State v. Robbennolt

Court of Appeals of Utah

State v. Robbennolt

2012 UT App 209, 283 P.3d 1081, 2012 WL 3054130, 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 216

CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah

DecidedJuly 27, 2012

Docket20110436-CA

StatusPublished

This text of 2012 UT App 209 (State v. Robbennolt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Robbennolt, 2012 UT App 209, 283 P.3d 1081, 2012 WL 3054130, 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 216 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

DECISION

PER CURIAM.

' 1 Kelly Robbennolt appeals his conviction of forgery after a bench trial We affirm.

' 2 "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, ¶ 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (internal quotation marks omitted). When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a defendant "must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." Id. 111 {citation omitted). To meet the marshaling burden, Robbennolt was required to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order," all of the evidence presented at trial supporting the findings he now resists. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ¶ 17, 124 P.3d 235.

3 Robbennolt fails to meet this burden. Instead, he merely presents some evidence favorable to him that he argues conclusively establishes that he had authority to give a partial deed of trust to the victim. This does not constitute marshaling. See id. Further, in finding Robbennolt guilty of forgery, the trial court necessarily relied on the direct witness testimony and did not give weight to the evidence as Robbennolt presents it. Testimony established that Robbennolt's authority to issue partial deeds of trust was limited to a specific need to correct errors for particular investors. He did not have authority to grant additional interests in the subject property or encumber it further. The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Robbennolt lacked the authority to grant the partial deed of trust and that he acted with the purpose to defraud. Accordingly, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. 1

T 4 Affirmed.

1

. Robbennolt also asserts that the trial court's comment in finding him guilty precluded finding the element of intent. However, the trial court clearly found that Robbennolt had the intent to defraud and the comment singled out by Robben-nolt is out of context.

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DECISION

PER CURIAM.

' 1 Kelly Robbennolt appeals his conviction of forgery after a bench trial We affirm.

' 2 "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, ¶ 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (internal quotation marks omitted). When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a defendant "must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." Id. 111 {citation omitted). To meet the marshaling burden, Robbennolt was required to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order," all of the evidence presented at trial supporting the findings he now resists. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ¶ 17, 124 P.3d 235.

3 Robbennolt fails to meet this burden. Instead, he merely presents some evidence favorable to him that he argues conclusively establishes that he had authority to give a partial deed of trust to the victim. This does not constitute marshaling. See id. Further, in finding Robbennolt guilty of forgery, the trial court necessarily relied on the direct witness testimony and did not give weight to the evidence as Robbennolt presents it. Testimony established that Robbennolt's authority to issue partial deeds of trust was limited to a specific need to correct errors for particular investors. He did not have authority to grant additional interests in the subject property or encumber it further. The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Robbennolt lacked the authority to grant the partial deed of trust and that he acted with the purpose to defraud. Accordingly, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. 1

T 4 Affirmed.

1

. Robbennolt also asserts that the trial court's comment in finding him guilty precluded finding the element of intent. However, the trial court clearly found that Robbennolt had the intent to defraud and the comment singled out by Robben-nolt is out of context.

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2012 UT App 209, 283 P.3d 1081, 2012 WL 3054130, 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 216, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-robbennolt-utahctapp-2012.

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