[Cite as State v. Santia, 2011-Ohio-5984.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 24469 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 90-CR-0405 v. : : JEFFREY L. SANTIA : (Criminal Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : : : ...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 18th day of November, 2011.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by JOHNNA M. SHIA, Atty. Reg. #0067685, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
ROBERT L. SCOTT, Atty. Reg. #0086785, 8801 North main Street, Suite 200, Dayton, Ohio 45415 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
FAIN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Jeffrey L. Santia appeals from an order of the trial court
denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to having failed to provide the 2
notice of change of address required of him as a registered sex offender. He contends that
unless his guilty plea is withdrawn, he will be the victim of a manifest injustice, in that he was
convicted under the amended version of R.C. Chapter 2950 known as the “Adam Walsh Act,”
2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, when, as a result of State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, the less severe, previous version of R.C. Chapter 2950, known as “Megan’s
Law,” applied to him.
{¶ 2} The conduct alleged in the indictment constitutes a violation of the statute
regardless of whether the Adam Walsh Act amended version is applied, or the prior version
of the statute is applied. And, in Santia’s circumstances, the violation is punishable as a
fourth-degree felony regardless of which version of the statute is applied. Therefore, we
conclude that no manifest injustice has been visited upon Santia that requires the vacation of
his guilty plea. Accordingly, the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his
plea is Affirmed.
I
{¶ 3} In early January, 2004, Santia either pled guilty to, or was convicted of,
Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, a felony of the fourth degree. He was
classified as a sexually oriented offender under the version of R.C. Chapter 2950 in effect at
that time. As a result of 2003 S.B. 5, which went into effect on January 1, 2004, the violation
of the reporting, registration, notification and verification requirements of the statute
constituted a felony of the same degree as the most serious sexually oriented offense giving
rise to the sex offender classification, if that was a felony of the fourth or fifth degree. 3
Therefore under the law in effect when Santia was classified as a sexually oriented offender
(Megan’s Law), his violation of his reporting, registration, notification and verification
requirements would constitute a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶ 4} In February, 2009, Santia was charged by indictment with having failed to
provide the notice of change of address required of him under R.C. Chapter 2950. He pled
guilty, and was sentenced to community control sanctions. Santia had presumably been
reclassified in 2008, by the Ohio Attorney General, as a Tier I sex offender, as required by the
Adam Walsh Act.
{¶ 5} At the end of March 2009, Santia pled guilty to the offense charged in the
indictment, a fourth-degree felony. He was sentenced to community control sanctions for a
period not to exceed five years.
{¶ 6} In September 2010, Santia received notice from the office of the Ohio Attorney
General that his sex offender classification had been “switched back to [his] original Megan’s
Law classification,” because of the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bodyke.
In early October 2010, Santia moved to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that the
withdrawal of his plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.
{¶ 7} The trial court denied Santia’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. From the
order denying his motion, Santia appeals.
II
{¶ 8} As a preliminary matter, Santia has moved, pro se, for an order of this court
allowing him to file an additional brief, pro se, in his behalf, or, in the alternative, he wishes 4
us to consider State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St.3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481.
{¶ 9} The practice of this court has been not to permit a litigant to both have his
counsel file briefs or pleadings on his behalf, and to file briefs or pleadings pro se. Therefore,
Santia’s motion to allow him to file a brief pro se, in addition to the brief filed by his counsel,
is denied.
{¶ 10} It appears that Santia’s main purpose in this regard is to make sure that this
court is aware of State v. Gingell. We assure him that we were already aware of this decision,
and we have, in fact, considered it in connection with this appeal.
III
{¶ 11} Santia’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 12} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT’S POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
AGREEMENT BASED UPON A MAJOR CHANGE OF LAW AND INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.”
{¶ 13} A post-sentence withdrawal of a plea is permitted “to correct manifest
injustice.” Crim. R. 32.1. We conclude that no manifest injustice exists in this case that
requires the withdrawal of Santia’s plea for its correction.
{¶ 14} The specific conduct charged in the indictment, which Santia admitted by
virtue of his plea of guilty, constituted a violation of his notification requirements under either
Megan’s Law, or the Adam Walsh Act that amended it. Although the Adam Walsh Act 5
extended the period during which Santia, as a Tier I sex offender, would be required to comply
from ten years to fifteen years, his alleged failure to comply with the notification requirements
occurred well within the ten-year period prescribed by Megan’s Law.
{¶ 15} The Adam Walsh Act also shortened the period of time within which he was
required to notify the Sheriff of a change in his place of employment, from five days under
Megan’s Law to three days under the Adam Walsh Act. But Santia was charged in the
indictment with having violated his duty to comply with the notification requirements for a
period of 28 days, from January 4, 2009, through February 1, 2009. Again, the conduct with
which Santia was charged in the indictment would violate either the Megan’s Law or the
Adam Walsh Act version of R.C. Chapter 2950.
{¶ 16} Finally, the penalty to which Santia was exposed by virtue of his guilty plea
was the same under either version of R.C. Chapter 2950. Under either the Megan’s Law in
effect when Santia was classified in January, 2004, or the Adam Walsh Act amendments,
Santia’s offense was a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶ 17} When Santia pled guilty, State v. Bodyke had not yet been decided. We
assume, therefore, that Santia, the State, and the trial court all assumed that the Adam Walsh
Act amended version of R.C. Chapter 2950 applied to him. The result of State v. Bodyke is
that these assumptions were incorrect – the previous version of R.C. Chapter 2950, Megan’s
Law, applied to him. But in Santia’s case, it makes no difference that he, the State, and the
trial court were all operating on those incorrect assumptions. The charged conduct, to which
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[Cite as State v. Santia, 2011-Ohio-5984.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 24469 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 90-CR-0405 v. : : JEFFREY L. SANTIA : (Criminal Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : : : ...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 18th day of November, 2011.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by JOHNNA M. SHIA, Atty. Reg. #0067685, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
ROBERT L. SCOTT, Atty. Reg. #0086785, 8801 North main Street, Suite 200, Dayton, Ohio 45415 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
FAIN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Jeffrey L. Santia appeals from an order of the trial court
denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to having failed to provide the 2
notice of change of address required of him as a registered sex offender. He contends that
unless his guilty plea is withdrawn, he will be the victim of a manifest injustice, in that he was
convicted under the amended version of R.C. Chapter 2950 known as the “Adam Walsh Act,”
2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, when, as a result of State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, the less severe, previous version of R.C. Chapter 2950, known as “Megan’s
Law,” applied to him.
{¶ 2} The conduct alleged in the indictment constitutes a violation of the statute
regardless of whether the Adam Walsh Act amended version is applied, or the prior version
of the statute is applied. And, in Santia’s circumstances, the violation is punishable as a
fourth-degree felony regardless of which version of the statute is applied. Therefore, we
conclude that no manifest injustice has been visited upon Santia that requires the vacation of
his guilty plea. Accordingly, the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his
plea is Affirmed.
I
{¶ 3} In early January, 2004, Santia either pled guilty to, or was convicted of,
Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, a felony of the fourth degree. He was
classified as a sexually oriented offender under the version of R.C. Chapter 2950 in effect at
that time. As a result of 2003 S.B. 5, which went into effect on January 1, 2004, the violation
of the reporting, registration, notification and verification requirements of the statute
constituted a felony of the same degree as the most serious sexually oriented offense giving
rise to the sex offender classification, if that was a felony of the fourth or fifth degree. 3
Therefore under the law in effect when Santia was classified as a sexually oriented offender
(Megan’s Law), his violation of his reporting, registration, notification and verification
requirements would constitute a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶ 4} In February, 2009, Santia was charged by indictment with having failed to
provide the notice of change of address required of him under R.C. Chapter 2950. He pled
guilty, and was sentenced to community control sanctions. Santia had presumably been
reclassified in 2008, by the Ohio Attorney General, as a Tier I sex offender, as required by the
Adam Walsh Act.
{¶ 5} At the end of March 2009, Santia pled guilty to the offense charged in the
indictment, a fourth-degree felony. He was sentenced to community control sanctions for a
period not to exceed five years.
{¶ 6} In September 2010, Santia received notice from the office of the Ohio Attorney
General that his sex offender classification had been “switched back to [his] original Megan’s
Law classification,” because of the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bodyke.
In early October 2010, Santia moved to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that the
withdrawal of his plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.
{¶ 7} The trial court denied Santia’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. From the
order denying his motion, Santia appeals.
II
{¶ 8} As a preliminary matter, Santia has moved, pro se, for an order of this court
allowing him to file an additional brief, pro se, in his behalf, or, in the alternative, he wishes 4
us to consider State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St.3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481.
{¶ 9} The practice of this court has been not to permit a litigant to both have his
counsel file briefs or pleadings on his behalf, and to file briefs or pleadings pro se. Therefore,
Santia’s motion to allow him to file a brief pro se, in addition to the brief filed by his counsel,
is denied.
{¶ 10} It appears that Santia’s main purpose in this regard is to make sure that this
court is aware of State v. Gingell. We assure him that we were already aware of this decision,
and we have, in fact, considered it in connection with this appeal.
III
{¶ 11} Santia’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 12} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT’S POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
AGREEMENT BASED UPON A MAJOR CHANGE OF LAW AND INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.”
{¶ 13} A post-sentence withdrawal of a plea is permitted “to correct manifest
injustice.” Crim. R. 32.1. We conclude that no manifest injustice exists in this case that
requires the withdrawal of Santia’s plea for its correction.
{¶ 14} The specific conduct charged in the indictment, which Santia admitted by
virtue of his plea of guilty, constituted a violation of his notification requirements under either
Megan’s Law, or the Adam Walsh Act that amended it. Although the Adam Walsh Act 5
extended the period during which Santia, as a Tier I sex offender, would be required to comply
from ten years to fifteen years, his alleged failure to comply with the notification requirements
occurred well within the ten-year period prescribed by Megan’s Law.
{¶ 15} The Adam Walsh Act also shortened the period of time within which he was
required to notify the Sheriff of a change in his place of employment, from five days under
Megan’s Law to three days under the Adam Walsh Act. But Santia was charged in the
indictment with having violated his duty to comply with the notification requirements for a
period of 28 days, from January 4, 2009, through February 1, 2009. Again, the conduct with
which Santia was charged in the indictment would violate either the Megan’s Law or the
Adam Walsh Act version of R.C. Chapter 2950.
{¶ 16} Finally, the penalty to which Santia was exposed by virtue of his guilty plea
was the same under either version of R.C. Chapter 2950. Under either the Megan’s Law in
effect when Santia was classified in January, 2004, or the Adam Walsh Act amendments,
Santia’s offense was a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶ 17} When Santia pled guilty, State v. Bodyke had not yet been decided. We
assume, therefore, that Santia, the State, and the trial court all assumed that the Adam Walsh
Act amended version of R.C. Chapter 2950 applied to him. The result of State v. Bodyke is
that these assumptions were incorrect – the previous version of R.C. Chapter 2950, Megan’s
Law, applied to him. But in Santia’s case, it makes no difference that he, the State, and the
trial court were all operating on those incorrect assumptions. The charged conduct, to which
Santia admitted by pleading guilty, and the penalty therefor, remained the same either way.
Accordingly, we do not find that in this case a manifest injustice has been visited upon Santia. 6
{¶ 18} Santia’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶ 19} Santia’s sole assignment of error having been overruled, the order of the trial
court denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty is Affirmed.
GRADY, P.J., and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck Johnna M. Shia Robert L. Scott Jeffrey L. Santia Hon. Mary L. Wiseman