State v. Samaritan Asset Management Services, Inc.

22 Misc. 3d 669
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 29, 2008
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 22 Misc. 3d 669 (State v. Samaritan Asset Management Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Samaritan Asset Management Services, Inc., 22 Misc. 3d 669 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Bernard J. Fried, J.

Motion sequence Nos. 003 and 004 are consolidated for disposition. In motion sequence No. 003, defendants Johnson Capital Management, Inc. and Michael A. Johnson (together, the Johnson defendants) move, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), (8) and 3016 (b) to dismiss the complaint. In motion sequence No. 004, defendants Samaritan Asset Management Services, Inc. and Edward T. Owens (together, the Samaritan defendants) also move, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), (8) and 3016, to dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiff, the State of New York, by the Attorney General brings this action alleging that the defendants violated article 23-A of the General Business Law, commonly referred to as the Martin Act, and Executive Law § 63 (12), in that they employed fraudulent means to evade safeguards against “market timing” in the purchase and sale of mutual fund shares. The Attorney General seeks a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from engaging in the sale, purchase or distribution of any mutual funds, and for restitution of monies obtained and damages caused by the defendants’ actions.

“Market timing” is a strategy of rapidly trading in and out of mutual funds in an attempt to exploit brief discrepancies be[671]*671tween the official stock prices used to determine the value of the mutual fund shares, and the prices at which those stocks are actually trading. Most mutual funds compute their net asset values (NAVs) only once each day, on the basis of the fund’s portfolio value at the close of exchange trading. The market timer may seek to capitalize on the previous days’ NAV and the current upward or downward trend of the market. According to the Attorney General, hedge funds, such as those controlled by the defendants herein, may use computerized trading models to signal when to engage in short-term purchases or sales of mutual funds or, more often, short-term exchanges of money between an equity or bond fund and a money market fund or cash management fund.

Market timing is not illegal. However, market timing can cause damage to long-term shareholders of the mutual fund in several ways. First, market timers increase the transaction costs for the mutual fund. Second, frequent traders profit at the expense of long-term investors, thus diluting the profits of those investors. Third, to raise cash to meet timer redemptions, the mutual fund may incur unnecessary costs associated with drawing down on a fine of credit or selling stocks.

As fiduciaries of their clients, mutual fund managers have an obligation to stop timing activities that increase the funds’ management costs and decrease the value of the shareholders’ investments in the funds. Although mutual funds often maintain practices and policies that seek to identify, monitor and reject timing transactions, identifying these transactions among thousands of legitimate transactions is difficult. Mutual funds may look for large transactions, since market timers trade large dollar amounts to maximize profitability. Mutual funds may also seek to limit the number of trades any one shareholder may execute over a given period.

The Attorney General alleges that market timers, such as the defendants herein, seek to circumvent these obstacles by the use of “omnibus” accounts whereby a brokerage firm bundles all of its customers’ transactions for a particular fund and transmits a single buy or sell order to the mutual fund. The single buy or sell order is thus an aggregation of all of the brokerage firm’s individual customers’ buy and sell orders in that fund, and the mutual fund is unaware of both the customer’s identity and the dollar amount of each trade.

In addition, market timers try to take advantage of the fact that many transactions are not cleared directly with the mutual [672]*672funds. While some customers purchase and sell shares in direct transactions with the fund company, retirement plans and their beneficiaries typically clear transactions indirectly through a trust company or an intermediary. Most individuals, and many hedge funds, clear mutual fund transactions indirectly through brokerage firms.

The Samaritan defendants are Samaritan, the sponsor, general partner and manager of a group of hedge funds, and Edward Owens, its sole owner and director. Owens formed Samaritan in 1996. After forming Samaritan, Owens established several limited partnerships and limited liability companies operating as hedge funds, including Samaritan Balanced Fund, LP, Samaritan International Equity Fund, LP, Samaritan MultiStrategies Fund, LE Samaritan Global Fund Trading I, LE Samaritan Long/Short Equity Fund LLC, Samaritan Enhanced Equity Fund LLC, and Samaritan Charitable Fund LLC. Samaritan was the general partner of the limited partnerships and the manager of the limited liability companies. According to the Attorney General, Owens found institutions and wealthy individuals to invest in, or “subscribe” to the Samaritan hedge funds. The minimum investment for a subscriber was $500,000, or $1 million, depending on the hedge fund. At one point during the relevant period, Samaritan had approximately $500 million of investors’ funds and borrowed capital under its management. The Attorney General alleges that Owens determined the nature of the investment strategy of the hedge funds that he and Samaritan created and decided that the hedge funds would engage exclusively in mutual fund market timing.

The Johnson defendants are Johnson Capital, a registered investment advisor that, during the period covered by the amended complaint, served as an investment advisor to defendant Samaritan and the Samaritan-sponsored hedge funds. Michael Johnson is the president and an owner of Johnson Capital. In 1997, Samaritan engaged Johnson Capital to act as investment advisor to four of the Samaritan hedge funds, and to create and implement market timing strategies and invest the funds’ assets in accordance with these strategies. The Johnson defendants made trading decisions for approximately half of the assets of the Samaritan hedge funds. In 1998, the Johnson defendants began market timing on behalf of the Samaritan hedge funds, which continued until 2003.

The Attorney General alleges that the defendants utilized two of the above-mentioned strategies to evade the anti-market tim[673]*673ing countermeasures of the mutual funds. First, were the broker-related methods. According to the complaint, Johnson made trading decisions for approximately half of the assets of the Samaritan hedge funds, and submitted those decisions in the form of “trade orders” through brokers selected by Owens. The trading model used by Johnson required approximately 50 “round trips,” or completed purchases and sales, per year. Owens introduced Johnson to brokerage firms that had “timing capacity” arrangements with mutual funds, or could avoid detection of their clients’ mutual fund market timing by breaking up large trades into small trades, and then making the smaller trades through multiple accounts. By breaking the trades into smaller trades and keeping them below a specified dollar amount, they could “fly under the radar” of the mutual fund market timing defenses. The Attorney General contends that these efforts to evade the mutual fund timing defenses was tortious conduct under the Martin Act and Executive Law § 63 (12).

Second, the Attorney General claims that, starting in 2000, the defendants also attempted to buy, sell and exchange orders through an entity called Security Trust Company, N.A.

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Bluebook (online)
22 Misc. 3d 669, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-samaritan-asset-management-services-inc-nysupct-2008.