[Cite as State v. Samson, 2026-Ohio-2173.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0134
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0004 JOSHUA SAMSON, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 9, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, for Plaintiff-Appellee; CHRIS BRIGDON, for Defendant-Appellant.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Joshua Samson appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court
following his plea of guilty to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count
of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Appellee is the State of Ohio. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On or about June 21, 2024, the appellant was operating his motor vehicle
while intoxicated when he crossed the center line and crashed head on into another
vehicle, resulting in the death of victim K.V. The appellant’s driver’s license was
suspended at the time of the collision. {¶3} On January 9, 2025, the appellant was indicted on the following charges:
Count One, Aggravated Vehicular Homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) and
(B)(2)(b)(i), a felony of the first degree; Count Two, Aggravated Vehicular Homicide in
violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) and (B)(3), a felony of the second degree; and, Count
Three, Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Drug of Abuse or a
Combination of Them – OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (G)(1)(a), a
misdemeanor of the first degree. The appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges at his
February 19, 2025, arraignment, and the matter was set for trial.
{¶4} The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement which was
memorialized in an April 25, 2025, Plea of Guilty form. The Plea of Guilty form set forth
the charges to which the appellant agreed to plead guilty: Count Two, Aggravated
Vehicular Homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), a second-degree felony; and,
Count Three, OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor. The
Plea of Guilty form also set forth the potential prison terms for each offense, and was
initialed and signed by the appellant, his attorney, and counsel for the appellee. The
appellee thereafter moved for dismissal of Count One of the Indictment, which the trial
court granted.
{¶5} A Change of Plea hearing took place on April 25, 2025, at which the trial
court engaged in the requisite Crim.R. 11 colloquy. The trial court accepted the appellant’s
guilty pleas, ordered a presentence investigation (PSI), and ordered the matter to be
scheduled for a sentencing hearing.
{¶6} The sentencing hearing proceeded on June 16, 2025. The trial court heard
victim impact statements from two of the victim’s family members. The appellee
summarized multiple letters from other family members who expressed how the victim’s death had impacted their lives, and read part of the victim’s obituary into the record. In
addition, the trial court summarized the appellant’s PSI report. The PSI report reflected
an extensive criminal history and contained multiple instances of the appellant’s
disregard for the legal system, including outstanding warrants for failure to appear in
court, failure to appear for drug treatment, driving on a suspended license, and other
crimes. The PSI reflected that the appellant had a total of four OVIs, three of which
occurred while the appellant’s driver’s license was suspended.
{¶7} The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight years in prison, up to an
indefinite maximum of twelve years on Count Two; and, 180 days of local incarceration
on Count Three, to run concurrently with the prison term imposed for Count Two. The
appellant was given credit for 104 days of time served.
{¶8} The appellant has appealed the decision of the trial court, and sets forth the
following sole assignment of error:
{¶9} “I. SHOULD THIS HONORABLE COURT REMAND THIS MATTER FOR
RE-SENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SENTENCING THE
APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WHEN IGNORING THE
SENTENCING FACTORS IN R.C. 2929.12 AND PRINCIPLES IN R.C. 2929.11?”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶10} Generally, felony sentences are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State
v. Goings, 2014-Ohio-2322, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). An appellate court may increase, modify, or
vacate and remand a judgment only if it clearly and convincingly finds either “(a) the
record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of
section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant” or “(b) the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Yeager, 2016-Ohio-4759, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), citing R.C.
2953.08(G)(2).
ANALYSIS
{¶11} The appellant pleaded guilty to Aggravated Vehicular Homicide in violation
of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), a felony of the second degree, and OVI in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial court considered the
information presented during the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing. In
addition, the court considered the appellant’s criminal history as reflected in his
presentence investigation, which included multiple arrest warrants, passing bad checks,
failure to pay restitution, receiving stolen property, possession of drugs, failure to
complete treatment in connection with drug charges, theft by deception, domestic
violence, theft, criminal trespass, multiple OVIs, and multiple driving under suspension
charges. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an aggregate prison term of eight years,
with an indefinite maximum of twelve years.
{¶12} R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) provides that “[f]or a felony of the second degree
committed on or after March 22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term
with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or
eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the
Revised Code….” R.C. 2929.144(B)(1) provides that “[i]f the offender is being sentenced
for one felony and the felony is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, the
maximum prison term shall be equal to the minimum term imposed on the offender
under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code plus fifty per cent
of that term.” The appellant was sentenced to eight years, with an indefinite term of twelve years (eight years plus fifty per cent of that term), and thus was sentenced in
conformity with statutory guidelines.
{¶13} The appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider the principles set
forth in R.C. 2929.11(A) and (B) prior to the imposition of sentence. However, as set forth
by this Court in State v. Locke, 2024-Ohio-1029 (5th Dist.):
In our review of the language of R.C. § 2929.11 and 2929.12, we have
held that:
While trial courts are required to consider both R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
2929.12 before imposing a prison sentence, they are not required to
make specific findings under any of those considerations. State v.
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[Cite as State v. Samson, 2026-Ohio-2173.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0134
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0004 JOSHUA SAMSON, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 9, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, for Plaintiff-Appellee; CHRIS BRIGDON, for Defendant-Appellant.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Joshua Samson appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court
following his plea of guilty to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count
of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Appellee is the State of Ohio. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On or about June 21, 2024, the appellant was operating his motor vehicle
while intoxicated when he crossed the center line and crashed head on into another
vehicle, resulting in the death of victim K.V. The appellant’s driver’s license was
suspended at the time of the collision. {¶3} On January 9, 2025, the appellant was indicted on the following charges:
Count One, Aggravated Vehicular Homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) and
(B)(2)(b)(i), a felony of the first degree; Count Two, Aggravated Vehicular Homicide in
violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) and (B)(3), a felony of the second degree; and, Count
Three, Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Drug of Abuse or a
Combination of Them – OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (G)(1)(a), a
misdemeanor of the first degree. The appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges at his
February 19, 2025, arraignment, and the matter was set for trial.
{¶4} The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement which was
memorialized in an April 25, 2025, Plea of Guilty form. The Plea of Guilty form set forth
the charges to which the appellant agreed to plead guilty: Count Two, Aggravated
Vehicular Homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), a second-degree felony; and,
Count Three, OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor. The
Plea of Guilty form also set forth the potential prison terms for each offense, and was
initialed and signed by the appellant, his attorney, and counsel for the appellee. The
appellee thereafter moved for dismissal of Count One of the Indictment, which the trial
court granted.
{¶5} A Change of Plea hearing took place on April 25, 2025, at which the trial
court engaged in the requisite Crim.R. 11 colloquy. The trial court accepted the appellant’s
guilty pleas, ordered a presentence investigation (PSI), and ordered the matter to be
scheduled for a sentencing hearing.
{¶6} The sentencing hearing proceeded on June 16, 2025. The trial court heard
victim impact statements from two of the victim’s family members. The appellee
summarized multiple letters from other family members who expressed how the victim’s death had impacted their lives, and read part of the victim’s obituary into the record. In
addition, the trial court summarized the appellant’s PSI report. The PSI report reflected
an extensive criminal history and contained multiple instances of the appellant’s
disregard for the legal system, including outstanding warrants for failure to appear in
court, failure to appear for drug treatment, driving on a suspended license, and other
crimes. The PSI reflected that the appellant had a total of four OVIs, three of which
occurred while the appellant’s driver’s license was suspended.
{¶7} The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight years in prison, up to an
indefinite maximum of twelve years on Count Two; and, 180 days of local incarceration
on Count Three, to run concurrently with the prison term imposed for Count Two. The
appellant was given credit for 104 days of time served.
{¶8} The appellant has appealed the decision of the trial court, and sets forth the
following sole assignment of error:
{¶9} “I. SHOULD THIS HONORABLE COURT REMAND THIS MATTER FOR
RE-SENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SENTENCING THE
APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WHEN IGNORING THE
SENTENCING FACTORS IN R.C. 2929.12 AND PRINCIPLES IN R.C. 2929.11?”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶10} Generally, felony sentences are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State
v. Goings, 2014-Ohio-2322, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). An appellate court may increase, modify, or
vacate and remand a judgment only if it clearly and convincingly finds either “(a) the
record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of
section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant” or “(b) the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Yeager, 2016-Ohio-4759, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), citing R.C.
2953.08(G)(2).
ANALYSIS
{¶11} The appellant pleaded guilty to Aggravated Vehicular Homicide in violation
of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), a felony of the second degree, and OVI in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial court considered the
information presented during the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing. In
addition, the court considered the appellant’s criminal history as reflected in his
presentence investigation, which included multiple arrest warrants, passing bad checks,
failure to pay restitution, receiving stolen property, possession of drugs, failure to
complete treatment in connection with drug charges, theft by deception, domestic
violence, theft, criminal trespass, multiple OVIs, and multiple driving under suspension
charges. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an aggregate prison term of eight years,
with an indefinite maximum of twelve years.
{¶12} R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) provides that “[f]or a felony of the second degree
committed on or after March 22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term
with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or
eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the
Revised Code….” R.C. 2929.144(B)(1) provides that “[i]f the offender is being sentenced
for one felony and the felony is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, the
maximum prison term shall be equal to the minimum term imposed on the offender
under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code plus fifty per cent
of that term.” The appellant was sentenced to eight years, with an indefinite term of twelve years (eight years plus fifty per cent of that term), and thus was sentenced in
conformity with statutory guidelines.
{¶13} The appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider the principles set
forth in R.C. 2929.11(A) and (B) prior to the imposition of sentence. However, as set forth
by this Court in State v. Locke, 2024-Ohio-1029 (5th Dist.):
In our review of the language of R.C. § 2929.11 and 2929.12, we have
held that:
While trial courts are required to consider both R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
2929.12 before imposing a prison sentence, they are not required to
make specific findings under any of those considerations. State v.
Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶31;
State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). “Indeed,
consideration of the factors is presumed unless the defendant
affirmatively shows otherwise.” State v. Phillips, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 110148, 2021-Ohio-2772, 2021 WL 3560891, ¶8, citing State v.
Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, 108 N.E.3d 1109, ¶16 (8th Dist.).
Crawford at ¶ 18.
In a separate case, we concluded that “[a]lthough a trial court must
consider the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, there is no requirement
that the court state its reasons for imposing a maximum sentence, or for
imposing a particular sentence within the statutory range.” There is no
requirement in R.C. 2929.12 that the trial court states on the record that it
has considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and recidivism or even discussed them. (Citations omitted.) State v. Webb, 5th Dist.
Muskingum No. CT2018-0069, 2019-Ohio-4195, ¶17.
The trial court was not obliged to describe its rationale for the
sentence on the record or that it had considered the factors listed in R.C. §
2929.12, and the appellant has neither affirmatively shown that the factors
were not considered.
Id. at ¶¶ 19-21. Thus, the fact that the trial court did not discuss the factors contained in
R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 does not rise to the level of reversible error. There is no
statutory requirement that the trial court state on the record that it has considered the
statutory criteria set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, let alone discuss them on the
record. Furthermore, the appellant has presented no evidence to show that the factors
were not considered by the trial court.
{¶14} The sentence imposed by the trial court was within statutory sentencing
parameters, and the trial court was not required to recite on the record the factors set
forth by R.C. 2929.11 and/or R.C. 2929.12. We therefore find the appellant’s sole
assignment of error to be without merit. CONCLUSION
{¶15} Based upon the foregoing, the appellant’s sole assignment of error is
overruled, and the decision of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is hereby
affirmed.
{¶16} Costs to appellant.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Popham, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.