State v. Robinson

2023 Ohio 825

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 15, 2023
• Docket: 22 CA 15 & 22 CA 16
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Robinson, 2023-Ohio-825.]

COURT OF APPEALS KNOX COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J. Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs- Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 SARAH M. ROBINSON

Defendant-Appellant OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. 21CR03-0042 and 22CR06-0117

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

CHARLES T. MCCONVILLE TODD W. BARSTOW NICOLE E. DERR 261 West Johnstown Road KNOX COUNTY PROSECUTORS Suite 204 117 East High Street, Suite 234 Columbus, Ohio 43230 Mount Vernon, Ohio 43050 Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 2

Wise, J.

{¶1} Appellant Sarah M. Robinson appeals the July 25, 2022, judgment of

conviction and sentence of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is State

of Ohio.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On March 9, 2021, in Knox County case 22CA000015, the Knox County

Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs, in

violation of R.C. §2925.11(A).

{¶3} On June 2, 2022, in Knox County case 22CA000016, Appellant was charged

by information with one count of Assault, in violation of R.C. §2903.13(A) and one count

of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence in violation of R.C.

§4511.19(A)(1)(a). Later on June 2, 2022, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the

charges in both cases.

{¶4} On July 21, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing

Appellee presented the facts that on January 6, 2021, Appellant was stopped for a traffic

violation, a canine sniff indicated the presence of narcotics. After a search of the vehicle,

law enforcement found a small amount of methamphetamine. Appellee also presented

facts that on May 13, 2022, Appellant operated a motor vehicle involved in an accident.

She was unsteady on her feet and slurring her speech. She became combative with law

enforcement officers and bit a patrolman.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶5} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and herein raises the following

Assignment of Error: Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 3

{¶6} “I. APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND

VOLUNTARILY ENTER HER PLEAS OF GUILTY, IN VIOLATION OF HER RIGHT TO

DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION SIXTEEN OF THE

OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

I.

{¶7} In Appellant’s first Assignment of Error, Appellant argues she did not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. We disagree.

{¶8} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and

the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).

{¶9} Crim.R. 11 governs rights upon plea. In pertinent part, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)

states:

Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant

understands that by the plea the defendant is waving the rights to jury trial,

to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to

prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

{¶10} The standard for a trial court’s Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) constitutional

notifications is strict compliance. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200,

897 N.E.2d 621. “Strict compliance does not require an exact recitation of the precise Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 4

language of the rule, but instead focuses on whether the trial court explained or referred

to the right in a manner reasonably intelligent to that defendant.” State v. Schmick, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95210, 2011-Ohio-2263, ¶8.

{¶11} “ ‘This Court along with several courts, including the Ohio Supreme Court,

has held there is no requirement that a trial court inform a defendant of his right to a

unanimous verdict.’” State v. Johnston, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 17CA000022, 2017-Ohio-

8593, ¶12, quoting State v. Rogers, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2008-0066, 2009-Ohio-

4899; State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 810 N.E.2d 927, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶44-

46; State v. Barnett, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060950, 2007-Ohio-4599; State v.

Coleman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26008, 2012-Ohio-1712, ¶12.

{¶12} Appellant points to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos

v. Louisiana, 206 L.Ed.2d 583, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020) in support of revisiting our decision

in Johnston. In Ramos, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right to a jury trial, incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a

unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense. However, Ohio has

always recognized unanimity.

{¶13} In State v. Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No 109852, 2021-Ohio-2676, ¶17-18,

the Eighth District Court of Appeals spoke directly to this issue:

Ohio has long recognized that a nonunanimous jury verdict is

unconstitutional and void. Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296, 296 (1853). Work

had been charged with assault and battery and convicted by a jury of six

men in probate court. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the legislation

regulating the practice of probate courts was unconstitutional and void Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 5

because it provided for a jury of six. Id. The court went to find that because

the right to a trial by jury is so fundamental, “the number of jurors cannot be

diminished, or a verdict authorized short of a unanimous concurrence of all

the jurors. Id. at 306. In 1933, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this court’s

decision finding a Cuyahoga County rule allowing for juries of six

unconstitutional. Cleveland R. Co v. Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 282, 188

N.E. 1 (1933). Decades later, in July 1973, Crim.R. 23 went into effect,

creating a uniform statewide rule that “[i]n felony cases juries shall consist

of twelve.” Crim R. 23(B)

The Ramos decision explicitly recognized Ohio’s long history of

requiring unanimity, noting that the Ohio Supreme Court in Work referred to

unanimity as “one of ‘the essential and distinguishing features of the trial by

jury.’” Ramos at 1423, quoting Work. Further, this right is explicitly protected

in Crim.R. 31(A) and implicitly protected in the Ohio Constitution. Thus, the

Ramos decision did not recognize a new constitutional right for criminal

defendants in Ohio like Scott. Further, neither Crim.R. 11(C) nor Ramos

impose an obligation on courts to inform a defendant about the exact

contours of a jury trial.

{¶14} We agree with the Eighth District Court of Appeals. Defendants have always

possessed the right to be convicted by a unanimous jury verdict. The Ramos decision

did nothing to alter that right nor the specific requirements of the Crim.R. 11 plea

colloquy. {¶15} Even though Appellant is correct that, had her case proceeded to a jury trial,

unanimity would have been required for a conviction and the trial court did not explicitly

inform her of unanimity requirement, neither Crim.R. 11 nor Ramos require the trial court

to do so.

{¶16} Upon review of the record, we find the trial court strictly complied with

Crim.R. 11. Appellant was informed of her right to a jury trial, indicated she understood

the right, and that she was waiving that right by pleading guilty. Therefore, Appellant’s

plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.

{¶17} Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.

{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of

Knox County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.

JWW/br 031