[Cite as State v. R.L., 2025-Ohio-5138.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114828 v. :
R.L., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 13, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-19-636564-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael R. Wajda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Robert B. McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant R.L. appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion
for expungement. We reverse and remand to the trial court. {¶2} On July 23, 2019, R.L. pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated
trespass, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2911.211; and one count
of assault, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). R.L. was
sentenced to a suspended jail sentence of 38 days and one year of inactive
community control.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} At sentencing, R.L. was advised, as a condition of her probation, not to
have contact with the victim D.N. On November 21, 2019, the trial court found
R.L. to be in violation of her community-control sanctions by contacting D.N. in
violation of the no-contact order. R.L. was ordered by the trial court to report to
the probation officer on December 10, 2019, and then to continue reporting for 12
months based on the officer’s discretion. On December 19, 2023, R.L. filed an
application to expunge her record of arrest and conviction. On March 28, 2024, a
hearing on R.L.’s application was scheduled. R.L.’s attorney appeared, but R.L. did
not attend the hearing. Counsel requested a continuance. Her trial counsel’s
motion to continue the hearing was denied, and the application for expungement
was deemed as withdrawn for want of prosecution.
{¶4} On September 27, 2024, R.L. filed another application for
expungement. On October 29, 2024, the State of Ohio (“the State”) filed a brief in
opposition. The opposition was partially based on opposition from the victim.
Additionally, the State noted that R.L. had been convicted of several low-level
offenses between her conviction in this case and the filing of the application to expunge. On November 21, 2024, a hearing on R.L.’s application for expungement
was held, but she did not attend. After taking the matter under advisement, on
December 12, 2024, the trial court denied R.L.’s motion for expungement without
explanation.
{¶5} On December 18, 2024, R.L. filed another application for
expungement. This time R.L. attempted to explain her absence on November 21,
2024, and requested a new hearing. On January 17, 2025, the State filed its
response not opposing the expungement. The State agreed that R.L. was
statutorily eligible for an expungement. The State also informed the court that they
were unable to contact the victim and therefore could not continue to oppose R.L.’s
motion. The trial court did not set a hearing. On January 23, 2025, by journal
entry, the trial court denied R.L.’s motion to expunge her record, stating: “The
defendant’s motion for expungement, filed 12/18/2024, is denied.” Journal Entry
No. 191293807 (Jan. 23, 2025).
{¶6} R.L. filed this appeal, assigning two errors for our review:
1. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied R.L.’s motion for expungement because that decision failed to properly weigh the competing interests involved and is not supported by the record; and
2. The trial court failed to articulate and create a record for this Court to engage in a meaningful appellate review.
II. Standard of Review {¶7} “Generally speaking, a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an
expungement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. L.M., 2025-Ohio-3076,
¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing State v. B.J., 2018-Ohio-5358, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). “The
applicability of the statute, however — i.e., statutory interpretation — is a question
of law subject to de novo review.” Id., citing id.
III. Law and Analysis
{¶8} We will review both assignments of error together. In R.L.’s first
assignment of error, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied her application for expungement and failed to weigh the competing
interests involved. R.L. contends in her second assignment of error that the trial
court failed to articulate and create a record for this court to engage in a meaningful
appellate review. In R.L.’s brief in support of her motion to expunge, she states
that she had “successfully completed the sentence and the applicable time has
passed making” her eligible to file the application for the expungement of her
record. However, “[e]xpungement is an act of grace created by the state, and so it
is a privilege, not a right.” (Cleaned up.) State v. S.J., 2020-Ohio-183, ¶ 10 (8th
Dist.).
{¶9} “Trial courts apply a two-step analysis when determining whether to
grant an application to seal a record of conviction.” State v. T.W.C., 2025-Ohio-
2890, ¶ 9. “First, the trial court ‘determines whether the offender is an eligible
offender, including whether the offender has waited the requisite time before
filing.’” Id., quoting State v. J.L., 2020-Ohio-3466, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “Second, the trial court ‘weighs a number of substantive considerations for and against the
sealing.’” Id., quoting id. at ¶ 9.
{¶10} The former statutory law defining an eligible offender has changed,
and now R.C. 2953.32(C) and (D) defines what the trial court must do in order to
determine if an offender’s record can be sealed. Additionally,
[a]n offender who was convicted of a fourth-or fifth-degree felony may apply to have his [or her] sealed one year after receiving a final discharge. If the offender owes restitution, he obtains a final discharge and is eligible to have his conviction sealed only when restitution has been fully paid.
T.W.C. at ¶ 1.
{¶11} This record is incomplete because the trial court did not state whether
it determined if R.L. is statutorily eligible or whether she has waited the requisite
time before filing her application. Additionally, the trial court did not provide a
record demonstrating that it weighed a number of substantive considerations for
and against the sealing, although it held a hearing on the matter in November
2024. “The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that ‘the essential purpose of an
expungement hearing is to provide a reviewing court with all relevant information
bearing on an applicant’s eligibility for expungement.’” State v. M.R., 2017-Ohio-
973, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 640 (1996).
See State v. B. H., 2018-Ohio-2649, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
{¶12} The trial court’s journal entry is incomplete and does not provide any
relevant information regarding the trial court’s determination and thus failed to
provide this court with an opportunity to review the trial court’s judgment. Id. The journal entry simply states: “Defendant [R.L.’s] motion for expungement, filed
12/18/2024, is denied.” Journal Entry No. 191293807 (Jan. 23, 2025).
{¶13} The State argues that R.L.’s arguments are barred by res judicata.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. R.L., 2025-Ohio-5138.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114828 v. :
R.L., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 13, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-19-636564-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael R. Wajda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Robert B. McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant R.L. appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion
for expungement. We reverse and remand to the trial court. {¶2} On July 23, 2019, R.L. pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated
trespass, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2911.211; and one count
of assault, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). R.L. was
sentenced to a suspended jail sentence of 38 days and one year of inactive
community control.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} At sentencing, R.L. was advised, as a condition of her probation, not to
have contact with the victim D.N. On November 21, 2019, the trial court found
R.L. to be in violation of her community-control sanctions by contacting D.N. in
violation of the no-contact order. R.L. was ordered by the trial court to report to
the probation officer on December 10, 2019, and then to continue reporting for 12
months based on the officer’s discretion. On December 19, 2023, R.L. filed an
application to expunge her record of arrest and conviction. On March 28, 2024, a
hearing on R.L.’s application was scheduled. R.L.’s attorney appeared, but R.L. did
not attend the hearing. Counsel requested a continuance. Her trial counsel’s
motion to continue the hearing was denied, and the application for expungement
was deemed as withdrawn for want of prosecution.
{¶4} On September 27, 2024, R.L. filed another application for
expungement. On October 29, 2024, the State of Ohio (“the State”) filed a brief in
opposition. The opposition was partially based on opposition from the victim.
Additionally, the State noted that R.L. had been convicted of several low-level
offenses between her conviction in this case and the filing of the application to expunge. On November 21, 2024, a hearing on R.L.’s application for expungement
was held, but she did not attend. After taking the matter under advisement, on
December 12, 2024, the trial court denied R.L.’s motion for expungement without
explanation.
{¶5} On December 18, 2024, R.L. filed another application for
expungement. This time R.L. attempted to explain her absence on November 21,
2024, and requested a new hearing. On January 17, 2025, the State filed its
response not opposing the expungement. The State agreed that R.L. was
statutorily eligible for an expungement. The State also informed the court that they
were unable to contact the victim and therefore could not continue to oppose R.L.’s
motion. The trial court did not set a hearing. On January 23, 2025, by journal
entry, the trial court denied R.L.’s motion to expunge her record, stating: “The
defendant’s motion for expungement, filed 12/18/2024, is denied.” Journal Entry
No. 191293807 (Jan. 23, 2025).
{¶6} R.L. filed this appeal, assigning two errors for our review:
1. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied R.L.’s motion for expungement because that decision failed to properly weigh the competing interests involved and is not supported by the record; and
2. The trial court failed to articulate and create a record for this Court to engage in a meaningful appellate review.
II. Standard of Review {¶7} “Generally speaking, a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an
expungement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. L.M., 2025-Ohio-3076,
¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing State v. B.J., 2018-Ohio-5358, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). “The
applicability of the statute, however — i.e., statutory interpretation — is a question
of law subject to de novo review.” Id., citing id.
III. Law and Analysis
{¶8} We will review both assignments of error together. In R.L.’s first
assignment of error, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied her application for expungement and failed to weigh the competing
interests involved. R.L. contends in her second assignment of error that the trial
court failed to articulate and create a record for this court to engage in a meaningful
appellate review. In R.L.’s brief in support of her motion to expunge, she states
that she had “successfully completed the sentence and the applicable time has
passed making” her eligible to file the application for the expungement of her
record. However, “[e]xpungement is an act of grace created by the state, and so it
is a privilege, not a right.” (Cleaned up.) State v. S.J., 2020-Ohio-183, ¶ 10 (8th
Dist.).
{¶9} “Trial courts apply a two-step analysis when determining whether to
grant an application to seal a record of conviction.” State v. T.W.C., 2025-Ohio-
2890, ¶ 9. “First, the trial court ‘determines whether the offender is an eligible
offender, including whether the offender has waited the requisite time before
filing.’” Id., quoting State v. J.L., 2020-Ohio-3466, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “Second, the trial court ‘weighs a number of substantive considerations for and against the
sealing.’” Id., quoting id. at ¶ 9.
{¶10} The former statutory law defining an eligible offender has changed,
and now R.C. 2953.32(C) and (D) defines what the trial court must do in order to
determine if an offender’s record can be sealed. Additionally,
[a]n offender who was convicted of a fourth-or fifth-degree felony may apply to have his [or her] sealed one year after receiving a final discharge. If the offender owes restitution, he obtains a final discharge and is eligible to have his conviction sealed only when restitution has been fully paid.
T.W.C. at ¶ 1.
{¶11} This record is incomplete because the trial court did not state whether
it determined if R.L. is statutorily eligible or whether she has waited the requisite
time before filing her application. Additionally, the trial court did not provide a
record demonstrating that it weighed a number of substantive considerations for
and against the sealing, although it held a hearing on the matter in November
2024. “The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that ‘the essential purpose of an
expungement hearing is to provide a reviewing court with all relevant information
bearing on an applicant’s eligibility for expungement.’” State v. M.R., 2017-Ohio-
973, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 640 (1996).
See State v. B. H., 2018-Ohio-2649, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
{¶12} The trial court’s journal entry is incomplete and does not provide any
relevant information regarding the trial court’s determination and thus failed to
provide this court with an opportunity to review the trial court’s judgment. Id. The journal entry simply states: “Defendant [R.L.’s] motion for expungement, filed
12/18/2024, is denied.” Journal Entry No. 191293807 (Jan. 23, 2025).
{¶13} The State argues that R.L.’s arguments are barred by res judicata.
“Based upon the foregoing well-established principles, Ohio courts have held that
the doctrine of res judicata ordinarily prohibits successive applications to seal a
conviction.” State v. S.J., 2020-Ohio-183, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. D.M.,
2018-Ohio-3327, ¶ 24-25 (4th Dist.). “A successive application may succeed,
however, if the defendant establishes ‘a change in circumstances from the time of
the filing of the previous application.’” Id., quoting In re Sealing of the Record of
Brown, 2008-Ohio-4105, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). “In the absence of a change in
circumstances, ‘res judicata bars successive attempts to relitigate the same issues
in subsequent expungement applications.’” Id., quoting id.
{¶14} The State further argues that both of R.L.’s applications for
expungement were identical and R.L. did not establish a change of circumstances
from the time of filing the first application. While R.L.’s applications were
identical, the trial court did not rule that the second application was successive,
but instead simply denied it. Furthermore, the State did not make that argument
in the trial court. See State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-1026, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.) (“A party
cannot raise new issues or arguments for the first time on appeal.”); State v.
Delgado, 2015-Ohio-5256, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (“The state never asserted res judicata
in the trial court, however, and cannot raise it now on appeal.”) Instead, the State
noted that R.L. was statutorily eligible and that they were not opposing the motion. {¶15} Therefore, R.L.’s assignments of error are sustained. We reverse the
trial court’s decision and remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the
statutory factors in order to provide a complete record.
{¶16} Judgment reversed and case remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR