State v. Riley

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Riley, 2026-Ohio-2351.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO Case No. CT2025-0136

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. CR2025-0522, CR2025-0616 LINDSIE Y. RILEY Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 18, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges

APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, for Plaintiff-Appellee; CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, for Defendant-Appellant.

King, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Lindsie Riley appeals the December 19, 2025

judgment of conviction and sentence of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas.

Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

Common Pleas Case No. CR2025-0522

{¶ 2} On February 14, 2024, United States Marshals were searching for two

fugitives in Muskingum County. They arrived at an apartment on Clay Street in Zanesville

where they believed the fugitives were hiding and received permission from a resident to

search the interior. While the officers did not find the fugitives in the apartment, they did

find Riley and her boyfriend, Benjamin Hanning in an upstairs bedroom where controlled

substances and drug paraphernalia were located in plain sight. Hanning is a local drug dealer who is well known to local law enforcement, but Riley advised the officers the drugs

belonged to her. The Muskingum County Sheriff's Office assisted and took possession of

the drugs which were later tested and confirmed to be oxycodone, methamphetamine,

fentanyl, and alprazolam.

{¶ 3} Riley was subsequently charged with one count of aggravated possession of

drugs, a felony of the second degree, one count of possession of a fentanyl-related

compound, a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of illegal use or possession of drug

paraphernalia, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.

{¶ 4} Riley entered pleas of not guilty and elected to proceed to a bench trial which

took place on October 30, 2025. The State presented evidence from U.S. Marshal Peyton

Ross and Muskingum County Sheriff's Office Detective Ryan Paisley who provided the

above outlined facts. Riley testified on her own behalf. She stated that the drugs actually

belonged to her boyfriend who was a drug dealer. She further indicated she only took

responsibility for the drugs due to his abusive nature and the fact that she feared him.

{¶ 5} The trial court found Riley guilty as charged.

Common Pleas Case No. CR2025-0616

{¶ 6} On March 17, 2025, Riley was found standing outside a drug house at 3:00

a.m. When approached by a patrolling officer, Riley provided her name and stated she

had outstanding warrants and needles and drugs on her person. Riley was found to have

.99 grams of methamphetamine on her person. She was later charged with one count of

possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree, possession of drug paraphernalia, a

misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and possession of drug abuse instruments, a

misdemeanor of the first degree. {¶ 7} During a hearing consolidated with case number CR2025-0522, Riley pled

guilty to all three charges.

{¶ 8} The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing on both cases. In case

number CR2025-0522, the trial court imposed an indefinite sentence of five to seven and

a half years for aggravated possession of drugs, eighteen months for possession of a

fentanyl-related compound, and thirty days for possession of drug paraphernalia. The

trial court ordered Riley to serve the sentences concurrently.

{¶ 9} In case number CR2025-0616, the trial court sentenced Riley to twelve

months for possession of drugs, 30 days for possession of drug paraphernalia, and 180

days for possession of drug abuse instruments. The trial court ordered Riley to serve the

sentences concurrently with each other and concurrently to the sentence imposed in case

number CR2025-0052.

{¶ 10} Riley timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. She raises two assignments of error as follows:

I

{¶ 11} "RILEY'S CONVICTIONS IN CASE NUMBER CR 2025-0052 ARE

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL."

II

{¶ 12} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM

SENTENCE FOR RILEY'S CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF DRUG

PARAPHERNALIA IN CASE NUMBER CR 2025-0522 AND HER CONVICTIONS FOR

POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA AND POSSESSION OF DRUG ABUSE

INSTRUMENTS IN CASE NUMBER CR 2025-0616 WITHOUT FINDING THAT THEY

CONSTITUTED THE WORST FORM OF THE OFFENSE. " I

{¶ 13} In her first assignment of error, Riley argues her convictions are against the

manifest weight of the evidence because the drugs belonged to her boyfriend and not her.

We disagree.

Standard of Review

{¶ 14} On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire

record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of

witnesses and determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact]

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st

Dist.1983). See also, State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). The granting of a new

trial "should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction." Martin at 175.

Possession

{¶ 15} "'Possess' or 'possession' means having control over a thing or substance,

but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through

ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found."

R.C. 2925.01(K). Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Butler, 42 Ohio St.3d

174, 176 (1989). "Constructive possession exists when an individual exercises dominion

and control over an object, even though that object may not be within his immediate

physical possession." State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 329 (1976). To establish

constructive possession of illegal drugs, the State's evidence must demonstrate the

defendant was able to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. State v. Kuhn,

2023-Ohio-2740, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.). Dominion and control may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. Id., citing State v. Trembly, 137 Ohio App.3d 134, 141 (8th Dist. 2000).

Circumstantial evidence that a defendant was located in very close proximity to readily

usable drugs may show constructive possession. Kuhn, citing State v. Barr, 86 Ohio

App.3d 227 (8th Dist. 1993). Circumstantial evidence is that which can be "inferred from

reasonably and justifiability connected facts." State v. Fairbanks, 32 Ohio St.2d 34 (1972).

Circumstantial evidence is to be given the same weight and deference as direct evidence.

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991).

Riley's Argument

{¶ 16} Riley argues the weight of the evidence failed to prove, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that she had either actual or constructive possession of the drugs found in the

bedroom she shared with her boyfriend.

{¶ 17} There is no dispute that Riley and her boyfriend, Benjamin Henning,

occupied the same room where the controlled substances were found. The State's

photographic evidence shows a bedroom cluttered with the belongings of both parties,

and a night stand, chair, and coffee table littered with various drug paraphernalia,

needles, a single pill in a plastic baggie, white powder, a rolled-up dollar bill, aluminum

foil, and a piece of a straw. State's exhibits B-7 – B-42. Riley and Henning were in bed

when Marshals entered the room. All of the afore mentioned items were in close proximity

to Riley and Riley was able to readily exercise dominion and control of the items. Riley

testified on cross-examination that Henning provided her with drugs. Transcript of trial

(T.) at 77.

{¶ 18} Riley's argument centers on ownership rather than possession of the drugs.

She argues that the drugs belonged to Henning, Henning was a drug dealer, law

enforcement was aware of that fact, and she only lied about ownership because she feared Henning. However, "[o]wnership need not be proven to establish constructive

possession." State v. Sarvabui, 2020-Ohio-1429, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). As the Ninth District

Court of Appeals has found, the finder of fact "is entitled to find that the defendant

constructively possessed a controlled substance based on "the drugs' presence in a usable

form and in close proximity to the defendant." Id. citing State v. Figueroa, 2005-Ohio-

1132, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). Indeed, during sentencing in this matter, the trial court indicated it

had found "some credibility that he is a drug dealer and that that was probably mostly

him but, also, as the State has just indicated, you would still also be in possession."

Transcript of sentencing (T.S) at 22.

{¶ 19} We find the trial court did not lose its way in finding Riley possessed the

drugs in question. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 20} In her final assignment of error, Riley argues the trial court abused its

discretion when it sentenced her to maximum terms for her misdemeanor convictions

without first finding she had committed the worst form of the offenses. We disagree.

Applicable Law

{¶ 21} A trial court has broad discretion in misdemeanor sentencing, and an

appellate court will not disturb a sentence that falls within the statutory range absent an

abuse of that discretion. State v. Thadur, 2016-Ohio-417, ¶ 11, 59 N.E.3d 602 (5th Dist.),

citing State v. Smith, 2006-Ohio-1558, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.); State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-

4596, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.). "Abuse of discretion" means an attitude that is unreasonable,

arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985).

Most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable,

rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Ent., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An unreasonable

decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.

Id. "It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would

not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing

reasoning processes that would support a contrary result." Id.

{¶ 22} R.C. 2929.22(B)(1) provides factors for a trial court to consider in

fashioning an appropriate sentence for a misdemeanor offense:

(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses;

(b) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the

offense or offenses indicate that the offender has a history of

persistent criminal activity and that the offender's character and

condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will commit

another offense;

(c) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the

offense or offenses indicate that the offender's history, character, and

condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will be a danger

to others and that the offender's conduct has been characterized by a

pattern of repetitive, compulsive, or aggressive behavior with

heedless indifference to the consequences;

(d) Whether the victim's youth, age, disability, or other factor

made the victim particularly vulnerable to the offense or made the

impact of the offense more serious; (e) Whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes in

general, in addition to the circumstances described in divisions

(B)(1)(b) and (c) of this section;

(f) Whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical

condition that is traceable to the offender's service in the armed

forces of the United States and that was a contributing factor in the

offender's commission of the offense or offenses;

(g) The offender's military service record.

{¶ 23} R.C. 2929.22(C) provides in relevant part "[a] court may impose the longest

jail term authorized under section 2929.24 of the Revised Code only upon offenders who

commit the worst forms of the offense or upon offenders whose conduct and response to

prior sanctions for prior offenses demonstrate that the imposition of the longest jail term

is necessary to deter the offender from committing a future criminal offense."

{¶ 24} Riley argues her conduct cannot be classified as "the worst form of the

offense" and because the trial court failed to so find, her maximum misdemeanor

sentences in both cases must be vacated. However, "a trial court is not required to make

on-the-record findings to support the imposition of a maximum sentence for a

misdemeanor." State v. Adkins, 2020-Ohio-3296, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). Even when the record

is silent, reviewing courts presume the trial court considered the appropriate statutory

factors. State v. Hedrick, 2026-Ohio-1903 at ¶ 14 (12th Dist.) citing State v. Yeban, 2024-

Ohio-2545, ¶ 69 (1st Dist.). Riley concedes this point in her reply brief at page 3. {¶ 25} Moreover, R.C. 2929.22(C) is stated in the alternative—either the offender

committed the worst form of the offense or the offender's "conduct and response to prior

sanctions for prior offenses demonstrate that the imposition of the longest jail term is

necessary to deter the offender from committing a future criminal offense." The trial court

noted that Riley had prior misdemeanor convictions for possession of drug instruments

and drug paraphernalia, had violated her bond in the instant matter by having a positive

urine drug screen, and had committed a new offense while her first case was pending. T.S.

17, 20-24. {¶ 26} Upon review of the record and Riley's arguments, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in imposing maximum sentences for Riley's

misdemeanor convictions. Accordingly, the final assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 27} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

{¶ 28} Costs to Appellant.

By: King, P. J.

Hoffman, J. and

Montgomery, J. concur.