NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 26-FEB-2024 07:51 AM Dkt. 107 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RYAN SAFFEELS, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX(2))
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Ryan Saffeels (Saffeels) appeals
from the February 28, 2023 Judgment; Conviction and Sentence;
Notice of Entry (Judgment) entered in the Circuit Court of the
Second Circuit1 (Circuit Court), convicting him of three counts
of Third Degree Sexual Assault, in violation of Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 707-732 (2014).2
1/ The Honorable Peter T. Cahill presided. 2/ HRS § 707-732(1) provides, in part:
§ 707-732 Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if: (b) The person knowingly subjects to sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes such a person to have sexual contact with the person[.] NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Saffeels raises two points of error on appeal,
contending that the Circuit Court erred in denying his October 3,
2022 motion to dismiss the charges (Motion to Dismiss) for
failure to commence trial within 180 days of the indictment, in
violation of his right to a speedy trial under (1) Hawai#i Rules
of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 and (2) the United States and
Hawai#i Constitutions.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Saffeels's points of error as follows:.
HRPP Rule 48(b) provides:
(b) By court. Except in the case of traffic offenses that are not punishable by imprisonment, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with or without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not commenced within 6 months[.]
"HRPP Rule 48 is intended to ensure an accused a speedy
trial, which is separate and distinct from [the] constitutional
protection to a speedy trial." State v. Fukuoka, 141 Hawai#i 48,
55, 404 P.3d 314, 321 (2017) (citation & quotation marks
omitted). "The six-month period under HRPP Rule 48 is equivalent
to 180 days." State v. Hernane, 145 Hawai#i 444, 450, 454 P.3d
385, 391 (2019). HRPP Rule 48(c) identifies certain periods of
delay that are not chargeable against Plaintiff-Appellee State of
Hawai#i (State), and which "shall be excluded in computing the
time for trial commencement."
Though Saffeels was indicted on June 8, 2020, it is
undisputed that he consistently waived his right to a speedy
2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
trial until December 20, 2021, while pursuing plea negotiations.
The parties dispute, among other things, whether each of the
subsequent trial delays are "excluded" from the 180-day
calculation under HRPP Rule 48, or are chargeable to the State.
In particular, the parties dispute whether a State-requested
trial continuance from March 30, 2022, to August 29, 2022,
granted over Saffeels's objection, and based on the
unavailability of a witness who was a minor (Minor Witness), is
excluded. The parties also disagree whether the length of that particular trial delay should be measured starting on the date
the continuance was granted, which would amount to 158 days, or
on the date the trial was originally scheduled, which would
amount to 152 days. Nonetheless, it appears the parties
otherwise agree that a minimum of 109 other days are chargeable
to the State. Thus, whether the length of the particular
continuance for the Minor Witness is 152 or 158 days, if it is
also chargeable to the State, the total chargeable days would
necessarily exceed 180.
HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i) excludes from computation delays
caused by the State's continuance due to the unavailability of
material evidence, under specific circumstances, as follows: (c) Excluded periods. The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial commencement: . . . . (4) periods that delay the commencement of trial and are caused by a continuance granted at the request of the prosecutor if: (i) the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the prosecution's case, when the prosecutor has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are
3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will be available at a later date[.]
(Emphasis added).
The use of the conjunctive "and" in subsection
(c)(4)(i) indicates the elements of due diligence and reasonable
belief as to subsequent availability must both be satisfied. See
State v. Crouser, 81 Hawai#i 5, 11, 911 P.2d 725, 731 (1996)
(holding that, where the elements of a statute are "set out in
the conjunctive, rather than the disjunctive," the other side
need only disprove one element to defeat it). It appears that the Minor Witness is the son of a woman
Saffeels lived with while the case was pending, and that he was
present, though perhaps not awake, at the time the incident took
place. At the March 24, 2022 hearing where the State requested
the continuance, Saffeels indicated that the Minor Witness had
been sent to live with his brother in Texas three weeks prior,
due to issues at school, and he would return to O#ahu in August
of that year. Thus, there were reasonable grounds to believe the
Minor Witness could testify at a later date, which satisfies the element of subsequent availability. However, at the October 27,
2022 hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Circuit Court
indicated that the State failed to "exercise due diligence" in
procuring the Minor Witness's testimony, as it admitted to having
"rushed" a separate subpoena for the Minor Witness just one week
before scheduled trial—and only after it realized the subpoena
did not previously "go out with the rest of" the trial subpoenas
a month prior—and the circumstances did "not excuse" the State's
failure to "get the subpoena out earlier." Moreover, it appears
4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the State did not end up calling Minor Witness to testify at the
subsequent trial. Thus, it is dubious, at best, whether the
delay was due to the "unavailability of evidence material to the
prosecution's case," to satisfy the elements for exclusion in
HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i). (Emphasis added).
We thus conclude that the delay caused by the State's
continuance to secure the testimony of Minor Witness should be
charged to the State, and that at least 180 days chargeable to
the State had elapsed at the time Saffeels moved for dismissal. Therefore, the Circuit Court erred in denying the Motion to
Dismiss. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach any of
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 26-FEB-2024 07:51 AM Dkt. 107 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RYAN SAFFEELS, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX(2))
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Ryan Saffeels (Saffeels) appeals
from the February 28, 2023 Judgment; Conviction and Sentence;
Notice of Entry (Judgment) entered in the Circuit Court of the
Second Circuit1 (Circuit Court), convicting him of three counts
of Third Degree Sexual Assault, in violation of Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 707-732 (2014).2
1/ The Honorable Peter T. Cahill presided. 2/ HRS § 707-732(1) provides, in part:
§ 707-732 Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if: (b) The person knowingly subjects to sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes such a person to have sexual contact with the person[.] NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Saffeels raises two points of error on appeal,
contending that the Circuit Court erred in denying his October 3,
2022 motion to dismiss the charges (Motion to Dismiss) for
failure to commence trial within 180 days of the indictment, in
violation of his right to a speedy trial under (1) Hawai#i Rules
of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 and (2) the United States and
Hawai#i Constitutions.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Saffeels's points of error as follows:.
HRPP Rule 48(b) provides:
(b) By court. Except in the case of traffic offenses that are not punishable by imprisonment, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with or without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not commenced within 6 months[.]
"HRPP Rule 48 is intended to ensure an accused a speedy
trial, which is separate and distinct from [the] constitutional
protection to a speedy trial." State v. Fukuoka, 141 Hawai#i 48,
55, 404 P.3d 314, 321 (2017) (citation & quotation marks
omitted). "The six-month period under HRPP Rule 48 is equivalent
to 180 days." State v. Hernane, 145 Hawai#i 444, 450, 454 P.3d
385, 391 (2019). HRPP Rule 48(c) identifies certain periods of
delay that are not chargeable against Plaintiff-Appellee State of
Hawai#i (State), and which "shall be excluded in computing the
time for trial commencement."
Though Saffeels was indicted on June 8, 2020, it is
undisputed that he consistently waived his right to a speedy
2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
trial until December 20, 2021, while pursuing plea negotiations.
The parties dispute, among other things, whether each of the
subsequent trial delays are "excluded" from the 180-day
calculation under HRPP Rule 48, or are chargeable to the State.
In particular, the parties dispute whether a State-requested
trial continuance from March 30, 2022, to August 29, 2022,
granted over Saffeels's objection, and based on the
unavailability of a witness who was a minor (Minor Witness), is
excluded. The parties also disagree whether the length of that particular trial delay should be measured starting on the date
the continuance was granted, which would amount to 158 days, or
on the date the trial was originally scheduled, which would
amount to 152 days. Nonetheless, it appears the parties
otherwise agree that a minimum of 109 other days are chargeable
to the State. Thus, whether the length of the particular
continuance for the Minor Witness is 152 or 158 days, if it is
also chargeable to the State, the total chargeable days would
necessarily exceed 180.
HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i) excludes from computation delays
caused by the State's continuance due to the unavailability of
material evidence, under specific circumstances, as follows: (c) Excluded periods. The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial commencement: . . . . (4) periods that delay the commencement of trial and are caused by a continuance granted at the request of the prosecutor if: (i) the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the prosecution's case, when the prosecutor has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are
3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will be available at a later date[.]
(Emphasis added).
The use of the conjunctive "and" in subsection
(c)(4)(i) indicates the elements of due diligence and reasonable
belief as to subsequent availability must both be satisfied. See
State v. Crouser, 81 Hawai#i 5, 11, 911 P.2d 725, 731 (1996)
(holding that, where the elements of a statute are "set out in
the conjunctive, rather than the disjunctive," the other side
need only disprove one element to defeat it). It appears that the Minor Witness is the son of a woman
Saffeels lived with while the case was pending, and that he was
present, though perhaps not awake, at the time the incident took
place. At the March 24, 2022 hearing where the State requested
the continuance, Saffeels indicated that the Minor Witness had
been sent to live with his brother in Texas three weeks prior,
due to issues at school, and he would return to O#ahu in August
of that year. Thus, there were reasonable grounds to believe the
Minor Witness could testify at a later date, which satisfies the element of subsequent availability. However, at the October 27,
2022 hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Circuit Court
indicated that the State failed to "exercise due diligence" in
procuring the Minor Witness's testimony, as it admitted to having
"rushed" a separate subpoena for the Minor Witness just one week
before scheduled trial—and only after it realized the subpoena
did not previously "go out with the rest of" the trial subpoenas
a month prior—and the circumstances did "not excuse" the State's
failure to "get the subpoena out earlier." Moreover, it appears
4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the State did not end up calling Minor Witness to testify at the
subsequent trial. Thus, it is dubious, at best, whether the
delay was due to the "unavailability of evidence material to the
prosecution's case," to satisfy the elements for exclusion in
HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i). (Emphasis added).
We thus conclude that the delay caused by the State's
continuance to secure the testimony of Minor Witness should be
charged to the State, and that at least 180 days chargeable to
the State had elapsed at the time Saffeels moved for dismissal. Therefore, the Circuit Court erred in denying the Motion to
Dismiss. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach any of
the parties' other arguments, nor do we reach Saffeels's second
point of error, that the State violated his constitutional right
to a speedy trial. Rees v. Carlisle, 113 Hawai#i 446, 456, 153
P.3d 1131, 1141 (2007) ("[J]udicial restraint requires that
courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity of deciding them.").
As to whether Saffeels is entitled to a dismissal of
the charges with or without prejudice, this determination should
be made by the Circuit Court in the first instance. See State v.
Choy Foo, 142 Hawai#i 65, 70, 414 P.3d 117, 122 (2018); State v.
Liu, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016 WL 3063668 (Haw. App. May 27, 2016)
(SDO).
Therefore, the Circuit Court's February 28, 2023
Judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of an
order of dismissal, with or without prejudice, in the Circuit
5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Court's discretion, after considering the factors established in
State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 625 P.2d 1040 (1981).
It is also hereby ordered that Saffeels's Motion for
Release Pending Appeal filed on July 2, 2023 is dismissed as
moot.3
It is further ordered that all pending motions are
denied as moot.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 26, 2024.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Acting Chief Judge Gerald T. Johnson, Court-Appointed Attorney /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka for Defendant-Appellant. Associate Judge
Renee Ishikawa Delizo /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
3/ This ruling is without prejudice to any relief Saffeels may seek in the Circuit Court in light of this Summary Dispostion Order.