ACOBA, Judge.
Following a jury-waived trial on February 24, 1993, the district court found Defendant-Appellant Tekiripute Sadler (Defendant) guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-733(l)(a) (1998)1 and of criminal trespass in the second degree in violation of HRS § 708—814(l)(b) (1993).2 On April 1, 1993, the court sentenced Defendant and entered judgment. Execution of the sentence was stayed pending appeal. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the sexual assault conviction and remand that charge for a new trial, and we reverse the criminal trespass conviction.
I.
Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a misdemeanor punishable by a one-year maximum term of imprisonment. HRS §§ 707-733, 701-107(3) (1993),3 and 706-663 (1993).4 Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 5(b)(1) provides that “the court shall in appropriate cases inform the defendant of the right to jury trial in the circuit court or that the defendant may elect to be tried without a jury in the district court.”
“Appropriate cases” arise whenever the accused has a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 reh’g. denied, 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270, 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968); State v. Swain, 61 Haw. 173, 175, 599 P.2d 282, 284 (1979); State v. Shak, 51 Haw. 612, 614, 466 P.2d 422, 424, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 191, 27 L.Ed.2d 190 (1970). In Hawai'i, a statutory right to a jury trial arises whenever a criminal defendant can be imprisoned for six months or more upon conviction of the offense. HRS § 806-60.
State v. Ibuos, 75 Haw. 118, 120, 857 P.2d 576, 577 (1993). Because the sexual assault offense at issue here is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum one-year term of imprisonment, Defendant was potentially subject to punishment for more than six months, [374]*374■and thus, the court had a duty to inform Defendant of his right to a jury trial under HRPP Rule 5(b)(1).
Correspondingly, HRPP Rule 5(b)(3) mandates that the defendant must waive the right to trial by jury, “in writing or orally in open court.” Hence, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held that, “[a] knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to trial by jury must come directly from a defendant, either in writing or orally.” Ibuos, 75 Haw. at 121, 857 P.2d at 578 (citing HRPP Rule 5(b)(3)). Waiver of the right to a jury trial by defense counsel is not a valid waiver. See State v. Young, 73 Haw. 217, 221, 830 P.2d 512, 514 (1992). The Young court explained that “the waiver of a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial must be through the personal action of the beneficiary of that right.” Id. at 222, 830 P.2d at 515.
Here, Defendant was not tried in circuit court, and as the State concedes, there was no written or personal oral waiver of a jury trial. Although Defendant’s attorney waived trial by jury, such a waiver was not effective.5 See Young, supra. A counsel’s waiver of the client’s right to a jury trial is insufficient in the absence of any colloquy between the court and the defendant. Ibuos, 75 Haw. at 121, 857 P.2d at 578. Here, because Defendant did not validly waive his right to a jury trial, we vacate the jury-waived conviction for sexual assault and remand the sexual assault charge for a new trial.
II.
A jury trial was not required for the charge of criminal trespass in the second degree because it is a petty misdemeanor punishable by a thirty-day maximum term of imprisonment. HRS §§ 708-814(l)(b), 708-814(2) and 706-663. With respect to this conviction, we agree with Defendant that there was insufficient evidence to convict him.6
A.
On September 11,1992, Defendant allegedly became unruly at the Waikiki bar called Hernando’s Hideaway (Hernando’s). The manager of the bar called the police and had a police officer issue a “trespass warning” to Defendant.7 This so-called “verbal trespass warning”8 prohibited Defendant from re[375]*375turning to Hernando’s for a period of one year. However, Defendant returned to Her-nando’s on October 31, 1992, a month after the “trespass warning.” He was arrested in the instant case for violating the September 11 warning.9
The police officer who issued the warning testified that after calming Defendant on September 11, he explained to Defendant that Defendant was prohibited from coming back to Hernando’s for one year. The officer also informed Defendant he would be arrested if he returned during that period.10 In contrast to Defendant’s claim that he was too inebriated to understand the warning, the officer stated that “in my opinion, [Defendant] understood” the warning. While Defendant did not dispute the fact that he received a “verbal warning” from Hernando’s at “one time,” he testified that he had “had a few drinks” and could not recall the “exact date” of the warning.11
B.
HRS § 708—814(l)(b) states that a person commits the offense of criminal trespass in the second degree if “[t]he person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon commercial premises after reasonable warning or request to leave by the owner or lessee or the owner’s or lessee’s authorized agent or [a] police officer[.]”
We believe the conduct in this case did not fall within the ambit of the criminal liability defined under the statute. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo, and our “foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature[,] which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” State v. Wells, 78 Hawai'i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73, reconsideration denied, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995) (citations omitted). On the face of the statute, liability is based only on the refusal to obey a “warning or request to leave.” HRS § 708-814(l)(b) (emphasis added).
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ACOBA, Judge.
Following a jury-waived trial on February 24, 1993, the district court found Defendant-Appellant Tekiripute Sadler (Defendant) guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-733(l)(a) (1998)1 and of criminal trespass in the second degree in violation of HRS § 708—814(l)(b) (1993).2 On April 1, 1993, the court sentenced Defendant and entered judgment. Execution of the sentence was stayed pending appeal. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the sexual assault conviction and remand that charge for a new trial, and we reverse the criminal trespass conviction.
I.
Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a misdemeanor punishable by a one-year maximum term of imprisonment. HRS §§ 707-733, 701-107(3) (1993),3 and 706-663 (1993).4 Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 5(b)(1) provides that “the court shall in appropriate cases inform the defendant of the right to jury trial in the circuit court or that the defendant may elect to be tried without a jury in the district court.”
“Appropriate cases” arise whenever the accused has a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 reh’g. denied, 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270, 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968); State v. Swain, 61 Haw. 173, 175, 599 P.2d 282, 284 (1979); State v. Shak, 51 Haw. 612, 614, 466 P.2d 422, 424, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 191, 27 L.Ed.2d 190 (1970). In Hawai'i, a statutory right to a jury trial arises whenever a criminal defendant can be imprisoned for six months or more upon conviction of the offense. HRS § 806-60.
State v. Ibuos, 75 Haw. 118, 120, 857 P.2d 576, 577 (1993). Because the sexual assault offense at issue here is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum one-year term of imprisonment, Defendant was potentially subject to punishment for more than six months, [374]*374■and thus, the court had a duty to inform Defendant of his right to a jury trial under HRPP Rule 5(b)(1).
Correspondingly, HRPP Rule 5(b)(3) mandates that the defendant must waive the right to trial by jury, “in writing or orally in open court.” Hence, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held that, “[a] knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to trial by jury must come directly from a defendant, either in writing or orally.” Ibuos, 75 Haw. at 121, 857 P.2d at 578 (citing HRPP Rule 5(b)(3)). Waiver of the right to a jury trial by defense counsel is not a valid waiver. See State v. Young, 73 Haw. 217, 221, 830 P.2d 512, 514 (1992). The Young court explained that “the waiver of a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial must be through the personal action of the beneficiary of that right.” Id. at 222, 830 P.2d at 515.
Here, Defendant was not tried in circuit court, and as the State concedes, there was no written or personal oral waiver of a jury trial. Although Defendant’s attorney waived trial by jury, such a waiver was not effective.5 See Young, supra. A counsel’s waiver of the client’s right to a jury trial is insufficient in the absence of any colloquy between the court and the defendant. Ibuos, 75 Haw. at 121, 857 P.2d at 578. Here, because Defendant did not validly waive his right to a jury trial, we vacate the jury-waived conviction for sexual assault and remand the sexual assault charge for a new trial.
II.
A jury trial was not required for the charge of criminal trespass in the second degree because it is a petty misdemeanor punishable by a thirty-day maximum term of imprisonment. HRS §§ 708-814(l)(b), 708-814(2) and 706-663. With respect to this conviction, we agree with Defendant that there was insufficient evidence to convict him.6
A.
On September 11,1992, Defendant allegedly became unruly at the Waikiki bar called Hernando’s Hideaway (Hernando’s). The manager of the bar called the police and had a police officer issue a “trespass warning” to Defendant.7 This so-called “verbal trespass warning”8 prohibited Defendant from re[375]*375turning to Hernando’s for a period of one year. However, Defendant returned to Her-nando’s on October 31, 1992, a month after the “trespass warning.” He was arrested in the instant case for violating the September 11 warning.9
The police officer who issued the warning testified that after calming Defendant on September 11, he explained to Defendant that Defendant was prohibited from coming back to Hernando’s for one year. The officer also informed Defendant he would be arrested if he returned during that period.10 In contrast to Defendant’s claim that he was too inebriated to understand the warning, the officer stated that “in my opinion, [Defendant] understood” the warning. While Defendant did not dispute the fact that he received a “verbal warning” from Hernando’s at “one time,” he testified that he had “had a few drinks” and could not recall the “exact date” of the warning.11
B.
HRS § 708—814(l)(b) states that a person commits the offense of criminal trespass in the second degree if “[t]he person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon commercial premises after reasonable warning or request to leave by the owner or lessee or the owner’s or lessee’s authorized agent or [a] police officer[.]”
We believe the conduct in this case did not fall within the ambit of the criminal liability defined under the statute. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo, and our “foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature[,] which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” State v. Wells, 78 Hawai'i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73, reconsideration denied, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995) (citations omitted). On the face of the statute, liability is based only on the refusal to obey a “warning or request to leave.” HRS § 708-814(l)(b) (emphasis added). Here, Defendant was arrested for returning to the premises after having been previously removed and told that he would be arrested should he “come back to the club.” Given its ordinary reading, the statute contemplates a warning or request contemporaneous with a person entering or remaining unlawfully on the premises. Nothing in the statute hinges penal liability on a warning which in effect, amounts to a quasi-restraining order against a particular person, enforceable by the State in the future, at the behest of private parties. •
The Commentary in the Hawaii Penal Code is an aid to understanding the provi[376]*376sions of the Code. HRS § 701-105 (1993). The Supplemental Commentary on HRS §§ 708-813 to 815 (1993) indicates the legislature’s objective was merely to expedite the removal of persons from commercial premises by making the refusal to heed a request to leave a crime, rather than a violation, thus authorizing the police to promptly remove a person by means of an arrest, as they might do in the case of any other crime.
The Supplemental Commentary refers to Act 201, Session Laws 1979. Under Act 201, the legislature added subsection (c) to HRS § 708-814, increasing the penalty for criminal trespass from a violation to a petty misdemeanor. 1979 Haw. Sess. L. Act 201, § 1 at 422-23. The legislative objective was to enable retailers to expedite the removal of “undesirables”12 from commercial premises. See Hse.Stand.Comm.Rep.No. 984, in 1979 House Journal, at 1633. The legislature found that the police would not place persons charged with simple trespass under physical arrest without first obtaining a penal summons. Id. at 1632. Because obtaining the summons was “a lengthy, time-consuming process,” the legislature sought a more expeditious means of removing disruptive persons from commercial premises. Id. at 1633. It did this by making trespass a petty misdemeanor, thus allowing the police to make an arrest and to remove a person from the premises without first obtaining a penal summons. Id. at 1632-33.
Your Committee finds that present law makes it extremely difficult for retailers and shopping centers to remove from their premises, solicitors or demonstrators who are harassing or inconveniencing customers or causing loss of sales, because being that such persons can only be charged with simple trespass, a violation, the police will not place them under physical arrest without a penal summons being first obtained. Since the obtaining of such a summons is a lengthy, time-consuming process, in effect there is nothing the merchant or retailer can presently do.
Making the entering or remaining unlawfully in commercial premises criminal trespass in the second degree would effectively give retailers a means to remove undesirables because it would allow the 'police to place them under physical arrest, criminal trespass in the second degree being a petty misdemeanor.
Id. (emphasis added).
Consequently, Defendant’s conduct did not fall within the prohibition of HRS § 708-814(l)(b) and his conviction, therefore, must be reversed.
III.
Accordingly, the April 1, 1993 judgment is vacated as to the sexual assault charge, and that charge is remanded for a new trial. The judgment on the trespass conviction is reversed.