LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 1. David J. Roberson ("Roberson") seeks review of a published decision by the court of appeals affirming both his judgment of conviction for delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.16(2)(b)(l), 961.41(l)(cm)(l) and 939.05, and a decision denying his postconviction motion by the Honorable Elsa C. Lamelas, Milwaukee County. State v. Roberson, 2005 WI App 195, 287 Wis. 2d 403, 704 N.W.2d 302. Roberson contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress two out-of-court identifications of Roberson by police officers when the identifications immediately followed a warrantless entry into Roberson's home, which Roberson asserts was illegal. Roberson asks this court to reverse the court of appeals and remand the matter for an evidentiaiy hearing, in accordance with State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979), to address whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
¶ 2. The State asserts that Roberson failed to allege sufficient facts that would have satisfied Roberson's burden of making a specific offer of proof that the suppression motion would have succeeded, and therefore failed to establish that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. According to the State, the record conclu[286]*286sively shows that a suppression motion would have failed because the police had probable cause to arrest Roberson before they entered his home and because the identifications made of him thereafter outside the home were admissible. In the alternative, the State contends that the warrantless entry was lawful because Roberson's mother consented to the entry, and because there were exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry. Finally, the State argues that Roberson could not prove prejudice, which is necessary to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, because the record conclusively shows that the subsequent in-court identifications were admissible.
¶ 3. We conclude that the in-court identifications of Roberson were properly admitted into evidence, regardless of whether the warrantless entry was illegal and regardless of whether the out-of-court identifications were inadmissible. We therefore conclude that Roberson's counsel's failure to move to suppress the out-of-court identifications did not prejudice his defense. We decline to address Roberson's challenge to the warrantless entry and out-of-court identifications immediately following the warrantless entry because exclusion of the out-of-court identifications would not alter the outcome of our analysis.1 We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
HH
¶ 4. The following facts are relevant to the in-court identification. At the time of trial, Detective Mark Wagner was a police officer with the City of Milwaukee [287]*287for over ten years and was assigned to the Vice Control Division, Narcotics Unit, Rapid Enforcement Drug Offense (REDO) team. Wagner testified that at approximately noon on December 1, 2002, he was conducting a follow-up narcotics investigation in front of a liquor store on the northwest corner of 19th Street and State Street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. While seated alone in a vehicle approximately one block from the liquor store, Wagner observed through his binoculars individuals entering and exiting the liquor store. He watched as two males left the side of a gray vehicle, approached other individuals entering and exiting the liquor store, and engaged in hand-to-hand transactions of some sort with those individuals. Wagner suspected the two men were selling drugs, and continued to observe their activities for approximately 20 minutes.
¶ 5. Wagner contacted Officer Michael Terrell, who was working undercover as part of the same REDO team, and informed him that there were two males that were possibly dealing narcotics and that he would like Terrell to attempt to purchase narcotics from them. He informed Terrell that the two individuals were black males and were wearing dark jeans and black jackets with gray stripes down the sleeves, and that one subject had longer wavy black hair with a headband around his ears, while the other one's hair was braided. Wagner directed Terrell to attempt to buy drugs from the two men.
¶ 6. After Wagner radioed Terrell, the two men entered the gray vehicle, which was parked on State Street facing westbound. The vehicle backed onto 19th Street and Wagner lost sight of the vehicle. When Terrell arrived on the scene, the two men had already left. According to Terrell, he approached a male, later identified as Lindsey Edwards, and indicated that he was [288]*288looking to purchase cocaine.2 Edwards walked Terrell to a gray vehicle. The passenger side door of the gray vehicle opened as Terrell approached the vehicle. He saw a black male with wavy black hair and wearing a black jacket, matching the description that Wagner had given him, sitting on the passenger side of the vehicle. Edwards initiated contact with the man in the passenger seat of the vehicle, and then walked away. Terrell told the man in the passenger seat he had $25, and the man agreed to sell him three corner cuts of cocaine. Terrell gave him the $253 and Terrell was given the cocaine. According to Terrell's testimony, the exchange took approximately 20 seconds.
¶ 7. Upon leaving the scene of the buy, Terrell radioed Wagner, informing him that he bought cocaine from a man in the passenger side of a gray vehicle, that the man seated in the passenger seat had black wavy hair and was wearing a black and gray jacket, and that the car was parked between 18th and 19th Streets in a parking lot. This radio communication occurred approximately five minutes after Wagner had lost sight of the vehicle. Wagner notified the other officers in the area that Terrell had purchased narcotics from the suspects, who were in a gray, two-door vehicle between 18th and 19th Streets.
¶ 8. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle again came into Wagner's sight and he observed it make a series of turns, eventually parking in front of a residence approximately two blocks from where Wagner was parked. Wagner watched two males exit the vehicle and run [289]*289onto the porch of the house located at 1011 North 21st Street. Wagner testified that he observed the men look around as they went up the porch, as if they had spotted the police. However, he testified that he did not know if they had seen the police. Wagner directed several officers involved in the investigation to establish a perimeter around the house. Wagner watched the front of the house and Terrell watched the back. Officers Mitchell Ward and Bodo Gajevic approached the front door and knocked on it. Roberson's mother, Cecilia Roberson, who also resided at the home, answered the door.
¶ 9. The officers entered Ms. Roberson's home and brought five men out of the house and onto the porch for Wagner to attempt to make an identification. It is unclear whether Ms. Roberson granted the police permission to enter her home. Wagner recognized one of the individuals as the driver of the car, but did not see the man who had been in the passenger seat among the five men on the porch. Terrell was also asked to view the five individuals brought outside the home to make an identification. Terrell did not recognize any of the several individuals originally brought to the porch.
¶ 10. According to Ward, Ms. Roberson then consented to a search of her house for more subjects. Ms. Roberson testified that she did not give the police permission to enter her home,4 and that the officers entered her home when she turned her back to them to see if there was anyone else in the house.
[290]*290¶ 11. Several police officers reentered the home, found an individual, later identified as Roberson, in an upstairs bedroom and brought him onto the porch. On the porch, Detective Wagner positively identified Roberson as the man in the gray vehicle who he suspected of selling drugs outside the liquor store. Terrell also identified Roberson as the person from whom he had purchased the three corner cuts of cocaine. These identifications took place approximately 10 to 15 minutes after Terrell had purchased the cocaine.
¶ 12. Police officers searched the home but did not find any cocaine or the recorded bills used by Terrell for his drug purchase. The police found numerous jackets that were similar to the jacket worn by the man observed by Wagner outside the liquor store and by the man from whom Terrell purchased the cocaine. However, the police did not take any of these jackets into evidence. In addition, the police did not search the gray vehicle parked outside the residence from where Roberson was detained.
¶ 13. Roberson was arrested5 and charged with delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.16(2)(b)(l), 961.41(l)(cm)(l) and 939.05.6
¶ 14. A jury trial was held on February 10-13, 2003. The State presented no physical evidence linking Roberson to the crime and relied entirely on the identifications of Roberson by Wagner and Terrell. Wagner identified Roberson as one of the two individuals he [291]*291observed for approximately 20 minutes standing by the gray vehicle outside the liquor store, and as the person who entered the passenger side of the gray vehicle.7 Wagner testified that he is trained to carefully watch someone who is under surveillance, both because of the danger involved and so that he will be able to identify the suspect at a later time.
Q: And do you see either one of those - the two individuals you say who you noticed by the gray car who were approaching these people and appearing to shake their hands or provide something to them, do you see either one of those two people here in court right now?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Could you please tell the jury, point out where that person is seated and what color clothing they are wearing.
A: Sure. He's seated at the defense table. He's wearing an orange, green, dark green sweater; and he has his hair braided.
Attorney Licata: May the record reflect that the witness has just identified Defendant David Roberson.
The court: It shall.
Q: Now there's another gentleman seated at the table with Mr. Roberson, the gentleman in the white sweater here next to his attorney, Ms. Stuller. Was that person the other person who was with Roberson on the street corner by the gray car?
[292]*292A: No, it was not.
Q: ... I will refer to Mr. Roberson and Mr. Wright are the two people on the street corner who you see going up and shaking people's hands or making these transactions, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And about how long do you see them do this kind of behavior for?
A: Approximately 20 minutes.
Q: So if you got there about 12:20 and it was about 5 minutes before you saw this behavior begin, is that what you testified to?
A: Yes
Q: And it goes on for about 20 minutes. We're now at about 12:45, in there?
A: Correct, somewhere in that area.
Q: And at this point, what, if anything, did you do?
A: I contacted Officer Michael Terrell, who already had known that I was going to go up in the area of 19th and State. And I notified him that there was two subjects that were possibly dealing narcotics and that I would like them to try to purchase narcotics from them.
Q: Did you provide Officer Terrell a description of these two people, Mr. Roberson and Mr. Wright?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Do you recall what they were wearing and what description you provided? And if you need to refer to your report at any point, just tell the judge you'd like to do that.
[293]*293A: Okay. Both the subjects were wearing black jackets, pretty similar jackets, with gray stripes down both sleeves. One subject had wavy hair. Mr. Roberson had wavy, longer wavy black hair. Mr. Wright had braided hair with some sort of design pattern it seemed like was in it. Both were wearing dark blue jeans, and Mr. Roberson had some type of blue or black ear — it looked like a headband but that went around the ears.
Q: Did you have any trouble — there was nothing concealing his face, was there?
A: No.
Q: And you were able to look at him for about 20 minutes before you called Officer Terrell.
A: Yes.
Q: And are you trained when you're making this surveillance to be carefully watching someone in terms of being able to identify them?
A: Yes, we are.
Q: And in this case that surveillance was, the 20 minutes, was that continuous observation?
A: Yes.
Q: Mr. Roberson didn't leave your sight for 10 minutes and come back; he was out there the whole time?
A: Yes, he was standing on the corner or walking in front of the store the whole time.
¶ 15. During trial, Terrell similarly identified Roberson as the person in the passenger seat in the gray car from whom he purchased cocaine.
[294]*294Q: Do you see either of those two people who were in that gray car as you approached with Mr. Edwards do you see either of those two people in this courtroom right now?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could you please tell the jury where that person is seated and what they're wearing now.
A: He's sitting next to the gentleman with the tie, and he has on a green sweater with orange stripes.
Mr. Licata: May the record reflect the witness just identified Defendant Roberson?
The court: It will.
¶ 16. Terrell also testified about his interaction with Roberson:
Q: Now when you got to the gray car, what happened?
A: As we got to, as we approached the car, the passenger door opened.
Q: How many people were in that car that you saw?
A: There were two people in the car.
Q: Where were they sitting in the gray car?
A: One was in the driver's seat, and one was in the passenger's seat.
Q: And at that point you see Mr. Roberson for the first time?
A: Yes sir.
[295]*295Q: And did Mr. Roberson match the description that you had been given of one of the two people who, by Officer Wagner the people he had seen?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you testified earlier the description had been wavy hair and the black jacket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that's how Mr. Roberson looked.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you saw Mr. Roberson and his physical description, what did you think?
A: It, it matched the description.
Q: Do you speak to Roberson at this point, or does Roberson speak to you; what happens?
A: I speak to him.
Q: What do you say to Mr. Roberson?
A: I told him I had $25.
Q: And what did he say to you if anything?
A: He said that was fine. I don't remember his exact words, but he agreed that 25 was good for three.
Q: Now when you told Roberson, I have $25, and he said, That's fine, what happened then?
A: I gave him the money.
Q: And it was Roberson who took the money.
[296]*296A: Yes, sir.
Q: Not the guy in the driver's seat.
A: No.
Q: Did you get a look at the guy in the driver's seat at this point or not?
A: From an angle I could see that he was a black, a black male; and I could see his complexion and that he had on a black jacket, jeans. But that's, that's about it.
I really couldn't - I wouldn't be able to identify him.
Q: Do you recall if his complexion was light or dark?
A: Yeah, it was a dark complexion.
Q: And would you describe Mr. Roberson's complexion as light or dark?
A: I would say he's light to medium complexion.
¶ 17. Roberson's theory of defense was that the officers had misidentified him as the suspect. He provided alibi witnesses that testified that he was inside his home when the drug transaction occurred. Upon his conviction, Roberson stated that he had been "found guilty of something I didn't do."
¶ 18. A unanimous jury convicted Roberson of one count of delivery of cocaine.8 Roberson was sentenced to imprisonment for 60 months, including initial confinement for 30 months and extended supervision for 30 months.
¶ 19. Roherson filed a postconviction motion, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge the war-rantless entry into his home and the subsequent out-of-court identifications of Roberson by Wagner and [297]*297Terrell.9 In his postconviction motion, Roberson asserted that the out-of-court identifications were tainted by the illegal arrest.
[298]*298¶ 20. The circuit court denied Roberson's post-conviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. The [299]*299circuit court concluded that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing because it had already heard testimony from Ms. Roberson and the police officers and that an evidentiary hearing would provide no new evidence. The circuit court judge reasoned that she would have found Ms. Roberson less credible given the inconsistencies between her testimony and Ward's testimony, as well as Ms. Roberson's "evident partiality towards her son." The circuit court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the failure of Roberson's counsel to file a suppression motion would have altered the result of the proceedings.
¶ 21. The court of appeals initially reversed the circuit court, finding that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing in accordance with Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797. State v. Roberson, No. 2003AP2802-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2004). However, the State filed a motion to reconsider and the court of appeals withdrew its initial opinion and then affirmed the circuit court, finding that even if Roberson's arrest was illegal, the identifications of Roberson were admissible. The court of appeals concluded that the police had probable cause to arrest Roberson, independent of the illegal entry. Roberson, 287 Wis. 2d 403, ¶¶ 21-23. Accordingly, the court found that Roberson's counsel's alleged ineffectiveness did not prejudice the outcome of the case. Id., ¶ 24.
¶ 22. Roberson petitioned this court for review, which we granted.
II
¶ 23. The present case requires us to determine whether Roberson's counsel was ineffective. Under both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, [300]*300criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to counsel. U.S. Const, amends. VI, XIV; Wis. Const, art. I, § 7. This right includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)); State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶ 39, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801. The standard for determining whether counsel's assistance is effective under the Wisconsin Constitution is identical to that under the federal constitution. State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶ 18 n.7, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (citing State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 235-36, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996)).
¶ 24. To establish the denial of a defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶¶ 18-20. In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "we grant deference only to the circuit court's findings of historical fact. We review de novo the legal questions of whether deficient performance has been established and whether it led to prejudice rising to a level undermining the reliability of the proceeding." Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶ 24.
¶ 25. Whether an in-court identification has been tainted by prior illegal activity is a question of constitutional fact, which is a mixed question of fact and law and requires a two-part inquiry. See State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 164-66, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997) (citing State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447-48, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991)). We first examine the circuit court's histori[301]*301cal or evidentiary findings of fact, which we will not reverse unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 165. We then examine whether the facts satisfy the relevant constitutional standard, which is reviewed independently from the circuit court's and court of appeals' analyses. Id.
¶ 26. Roberson's claims regarding the warrant-less entry and the identification evidence must also be considered within his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶ 48, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74; State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 618 n.1, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984).
HH HH
¶ 27. Roberson contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the out-of-court identifications as the fruit of an illegal, warrant-less entry. Roberson also asserts that the circuit court erred in denying him a hearing to prove his counsel was ineffective, as required under Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797.
¶ 28. Wisconsin applies the two-part test described in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 126, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the defendant must prove that his or her counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced his or her defense. Id. at 127. In this analysis, courts may decide ineffective assistance claims based on prejudice without considering whether the counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 128 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
[302]*302¶ 29. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error (s), the result of the trial would have been different. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶ 20; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "The focus of this inquiry is not on the outcome of the trial, but on the reliability of the proceedings." Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶ 20 (citation omitted). See also State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶ 30, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62.
¶ 30. In the present case, Roberson claims that the warrantless entry" was illegal, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is rooted in his counsel's failure to move to suppress the out-of-court identifications that arose out of the warrantless entry.10 Yet, this case actually involves two separate identifications: the officers' out-of-court and in-court identifications.11 For there to exist a reasonable probability of a different outcome [303]*303in this case, we would need to determine that the warrantless entry was illegal, and that both the out-of-court and in-court identifications were improperly admitted into evidence at trial.
¶ 31. Assuming that the warrantless entry was illegal12 and the out-of-court identifications were inad[304]*304missible,13 we conclude that Roberson cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test because the in-court identifications were properly admitted.
¶ 32. The admissibility of an in-court identification depends upon whether that identification evidence has been tainted by illegal activity. In general, evidence must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, "if [305]*305such evidence is obtained 'by exploitation of that illegality.' " State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶ 24, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (citation omitted); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990).
¶ 33. The remedy for an illegal warrantless search may be the suppression of any identification evidence that has been tainted. However, an illegal search is irrelevant to the admissibility of any evidence that does not actually flow from that illegal activity. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475 (1980). As the United States Supreme Court has concluded, "[t]he exclusionary rule enjoins the Government from benefiting from evidence it has unlawfully obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that was in official hands prior to any illegality." Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 34. An in-court identification is admissible, therefore, if the court determines that the identification is based on an independent source. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d at 166-68 (citations omitted); State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 188, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990) (citing Crews, 445 U.S. 463). See also Powell v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 51, 65-66, 271 N.W.2d 610 (1978). The primary question is whether "the evidence to which the instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 186 -(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). To be admissible, the in-court identification must be made "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d at 167 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). In other words, the in-court identification must rest on an independent [306]*306recollection of the witness's initial encounter with the suspect. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 188.
¶ 35. Ordinarily, an analysis of the admissibility of an in-court identification shifts to the State the heavy burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was not tainted by the illegal activity.14 Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 186; Powell, 86 Wis. 2d at 65; Holmes v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 488, 496, 208 N.W.2d 815 (1973). However, the question of the admissibility of the in-court identifications in this case arises as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶ 48. In an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Strickland "places the burden on the defendant to affirmatively prove prejudice." Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 129. Compare [307]*307Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, (1967) with Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See also State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 41, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 ("[0]rdinarily, the one who benefits from the error must prove harmlessness, but in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must prove prejudice.") (citation omitted). In determining whether the defendant has met his or her burden of proving prejudice, the reviewing courts are required to consider the totality of the evidence before the trier of fact. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 129-30.
¶ 36. The in-court identifications by Wagner and Terrell were based on their independent recollections of their observations of and encounters with Roberson outside the liquor store prior to the drug transaction, as well as during the drug transaction, and were not related to the identification of Roberson outside of his home. This determination finds ample support in the record. Both Wagner and Terrell's in-court identifications followed their testimony regarding their observations of Roberson in full daylight outside the liquor store and during the drug buy. Their in-court identifications were made prior to any testimony about the out-of-court identifications. These in-court identifications occurred less than three months after the officers' observations of and interaction with Roberson.
¶ 37. Both Terrell and Wagner worked for the City's Rapid Enforcement Drug Offense team and had been trained to carefully observe suspects' facial features in order to be able to identify suspects by their face. Wagner had worked as a police officer with the City of Milwaukee for over ten years and Terrell had worked as a police officer with the City for over four years.
¶ 38. Wagner's trial testimony reveals that he had sufficient opportunity to view Roberson. Wagner ob[308]*308served two men, later identified as Roberson and Wright, outside the liquor store for over 20 minutes and watched the men get into a gray car. Wagner testified that he used binoculars to view Roberson and that his view of Roberson outside the liquor store was unobstructed and continuous and that he had no trouble seeing the suspects' faces and clothing. Although Wagner lost sight of the car for a brief amount of time, when Wagner regained sight of the car, he watched the car make a series of turns and park in front of a house, later identified as Roberson's home. He then observed Roberson and Wright exit the car and enter Roberson's home. Moments later, Wagner was asked to view five individuals brought onto the porch of Roberson's home. Wagner informed the officers that the suspect was not on the porch and instructed them to search the house because the main suspect was still inside the residence.
¶ 39. Terrell's testimony reveals that he had sufficient opportunity to observe Roberson during the drug buy. Terrell testified that when he approached the gray car to initiate the drug purchase, a man seated in the passenger seat, later identified as Roberson, matched the description he had been given by Wagner. Terrell told Roberson that he had $25 and the suspect agreed to sell him three corner cuts of cocaine. Terrell handed the money directly to Roberson. At trial, Terrell explained that although he had a clear view of Roberson in the passenger seat, he had been unable to view the driver and therefore could not identify the driver of the car. In addition, like Wagner, Terrell testified that he did not recognize the person who had sold him the cocaine among the first five individuals who were brought onto the porch of Roberson's home.
¶ 40. We conclude that the officers' capacity to identify Roberson during trial neither resulted from [309]*309nor was biased by the alleged unlawful police conduct. Even assuming that the entry was illegal and the subsequent out-of-court identifications were inadmissible, the police acquired nothing from the illegal entry or the subsequent out-of-court identifications that was relevant to their ability to identify Roberson at trial, and there is no evidence to show that the subsequent in-court identification testimony was somehow tainted.
¶ 41. Because the record in this case clearly reveals that neither the warrantless entry, nor the subsequent out-of-court identifications, contaminated the officers' ability to provide the jury with accurate identification testimony about the officers' previous observations of and encounters with Roberson, we conclude that the in-court identifications were not the proverbial "fruit of the poisonous tree."
IV
¶ 42. We next address whether the circuit court erred in denying Roberson a hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Under Machner, "a hearing may be held when a criminal defendant's trial counsel is challenged for allegedly providing ineffective assistance." Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶ 2 n.3.15
¶ 43. However, the circuit court has the discretion to deny the postconviction motion without a Machner hearing "if the motion fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a question of fact, presents only conclusory alle[310]*310gations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief" State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 555 n.3, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996)).
¶ 44. Because we conclude that the record sufficiently establishes that Roberson was not prejudiced by his counsel's actions, we further conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Roberson a hearing on his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in accordance with Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797.
V
¶ 45. We conclude that the in-court identifications of Roberson by Detective Wagner and Officer Terrell were properly admitted into evidence, regardless of whether the warrantless entry was illegal, and regardless of whether the out-of-court identifications were inadmissible. We further conclude that Roberson's counsel's failure to move to suppress the out-of-court identifications did not prejudice his defense. We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.