State v. Rojas

2024 Ohio 2209, 245 N.E.3d 906

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 10, 2024
• Docket: CA2023-07-007 CA2023-06-006
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Rojas, 2024-Ohio-2209.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

PREBLE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NOS. CA2023-07-007 CA2023-06-006 : - vs - OPINION : 6/10/2024

ROSALINDA CAROL ROJAS, :

Appellant. :

APPEALS FROM PREBLE COUNTY COURTS OF COMMON PLEAS, GENERAL DIVISION, Case No. 21CR013712 and JUVENILE DIVISION, Case No. 20212074

Martin P. Votel, Preble County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kathryn M. West, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Charlyn Bohland, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.

HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Rosalinda Carol Rojas, appeals from a reverse bindover decision

in which the Preble County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, concluded that

she was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system following her guilty plea to

felonious assault. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court's decision. Preble CA2023-07-007 ______CA2023-06-006

{¶ 2} On July 15, 2021, appellant, then 17 years old, used a machete to attack

the victim, T.D., at a campsite in Hueston Woods State Park. T.D. sustained several deep,

life-threatening injuries to her legs, arms, chest, and head that required surgery. At the

time of the attack appellant was under the influence of LSD.

{¶ 3} A complaint was filed in the Preble County Juvenile Court on July 20, 2021

alleging that appellant was a delinquent child for committing acts that if charged as an

adult would constitute one count of attempted murder, a felony of the first degree, two

counts of felonious assault, second-degree felonies, and one count of assault, a

misdemeanor of the first degree. The state filed a motion for mandatory bindover to the

Preble County Court of Common Pleas so that appellant could be prosecuted as an adult

in accordance with R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i). That statute provides that if a complaint is

filed alleging a child is a delinquent child for committing acts that if charged as an adult

would constitute attempted murder, the juvenile court must transfer the case so that the

child can be prosecuted as an adult if the child was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the

act charged and there was probable cause to believe that the child committed the act

charged. Though felonious assault would normally be a discretionary-bindover offense

under R.C. 2152.10, where it is filed as part of the same case as the attempted murder

charge, "'the statute requires transfer of that charge as well.'" State v. Rojas, 12th Dist.

Preble No. CA2021-11-013, 2022-Ohio-2333, ¶ 3, quoting State v. Echols, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 19AP-587, 2021-Ohio-4193, ¶ 16.

{¶ 4} The juvenile court held a probable cause hearing on the state's motion for

mandatory bindover on July 28, 2021. On August 2, 2021, the juvenile court issued an

entry granting the state's motion after finding that appellant was 17 years old at the time

of the attack and that there was probable cause to believe appellant committed all the

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acts making up the four charged offenses. That same day, the Preble County Grand Jury

returned an indictment charging appellant with one count of first-degree felony attempted

murder.

{¶ 5} Appellant entered a not guilty plea to the indictment. While awaiting trial,

appellant was held at a juvenile detention facility. On September 22, 2021, the common

pleas court held a change of plea hearing wherein appellant entered a guilty plea to a

reduced charge of second-degree felonious assault. In consideration of appellant's guilty

plea to felonious assault, the remaining charges were dismissed. The common pleas

court accepted appellant's guilty plea upon finding that the plea was knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered. On October 11, 2021, the common pleas court held

a sentencing hearing and sentenced appellant to an indefinite sentence of a minimum six

years in prison to a maximum nine years in prison. Appellant was also ordered to pay

court costs and restitution to the victim in the amount of $3,303.19. Following the

imposition of her sentence, appellant was transferred into the custody of the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("ODRC").

{¶ 6} Appellant appealed her sentence, arguing that the common pleas court

erred in imposing a sentence without adhering to the reverse-bindover procedures set

forth in R.C. 2152.121. "Reverse bindovers occur in cases where juveniles who were

transferred to adult court are subsequently convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, offenses that

would not have qualified for mandatory * * * transfer to adult court in the first instance."

State v. Peak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112842, 2024-Ohio-735, ¶ 12, citing R.C.

2152.121(B). See also State v. D.B., 150 Ohio St.3d 452, 2017-Ohio-6952, ¶ 13

(Reverse-bindover procedures are "required if the crimes for which convictions were

obtained, had they been delinquency charges, would have subjected the juvenile's case

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only to discretionary, rather than mandatory transfer proceedings"). Under those

circumstances, the common pleas court imposes an adult sentence, stays the sentence,

and returns the case to the juvenile court through a reverse bindover for the imposition of

a serious youthful offender ("SYO") disposition. R.C. 2152.121(B)(3). However, if the

prosecutor files an objection to the imposition of a SYO disposition, the juvenile court

must hold an amenability hearing to determine "whether the child is not amenable to care

or rehabilitation within the juvenile system and whether the safety of the community may

require that the child be subject solely to adult sanctions." R.C. 2152.121(B)(3)(b).

Because the common pleas court did not apply the reverse-bindover procedures set forth

in R.C. 2152.121(B)(3) to appellant's case following her guilty plea to felonious assault,

we reversed her sentence and remanded the case for consideration and application of

R.C. 2152.121. See Rojas, 2022-Ohio-2333 at ¶ 10.

{¶ 7} Upon remand, the common pleas court transferred the case to the juvenile

court for a SYO disposition. Appellant was removed from prison and placed at the West

Central Juvenile Detention Center ("WCJDC").

{¶ 8} On August 3, 2022, the prosecutor filed an objection to a SYO dispositional

sentence and requested a hearing on appellant's amenability. The prosecutor also moved

for a new amenability evaluation, noting that a prior amenability evaluation that had been

conducted by Dr. Joyce McGhee, Psy.D., in August 2021 was a year old.1 In that report,

Dr. McGhee had opined that appellant, who at the time had been 17 years and 9 months

old, was "amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system." Appellant's legal

1. Dr. McGhee's amenability evaluation was conducted on August 5, 2021. Her written report, dated September 1, 2021, was not filed with the juvenile court until September 8, 2021. No amenability hearing was held following the filing of Dr. McGhee's evaluation as appellant was subject to mandatory bindover on the then-pending attempted murder charge.

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counsel agreed that an updated amenability evaluation was necessary. The juvenile court

ordered a new evaluation and scheduled an amenability hearing for October 10, 2022.

{¶ 9} On September 2, 2022, just two months shy of her 19th birthday, appellant

was evaluated by Dr. Carla S. Dreyer, Psy.D. The in-person evaluation lasted

approximately one hour and 25 minutes. During that time, Dr. Dreyer administered the

Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and evaluated appellant using the HCR-20v3, "a

structured clinical judgment risk assessment instrument used for individuals over the age

of 18" that "indicates an assessment of historical factors, present clinical factors, and

future risk management factors."2 On September 19, 2022, Dr. Dreyer filed a written

report with the juvenile court in which she expressed her professional opinion that "given

[appellant's] risk for future violence and reoffending, risk factors, lack of protective factors,

age, and history, [appellant] is not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system at this

time."

{¶ 10} Appellant requested a continuance of the amenability hearing and the

appropriation of funds for a second amenability evaluation. The juvenile court granted

the motion and appellant was evaluated by Dr. Daniel D. Hrinko, Psy.D., on October 26

and November 11, 2022. The evaluation consisted of a clinical interview lasting two and

one-half hours and psychological testing lasting three and one-half hours. Dr. Hrinko

assessed appellant utilizing the HCR-20v3 checklist as well as the Minnesota Multiphasic

Personality Inventory-2RF ("MMPI-2-RF") and the Jesness Inventory Revised ("JI-R"). In

2. Dr. Dreyer explained in her written report that the HCR-20v3, rather than the Structured Assessment for Violence Risk in Youth ("SAVRY"), was utilized in appellant's evaluation because of her age. Dr. Dreyer explained the SAVRY "is often used in evaluation related to a youth's amenability to treatment for possible transfer to the adult criminal justice system. That is, the SAVRY is a checklist of risk and protective factors to assist in the assessment of a juvenile's risk for violence. However, this measure is for individuals aged 12 through 18. Given that [appellant] is currently 18 years, 10 months old, the SAVRY was not used in the current assessment."

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a report dated November 15, 2022, Dr. Hrinko stated, "it is the opinion of this evaluator

that [appellant] is a good candidate for rehabilitation within the services available within

the juvenile justice system and that [appellant] does not pose a significant hazard to the

safety of the community."3

{¶ 11} On February 15 and March 10, 2023, the juvenile court conducted an

amenability hearing. At the time of the hearing, appellant was approximately nineteen-

and-one-half years old. The hearing commenced with the parties stipulating to the

admission of certain exhibits, including Dr. McGhee's September 2021 report, medical

records for T.D., appellant's report cards from WCJDC, and appellant's institutional

summary report from ODRC. Additional exhibits, including Dr. Dreyer's September 19,

2022 report, Dr. Hrinko's November 15, 2022 report, behavior logs from appellant's stay

at WCJDC, photographs from the crime scene at Hueston Woods, appellant's recorded

statements to law enforcement following her attack on T.D., an October 14, 2019 Incident

Report from the Hamilton Police Department, and a January 25, 2020 Arrest Report from

the Hamilton Police Department, were also entered into evidence at the hearing. The

court heard testimony from witnesses called by both parties. The state presented

testimony from the Ohio Department of Nature Resources (ODNR) officer who was first

on the scene at Hueston Woods, the ODNR detective who investigated the incident, the

victim of the attack and her mother, the MedFlight paramedic who treated and transported

T.D. after the attack, and Dr. Dreyer. The defense presented testimony from Dr. Hrinko,

Chuck Bechard, a teacher who taught appellant while she was held at WCJDC, and

Jessica Jefferson, the Program Administrator for the Ohio Department of Youth Services

("DYS"). The defense also sought to introduce testimony from B.D., another individual

3. Dr. Hrinko's written report was not filed with the juvenile court until December 1, 2022.

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who had gone camping with appellant and T.D., but he did not appear when subpoenaed.

B.D.'s recorded statement to law enforcement was entered into evidence.

{¶ 12} The witnesses' testimony and the exhibits entered into evidence indicated

that appellant, T.D. and B.D. were camping in Hueston Woods on July 15, 2021. T.D. had

taken marijuana and LSD on the camping trip. Appellant, T.D. and B.D. each took four

tabs of LSD. It was appellant's second time using LSD.

{¶ 13} Although appellant and T.D. were not romantically involved, appellant began

touching T.D. in a sexual manner. The touching began in T.D.'s car and continued in T.D.'s

tent. T.D. rebuffed appellant's advances, forcefully pushing appellant away. Appellant

became angry, storming out of the tent and screaming in pure rage. When appellant did

not calm down, B.D. called T.D. to come out of the tent and help deal with appellant's

behavior.

{¶ 14} As soon as T.D. exited the tent, appellant struck T.D. on the head with a

machete, fracturing her skull and knocking her to the ground.4 Appellant continued to

strike appellant with the machete, causing numerous injuries to T.D.'s body. T.D.'s tibia

and fibula were fractured in her left leg and she received a number of lacerations to her

left leg, left forearm, and left chest. An artery in T.D.'s left arm was severed and an artery

in her left leg was nicked. As T.D. lay bleeding on the ground, she asked appellant if she

was going to die and appellant said, "Yes, yes you are."

{¶ 15} Law enforcement and emergency paramedics responded to the scene.

Appellant was secured in the back of a police vehicle while T.D. was treated. T.D. required

two tourniquets to stave blood flow and she was transported to a nearby hospital where

she underwent emergency surgery to repair the severed and nicked arteries. T.D. then

4. T.D. brought the machete to the campground to cut firewood for a campfire.

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faced a lengthy recovery. She was unable to walk for nearly six months and underwent

physical therapy for approximately eight months. As of the date of the amenability

hearing, she still had nerve damage to a couple of fingers. In addition to the physical pain

and suffering she experienced, T.D. testified she was still dealing with the psychological

ramifications of the attack. She now suffers from anxiety, anger issues, and PTSD. Her

ability to work and attend college has been negatively impacted by the incident.

{¶ 16} Dr. Dryer testified that as part of her evaluation of appellant, she conducted

a clinical interview, administered the PAI and the HCR-20v.3 to appellant, spoke with

appellant's maternal grandmother and grandfather, and reviewed Dr. McGhee's

September 2021 amenability report, appellant's juvenile court records, school records,

records pertaining to the attack on T.D., records from WCJDC, and records from

appellant's treatment at the Central Clinic/CDC from 2010 and 2011. Dr. Dreyer noted

appellant's intellectual functioning was estimated to be in the low-average range, but that

appellant's thoughts were logical, coherent, and goal directed and her judgment during

the assessment was appropriate. Dr. Dreyer found that appellant's maturity, both

emotionally and psychologically, was similar to that of her same-age peers.

{¶ 17} Dr. Dreyer explained that the results of the PAI were deemed invalid

because of the manner in which appellant had responded to the testing. Appellant had

attempted to "portray herself as being kind of exceptionally free of difficulties." As for the

HCR-20v3, Dr. Dreyer explained that it is a "checklist of risk factors for violent behavior"

wherein historical factors, present clinical factors, and future risk management factors are

examined. The factors are scored as being "present," "partially present or possibly

present," or "absent."

{¶ 18} Of the ten historical factors the assessment looks at, four factors were found

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to be present (history of problems with violence, other antisocial behavior, substance use,

and traumatic experiences), five factors were found to be partially or possibility present

(history of problems with relationships, problems with employment, the existence of a

personality disorder, the existence of violent attitudes, and problems with treatment or

supervision), and one risk factor was absent (history of problems with major mental

disorders).

{¶ 19} With respect to appellant's history of problems with violence, in addition to

appellant's machete-attack on T.D., appellant's school records indicated she once

threatened a peer with scissors and punched other children. As for her antisocial

behaviors, there were a number of occasions where appellant broke the rules or engaged

in criminal behavior. She began using marijuana at age 11. Once she reached high

school, she began to skip school frequently. She was involved with the juvenile court for

issues relating to truancy, theft, the commission of traffic offenses, and for possessing

marijuana at school. She failed to attend juvenile court hearings on the various offenses

identified above and was ordered by the juvenile court to spend a few days at the Juvenile

Detention Center for failing to appear. At the time of her arrest for the attack on T.D.,

appellant had an outstanding warrant with the juvenile court for failing to attend a court

appearance. However, appellant had never been committed to DYS as a juvenile court

disposition.

{¶ 20} As for appellant's substance use issues, Dr. Dreyer noted that appellant has

a "long-standing history of marijuana abuse," which started when she was 11 years old.

Appellant reported using 4 grams of high-grade marijuana daily. Appellant also admitted

to using ecstasy and to having used LSD on one occasion prior to the date of the attack

on T.D. Appellant was once caught in school with marijuana in her sock, which resulted

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in her taking "drug classes." Appellant also admitted to nicotine, tobacco, and alcohol

use.

{¶ 21} Dr. Dreyer noted appellant has experienced a number of traumatic

experiences in her life, including childhood neglect, an unstable upbringing, and a history

of contacts with Children Services. Appellant's parents separated when she was two and

she had minimal involvement with her biological father. He was deported to Mexico when

she was 11 years old. Appellant's mother had substance abuse issues, which appellant

witnessed firsthand when she saw her mother overdose and when her mother took

appellant and her half-siblings to "dope houses." Appellant's mother died of complications

from drug use in either 2018 or 2019.

{¶ 22} Mother's substance abuse issues led to appellant being placed in foster

care for a few weeks when she was a baby and again when she was in the third grade.

In both instances, appellant's maternal grandfather was able to obtain custody. Appellant

lived with her stepfather, half-siblings, and maternal grandparents at the time of offense

against T.D.

{¶ 23} As for appellant's partially or possibly present history of problems with

relationships, Dr. Dreyer noted that appellant has a history of associating with peers who

were "one or two years older" who "hav[e] a history of contacts with the court and us[e]

marijuana." Appellant has also had problems with romantic relationships in the past.

Appellant had a "long-term" romantic relationship that lasted over three years, which she

described as "toxic" and full of arguments and verbal abuse. Appellant then engaged in

a relationship with another inmate while in prison. Her pursuit of this relationship led to

multiple violations of the prison's rules.

{¶ 24} Appellant also had a partially or possibly present history of problems with

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employment. She quit one job after working at the job for only a week. She obtained

another job where she worked for approximately three months before being arrested for

the attack on T.D. Appellant had been scheduled to work on the day of the attack on T.D.,

but she skipped work to go to Hueston Woods.

{¶ 25} Dr. Dreyer felt appellant had features of an underlying personality disorder

"which were apparent in terms of her history and are consistent with [a] history of trauma."

Though appellant had some antisocial personality features and dependent relationship

features, Dr. Dreyer did not believe that appellant "ha[d] enough of the characteristics to

qualify for a full diagnosis of a personality disorder." As for appellant's possibly or partially

present "violent attitude," Dr. Dreyer noted that appellant "has had a history of using

aggression and being violent in various settings," including at school, during a fight in

prison, and the attack in Hueston Woods.

{¶ 26} Dr. Dreyer also noted that appellant had previous involvement in outpatient

services and she had not responded well to that treatment. After being found with

marijuana at school, appellant had to participate in outpatient substance abuse treatment.

Appellant also participated in outpatient treatment through Central Clinic/CDC when she

was younger, around 2010 and 2011. Despite the treatment she received, appellant

continued her drug use and other behavioral problems.

{¶ 27} With respect to the absent historical factor, Dr. Dreyer noted that appellant

did not have any major mental disorders. However, historical records indicated that in

2011, appellant had been diagnosed by CDC with an adjustment disorder with mixed

disturbance of emotions and conduct due to self-reported "sadness and problematic

behaviors in school that increased after her mother's release from a residential drug

rehabilitation program." Dr. Dreyer also noted that Dr. McGhee's 2021 evaluation

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suggested a diagnosis of a generalized anxiety disorder as well as a cannabis use

disorder.

{¶ 28} Turning to the HCR-20v3's "present clinical factors," Dr. Dreyer explained

that she looked at the factors with reference to the six months immediately prior to the

assessment. There are five clinical factors the assessment looks at, and Dr. Dreyer found

that one factor was present (recent problems with insight), two factors were partially or

possibly present (recent problems with violent ideation or intent and problems with

treatment or supervision responses), and two factors were absent (recent problems with

symptoms of major mental disorder and instability).

{¶ 29} Dr. Dreyer noted that appellant had very little, if any, insight into her

substance abuse issues or her need for treatment to address some of the major difficulties

in her life. During her evaluation, appellant "denied the need for further treatment to

address her criminal thinking or substance abuse." She had also denied mental health

services when she was first placed in prison. While in prison and at WCJDC, appellant

"continued to engage in rule-breaking behaviors * * * with little, if any, insight into such."

Dr. Dreyer noted that appellant was moved up a security level due to her refusal to comply

with rules while she was in prison. Appellant had a total of 20 rule infractions in the ten

months she was held in prison.

{¶ 30} Finally, Dr. Dreyer discussed the five future risk management factors that

applied to appellant. Dr. Dreyer noted that these factors were "rated with consideration

for [appellant] being released [in]to the community." Two of the risk management factors

were found to be present (future problems with professional services and plans and

problems with her living situation) and three factors were found to be partially or possibly

present (future problems with personal support, problems with treatment or supervision

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responses, and problems with stress or coping). Appellant would presumably return to

the home that she shared with her grandparents and her stepfather. Though appellant

had a good relationship with her relatives, she had a history of breaking the rules in their

care. Appellant's truancy and drug use were permitted to occur without any real

consequences while in her grandparents' care. Dr. Dreyer was also concerned that

appellant's grandparents had painted appellant as the victim in the situation and assigned

blame to T.D. for appellant's circumstances. Appellant's grandparents felt T.D. was at

fault because she brought the LSD and had been over 18 when the incident occurred.

{¶ 31} Dr. Dreyer was also concerned about whether appellant would comply with

supervision and treatment requirements. She noted that appellant had immediately gone

back to using marijuana after completing a substance abuse course. Appellant had also

continued her rule-breaking behavior while in prison and in the WCJDC. In her written

report, Dr. Dreyer noted that appellant "has a history of rule-breaking behaviors and

criminal thinking, as well as substance abuse. She reported continuing to engage in

problematic behaviors in a structured setting (i.e., prison) with no insight into her risk

management needs."

{¶ 32} Dr. Dreyer considered the results of the HCR-20v3 assessment in light of

the factors identified in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). She found that appellant's lack of insight

into her need for treatment and change would be a barrier to treatment and would

lengthen the amount of time appellant would need for treatment. Dr. Dreyer did not

believe appellant would make sustained changes or be rehabilitated in the period of time

left before her 21st birthday. She therefore did not think appellant was amenable to

rehabilitation within the juvenile system. Her professional opinion was summarized, in

relevant part, as follows in her written report:

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It is clear that [appellant] has a history of contacts with the Court, with the instant offense representing her most serious charges. She has continued to engage in rule-breaking behaviors since her arrest and incarceration, with little, if any, insight into such. Further, she frankly denied the need for any future treatment or intervention. While she may be in need of further intervention, there is a limited amount of time left for such in the Juvenile Court and her prognosis for sustained change with any intervention is guarded, at best. Thus, given her history and presentation, it does not appear that [appellant] would substantially benefit from further services or intervention within the Juvenile Court system.

* * * It is my professional opinion that given her risk for future violence and reoffending, risk factors, lack of protective factors, age, and history, [appellant] is not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system at this time.

{¶ 33} Dr. Hrinko then testified about his evaluation of appellant. He explained that

as part of his evaluation, he conducted a clinical interview with appellant, administered

the HCR-20v3 checklist, the MMPI-2-RF test, and JI-R test, reviewed the amenability

evaluations conducted by Dr. McGhee and Dr. Dreyer, reviewed records pertaining to the

incident in Hueston Woods, reviewed appellant's school records, and reviewed

appellant's mental health and institutional records from ODRC, WCJDC, and the Butler

County Juvenile Detention Center. With respect to the HCR-20v3 checklist, Dr. Hrinko

looked at the same historical factors, present clinical factors and risk management factors

that Dr. Dreyer examined, but he reached a different conclusion as to appellant's

amenability for rehabilitation or treatment in the juvenile system.

{¶ 34} Dr. Hrinko agreed with Dr. Dreyer that appellant had experienced a lot of

trauma in her life. He noted that appellant's mother's drug abuse was a significant source

of the early childhood trauma appellant experienced. Appellant also experienced trauma

from the long-term "toxic" relationship she had, which began when appellant was in eighth

grade and did not end until a few months before the incident in Hueston Woods. Appellant

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had described the relationship as abusive and noted that the police had been called to

her home at one point.

{¶ 35} Dr. Hrinko explained that appellant began to self-medicate herself through

the use of marijuana starting around age 11. As appellant aged, she began to experiment

with other drugs, including methamphetamine. Dr. Hrinko was under the impression that

the day appellant attacked T.D. was the first time appellant had used LSD. Dr. Hrinko

testified that appellant relied upon drugs as a coping mechanism. As a result, "she failed

to develop more mature coping skills, such as sharing information, trusting relationships,

looking at other ways of coping that a normally developing adolescent would be expected

[to use]." He suggested that appellant's emotional development stopped around the time

she started using drugs, at age 11.

{¶ 36} Dr. Hrinko believed appellant was in need of "significant services pertaining

to her underlying trauma and understanding how her substance use was a way of

managing * * * because once she began to address the underlying trauma and developed

appropriate, more socially acceptable coping skills, then her ability to avoid substances

would be much easier." Dr. Hrinko noted that after appellant was caught with marijuana

at school, she was sent to an educational program on substance abuse. Appellant initially

did not comply with the rules of that program. However, after learning she would be

expelled from school if she did not complete the program, appellant changed her behavior

long enough to graduate from the program. Appellant did not, however, make any real

changes following the completion of the program. She celebrated her graduation day by

using drugs and getting high.

{¶ 37} Dr. Hrinko also noted that appellant had received "brief counseling services"

following her mother's death and had been seen at a mental health agency for school

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behavior problems. However, appellant had a dismissive attitude and failed to make use

of those services or opportunities. Despite noting "[t]here are concerns associated with

[appellant's] limited response to treatment/supervision in the past," Dr. Hrinko

nonetheless believed appellant's attitude and willingness to engage in services had

improved. Appellant never denied her need for treatment to Dr. Hrinko. He believed

appellant had gained insight into her use of drugs and was willing to work with a therapist

to address her drug use and past traumas. He noted that at one point, while in prison,

appellant had reached out and asked for some crisis mental health services. Appellant

had also attended approximately 12 therapy sessions since being removed from prison

and placed back in the WCJDC. According to Dr. Hrinko, appellant was "appropriately

making use" of those appointments to address her feelings on the possible outcomes of

the amenability hearing. Although, Dr. Hrinko acknowledged, "there was never any

evidence of her beginning to use that opportunity to explore those deeper issues [(i.e.,

trauma or substance abuse issues)] that underlie this whole situation."

{¶ 38} Dr. Hrinko was aware of appellant's antisocial tendencies, her prior

involvement with the juvenile court for truancy, theft, and traffic offenses, and her past

refusals to show up for certain court proceedings, which resulted in brief periods of

detention by the juvenile court (two three-day periods of detention). He was also aware

that appellant had violated multiple prison rules and rules at WCJDC. He acknowledged

that appellant's "response to supervision opportunities have been less than stellar."

Nonetheless, he did not believe any rules that were violated at WCJDC were from

significant behavior problems. He also did not believe appellant's rule violations while in

prison were significant. Rather, he believed that the rule infractions appellant were the

result of appellant adjusting to her new environment and an "exploitive" relationship with

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an older inmate.

{¶ 39} Dr. Hrinko did not believe appellant had a history of fights or aggressive

behaviors, outside of the incident involving T.D. However, he admitted on cross-

examination that he had not been aware that appellant had received a rule infraction in

prison for engaging in a fight with another inmate. He also had not been aware that

appellant had punched her school-peers and had once threatened a peer with scissors.

When confronted with this information, he indicated that it would "cause him to look at an

increase in the severity of her past behaviors," but even considering such information, it

did not "carry sufficient weight to cause [him] to completely overhaul his opinion" that she

was amenable to rehabilitation within the services available within the juvenile justice

system.

{¶ 40} Dr. Hrinko believed appellant's conduct over the six months prior to the

hearing indicated she was capable of complying with the rules of juvenile detention and

any treatment program. He stated:

My experience tells me that placed in an appropriate residential type treatment program where there is stability and predictability for at least 12 to 18 months [appellant] would then be in a position to allow her to engage in a therapeutic relationship, receive the support necessary, and explore those issues bringing them to a reasonable understanding within 12 to 18 months to prepare her for what the next phase of her life might have to offer.

***

I understand that time is somewhat short given [appellant's] age, but I believe if she was in a secure environment with access to trauma-informed mental health therapy and substance abuse treatment programming, with the emphasis on the trauma-informed mental health therapy, that she could be given the opportunity and I believe would likely make use of that to begin to explore these concepts about trusting relationships, how her past has made it difficult for her to understand what is in her best interest, and to develop

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appropriate coping skills that will eventually serve her well upon returning to the community. I believe it would take a minimum of 12 and probably 18 months for that to take full effect because there will be times of progress and regression. It's typical of the treatment process.

Based on the results of the HCR-20v3 checklist, Dr. Hrinko was of the opinion that

appellant's "risk for future aggressive and/or inappropriate behaviors is moderate

although the risk of imminent violence or serious physical harm is low."

{¶ 41} According to Dr. Hrinko's written report, the MMPI-2-RI assessment

indicated appellant had "a significant history of antisocial behaviors" and was "at risk for

acting out when bored and [using] abuse mood altering substances." Additionally, there

were indicators that suggested appellant "is driven primarily by external motivating factors

and may, as a result, be hesitant to engage in treatment activities." Dr. Hrinko expected

it would take appellant several treatment sessions before she started getting serious

about addressing her underlying trauma and substance abuse issues.

{¶ 42} Dr. Hrinko also administered the JI-R test, which is used to identify different

personality types. Though appellant had several behaviors that could fall within a

personality disorder marked by antisocial features, Dr. Hrinko did not believe appellant

had well-developed antisocial tendencies. He did not think she had a commitment to

criminal thinking and behaviors but, rather, could benefit from services to adjust her

antisocial attitude. He noted that appellant "views the world in terms of power and control

and goes to great effort to control herself, her situations, and others to meet her needs.

She is somewhat distrustful of those in authority and benefits from clarity and certainty in

her environment." He opined that "she is likely to respond well to introspective therapy"

and "[w]hen engaged in such services, she is likely to benefit resulting in significant

changes in her overall functioning." Though Dr. Hrinko did not personally know what

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residential facility would best lend itself to a placement for appellant, he was confident

DYS would be able to identify and arrange an appropriate placement. He therefore

opined that appellant was "a good candidate for rehabilitation within the services available

within the juvenile justice system and that [appellant] does not pose a significant hazard

to the safety of the community."

{¶ 43} Bechard, who has taught appellant at the WCJDC for approximately two-to-

three hours per day, five days a week, testified that appellant is one of three detainees

over the age of 18 at WCJDC. She is currently focused on obtaining her GED.

{¶ 44} At WCJDC, Bechard helps facilitate two group-based programs, a "Go for

the Gold" course aimed at instructing juveniles on building relationships and setting

boundaries with others and a drug and alcohol group program where juveniles talk about

addiction and learn to set goals and priorities. Bechard does not run either program but

is present and helps the counselors who run the programs. Appellant's report card, which

detailed her activities at the WCJDC from August 17, 2022 through January 4, 2023,

indicated that she had taken 20 hours of Alcohol and Drug Prevention Education, 17 hours

of Establishing Healthy Relationships Education through the "Go for the Gold" program,

and 8 hours of Anger Management courses. Bechard described appellant as a "willing

participant" in those group programs, and he observed her asking thoughtful questions

and being supportive of other juveniles. Bechard has never observed appellant act

inappropriately with staff and appellant has never been aggressive or violent in his

presence.

{¶ 45} Jefferson explained that all female youths committed to DYS are first sent

to the Children for Adolescent Services ("CAS"), where DYS conducts a review of any

prior psychological evaluations or records pertaining to the juvenile and an independently

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licensed therapist conducts a mental health assessment so that DYS can determine what

services, beyond those ordered by a judge, should be offered to the juvenile. Female

juvenile delinquents are either kept at CAS or sent to one of three stepdown facilities:

Applewood Center, Osterland, or Buckeye Ranch. All three stepdown facilities are lock-

down facilities. Osterland, however, is the only facility other than CAS that houses

delinquents who are over the age of 18. All facilities are set up to offer cognitive

behavioral therapy, dialectical behavioral therapy, substance abuse treatment, intensive

mental health treatment, trauma therapy, and occupational therapy. All juveniles receive

cognitive behavioral therapy and dialectical behavioral therapy. Other therapies are

provided if ordered by the juvenile court or if the juvenile's intake information indicated

the juvenile would benefit from receiving the services. For instance, Jefferson explained,

if a juvenile's intake information indicated she had a history of trauma in her life, the

juvenile would be provided with trauma-informed therapy.

{¶ 46} Jefferson explained that all female juvenile delinquents committed to DYS

are on a mental health caseload. Those housed in CAS meet weekly with a mental health

provider and with an occupational therapist. Those housed at one of the stepdown

facilities meet with a mental health provider three times a week. They also meet with a

"life skills" group three times a week, where they are taught daily living skills.

{¶ 47} Jefferson testified that most youth "spend at least 18 months" in DYS where

they receive ongoing therapy and services. Even those delinquents who deny committing

a crime or deny that they need treatment must participate in group therapy. Jefferson

stated that 12 to 18 months would be enough time to complete substance abuse treatment

and anger management programming. While a juvenile is committed to DYS, there are

monthly meetings with the juvenile's treatment team to discuss the juvenile's progress

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and any appropriate treatments. The treatment team includes Jefferson and the juvenile's

parents, mental health providers, parole officers, and social workers.

{¶ 48} Jefferson explained that a juvenile who has completed treatment and been

approved to re-enter the community before they attain the age of 21 is placed on parole

upon release from DYS. For those juveniles who do not complete treatment, they are

held at a DYS facility until they attain the age of 21. At that time, they are released from

DYS's custody and encouraged to participate in a voluntary mentorship program. They

are also encouraged to participate in voluntary programs that assist with housing and

schooling. However, because the juvenile court loses jurisdiction when a juvenile turns

21 years old, DYS cannot make participation in the mentorship program or any other

program mandatory.

{¶ 49} The juvenile court took the forgoing testimony and evidence under

advisement. On May 18, 2023, the juvenile court issued a decision finding that appellant

was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system and that the safety

of the community required that she be subject solely to adult sanctions. In reaching this

conclusion, the juvenile court considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(D), which

favored transfer to adult court, against those factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(E), which

weighed against transfer. The court found that none of the factors in R.C. 2152.12(E)

weighing against transfer applied, but that six factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) favoring transfer

applied. The court concluded that the "factors in favor largely outnumber the factors

against transfer and the expert that ultimately recommended transfer was far more

credible." The juvenile court therefore sustained the state's objection to a SYO disposition

and ordered that appellant be transferred back to the adult court for the imposition of her

adult sentence.

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{¶ 50} After appellant was transferred back to the common pleas court, the court

reinstated the sentence it originally imposed—an indefinite prison sentence of a minimum

of six years and a maximum of nine years, payment of court costs, and an order of

restitution to T.D. in the amount of $3,303.19. Appellant timely appealed from the juvenile

court's amenability determination and from the sentence imposed by the common pleas

court. This court consolidated the appeals. See State v. Rojas, Preble CA2023-06-006

and CA2023-07-007 (July 27, 2023) (Entry of Consolidation).

{¶ 51} Appellant now raises the following as her sole assignment of error:

{¶ 52} THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

DETERMINED THAT [APPELLANT] WAS NOT AMENABLE TO TREATMENT IN THE

JUVENILE SYSTEM, IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2152.12(B); 2152.121; FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I,

SECTION 10, OHIO CONSTITUTION.

{¶ 53} Appellant argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding she was

not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system. She contends that the

evidence introduced at the amenability hearing demonstrated that she could benefit from

trauma-informed treatment at DYS, that there was sufficient time for her to be rehabilitated

in the juvenile system before she reached age 21, and that the safety of the community

would be adequately protected by a juvenile disposition, especially as a SYO disposition

provided an extra layer of protection. She further contends that the juvenile court erred

in crediting Dr. Dryer's opinion over those of Dr. Hrinko and Dr. McGhee.

{¶ 54} In determining whether a child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation

within the juvenile court system and whether the safety of the community may require that

the child be subject solely to adult sanctions, a juvenile court "shall consider the factors

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listed in division (E) of [R.C. 2152.12] as factors indicating that the [prosecutor's] motion

[for transfer to the adult court] should not be granted, and shall consider whether the

applicable factors listed in division (D) of that section outweigh the applicable factors listed

in division (E) of that section." R.C. 2152.121(B)(3)(b). "If the juvenile court at the hearing

finds that the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or

that the safety of the community may require that the child be subject solely to adult

sanctions, the court shall grant the motion." Id.

{¶ 55} The state bears the burden of persuasion when asking the juvenile court to

transfer the case to adult court, though "the state need not produce affirmative evidence

of nonamenability." State v. Nicholas, 171 Ohio St.3d 278, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 57. "[A]

juvenile court's decision to exercise its discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult court must

be supported by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at ¶ 35. "An appellate court

reviews a juvenile court's determination regarding a juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation

or treatment in the juvenile system under and abuse-of-discretion standard [of review]."

Id. at ¶ 22. "If there is some competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's

decision, there is no abuse of discretion." Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397,

401 (1998).

{¶ 56} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D), the factors that favor transfer to adult court

include the following:

(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.

(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.

(3) The child's relationship with the victim facilitated the act

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charged.

(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity.

(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child's person or under the child's control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.

(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction.

(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system.

(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.

(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system.

R.C. 2152.12(D)(1)-(9).

{¶ 57} The factors that weigh against a transfer to adult court are set forth in R.C.

2152.12(E) and including the following:

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged.

(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act charged.

(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person.

(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property, or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur, in allegedly committing the act charged.

(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent

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child.

(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.

(7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability.

(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public safety

R.C. 2152-12(E)(1)-(8).

{¶ 58} "No one factor under R.C. 2152.12(D) or (E) is outcome determinative."

State v. Jordan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111547, 2023-Ohio-311, ¶ 11. "If, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the trial court concludes that the factors in favor of the

transfer outweigh those against, the statutory analysis is satisfied." Id., citing Nicholas,

2022-Ohio-4276 at ¶ 35. The record reflects that the juvenile court properly considered

whether appellant was amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system, weighing

the statutory factors that favored transfer to the adult court against the statutory factors

that favored the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction. The juvenile court made six

findings that weighed in favor of transfer: (1) T.D. suffered physical harm and

psychological harm, R.C. 2152.12(D)(1); (2) appellant's relationship with T.D. facilitated

the charged acts, R.C. 2152.12(D)(3); (3) at the time of the incident, there was a warrant

for appellant out of the Butler County Juvenile Court for failing to attend a court date and

appellant had previously been involved with the Butler County Juvenile Court for issues

of truancy, substance abuse, theft, and driving without a license, R.C. 2152.12(D)(6); (4)

the results of previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicated that rehabilitation of

appellant would not occur in the juvenile system, R.C. 2152.12(D)(7); (5) appellant was

emotionally, physically, and psychologically mature enough for the transfer to adult court

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as she had demonstrated "street smarts" and "advanced maturity" in prison by entering

into a romantic partnership and procuring items that did not belong to her, R.C.

2152.12(D)(8); and (6) there was not sufficient time to rehabilitate appellant within the

juvenile system as there was just over 17 months available in the juvenile system, the

experts had suggested appellant would need a minimum of 12 to 18 months in treatment

to have a chance at being successful, and there were doubts as to appellant's insight into

her need for treatment. We find that the testimony and exhibits entered into evidence at

the amenability hearing support these findings.

{¶ 59} We further find, contrary to appellant's assertions, that the trial court

considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(E) that weighed against transfer to the

adult court, as well as the various traumas that appellant has faced, in making its

amenability determination. Though the juvenile court did not find that any of the factors

in R.C. 2152.12(E) weighed against transfer to the adult court, it did note in its discussion

of factor (E)(1) that T.D. had planned the camping trip and brought the LSD and marijuana

on the trip. The court found, however, in its discussion of factor (E)(3), that appellant had

voluntarily taken the LSD and had not been acting under the negative influence or

coercion of another at the time of the attack. In considering appellant's emotional,

psychological, and physical maturity, the court noted that Dr. McGhee's September 2021

report had discussed appellant's immaturity. However, the court noted that the report was

written when appellant had only been 17 years old. At the time of the amenability hearing,

appellant was 19 and one-half years old. Dr. Hrinko had found that there were no

indications that appellant was childish or immature in her thoughts and actions. Dr. Hrinko

did indicate, however, that appellant's coping skills were "basically at that of an eleven

(11) year old" due to starting her drug use at that stage. The juvenile court indicated that

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while that might cause one to question her emotional and psychological maturity,

appellant's actions while in prison indicated she was mature. The court stated:

[Appellant] has been in the adult system and she was able to secure items that were not hers * * * and found a partner, whether abusive or not. (She told one expert that it was an abusive relationship, although he was not sure there was actually abuse and though that it was maybe more of a manipulation. [Appellant] did not tell the other evaluator anything negative about the prison relationship.) Such behavior points to some "advanced" maturity insofar as "street smarts."

{¶ 60} As for factor (E)(7), the court found that appellant did not have an intellectual

disability. Rather, she was in the low-average to average intellectual range. She likewise

had not been diagnosed with a mental illness, though Dr. Hrinko had indicated a

"reasonable likelihood that she suffers from a substance use disorder." Both Dr. Hrinko

and Dr. Dreyer believed appellant exhibited antisocial behaviors, which the juvenile court

took into consideration.

{¶ 61} The juvenile court also considered the amount of time appellant had left in

the juvenile court system before she turned 21, whether that time was sufficient to

rehabilitate her, and whether the level of security available in the juvenile system provided

a reasonable assurance of public safety under R.C. 2152.12(E). At the time the court

issued its amenability decision on May 18, 2023, appellant had 17 and one-half months

left before her 21st birthday. The experts believed appellant would need a minimum of

12-18 months of treatment to have a chance at treatment being successful. Even if

appellant was immediately connected with appropriate services and was genuinely

interested in getting better, there were concerns that her traumatic history and her

personality traits might make her hesitant to engage in treatment activities.

{¶ 62} Furthermore, there were concerns about whether appellant had insight into

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her need for treatment. Though Dr. Hrinko believed appellant had recently gained insight

into her need for treatment, Dr. Dreyer felt differently. Dr. Dreyer believed appellant lacked

insight, as evidenced by appellant's denial of her need for treatment during her

amenability evaluation with Dr. Dreyer and appellant's refusal of mental health services

when first placed in prison. As the juvenile court noted, "treatment to assist one in gaining

insight * * * takes more time."

{¶ 63} The juvenile court indicated that while it was not concerned about public

safety while appellant was housed in a juvenile facility such as DYS, as "[s]uch are locked

facilities," it was concerned for public safety "if [appellant] [was] released at twenty-one

(21) without having completed the necessary treatment." The juvenile court found that

given appellant's history involving violence, which included a history of violence against

school peers, a fellow prisoner, and T.D., her pattern of disregarding rules, and her limited

insight into her need for treatment, appellant's "reintroduction to general society without

competing the extensive services necessary to manage her long-standing trauma and

substance abuse is concerning from a public safety standpoint."5

{¶ 64} From the record before us, we find that the juvenile court's findings and its

discussions of the applicable factors under R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) are supported by the

preponderance of the evidence. Though appellant may disagree with the weight afforded

to the relevant statutory factors, this is insufficient to show that the juvenile court's findings

were based on erroneous facts or an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable

application of R.C. 2152.12. See In re M.A., 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2018-07-005, 2019-

5. Appellant argues the incidents of violence against her school peers are of limited relevance because they were committed around 2010 and 2011, when she was around 8 years old and was facing trauma in her life. Even though they occurred when appellant was much younger, the incidents still demonstrate a history of violence and aggressive behaviors. Dr. Dreyer and the juvenile court were therefore permitted to consider these events when looking at appellant's amenability in the juvenile system and the safety of the community.

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Ohio-829, ¶ 33; State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112633, 2024-Ohio-729, ¶ 29-

31; State v. Cunningham, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1136, 2022-Ohio-3497, ¶ 100-101.

{¶ 65} We further find no error in the juvenile court's decision to credit Dr. Dreyer's

expert opinion over that of Dr. Hrinko's or Dr. McGhee's opinions. Dr. McGhee's

evaluation was out-of-date, as it was conducted in August of 2021, when appellant was

only 17 years and 9 months old. In forming her opinion that 17-year-old appellant was

amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, Dr. McGhee did not have

access to information about appellant's continued lack of insight, her refusal to accept

mental health services in prison, or her continued antisocial behavior while in prison and

WCJDC. As for Dr. Hrinko's written opinion, it failed to take into account certain facts,

such as appellant's violence against her school peers, that she had been involved in a

fight in prison, and that her use of LSD on the day of the attack on T.D. was her second

time using the drug. As the court noted,

Dr. Hrinko did not realize * * * that [appellant] had other incidents of violence. He did not know that she told the other two experts that she had used LSD before. He also did not include that there had been a fighting incident in prison. He claims such did not sway him from the position that [appellant] should not be transferred back to adult court, but his shortcomings are more concerning than Dr. Dreyer's [typos in her written report].

The court was further troubled by Dr. Hrinko's "weighing" of the HCR-20v3 factors, which

Dr. Dreyer had indicated were only supposed to be marked as either being present,

partially present or possibly present, or absent. Finally, the court indicated "[a]nother

concerning part of Dr. Hrinko's report [was] his discussion (and report) of the incident

[involving T.D.] from [appellant's] perspective. Such is contrary to the Ohio Revised

Code." See R.C. 2152.12(F)(4) ("No report of an investigation conducted pursuant to

division [C] of this section shall include details of the alleged offense as reported by the

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child"). Given these circumstances, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its

discretion in finding Dr. Dreyer's expert opinion more credible and affording more weight

to her testimony.

{¶ 66} Appellant also suggests that the juvenile court failed to give proper weight

to the type of treatment available to appellant if she was sent to a DYS facility. In

summarizing Dr. Hrinko's testimony as it related to factor 2152.12(D)(7), the trial court

stated, in relevant part, that "[t]he defense expert believes [appellant] could be

rehabilitated in the juvenile system, but also indicated that he did not know anything about

the placement(s) available. He also acknowledged that he did not know what specific

treatment(s) had been offered [to] her." Appellant contends that by making this statement,

the court "discounted [DYS programming's] impact because the defense expert wasn't

familiar with DYS's programming." Appellant contends this resulted in reversible error

and, in support of her argument, cites to State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276.

{¶ 67} In Nicholas, the juvenile court granted the state's motion to transfer Nicholas

to adult court based on its finding that DYS did not have the "'resources or capability' to

treat dissociative-identity disorder, which requires long-term intensive treatment with 24-

hour-a day and 7-days a week supervision and support." Id. at ¶ 15. However, there was

no evidence to support the finding that Nicholas required that type of care. Rather, such

a finding contradicted the expert testimony offered at the amenability hearing. The

Supreme Court reversed, stating in pertinent part the following:

Here, the juvenile court's decision that Nicholas is not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation in the juvenile system was based on a perception that DYS lacks the necessary resources to treat Nicholas's mental illness—a perception that is not only unsupported by the record but that is, in fact, contrary to the reality established by the record. Absent that misperception, the juvenile court's amenability determination is not supported by the preponderance of the

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evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 56.

{¶ 68} Here, unlike in Nicholas, the juvenile court did not find that DYS lacked the

resources to treat appellant or ignore testimony offered by Jefferson about the type of

treatment available to appellant if placed in a DYS facility. Rather, the court clearly

considered Jefferson's testimony and the options for treatment at DYS, but found, in light

of Dr. Dreyer's evaluation and the limited amount of time left before appellant's 21st

birthday, that appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. Nothing

about the court's determination was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.

{¶ 69} Finally, appellant argues the trial court should have considered the

"increased options for accountability" that a SYO disposition provided the court if it would

have denied the state's motion and imposed a juvenile disposition. However, the Ohio

Supreme Court expressly held that "a juvenile court need not consider all potential

juvenile dispositions, including a serious-youthful-offender disposition, when balancing

the factors weighing in favor of and against transfer." Id. at ¶ 57. The juvenile court,

therefore, did not error in electing not to consider an SYO disposition in its weighing of

the factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E).

{¶ 70} Accordingly, following our review of the record, we find no abuse of

discretion in the juvenile court's determination that appellant was not amenable to

rehabilitation in the juvenile system. The record clearly reflects that the juvenile court

weighed the appropriate statutory factors listed in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) and there is

competent, credible evidence in the record to support the court's findings. Appellant's

sole assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.

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{¶ 71} Judgment affirmed.6

S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.

6. Appellant's sole assignment of error is related to the appeal in Case No. CA2023-06-006, regarding the decision in Preble County Juvenile Court Case No. 20212074. Appellant filed a separate appeal in Case No. CA2023-07-007, pertaining to the common pleas court's sentencing on the felonious assault conviction in Case No. 21CR013712. The appeals were consolidated. Appellant's brief did not raise any assignments of error challenging the proceedings of the common pleas court or the sentence imposed by the common pleas court. Since we do not have an assignment of error to resolve relating to Case No. 21CR013712, the trial court's judgment in that case is also affirmed. See, Ford v. Crawford, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28717, 2021-Ohio-454, ¶ 4.

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