307 Ga. 477 FINAL COPY
S19A0995. THE STATE v. RUMPH.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), the State appeals from an
interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Columbia County
suppressing two statements that Christopher Rumph made to law
enforcement officers prior to his arrest on murder and other criminal
charges. The trial court suppressed the statements on the ground
that the police had failed to give Rumph Miranda1 warnings prior to
interviewing him. The State contends that the trial court erred in
suppressing the statements because, as Rumph was not in custody,
Miranda warnings were not required. For the following reasons, we
agree and reverse the trial court’s order.
“The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s
statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard
considering the totality of the circumstances.” (Citation and
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). punctuation omitted.) Norwood v. State, 303 Ga. 78, 80 (2) (810 SE2d
554) (2018). When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
admit or suppress evidence, “an appellate court must construe the
evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings
and judgment of the trial court.” Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746
(1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015). This means that the reviewing court
generally must accept the trial court’s findings as to disputed facts
unless they are clearly erroneous, although the reviewing court may
also consider facts that “definitively can be ascertained exclusively
by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no
questions of credibility,” such as facts indisputably discernible from
audio- or video-recordings. Id. at 746 (1) n. 5. Viewed in this way,
the evidence presented at the Jackson-Denno2 hearing, which
consisted of the testimony of an investigator and the audio- and
video-recordings of the investigator’s recorded interviews with
Rumph, shows the following.
On November 16, 2016, Jerry Whitten’s body was found at his
2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
2 place of work, Springwood Nursery in Columbia County. He had
been shot to death. Deputies with the Columbia County sheriff’s
office learned that the last person to see the victim alive was his co-
worker, Rumph. The two had worked the night shift together and
had driven to various job sites to make deliveries. Shortly after the
victim was found dead, the lead investigator, Sergeant Ryan
Whittle, telephoned Rumph and asked whether he and another
investigator could visit Rumph at his home and ask him some
questions about Whitten. Rumph agreed. Thereafter, Whittle spoke
with Rumph at Rumph’s home. Whittle audio-recorded this first
interview.
Whittle testified that he made no threats nor promises to
Rumph nor suggested that Rumph was a suspect or under arrest
during the interview at Rumph’s home. Rather, he informed Rumph
that he was investigating Whitten’s death and that, because Rumph
was the last person to see the victim before he was killed, he wanted
to “rule [Rumph] out” as a possible suspect. Whittle testified that he
did not give Rumph Miranda warnings. Rumph was cooperative and
3 signed a form consenting to a search of his car and clothes. The
audio-recording of this interview reveals that Whittle did not say
anything to indicate that Rumph was in custody or required to
cooperate with the investigation. Rumph did not say that he wanted
to stop the interview. In his conversation with Whittle, Rumph
described what he and the victim had done that night, where they
had made deliveries, and whether anything unusual happened, like
whether strangers had followed them or Rumph had seen anyone
lurking in the parking lot. Rumph also recounted his activities after
he left work that morning, which consisted of going home and
resting, then driving around, drinking coffee, and waiting for the
Department of Driver Services to open so that he could renew his
truck driver’s certificate.
After this interview, the investigators left. They returned
about 20 minutes later, however, to ask Rumph if he would ride with
them to the nursery and show them around the premises. According
to Whittle, Rumph agreed. This encounter was not recorded. Whittle
testified that Rumph rode in the front seat of the patrol car and that
4 a second investigator rode in the back. Rumph showed Whittle
where the victim had parked his car and how employees entered the
nursery premises.
Whittle testified that, shortly after visiting the nursery, he
asked Rumph to give a video-recorded statement at the sheriff’s
office substation, and Rumph agreed. Whittle testified that Rumph
was not restrained in any way and that he was free to leave at any
time, although he did not expressly tell Rumph that. Whittle also
testified that he stopped the interview to allow Rumph to take
cigarette breaks. Although an officer accompanied Rumph during
his breaks, he did so because guests were not allowed to move about
unaccompanied through secure areas of the sheriff’s office.
The video-recording of the interview shows that the interview
room door was often left open and that people entered and exited the
room freely, suggesting that it was unlocked. The recording also
shows that Rumph had his keys and cell phone with him. During the
interview, Rumph received a call from his mother, and he told her
that he was in the middle of an interview. He asked his mother if
5 she would pick him up at the substation after he finished talking to
Whittle. Rumph also asked if he could go outside and smoke a
cigarette, and he was allowed to do so, accompanied by an officer.
After returning from his cigarette break, Whittle offered to take
Rumph home so that his mother did not have to pick him up. At the
investigator’s request, Rumph allowed the investigator to perform a
gunpowder residue test and to copy the contents of his cell phone.
The video-recording reveals that Rumph remained in the
substation for another hour, often taking long breaks from the
interview while Whittle performed other tasks or while Rumph left
to take cigarette and coffee breaks. The recording shows that the
interview room door was propped open and that, at one point,
Rumph returned to the room alone. When the interview resumed,
Whittle asked Rumph about his relationship with the victim.
Rumph said the two had clashed initially over politics but that they
no longer argued. Rumph’s mother called again and asked Rumph if
he was being forced to talk to the investigators; he emphatically
responded “no” and assured his mother that they were just asking
6 him questions about his co-worker. When Rumph’s mother pressed
the issue, Whittle said “no” loudly so that Rumph’s mother could
hear him say that Rumph was not required to talk to him. Rumph
told his mother that they were “just talking” and that he would be
done “in a minute.”
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307 Ga. 477 FINAL COPY
S19A0995. THE STATE v. RUMPH.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), the State appeals from an
interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Columbia County
suppressing two statements that Christopher Rumph made to law
enforcement officers prior to his arrest on murder and other criminal
charges. The trial court suppressed the statements on the ground
that the police had failed to give Rumph Miranda1 warnings prior to
interviewing him. The State contends that the trial court erred in
suppressing the statements because, as Rumph was not in custody,
Miranda warnings were not required. For the following reasons, we
agree and reverse the trial court’s order.
“The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s
statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard
considering the totality of the circumstances.” (Citation and
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). punctuation omitted.) Norwood v. State, 303 Ga. 78, 80 (2) (810 SE2d
554) (2018). When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
admit or suppress evidence, “an appellate court must construe the
evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings
and judgment of the trial court.” Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746
(1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015). This means that the reviewing court
generally must accept the trial court’s findings as to disputed facts
unless they are clearly erroneous, although the reviewing court may
also consider facts that “definitively can be ascertained exclusively
by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no
questions of credibility,” such as facts indisputably discernible from
audio- or video-recordings. Id. at 746 (1) n. 5. Viewed in this way,
the evidence presented at the Jackson-Denno2 hearing, which
consisted of the testimony of an investigator and the audio- and
video-recordings of the investigator’s recorded interviews with
Rumph, shows the following.
On November 16, 2016, Jerry Whitten’s body was found at his
2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
2 place of work, Springwood Nursery in Columbia County. He had
been shot to death. Deputies with the Columbia County sheriff’s
office learned that the last person to see the victim alive was his co-
worker, Rumph. The two had worked the night shift together and
had driven to various job sites to make deliveries. Shortly after the
victim was found dead, the lead investigator, Sergeant Ryan
Whittle, telephoned Rumph and asked whether he and another
investigator could visit Rumph at his home and ask him some
questions about Whitten. Rumph agreed. Thereafter, Whittle spoke
with Rumph at Rumph’s home. Whittle audio-recorded this first
interview.
Whittle testified that he made no threats nor promises to
Rumph nor suggested that Rumph was a suspect or under arrest
during the interview at Rumph’s home. Rather, he informed Rumph
that he was investigating Whitten’s death and that, because Rumph
was the last person to see the victim before he was killed, he wanted
to “rule [Rumph] out” as a possible suspect. Whittle testified that he
did not give Rumph Miranda warnings. Rumph was cooperative and
3 signed a form consenting to a search of his car and clothes. The
audio-recording of this interview reveals that Whittle did not say
anything to indicate that Rumph was in custody or required to
cooperate with the investigation. Rumph did not say that he wanted
to stop the interview. In his conversation with Whittle, Rumph
described what he and the victim had done that night, where they
had made deliveries, and whether anything unusual happened, like
whether strangers had followed them or Rumph had seen anyone
lurking in the parking lot. Rumph also recounted his activities after
he left work that morning, which consisted of going home and
resting, then driving around, drinking coffee, and waiting for the
Department of Driver Services to open so that he could renew his
truck driver’s certificate.
After this interview, the investigators left. They returned
about 20 minutes later, however, to ask Rumph if he would ride with
them to the nursery and show them around the premises. According
to Whittle, Rumph agreed. This encounter was not recorded. Whittle
testified that Rumph rode in the front seat of the patrol car and that
4 a second investigator rode in the back. Rumph showed Whittle
where the victim had parked his car and how employees entered the
nursery premises.
Whittle testified that, shortly after visiting the nursery, he
asked Rumph to give a video-recorded statement at the sheriff’s
office substation, and Rumph agreed. Whittle testified that Rumph
was not restrained in any way and that he was free to leave at any
time, although he did not expressly tell Rumph that. Whittle also
testified that he stopped the interview to allow Rumph to take
cigarette breaks. Although an officer accompanied Rumph during
his breaks, he did so because guests were not allowed to move about
unaccompanied through secure areas of the sheriff’s office.
The video-recording of the interview shows that the interview
room door was often left open and that people entered and exited the
room freely, suggesting that it was unlocked. The recording also
shows that Rumph had his keys and cell phone with him. During the
interview, Rumph received a call from his mother, and he told her
that he was in the middle of an interview. He asked his mother if
5 she would pick him up at the substation after he finished talking to
Whittle. Rumph also asked if he could go outside and smoke a
cigarette, and he was allowed to do so, accompanied by an officer.
After returning from his cigarette break, Whittle offered to take
Rumph home so that his mother did not have to pick him up. At the
investigator’s request, Rumph allowed the investigator to perform a
gunpowder residue test and to copy the contents of his cell phone.
The video-recording reveals that Rumph remained in the
substation for another hour, often taking long breaks from the
interview while Whittle performed other tasks or while Rumph left
to take cigarette and coffee breaks. The recording shows that the
interview room door was propped open and that, at one point,
Rumph returned to the room alone. When the interview resumed,
Whittle asked Rumph about his relationship with the victim.
Rumph said the two had clashed initially over politics but that they
no longer argued. Rumph’s mother called again and asked Rumph if
he was being forced to talk to the investigators; he emphatically
responded “no” and assured his mother that they were just asking
6 him questions about his co-worker. When Rumph’s mother pressed
the issue, Whittle said “no” loudly so that Rumph’s mother could
hear him say that Rumph was not required to talk to him. Rumph
told his mother that they were “just talking” and that he would be
done “in a minute.”
After Whittle pointedly questioned Rumph about allegations
that Rumph and the victim had a strained relationship, Rumph said
that he wanted a lawyer and asked if Whittle was charging him with
anything. Whittle responded that he had no intention of charging
Rumph. Whittle stopped questioning Rumph, volunteered again to
take him home, and then left the room. The video-recording shows
that Rumph waited alone while the property clerk returned his
phone and had him sign paperwork concerning it. During this time,
Rumph left the interview room on his own and asked someone if he
could see the detective again. According to Whittle, Rumph declined
the offer to drive him home; instead, Rumph called his mother to
come get him. The video-recording shows that the detective told
Rumph that they were in the process of getting search warrants for
7 his property and home. Shortly thereafter, the recording ends and,
according to Whittle, Rumph left the substation and went home.
The investigators later executed a search warrant at Rumph’s
home. Upon finding a handgun and spent shell casings in Rumph’s
bedside table drawer, they arrested Rumph on a charge of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After the arrest, Rumph
asked to speak with Whittle. Whittle conducted a third video-
recorded interview. Whittle gave Rumph Miranda warnings, and
Rumph signed a waiver-of-rights form. Rumph agreed to speak
without an attorney present. During this third interview, Rumph
claimed for the first time to have a mental condition and that,
because of the condition, he was unable to control his behavior.
At the conclusion of the Jackson-Denno hearing, the State
argued that the recorded statements from the first and second
interviews were voluntary and non-custodial and that the third
statement, though custodial, was also voluntary and made after
Rumph was given Miranda warnings. Rumph’s attorney objected
only to the admission of the third statement. The trial court
8 admitted Rumph’s third statement, finding that it was freely and
voluntarily made. However, the trial court summarily ruled that
Rumph was in custody when he gave the first two statements and
that, because Whittle had failed to give Rumph Miranda warnings,
which are required prior to custodial interrogation, the first two
statements were inadmissible. The trial court made no explicit
credibility determinations and did not explain its basis for finding
that Rumph’s first two statements were custodial.
In general, “Miranda warnings are required when a person is
(1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with
a formal arrest. Unless a reasonable person in the suspect’s
situation would perceive that he was in custody, Miranda warnings
are not necessary.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Freeman v.
State, 295 Ga. 820, 822-823 (3) (764 SE2d 390) (2014). Because
Rumph had not been formally arrested when he gave the statements
that the trial court suppressed, the critical inquiry in this case is
whether a reasonable person in Rumph’s situation would have
perceived that he was in custody. In this case, the record does not
9 support the trial court’s finding that Rumph was in custody during
his first two interviews. The evidence presented during the Jackson-
Denno hearing does not support a finding that Rumph was
restrained or that a reasonable person in Rumph’s situation would
have perceived that he was in custody in these circumstances.
With respect to the first interview at Rumph’s home, the
evidence shows that Whittle telephoned Rumph and asked for and
received his permission to speak with him at home prior to going
there. Whittle testified that he did nothing to intimidate or coerce
Rumph into speaking with him. Further, even if we assume that the
trial court rejected Whittle’s uncontradicted testimony entirely
(even though the trial court did not state anything to that effect
during the hearing or in its order), the audio-recording of the
interview shows that Whittle did not use harsh, intimidating, or
coercive language. Rather, he asked for Rumph’s help because
Rumph was the last person to see the victim alive. The interview
was conversational and consisted primarily of Whittle’s efforts to
trace the victim’s steps and to learn what, if anything, Rumph had
10 witnessed while he was working with the victim. Nothing in the
audio-recording suggests that a reasonable person in Rumph’s
situation would have perceived that he was in custody.
With respect to the second interview, Whittle testified that
Rumph agreed to go with the investigators to the sheriff’s office to
give a statement. Again, even if the trial court rejected Whittle’s
testimony, the video-recording of the interview does not support a
finding that a reasonable person in Rumph’s position would perceive
that he was in custody. Rumph retained possession of his keys and
his phone and was allowed to take phone calls and leave the
interview room for breaks. Rumph was often left alone in the
interview room, and the door of the room was often propped open.
And, during the course of the interview, Rumph spoke with his
mother on the phone and told her that he was not being forced to
talk with the investigator and that he expected to leave the office
soon. When Rumph asked if he was being charged with anything,
Whittle said “no” and Rumph left the substation shortly thereafter.
11 Because the evidence did not authorize the trial court to
conclude that Rumph had been formally arrested or that a
reasonable person in Rumph’s situation would perceive that he was
in custody, Miranda warnings were not required. See Drake v. State,
296 Ga. 286, 289 (2) (766 SE2d 447) (2014) (The defendant’s pre-
Miranda statements were properly obtained and were admissible
because the defendant was not in custody during the initial
interview. The evidence reflected that investigators requested
rather than demanded to speak with the defendant, the defendant
agreed voluntarily to go to the police station, and the defendant was
never physically restrained or threatened.). Consequently, the trial
court erred in suppressing Rumph’s audio- and video-recorded
statements on this basis.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED DECEMBER 23, 2019. Murder. Columbia Superior Court. Before Judge Brown.
12 Natalie S. Paine, District Attorney, Joshua B. Smith, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Keith B. Johnson, for appellee.