State v. Robert McKnight

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JUNE SESSION, 1999

FILED August 5, 1999

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9810-CC-00310 Cecil Crowson, Jr.

)

Appellate Court Clerk

Appellee, )

) ) MADISON COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. ROY B. MORGAN, JR.

ROBERT M. McKNIGHT, ) JUDGE )

Appe llant. ) (Habeas Corpus)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

C. MARK DONAHOE PAUL G. SUMMERS 312 East Lafayette Street Attorney General and Reporter P.O. Box 2004 Jackson, TN 38302-2004 PATRICIA C. KUSSMANN Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243

JERRY W OODALL District Attorney General

SHAUN A. BROWN Assistant District Attorney General P.O. Box 2825 Jackson, TN 38302

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

OPINION

In this appeal we determine whether the Defendant’s sentences for two

DUI conviction s expired during the time the s heriff could not incarcerate the

Defendant due to an overcr owde d jail. Th e trial co urt ruled that the Defe ndan t’s

sentences had not expired. We agree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 7, 1997, the Defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of

DUI, second offense and DUI, third offense.1 For these convictions, he received

consecu tive senten ces of ele ven mo nths an d twenty-n ine days in the cou nty

workhouse. He was ordered to serve 150 days in confinement for one of the

convictions, followed by sixty days co nfinem ent for the o ther con viction, with the

balance of his sente nces to be s erved on pro bation . His effective sentence was

thus two years, with 2 10 days to be serv ed in con fineme nt. 2

The Defendant imm ediate ly presented himself to the county sheriff’s office

to begin serving his sentences. He was told that no spac e was availab le for him

to serve his sentences and that he would be notified when to report. In August

of 1998, the Defen dant rec eived no tice from th e sheriff’s off ice that he w as to

report to begin serving his effective 210-day sentence.

On September 3, 1998, the Defendant filed a “Motion for Post-Conviction

Relief and/or W rit of Habe as Cor pus.” He asserted that the notification to report

1 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403.

2 The Defendant was also convicted of and sentenced for other offenses, none of which is relevant to the issues presented in this appeal.

3

to jail came over one year after his sentences became final and stated tha t “[t]o

require the Defendant to serve a sentence after expiration of the sentence is a

violation of the Defendant’s due process rights, violation of the credit for time at

liberty doctrin e and is a violation of the principle o f fundam ental fairne ss.”

The trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendant’s motion, at which

time the pa rties stip ulated to the p ertinent facts as stated herein. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial cou rt denied the D efendant re lief from h is

sentences, relying on th e provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-

403(p)(3). From this order, the Defendant now appeals.

In this appeal, the Defendant relies primarily on State v. Walker, 905

S.W.2d 554 (T enn. 1995). The facts presented in Walker were qu ite similar to

those presented in the case at b ar. On August 27, 1990, Defendant Walker was

convicted of DUI and received a jail sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine

days, with all but twen ty days su spend ed. Id. at 555 . He re ported to the s heriff’s

office to begin serving his sentence and was told that no space was available and

that he would b e notified w hen to re port. Id. Almost two years later he received

the notice to re port to jail. Id. He sought relief from his sentence, alleging that

it had exp ired. Id. The trial court denied Walker relief and this Court affirmed,

however, our supreme court granted Walker re lief. Id. The C ourt bas ed its

decision upon a n interpre tation of our statutes, holding that “where persons under

a crimina l sente nce im med iately pr esen t them selves to the a pprop riate

authorities for incarc eration and a re turn ed aw ay the s enten ce in each case shall

begin to run when the judgment of conviction becomes final or the prisoner is

actually incarcerated , whichever is earlier.” Id. at 557.

4

In Walker, our supreme court first discussed the due process and

fundamental fairness concerns, including the “cred it for time at liberty” doctrine:

The effect of an inordinate delay in the execution of a criminal judgment has been frequently litigated in other courts. Even w here the delay results from simple negligence or oversight, the courts have recognized that relief from the sentence might be ava ilable on due process grounds. In [these] cases the courts also analyzed the claims on the basis of waiver or estoppel but refused relief on any basis because of the high standard that must be met before relief is available. (The State’s action “must b e so affirm atively wron g or its inaction so grossly negligent that it would be un equivo cally inconsistent with ‘fundamental principles of libe rty and justic e’ to require a legal sentence to be served in the aftermath of such action of inaction.”)

Another doctrine called “cred it for time at liberty” has been invoked where the de fendant has been incarce rated unde r a criminal judgmen t but erroneou sly released thro ugh no fault of h is own. Unde r those circ umsta nces the courts hold that his sentence continues to run wh ile he is at liberty. We know of no instance, however, where this doctrine has been applied to a situation w here no time at all has been served.

In other cases, most of them in the state courts, where the defendant has presented himself for incarceration and has been refused admission for some reason (an overcr owde d jail or s imple inaction on the part of the jailer) the courts have said that the sentence began to run w hen th e defe ndan t did all that was required of him to allow the imposition of the criminal sentence.

The lack of in depth analysis in some of the state case s—p articula rly the part played by state statutes—persuades us that there is no uniform constitutional standard that has been applied in cases where a defe ndan t is refus ed ad miss ion to th e jail because of overcrowded conditions. We cannot say that under those conditions the State’s action is so affirmatively wrong or gross ly neglig ent tha t further incarc eration would be inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice. We will, therefore, exam ine the qu estion ba sed on our own statutes.

Id. at 555-56 (citations o mitted).

In the case at bar, as in Walker, we cannot conclude that service of the

Defe ndan t’s senten ces wo uld violate his due process rights or otherwise offend

principles of fundam ental fairness. He re, the Defend ant received an effective

sentence of two years. Due to overcrowded jail conditions, space was not

availab le to acc omm odate incarceration of the D efendant for ap proximately a

5

year after he was sentenced. Any inconvenience to the Defendant is certainly not

sufficient to violate D efenda nt’s due p rocess rights. Under these conditions and

circumstances, we ca nnot c onclu de tha t the Sta te’s ac tion is so affirma tively

wrong or gross ly negligen t that incarc eration w ould be inconsis tent with

fundamental principles of liberty and justice. We therefore examine the issue

based on the statutes enacted by our legislature.

In Walker, our supreme court analyzed the applicable statutes and found

a legislative intent that the sheriff shall commit a defendant to jail as soon as possible after the re ndition of th e judgm ent and that a judgment requiring incarceration should specifically provide that the sentence begins to run “on the day on wh ich the defen dant le gally comes into the custody of the sheriff for execution of the judgment of impriso nmen t.”

Id. at 556.

The court also noted in W alker that the sheriff was authorized to convey

prisoners to othe r jails in the st ate if the jail in the sh eriff’s coun ty was insu fficient.

Id. The co urt noted that the sh eriff had not committed Walker to jail as soon as

possible because the re was n o proof in th e record that the sh eriff attemp ted to

find the “nearest su fficient jail.” Id. at 557.

6

The Walker court concluded as follows:

What is the remedy for persons sentenced to jail who have presented themselves to the proper authorities for incarceration and have been denied their request to begin serving their sentences immed iately? We are persuad ed that our statutes requ ire more than a passive course of non-action that leaves such persons living indefin itely under an unexecuted criminal sentence. Therefore, we hold that wh ere pe rsons unde r a crim inal se ntenc e imm ediate ly present themselves to the appropriate authorities for incarceration and are turne d away th e sente nce in each case shall begin to run when the jud gme nt of co nviction beco mes final or th e priso ner is actually incarcerated , whichever is earlier.

Id. at 557 (em phasis add ed).

It appears clear that the court’s decision in Walker was base d on statutory

construction and a determination of legislative intent. By the time our supreme

court’s opinion in Walker was filed, our legislature had enacted new statutes

concerning the time and manner of service of DUI sentences.3

Chapter num ber 52 4 of the Public Acts of 1995 amended Tennessee Code

Annotated § 55-10-40 3 by adding the following new su bsection (p):

(p)(1) An offender sentenced to a period of incarceration for a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, 55-10-401, shall be required to commence service of such sentence within thirty (30) days of con viction or, if space is not immediately available in the approp riate municipal or cou nty jail or workhouse within such time, as soon as suc h spa ce is available. If in the opinion of the sheriff or chief administrative officer of a local jail or workhouse, space will not be available to allow an offender convicted of a violation of Tennessee Code Annota ted, 55-10-401, to commence service of such sentence within ninety (90) days of conviction, such sheriff or administrative officer shall use alternative facilities for the incarceration of such offender. If an offender convicted of a violation of Ten ness ee Co de An notate d, 55-1 0-401 , prior to th e effec tive date of this act has not commenced se rvice of the sentence imposed

3 The Walker court noted the passage of public chapter number 524 of the Acts of 1995 and observed that the new law “may” affect the ruling announced in Walker. Walker, 905 S.W.2d at 557 n.1. The new statutory provisions were not in effect until July 1, 1995 and only applied to the service of sentences pronounced on or after that date. 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 524, sec. 3.

7

within ninety (90) days [of] such offender’s conviction, the sheriff or administrative officer sha ll, after notifying the offender, use alternative facilities for the incarceration of such offender. The approp riate county or municipal legislative body shall approve the alternative facilities to be used in such coun ty or municipality.

(2) As used in this subsection “alternative facilities” include, but are not limited to, vacant schools or office buildings or any other building or structure owned , controlled or used by the ap propriate governmental entity that would be suitable for housing such offenders for short periods of time on an as-n eeded basis. A governmental entity may contract with another governmental entity or private corporation or person for the use of alternative facilities when needed and govern mental en tities may, by agreem ent, share use of alternative facilities.

(3) Noth ing in th is subs ection shall be construed to give an offender a right to serve a sentence for a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 55-10-401, in an alternative facility or within a specified period of time. Failure of a sheriff or chief administrative officer of a jail to require an offender to serve such a sentence within a certain period of time or in a certa in facility or type of facility shall have no effect upon the validity of the sentence.

1995 Te nn. Pub. Ac ts 524, sec. 2 (em phasis add ed).

This act specifically applies only to se ntenc es for D UI. Th is law cle arly

expresses the legislative intent that DUI offenders begin serving their sentences

within thirty days of conviction if space is available. If the sheriff is of the opinion

that space will not be available with in ninety da ys, the legis lature exp resses its

intent that the sheriff arrange for alternative facilities for the incarceration of the

offend er. Th e legis lature h as clea rly expressed its intent that jail sentences for

DUI conviction s be pro mptly se rved. W e believe, howev er, that the legislature

has also clearly expressed its intent that the failure of the sheriff to requ ire a DUI

offender to serve a sentence within a certain period of time does not relieve the

offender from the requirement of serving the sentence.

In summarizing the proposed bill to the mem bers of the Jud iciary

Committee of the Tennessee House of Representatives, Representative Roy

8

Herron, the sponsor of the bill, explained that the legislation provided “if the

sheriff doesn ’t require that as he’s su ppos ed to . . . if so meh ow the ball’s

dropped, that doesn’t mean you don’t have to serve the time.” He further stated

that the bill “makes clear that if for some reaso n, you d on’t be gin se rving w ithin

the time per iod requ ired by law , that that doesn’t mean your sentence is no

longer valid.” H. Judiciary Comm., 99th Gen. Assembly (Tenn., Apr. 5, 1995)

(statemen t of Represen tative Roy Herro n).

W e believe that by ena cting chapter n umber 524 of the Public Acts of

1995, the legislatu re intend ed that a DUI offender not escape responsibility for

serving a sentence simply because space was not available to serve th e

sentence in the co unty jail w ithin a s pecifie d period o f time. Sub ject to

constitutional constraints, policy decisions su ch as this are within the purview of

the legislature. Under the facts presented in this case, we cannot conclude that

requiring the De fenda nt to se rve his s enten ce wo uld be inconsisten t with

fundamental principles of liberty and justice in violation of the Defendant’s due

process rights.

The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.

____________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

9

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

___________________________________

NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE