[Cite as State v. Richardson, 2026-Ohio-280.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-25-00107
Appellee Trial Court No. CR 22 3016
v.
Armon Richardson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 29, 2026
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and, Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Neil S. McElroy, for appellant.
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Armon Richardson, appeals the May 5, 2025 judgment
of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition for post-conviction
relief without a hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Background
{¶ 2} The background of this case was recited in State v. Richardson, 2024-Ohio-
2840, (6th Dist.). Briefly stated, Armon Richardson was indicted on two counts of
aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of aggravated vehicular assault, and one count
of vehicular assault, in connection with a March 16, 2022 traffic accident that killed J.R.
and seriously injured her 15-year-old daughter. According to the State, Richardson
accelerated to 80-90 m.p.h. to beat a red light and struck J.R.’s vehicle as she attempted
to turn. Richardson ultimately entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated
vehicular homicide, a violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) and (B), a third-degree felony,
and one count of vehicular assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b) and (C), a
fourth-degree felony; the remaining charges were dismissed. The trial court accepted the
plea, found Richardson guilty, and continued the matter for sentencing. The trial court
imposed an aggregate prison term of 72 months.
{¶ 3} Richardson filed a direct appeal challenging the imposition of costs, which
were not addressed at sentencing but were nevertheless included in the sentencing entry.
In a decision released on July 26, 2024, we reversed, in part, concluding that the trial
court erred in imposing discretionary costs.
{¶ 4} Just over six months later, Richardson filed a petition for postconviction
relief. He argued that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because
defense counsel failed to adequately apprise him of potential defenses available to him at
trial. More specifically, Richardson maintained that defense counsel failed to discuss
2. with him the case of State v. Langenkamp, 2000-Ohio-1831 (3d Dist.), which according
to Richardson, holds that the contributory negligence of the decedent can be a defense if
it is the sole proximate cause of the accident. He claimed that counsel’s failure to advise
him of this defense led him to enter a plea of guilty instead of proceeding to trial.
Richardson requested an evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 5} Without conceding that this possible defense was not discussed with
Richardson, the State responded that Richardson failed to articulate grounds for a hearing
or for relief because he provided no evidence that the victim’s negligence here was the
sole proximate cause of the accident, and in the absence of such evidence, he cannot
show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient. It also maintained that
Richardson’s claim that he would not have entered his plea if counsel had informed him
of the case was nothing more than a post hoc assertion.
{¶ 6} In a judgment journalized on May 5, 2025, the trial court denied
Richardson’s petition without a hearing. It recognized that under Ohio law, the victim’s
own negligence will serve as a defense only if it is the sole proximate cause of the
accident. It observed that Richardson’s excessive speed and reckless driving were
significant factors contributing to the accident, thus even if the decedent was partially at
fault for the accident, her actions were not the sole proximate cause. As such, the court
found that “the defense asserted by petitioner is inapplicable to the facts of this case,”
therefore, defense counsel was not deficient for failing to discuss it with Richardson. It
also found that Richardson’s affidavit alone was insufficient to establish that he would
3. have proceeded to trial but for counsel’s alleged errors, especially given the favorable
outcome achieved under the plea agreement. The trial court concluded that no hearing
was warranted because Richardson failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish
substantive grounds for relief.
{¶ 7} Richardson appealed. He assigns the following error for our review:
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Richardson’s request for a hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, Richardson argues that the trial court erred
when it denied his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. A
petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 is the exclusive method by which an
offender can raise collateral challenges to the validity of his conviction or sentence. R.C.
2953.21(K). The basis for the petition must be “such a denial or infringement of the
person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or
the Constitution of the United States. . . .” R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 9} Under R.C. 2953.21(D), the trial court is required to determine whether the
petition presents substantive grounds for relief before granting a hearing. To be entitled
to a hearing, the petitioner must set forth “sufficient operative facts to establish
substantive grounds for relief.” State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 (1999), paragraph
two of the syllabus. In determining whether the petitioner has met this burden, the court
must consider the petition and any supporting affidavits and documentary evidence, along
with “all the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner. . . .”
4. R.C. 2953.21(D). The court is required to “proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues . .
.” unless the petition and the record show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. R.C.
2953.21(F). If the trial court does not find grounds for granting relief, it must deny the
petition. R.C. 2953.21(H). Generally, we review a trial court’s decision denying a
petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boaston, 2021-Ohio-
360, ¶ 43 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 10} Here, Richardson’s petition for postconviction relief is premised on a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. “Where ineffective assistance of counsel is
alleged in a petition for postconviction relief, the defendant, in order to secure a hearing
on his petition, must proffer evidence which, if believed, would establish not only that his
trial counsel had substantially violated at least one of a defense attorney’s essential duties
to his client but also that said violation was prejudicial to the defendant.” State v. Cole, 2
Ohio St.3d 112, 114 (1982). To establish the prejudice element of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Hale,
2008-Ohio-3426, ¶ 204, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
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[Cite as State v. Richardson, 2026-Ohio-280.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-25-00107
Appellee Trial Court No. CR 22 3016
v.
Armon Richardson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 29, 2026
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and, Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Neil S. McElroy, for appellant.
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Armon Richardson, appeals the May 5, 2025 judgment
of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition for post-conviction
relief without a hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Background
{¶ 2} The background of this case was recited in State v. Richardson, 2024-Ohio-
2840, (6th Dist.). Briefly stated, Armon Richardson was indicted on two counts of
aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of aggravated vehicular assault, and one count
of vehicular assault, in connection with a March 16, 2022 traffic accident that killed J.R.
and seriously injured her 15-year-old daughter. According to the State, Richardson
accelerated to 80-90 m.p.h. to beat a red light and struck J.R.’s vehicle as she attempted
to turn. Richardson ultimately entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated
vehicular homicide, a violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) and (B), a third-degree felony,
and one count of vehicular assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b) and (C), a
fourth-degree felony; the remaining charges were dismissed. The trial court accepted the
plea, found Richardson guilty, and continued the matter for sentencing. The trial court
imposed an aggregate prison term of 72 months.
{¶ 3} Richardson filed a direct appeal challenging the imposition of costs, which
were not addressed at sentencing but were nevertheless included in the sentencing entry.
In a decision released on July 26, 2024, we reversed, in part, concluding that the trial
court erred in imposing discretionary costs.
{¶ 4} Just over six months later, Richardson filed a petition for postconviction
relief. He argued that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because
defense counsel failed to adequately apprise him of potential defenses available to him at
trial. More specifically, Richardson maintained that defense counsel failed to discuss
2. with him the case of State v. Langenkamp, 2000-Ohio-1831 (3d Dist.), which according
to Richardson, holds that the contributory negligence of the decedent can be a defense if
it is the sole proximate cause of the accident. He claimed that counsel’s failure to advise
him of this defense led him to enter a plea of guilty instead of proceeding to trial.
Richardson requested an evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 5} Without conceding that this possible defense was not discussed with
Richardson, the State responded that Richardson failed to articulate grounds for a hearing
or for relief because he provided no evidence that the victim’s negligence here was the
sole proximate cause of the accident, and in the absence of such evidence, he cannot
show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient. It also maintained that
Richardson’s claim that he would not have entered his plea if counsel had informed him
of the case was nothing more than a post hoc assertion.
{¶ 6} In a judgment journalized on May 5, 2025, the trial court denied
Richardson’s petition without a hearing. It recognized that under Ohio law, the victim’s
own negligence will serve as a defense only if it is the sole proximate cause of the
accident. It observed that Richardson’s excessive speed and reckless driving were
significant factors contributing to the accident, thus even if the decedent was partially at
fault for the accident, her actions were not the sole proximate cause. As such, the court
found that “the defense asserted by petitioner is inapplicable to the facts of this case,”
therefore, defense counsel was not deficient for failing to discuss it with Richardson. It
also found that Richardson’s affidavit alone was insufficient to establish that he would
3. have proceeded to trial but for counsel’s alleged errors, especially given the favorable
outcome achieved under the plea agreement. The trial court concluded that no hearing
was warranted because Richardson failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish
substantive grounds for relief.
{¶ 7} Richardson appealed. He assigns the following error for our review:
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Richardson’s request for a hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, Richardson argues that the trial court erred
when it denied his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. A
petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 is the exclusive method by which an
offender can raise collateral challenges to the validity of his conviction or sentence. R.C.
2953.21(K). The basis for the petition must be “such a denial or infringement of the
person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or
the Constitution of the United States. . . .” R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 9} Under R.C. 2953.21(D), the trial court is required to determine whether the
petition presents substantive grounds for relief before granting a hearing. To be entitled
to a hearing, the petitioner must set forth “sufficient operative facts to establish
substantive grounds for relief.” State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 (1999), paragraph
two of the syllabus. In determining whether the petitioner has met this burden, the court
must consider the petition and any supporting affidavits and documentary evidence, along
with “all the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner. . . .”
4. R.C. 2953.21(D). The court is required to “proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues . .
.” unless the petition and the record show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. R.C.
2953.21(F). If the trial court does not find grounds for granting relief, it must deny the
petition. R.C. 2953.21(H). Generally, we review a trial court’s decision denying a
petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boaston, 2021-Ohio-
360, ¶ 43 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 10} Here, Richardson’s petition for postconviction relief is premised on a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. “Where ineffective assistance of counsel is
alleged in a petition for postconviction relief, the defendant, in order to secure a hearing
on his petition, must proffer evidence which, if believed, would establish not only that his
trial counsel had substantially violated at least one of a defense attorney’s essential duties
to his client but also that said violation was prejudicial to the defendant.” State v. Cole, 2
Ohio St.3d 112, 114 (1982). To establish the prejudice element of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Hale,
2008-Ohio-3426, ¶ 204, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151 (2002).
{¶ 11} Richardson maintains that the uncontroverted averments in his affidavit—
(1) that counsel did not advise him of a possible contributory-negligence defense, and (2)
5. that he would have proceeded to trial had he known of this potential defense—constituted
substantive grounds for relief, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
{¶ 12} First, Richardson’s averment that defense counsel did not discuss with him
the defense of contributory negligence defense is questionable given the trial court’s
remark at the sentencing hearing that there had been “talk about the fact that the victim’s
vehicle turned left in front of you.” The court told Richardson that this was “something
you would expect, because not often does someone traveling on roads, at least in Ohio,
encounter a car approaching an intersection at a hundred miles per hour.”
{¶ 13} In any event, even if the defense was not discussed with Richardson, as
intimated by the trial court, it is well-recognized that the contributory negligence of the
victim may not be used as a defense to aggravated vehicular manslaughter unless the
victim’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. State v. Smith, 2025-
Ohio-2086, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.); State v. Schwieterman, 2010-Ohio-102, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.); State
v. Bender, 2016-Ohio-8178, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.); City of Toledo v. Davenport, 1987 WL 5885,
*2 (6th Dist. Jan. 30, 1987). Missing from the materials supporting Richardson’s petition
is any evidence—or even any assertion—that the victim’s negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the accident or that Richardson’s conduct was not a proximate cause
of the accident.
{¶ 14} The only information in the record concerning fault for the accident is the
trial court’s acknowledgment that the victim turned left in front of Richardson’s vehicle,
followed by its remark that Richardson approached the intersection at one hundred miles
6. per hour. Absent a contention that the victim’s negligence was the sole proximate cause
of the accident or that Richardson’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident,
the record lacks evidence that this defense was applicable to Richardson’s case. If the
defense was not applicable, then defense counsel cannot be said to have been ineffective
for failing to bring it to Richardson’s attention. See State v. Zuber, 1998 WL 553203, *5
(11th Dist. June 26, 1998), quoting Lewis v. Alexander, 11 F.3d 1349, 1353-1354 (6th Cir.
1993) (“‘[C]ounsel may exercise his professional judgment with respect to the viability of
certain defenses and evidentiary matters without running afoul of the Sixth
Amendment.’”).
{¶ 15} Because the evidence offered in support of Richardson’s petition does not
demonstrate that the victim’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the
defense was inapplicable and Richardson’s petition lacked substantive grounds for relief
warranting a hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Richardson’s petition for postconviction relief without a hearing.
{¶ 16} We find Richardson’s sole assignment of error not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 17} Richardson offered no evidence in support of his petition for postconviction
relief indicating either that (1) the victim’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the accident, or (2) Richardson’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident. As
such, the record lacks evidence that the victim’s role in the accident provided Richardson
a potential defense, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring it to
7. Richardson’s attention. Under these facts, Richardson’s petition lacked substantive
grounds for relief warranting a hearing, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Richard’s petition without a hearing.
{¶ 18} We affirm the May 5, 2025 judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas. Richardson is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J. CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
8.