that he, the said defendant, would get the said 50,000 shares of Globe Silver stock included in the block of stock which the said New York financial company would handle, and the said James E. Marion would receive 30^5 a share or $15,000 in a few days; and the said James E. Marion, relying on said false and fraudulent representations' and pretenses, delivered the said 50,000 shares of Independence Lead stock to the said B. W. Sargent in exchange for 50,000 shares of Globe Silver stock; whereas the said representations and pretenses made by the said B. W. Sargent were false and known by him to be false at the time of .making them, and the said B. W. Sargent not having been a resident of the state of Washington since February 1, 1936.”

Reduced to its lowest terms, the information charges that Sargent obtained from Marion 50,000 shares of Independence Lead Mining stock by color and aid of certain false and fraudulent representations and pretenses, to-wit:

(1) By falsely representing and pretending that the Sunshine Mining vein was within four hundred feet of the Globe Silver property;

(2) By falsely representing and pretending that a strong financial company in New York had agreed to take a large block of Globe Silver stock; that he was *193 in a position to have 50,000 shares of Globe Silver stock included in the block; and, if Marion furnished such stock, he would receive thirty cents per share for it, or fifteen thousand dollars, within a few days.

Sargent proposed to supply Marion with the necessary 50,000 shares of Globe Silver in exchange for Marion’s 50,000 shares of Independence Lead. Marion, relying upon the false representations and pretenses, delivered the Independence Lead stock to Sargent, and so it is charged that Sargent obtained “from, the owner . . . the possession of . . . property ... by color of . . . fraudulent or false representations . . . or pretense ...”

It will be noted that there is no allegation that, Marion was defrauded, in the sense that he suffered any pecuniary loss. For aught that is charged, he may even have gained by the transaction. The appellant urges that this vitiates the information; but, as we read the statute, the gist of the offense is obtaining property from an owner by the use of false and fraudulent representations or pretenses, and whether or not the owner suffered a pecuniary loss is immaterial. State v. Miller, 212 Mo. 73, 111 S. W. 18; People v. Bryant, 119 Cal. 595, 51 Pac. 960; People v. Bartels, 77 Colo. 498, 238 Pac. 51.

This court, speaking through Judge Webster, said, in In re Rudebeck, 95 Wash. 433, 163 Pac. 930:

“Considerable confusion has arisen because of the fact that, in enumerating the constitutent elements of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses,, the cases frequently declare that the owner must have been actually defrauded. But this expression does not imply that he must have suffered actual pecuniary loss. The failure to appreciate this distinction has been the cause of most of the misunderstandings, and has resulted in apparent rather than real conflict in the cases. The owner is actually defrauded when he parts *194 with his property or money and fails to receive in exchange that for which he bargained. When the accused falsely represents to the owner that he is to receive in exchange for the money and property obtained from him a particular thing, and instead he receives another and entirely different thing, he is, in legal contemplation, actually defrauded.” (Italics ours.)

Concerning the point in question, it is said in 25 C. J. 608:

“False Pretenses [§ 38] 9. Loss to Prosecutor. While the statutes do not in express language require that the person from whom the property is obtained should be defrauded thereby, but only that it is obtained with intent to defraud him, nevertheless it is held as a general rule that the crime is not committed unless the prosecutor is in fact defrauded. Hence, as a rule, the crime is not committed if the prosecutor gets out of the transaction just what he bargained for. Except under a few statutes it is not necessary to constitute an offense that the prosecutor has or will necessarily suffer actual pecuniary loss. If he has been placed by the fraud of the accused in such a position that he may eventually suffer loss, or if he does not receive for the money or property parted with the thing promised by accused, even though he receives something else, regardless of whether such thing received is of equal value, less value, or no value at all, it is sufficient. Under the rule that actual loss is not necessary, it is no defense that the prosecutor has recovered, or may eventually recover for any loss sustained. Nor is the accused relieved from criminal liability, even though the person defrauded may eventually make himself whole in some mode not contemplated at the time he parted with the property.” (Italics ours.)

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Bluebook (online)
100 P.2d 20, 2 Wash. 2d 190, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-sargent-wash-1940.