State v. Sanders

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 25-223
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-223

Filed 5 November 2025

Guilford County, Nos. 21CR088036-400, 21CR088037-400, 21CR088038-400, 21CR088039-400, 21CR088040-400

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

LEVAN LA FORREST SANDERS

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 11 April 2024 by Judge Richard

S. Gottlieb in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

15 October 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Kristin Cook McCrary, for the State.

Andrew Nelson, for defendant-appellant.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

Levan La Forrest Sanders (“defendant”) appeals from judgments after jury

trial, in which he was convicted on five counts: accessory after the fact to first-degree

murder; first-degree kidnapping; conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping;

robbery with a dangerous weapon; and conspiracy to commit robbery with a STATE V. SANDERS

Opinion of the Court

dangerous weapon. Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion

for a directed verdict and motion to dismiss on the charge of conspiracy to commit

robbery with a dangerous weapon, because the robbery was complete before his

involvement. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by giving an acting

in concert instruction for the charge. For the following reasons, we find no error.

I. Background

The events in question occurred throughout the evening of 28 November 2021,

in two phases, before and after defendant’s direct involvement. Evidence offered at

trial tended to show the following.

A. Before Defendant’s Direct Involvement

On the evening of 28 November 2021, Alhindi Abdalmahmoud (“Mr.

Abdalmahmoud”) was in his apartment using a dating app to arrange sex with a

woman at his house in exchange for a Cash App payment. After receiving a message

that she had arrived, he went outside to meet her and found no woman there. Two

men, later identified as Rayshawn Hill and Tyrik Griffin, were outside in a sedan;

Mr. Griffin raised his gun and demanded money from Mr. Abdalmahmoud’s Cash

App account. Mr. Abdalmahmoud produced his personal cell phone and opened Cash

App, which was linked to his Wells Fargo bank account, and handed the device over

to the men, who drove away with it.

Worried about his money, Mr. Abdalmahmoud called his friend, Taha Babiker

(“Mr. Babiker”), from his second work cell phone. Mr. Babiker quickly came to Mr.

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Abdalmahmoud’s home and helped him close his Wells Fargo account. Mr.

Abdalmahmoud then answered a knock on the door and found Mr. Griffin aiming the

gun at him, having failed to access his money. Mr. Griffin then forced both men to

leave the apartment at gunpoint and forced Mr. Babiker to retrieve his wallet from

his car. In the car, Mr. Griffin and Mr. Hill took Mr. Babiker’s cell phone and Mr.

Abdalmahmoud’s work phone, and Mr. Hill drove them to a BB&T Bank ATM, where

Mr. Babiker had an account.

Mr. Griffin, still holding his gun, forced Mr. Babiker out of the car to use the

ATM. Mr. Abdalmahmoud, who had been ordered to stay in the car with his head

down, heard Mr. Hill shout, “He is trying to run!” followed by the sounds of running

and two gunshots. Mr. Griffin returned to the car, which ran over something as they

sped away, and Mr. Abdalmahmoud saw Mr. Babiker on the ground. Later that

evening, police found Mr. Babiker deceased with a bullet hole through his abdomen

and residue consistent with tire marks on his clothing. The jury viewed the bank’s

surveillance footage, which showed a man inserting his card at the ATM before

running, another man running after him with an object in his hand, and a blue car

driving in the same direction.

After leaving Mr. Babiker’s body, Mr. Hill drove to a nearby apartment

complex to make a series of phone calls to defendant and co-defendant Timothy Jones

(“Mr. Jones”). Earlier, Mr. Hill and Mr. Griffin spent part of the day at defendant’s

home in High Point, where he lived with Mr. Jones, departing just after dusk.

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B. Defendant’s Direct Involvement

According to phone records, Mr. Hill made two brief calls to Mr. Jones at 11:31

p.m. and Defendant at 11:36 p.m., followed by a 21-minute call to Mr. Jones beginning

11:40 p.m. Mr. Jones testified that Mr. Hill awoke them to ask for a ride, and sent

defendant the GPS location of an apartment complex in Greensboro. Defendant drove

his black Dodge car to the location with Mr. Jones and picked up Mr. Hill, Mr. Griffin,

and Mr. Abdalmahmoud. Defendant drove the group back to Mr. Abdalmahmoud’s

apartment, where Mr. Griffin forced him at gunpoint to retrieve his bank card.

Defendant then drove the group to two different ATMs, where Mr. Griffin

forced Mr. Abdalmahmoud out of the car at gunpoint to make withdrawals, but both

attempts were unsuccessful. Out of fear, Mr. Abdalmahmoud did not tell the co-

defendants that he had closed his account earlier. Defendant punched Mr.

Abdalmahmoud in the face twice and threatened to kill him unless he found a way to

withdraw money. Mr. Griffin also called a credit card company using Mr.

Abdalmahmoud’s phone, attempting to retrieve money, while Mr. Jones recorded his

social security information.

Defendant drove the group to his home, where the group stayed for several

hours while Mr. Griffin continued to hold Mr. Abdalmahmoud at gunpoint. The group

instructed him that when the bank opened, he would enter, act normally, and

withdraw his money. In the morning, Mr. Jones left the group to go to work, and

defendant drove the men to a Wells Fargo branch, where Mr. Griffin again threatened

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to kill Mr. Abdalmahmoud. Inside, Mr. Abdalmahmoud immediately told staff what

was occurring, and Kernersville police responded to the scene. Detective E.J.

Bruscino, who was already investigating the murder of Mr. Babiker for the

Greensboro Police Department, arrived and found Mr. Abdalmahmoud “in a state of

distress.” Detective Bruscino then saw bank records that corroborated Mr.

Abdalmahmoud’s account of the preceding events.

Police located both of Mr. Abdalmahmoud’s phones on a road between

Kernersville and High Point. CSI J.T. Reynolds located a Ford wheel well liner at

the BB&T location. At an apartment complex in Greensboro, police found a 2017 blue

Ford Focus with a separated front bumper, flat front tire, and a missing wheel well

liner. Forensic analysis found prints matching Mr. Griffin’s on Mr. Abdalmahmoud’s

personal phone and the abandoned Ford Focus, and prints matching Mr. Jones’ and

defendant’s on the exterior of the car. A shell casing found near Mr. Babiker’s body

matched the firearm from another incident in which Mr. Hill was shot. Mr.

Abdalmahmoud identified defendant in photo identification lineups, claiming 100%

certainty, and again at trial. Mr. Abdalmahmoud also identified defendant’s voice in

the State’s video evidence, in which the voice discussed getting money from Mr.

Abdalmahmoud’s account.

C. Defendant’s Trial

Defendant’s three-week trial began 25 March 2024. Defendant moved to

dismiss all charges at the close of the State’s evidence, arguing specifically that the

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robbery charge should be dismissed because it had been based on the taking of two of

the cell phones. However, the trial court found that the State presented sufficient

evidence and that the series of events constituted a continuous transaction, and

denied the motion. Defendant did not present evidence in his defense and

unsuccessfully moved to dismiss again. At both the charge conference and after the

jury instructions, defendant’s counsel unsuccessfully objected to the “acting in

concert” language the court included in its instruction about the robbery charge.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Defendant’s counsel

unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict in defendant’s favor. The trial court

sentenced defendant to imprisonment to two consecutive terms of 96 to 128 months

and an additional consecutive term of 84 to 113 months. Defendant gave notice of

appeal in open court.

II. Discussion

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss

the robbery charge, by denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the robbery

charge, and by including the “acting in concert” jury instruction as to the charge. We

discuss each issue in turn.

A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for a Directed Verdict

Defendant’s main contention is that the robbery was complete before his

involvement, because his co-defendants had already taken possession of the victims’

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cell phones before defendant left home. Defendant argues that the trial court should

have granted his motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict. We disagree.

1. Defendant Joined a Continuous Transaction

The required elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon include that the

defendant: 1) unlawfully took or attempted to take another’s personal property, 2)

using or threatening to use a firearm or another dangerous weapon, 3) which

threatened or endangered the victim’s life. N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a); State v. Hope, 317

N.C. 302, 305 (1986).

Defendant asks us to compare this case to State v. McNeil, 155 N.C. App. 540

(2002), and State v. Cole, 209 N.C. App. 84 (2011). In McNeil, the defendant forced a

store’s employee to empty the cash register, then forced him to walk to the back of

the store. McNeil, 155 N.C. App. at 541. He was convicted of second-degree

kidnapping and robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id. He had argued that the

restraint had occurred as part of the robbery, but the trial court found that the

robbery was complete before the defendant restrained the employee. Id. at 544–47.

In Cole, the defendant drove with his nephew to buy drugs, his nephew stole

the drugs and shot and killed the dealer, and the defendant drove them away

together. Cole, 209 N.C. App. at 86–88. Defendant, charged as an accessory to

robbery with a dangerous weapon, unsuccessfully argued that the robbery had not

been completed until the pair arrived at “a place of safety” but the Court held that

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“the taking in a robbery is complete” once the thief succeeds in removing the property

from the victim’s possession. Id. at 92.

Defendant is correct that the use or threatened use of force must generally

induce the victim to part with his property. Hope, 317 N.C. at 305. See also State v.

Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 474−76 (1983) (holding that, to be found guilty of robbery,

the defendant must “inten[d] to permanently deprive the owner of his property at the

time the taking occurred[.]”). However, the State asserts that defendant participated

in a series of events constituting a continuous transaction. This doctrine is applicable

where the use of force is “so joined by time and circumstances with the taking as to

be part of one continuous transaction.” State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 566 (1992).

Where a robbery with a dangerous weapon is part of a continuous transaction, “the

temporal order of the threat or the use of a dangerous weapon and the taking is

immaterial.” Id. Therefore, where a defendant participates in any threat of force “so

joined by time and circumstances” to the taking, it is irrelevant whether the taking

occurred before his participation. Id.

We agree the State’s evidence in this case tended to show a proper application

of the continuous transaction doctrine. As opposed to McNeil and Cole, where the

robberies themselves had a clear temporal endpoint preceding the commission of the

other crime charged, the record before us shows an active and ongoing armed robbery

at the outset of defendant’s active participation.

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To illustrate, a hypothetical example will be helpful here. Mr. A knows that

Mr. M keeps a large amount of cash in his office safe. Mr. A kidnaps Mr. M from his

home and drives him to the office, where he holds Mr. M at gunpoint and forces him

to hand over his gold-and-platinum keychain. Mr. A tries to open the safe, but none

of the keys will fit. Mr. A’s friend Mr. B is an experienced safe cracker, so he calls

him to help break open the safe in exchange for a cut of the takings. As they continue

to hold Mr. M at gunpoint, the two friends work unsuccessfully to open the safe until

the police arrive. Mr. B would not be able to avoid responsibility for the armed

robbery, even though the defendants were successful in taking possession of only a

portion of the desired loot, and because the taking of the keychain preceded Mr. B’s

participation. This is because Mr. B joined a continuous transaction, in which the

forceful robbery of the keychain was just one step in the ongoing series of crimes in

which he acted in concert, making the timing of the taking immaterial.

So too here. The State’s evidence, taken as a whole, tended to show that the

phones’ taking was only a part of the ongoing robbery, and a preliminary step taken

to continue robbing the victims, during an unbroken and continuous series of actions

that proceeded until long after defendant joined, accompanied by the nonstop threat

of violent force. Accordingly, the time that the only successfully taken property

changed hands is irrelevant.

2. Defendant Acted in Concert with Co-Defendants

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A defendant “acts in concert” when he is present and “act[s] together with

another who does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a common

plan or purpose to commit the crime.” State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 357 (1979). “[I]f

‘two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each . . . is also guilty of any other

crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural

or probable consequence thereof.’ ” State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 504 (2010) (quotes

omitted).

Acting in concert does not require that all details of the crime be known to each

co-defendant or worked out beforehand. State v. Johnson, 164 N.C. App. 1, 17 (2004),

disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 194 (2004). The “presence” prong may be constructive,

which is why getaway drivers are constructively present despite being at “a

convenient distance away.” State v. Combs, 182 N.C. App. 365, 370, aff’d 361 N.C.

585 (2007). The defendant’s actual distance from the crime is irrelevant; the State

must simply show he was near enough to render assistance if need be and to

encourage the crime’s actual perpetration. Id.

In the present case, defendant was convicted on the theory that he acted in

concert with his co-defendants to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. We

established that the robbery did not end when the co-defendants forced the victims to

hand over their phones, because Mr. Abdalmahmoud remained at gunpoint

throughout the ongoing armed robbery. The State presented, over the course of the

three-week trial, multiple strands of evidence showing that defendant actively

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participated in this common plan to rob the victims of their phones and bank accounts

by use of armed force, by joining his co-defendants, driving them to several locations,

bringing Mr. Abdalmahmoud to his home to be held captive, and making violent

threats against him. Therefore, the State’s evidence was sufficient to show more than

defendant’s constructive presence and specific intent. It tended to show that he was

not only near enough to render assistance and encouragement, but that he quickly

swooped in to actively perpetrate the robbery.

3. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion

for a Directed Verdict

This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss. State

v. Hooke, 243 N.C. App. 435, 441 (2015). We determine whether the State presented

substantial evidence of each essential element and that defendant perpetrated the

charged offense. State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301 (2002) (quotes omitted). The

evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the

benefit of all reasonable inferences. Id. “Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78 (1980). “Circumstantial evidence may withstand a

motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out

every hypothesis of innocence.” State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452 (1988). “Courts may

resort to circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, capability and identity to

identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.” Id. “The evidence need only

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give rise to a reasonable inference of guilt in order for it to be properly submitted to

the jury for a determination of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

“Contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant

dismissal.” Smith, 300 N.C. at 78. Our analysis of and standards concerning motions

to dismiss and motions for a directed verdict are “interchangeable.” State v. Wynn,

276 N.C. App. 411, 415 (2021).

Here, the State introduced multiple strands of evidence tending to show that

defendant participated in a common scheme to (1) unlawfully take or attempt to take

another’s personal property, (2) use or threaten to use a firearm or another dangerous

weapon, (3) which threatened or endangered the victim’s life. The State’s evidence

was consistent with the theory that defendant was constructively and then actually

present during an ongoing continuous transaction, which rendered irrelevant the

timing of the physical taking vis-à-vis the use of force. A reasonable jury could have

agreed that all elements of this crime and defendant’s responsibility were proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and

allowing it all reasonable inferences, this evidence was sufficient to submit for the

jury’s consideration the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Accordingly, the

trial court properly denied defendant’s motions, and we discern no error.

B. Jury Instructions

Defendant next argues that the court erred by giving instructions about “acting

in concert” when advising the jury on the burden to find the defendant guilty on the

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robbery with a dangerous weapon charge. Defendant’s counsel objected to the

instruction at trial, preserving it for de novo review. State v. King, 227 N.C. App. 390,

396 (2013).

To assist the jury to understand a case and reach its verdict, a trial judge is

required to instruct the jury on every “substantial feature of a case raised by the

evidence.” State v. Shaw, 322 N.C. 797, 803 (1988) (citation omitted). To establish

prejudice, the party asserting instructional error must show that the error was likely

to mislead the jury. King, 227 N.C. App. at 396. The jury instruction discussed here

is obligatory when the State’s evidence tends to show that, pursuant to a “common

plan or purpose to commit the crime,” the defendant was present and acting together

with another person whose actions constitute the crime. State v. Mitchell, 24 N.C.

App. 484, 486 (1975).

We incorporate by reference our discussion above as to the continuous

transaction and acting in concert. The State presented multiple strands of evidence,

including forensic exhibits, audiovisual exhibits, and extensive testimony from Mr.

Abdalmahmoud and co-defendant Mr. Jones. This evidence, taken as a whole, tended

to show that defendant joined in a continuing transaction in which he and co-

defendants jointly perpetrated the taking of property under threat of violence. As

such, the trial court was required to issue its instruction about acting in concert, and

it did so. The wording followed the North Carolina pattern jury instruction 202.10.

Accordingly, we discern no error.

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III. Conclusion

As to the trial court’s jury instructions and its denials of defendant’s motion to

dismiss and motion for a directed verdict, we find no error.

NO ERROR.

Judges TYSON and ZACHARY concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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