State v. Rush

2025 Ohio 4760

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: CT2025-0036
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Rush, 2025-Ohio-4760.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0036

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2024-0150 CHIQUITA L. RUSH, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: October 15, 2025

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Andrew J. King; Kevin W. Popham, Judges

APPEARANCES: RON WELCH, Prosecuting Attorney, JOSEPH A. PALMER, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; CHRIS BRIGDON, for Defendant- Appellant.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Chiquita L. Rush, appeals the trial court’s denial of her

motion to suppress. The appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On February 28, 2024, Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted the

appellant as follows:

• Count One: Trafficking in a Fentanyl-Related Compound in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2) with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of

R.C. 2941.141(A), a Major Drug Offender Specification in violation of R.C. 2941.1410(A), and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count Two: Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A) with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of

R.C. 2941.141(A), a Major Drug Offender Specification in violation of R.C.

2941.1410(A), and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

• Count Three: Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) with

an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of R.C. 2941.141(A), a

Major Drug Offender Specification in violation of R.C. 2941.1410(A), and a

Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count Four: Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) with an

accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of R.C. 2941.141(A), a

Major Drug Offender Specification in violation of R.C. 2941.1410(A), and a

Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count Five: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2) with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of

R.C. 2941.141(A), a Major Drug Offender Specification in violation of R.C.

2941.1410(A), and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

• Count Six: Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)

with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of R.C.

2941.141(A), a Major Drug Offender Specification in violation of R.C. 2941.1410(A), and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

• Count Seven: Trafficking in Marihuana in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)

with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of R.C.

2941.141(A) and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

• Count Eight: Possession of Marihuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) with

an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of R.C. 2941.141(A)

and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of R.C.

2941.1417(A);

• Count Nine: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2) with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of

R.C. 2941.141(A) and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation

of R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count Ten: Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)

with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of R.C.

2941.141(A) and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

• Count Eleven: Having Weapons While Under Disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3) with a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

R.C. 2941.1417(A); • Count Twelve: Having Weapons While Under Disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3) with a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

• Count Thirteen: Having Weapons While Under Disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3) with a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

• Count Fourteen: Illegal Manufacture of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A)

with an accompanying Firearm Specification in violation of R.C.

2941.141(A) and a Specification for Forfeiture of Property in violation of

{¶3} On August 7, 2024, the appellant filed a motion to suppress.

{¶4} On January 6, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the appellant’s motion

to suppress.

{¶5} At the suppression hearing, the appellant and her co-defendant raised

objections to the reliability of the State’s confidential informant (“CI”) whose information

formed the basis for the search warrant. The trial court limited the inquiry to law

enforcement’s knowledge of the CI’s reliability at the time the affidavit was prepared and

overruled the appellant’s objections seeking to expand the scope.

{¶6} Detective Ryan Paisley testified that he has been working with the drug unit

in the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office for five years. Detective Paisley prepared the

affidavit for the search warrant and executed the warrant related to the investigation of

the appellant and her co-defendant. To establish probable cause, the detective used a CI to conduct three controlled buys from the residence subject to the warrant. Law

enforcement outfitted the appellant with audio and video surveillance equipment.

{¶7} At the time Detective Paisley drafted the warrant application, he had no

reason to doubt the CI’s reliability. After the warrant was issued, the detective learned

that the CI had previously failed to return buy money after a controlled buy, and was later

indicted for stealing from the drug task force. The CI also had over forty criminal and traffic

charges including a felony conviction for a drug-related offense involving a firearm. The

detective did not include this information in his affidavit because he was unaware of it

when the affidavit was submitted.

{¶8} The Detective further testified that in all prior instances which he used this

CI, video and audio surveillance corroborated the CI’s statements.

{¶9} On January 6, 2025, the trial court overruled the appellant’s motion to

suppress.

{¶10} On January 13, 2025, the appellant entered into a plea agreement, pleading

no contest to one count of Trafficking in a Fentanyl-related Compound in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2) with an accompanying forfeiture specification in violation of R.C.

2941.1417(A) and one count of Having Weapons While Under Disability in violation of

R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) with an accompanying forfeiture specification in violation of R.C.

2941.1417.

{¶11} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raised the following

assignment of error:

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO

SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM A SEARCH WARRANT BASED ON AN AFFIDAVIT CONTAINING MATERIAL OMISSIONS REGARDING THE CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMANT’S RELIABILITY.”

I.

{¶13} In the appellant’s sole assignment of error, the appellant argues the trial

court erred in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a

search warrant because law enforcement omitted information from the search warrant

affidavit and by sustaining objections to defense questions limiting testimony to what law

enforcement knew at the time they prepared the affidavit. We disagree.

(a) Sufficiency of warrant affidavit

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶14} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶8. When ruling on a motion to suppress,

the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact, and is in the best position to resolve

questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. Id. See, also, State v. Dunlap, 73

Ohio St.3d 308, 314 (1995), quoting State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982).

Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings if competent

credible evidence exists to support those findings. See, Burnside, supra; and State v. Hill,

2024-Ohio-522, ¶16 (5th Dist.).

{¶15} However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true, it must

independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal

standard. See Burnside, supra; and, Hill, supra. “That is, the application of the law to the

trial court’s findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas, supra. Moreover, due weight should be given ‘to inferences drawn from those facts by resident

judges and local law enforcement officers.’ ” Hill, supra.

ANALYSIS

{¶16} As she did in her motion to suppress before the trial court, Rush argues the

affidavit supporting the search warrant contained material omissions, which were made

with reckless disregard for the truth.

{¶17} A search warrant and its supporting affidavits are presumed valid. State v.

McDaniel, 2015-Ohio-1007, ¶27 (5th Dist.) citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171,

98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). “ ‘To successfully attack the veracity of a facially

sufficient search warrant affidavit, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the affiant made a false statement, either “intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth.” ’ ” State v. McKnight, 2005-Ohio-6046, ¶31, quoting State v.

Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 441 (1992), quoting Franks at 155-156. “Reckless disregard

means that the affiant had serious doubts of an allegation’s truth. Omissions count as

false statements if designed to mislead, or * * * made in reckless disregard of whether

they would mislead, the magistrate.” Waddy at 441.

{¶18} Detective Paisley acknowledged omitting the CI’s criminal history from the

affidavit because he was unaware of that history at the time he submitted it. The appellant

argues that because Detective Paisley spoke with the prosecutor’s office prior to using

the CI, then he should have known about the criminal history. However, during cross-

examination, the appellant failed to explore the depth or subject matter of those

conversations. Accordingly, the appellant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Detective Paisley omitted the CI’s criminal history and propensity for

dishonesty was done with a reckless disregard for the truth.

(b) The trial court erred in issuing evidentiary rulings limited the

defense’s ability to establish a Franks violation.

{¶19} The appellant also summarily argues that the trial court erred by limiting the

appellant’s ability to establish a Franks violation. We disagree.

{¶20} The appellant has failed to provide citations to statute, case law, rules of

evidence, or learned treatise from this or any other jurisdiction to support her argument.

The appellant even fails to present a standard of review.

{¶21} App.R. 16 states, in pertinent part:

Brief of the Appellant. The appellant shall include in its brief, under the headings

and in the order indicated all of the following:

**

(7) an argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each

assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on

which appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.

{¶22} App.R. 12(A)(2) states, “(2) The court may disregard an assignment of error

presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which

the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief,

as required under App.R. 16(A).” {¶23} An appellate court may rely upon App.R. 12(A) in overruling or disregarding

an assignment of error because of “the lack of briefing” on the assignment of error. Hawley

v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157 (1988). “Errors not treated in the brief will be regarded as

having been abandoned by the party who gave them birth.” Uncapher v. Baltimore & O.R.

Co. 127 Ohio St. 351 (1933). “ ‘It is not the function of this court to construct a foundation

for [an appellant’s] claims; failure to comply with the rules governing practice in the

appellate courts is a tactic which is ordinarily fatal.’ ” State v. Romy, 2021-Ohio-501, ¶36

(5th Dist.); quoting Catanzarite v. Boswell, 2009-Ohio-1211, ¶16 (9th Dist.).

{¶24} The appellant has failed to show support for the contention that the trial

court erred by sustaining the State’s objections. “If an argument exists that can support

[an] assignment of error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.” Romy at ¶35. Therefore,

we may disregard this issue since she failed to support her argument with any competent

legal authority.

{¶25} Accordingly, the appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION

{¶26} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Muskingum County Court of

Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.

{¶27} Costs to the appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

King, J. and

Popham, J. concur.