State v. Salahuddin

Ohio Court of Appeals

State v. Salahuddin

2018 Ohio 1943

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedMay 18, 2018

Docket2017-CA-50

StatusPublished

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State v. Salahuddin, 2018 Ohio 1943 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).

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Opinion

[Cite as State v. Salahuddin, 2018-Ohio-1943.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2017-CA-50 : v. : T.C. NO. 2017-CR-222 : MUHAMMAD I. SALAHUDDIN : (Criminal Appeal from : Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : : ...........

OPINION

Rendered on the 18th day of May, 2018.

...........

NATHANIEL LUKEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0087864, 55 Greene Street, First Floor, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

PHILLIP HOOVER, Atty. Reg. No. 0034386, 77 West Main Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

.............

DONOVAN, J. -2-

{¶ 1} On April 28, 2017, defendant-appellant, Muhammad I. Salahuddin, was

indicted for the following offenses, to wit: Count I: trafficking in heroin, in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree; Count II: possession of a controlled substance

analog, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count III: trafficking in

heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree; Count IV:

possession of a controlled substance analog, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of

the fifth degree; Count V: trafficking in heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony

of the fifth degree; Count VI: possession of a controlled substance analog, in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count VII: trafficking in heroin, in violation

of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the third degree; Count VIII: possession of heroin, in

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count IX: aggravated possession

of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count X: possession

of a controlled substance analog, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth

degree. Also attached to the indictment was a specification indicating that a maroon

2007 Chrysler 300 owned by Salahuddin was subject to forfeiture.

{¶ 2} At his arraignment on May 5, 2017, Salahuddin pled not guilty to all of the

offenses contained in the indictment. A jury trial was originally scheduled to be held on

July 10, 2017. However, at a hearing held on July 12, 2017, Salahuddin pled guilty to

Counts III, V, VII, and IX in return for dismissal of the remaining counts in the indictment.

The trial court accepted Salahuddin’s pleas and found him guilty of the four counts. The

trial court also ordered the Greene County Adult Probation Department to prepare a pre-

sentence investigation report (PSI). We note that at the plea hearing, Salahuddin -3-

indicated to the trial court that he was currently on post-release control for a previous

conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.

{¶ 3} At Salahuddin’s disposition on August 25, 2017, the trial court sentenced him

as follows: Count III, trafficking in heroin, 18 months; Count V, trafficking in heroin, 12

months; Count VII, trafficking in heroin, 36 months; and Count IX, aggravated possession

of drugs, to wit: fentanyl, a Schedule II drug, 12 months. The trial court ordered

Salahuddin’s sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 78

months. Significantly, the record establishes that at no time did Salahuddin object to the

sentence imposed by the trial court, nor did he file a pre- or post-sentence motion to

withdraw his guilty pleas. Salahuddin filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on

September 12, 2017.

{¶ 4} Salahuddin’s appeal is now properly before this Court.

{¶ 5} Salahuddin’s sole assignment of error is as follows:

APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY

TRIAL COUNSEL ADVISING APPELLANT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA

TO POSSESSION OF FENTANYL WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE

THAT APPELLANT HAD THE REQUISITE MENTAL STATE FOR

CONVICION [sic].

{¶ 6} In his sole assignment, Salahuddin contends that he received ineffective

assistance when his counsel advised him to plead guilty to Count IX, aggravated

possession of drugs, because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

for that offense. Specifically, Salahuddin argues that a statement made by his counsel

at sentencing suggested that Salahuddin believed that he had purchased heroin to traffic, -4-

not fentanyl. Therefore, Salahuddin argues that he could not be convicted for Count IX

because the State would have been unable to prove that he “knowingly” possessed

fentanyl, which is an element of the offense. We also note that according to the PSI,

Salahuddin claimed that he did not know that the drug he had purchased and was selling

as heroin contained fentanyl. However, Salahuddin also remarked to the drafter of the

PSI that, “It’s not like I forced him to buy it.” We note that in the instant appeal,

Salahuddin does not challenge his convictions and sentences for Counts III, V, and VII.

Salahuddin’s assignment of error relates solely to whether he received ineffective

assistance when he was advised to plead guilty to Count IX, to wit: aggravated

possession of fentanyl.

{¶ 7} We evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments in light of the two-

pronged analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under that analysis, to reverse a conviction based on ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was

deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and that the

defendant was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Id. at 668. State v. Bradley, 42

Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). To succeed on such a claim, there must be a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

defendant's trial would have been different. Id.

{¶ 8} A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. State v. Faulkner, 2d Dist.

Champaign No. 2013-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9. Consequently, a guilty plea waives

all appealable errors, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the

extent that the errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily -5-

entering his or her guilty plea. State v. Frazier, 2016-Ohio-727, 60 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 81 (2d

Dist.). If a defendant pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, he must demonstrate that

the advice was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal

cases.” (Citations omitted.) Id. Furthermore, “[o]nly if there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but would have

insisted on going to trial will the judgment be reversed.” State v. Huddleson, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 20653, 2005-Ohio-4029, ¶ 9, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 52–53,

106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). (Other citations omitted.)

{¶ 9} “For counsel to render effective assistance to a criminal defendant, [he or]

she should, at the least, understand the basis of the criminal charges and possible

defenses of those charges.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Dalton, 153 Ohio App.3d 286,

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