[Cite as State v. Richardson, 2020-Ohio-50.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-18-1240
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201802300
v.
Tyreece A. Richardson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 10, 2020
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lauren Carpenter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Patricia Horner, for appellant.
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an October 19, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas, finding appellant guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement
on one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation
of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the third degree, and one count of burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), as amended to a felony of the fourth degree. In addition, another
offense pending against appellant was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
{¶ 2} We note at the outset that the scope of this appeal is narrow, limited to the
change of plea proceedings. Specifically, this appeal centers upon a determination of
whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in the course of accepting
appellant’s change of plea. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the
judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Tyreece Richardson, sets forth the following assignment of error:
I. The plea was not entered into Knowingly or Voluntarily.
{¶ 4} The following facts are relevant to this appeal. In the summer of 2016,
appellant was arrested in North Toledo after fleeing from a traffic stop, the legitimacy of
which is not in dispute. In a failed effort to evade capture, appellant led police on a
dangerous, high-speed chase during which appellant traveled at recklessly high rates of
speed and disregarded traffic control devices and laws.
{¶ 5} At the time of these events, appellant was on active post release control in
connection to prior felony convictions. Appellant possesses a lengthy criminal history.
{¶ 6} Appellant concedes that these events occurred when he was engaged in
efforts to acquire unlawful drugs for personal consumption. Appellant unconvincingly
attempts to mitigate his accountability for the crimes by conveying to the trial court, “I
wasn’t bothering nobody. I got a job. I go home. I do my drugs. I do my drugs at
home.”
2. {¶ 7} It is not persuasive that a dangerous, high-speed motor vehicle police chase
of appellant in a densely populated urban area did not “bother” anyone, in addition to the
lack of legal relevancy of such a position as it relates to criminal culpability.
{¶ 8} Contrary to appellant’s unsupported assertions on appeal that the trial court
failed to properly inform appellant of his rights in connection to the change of plea so as
to ensure the plea to have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the record reflects
that the trial court undertook exhaustive measures to address appellant’s questions, affirm
appellant’s understanding, and conform with Crim.R. 11 in the course of accepting the
negotiated change of plea.
{¶ 9} Appellant was facing a maximum potential term of incarceration of 54
months. Appellant was sentenced to a total term of incarceration of 36 months,
discretionary post release control, and restitution. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 10} In the sole assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court
failed to comply with the Crim.R. 11(C) requirements in the course of the change of plea
proceedings. This position is counter to the record of evidence.
{¶ 11} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c) establishes that the acceptance of a plea in a felony
case requires the trial court to determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,
understands the nature of the charges, the maximum penalties, understands the effect of
the plea, and understands all of the constitutional implications of the plea.
{¶ 12} It is well-established that substantial compliance is the threshold of
sufficiency with respect to the non-constitutional requirements set forth in Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a) and (b). As succinctly defined in State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-
3. Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, the test for substantial compliance is whether, “[U]nder the
totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of
his plea and the rights he is waving * * * To demonstrate prejudice in this context, the
defendant must show that the plea would not have otherwise been entered.” Veney at ¶
14-15.
{¶ 13} In support of this appeal, appellant asserts without evidentiary support that,
“[I]t was or should have been evident to the trial court that appellant was unsure of and
did not fully understand what was taking place in court.” In support, appellant
unilaterally maintains that he, “[H]ad not been on his medication for his bipolar mental
health condition.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 14} For clarity, the record is devoid of any evidence that appellant has ever
been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, or that appellant has ever been prescribed
medications by a medical healthcare provider for the treatment of bipolar disorder.
{¶ 15} As stated above, this appeal centers on the propriety of the change of plea.
Thus, our review focuses on the transcripts of the plea proceedings. The record reflects
that the trial court upheld the Crim.R. 11 conformity of the proceedings.
{¶ 16} As the change of plea hearing began, appellant demanded to be provided
with the grand jury evidence presented against him. In an effort to ascertain appellant’s
concerns, the trial court inquired, “You’re asking for transcripts from the grand jury
about what evidence was presented to them to indict you?” Appellant responded, “Yes,
you got me indicted over there at common pleas.”
4. {¶ 17} In turn, the trial court thoroughly explained to appellant the need for
secrecy of grand jury proceedings and carefully explained that nothing in those
proceedings prejudiced appellant given that appellant was entitled to a public jury trial if
he so chose to proceed in that fashion.
{¶ 18} The trial court next proceeded to advise appellant in response to appellant’s
concerns that he had not seen the dash cam video footage reflecting his crimes that the
arresting officer was prepared to testify that the officer directly observed appellant
driving the subject vehicle in the course of committing the underlying offenses.
{¶ 19} The record shows that the trial court went to great lengths to accommodate
appellant’s questions and concerns. The trial court also made timely arrangements for
appellant to privately view the police video in the adjacent jury room with his counsel
prior to making any decision on how to proceed.
{¶ 20} Appellant appeared to mistakenly discern legal relevance in his
unsupported claim that he could not be found guilty because, “I never knew how to drive.
I never knew how to drive. I get in the car right now, I’d crash. I would go to get me
some drugs, that’s -- I’m going to be honest. Really, I was intoxicated. I was going to
get me some drugs.” Again, the record reflects that the arresting officers directly
observed appellant driving the vehicle, in addition to the dash cam video evidence.
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[Cite as State v. Richardson, 2020-Ohio-50.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-18-1240
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201802300
v.
Tyreece A. Richardson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 10, 2020
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lauren Carpenter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Patricia Horner, for appellant.
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an October 19, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas, finding appellant guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement
on one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation
of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the third degree, and one count of burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), as amended to a felony of the fourth degree. In addition, another
offense pending against appellant was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
{¶ 2} We note at the outset that the scope of this appeal is narrow, limited to the
change of plea proceedings. Specifically, this appeal centers upon a determination of
whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in the course of accepting
appellant’s change of plea. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the
judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Tyreece Richardson, sets forth the following assignment of error:
I. The plea was not entered into Knowingly or Voluntarily.
{¶ 4} The following facts are relevant to this appeal. In the summer of 2016,
appellant was arrested in North Toledo after fleeing from a traffic stop, the legitimacy of
which is not in dispute. In a failed effort to evade capture, appellant led police on a
dangerous, high-speed chase during which appellant traveled at recklessly high rates of
speed and disregarded traffic control devices and laws.
{¶ 5} At the time of these events, appellant was on active post release control in
connection to prior felony convictions. Appellant possesses a lengthy criminal history.
{¶ 6} Appellant concedes that these events occurred when he was engaged in
efforts to acquire unlawful drugs for personal consumption. Appellant unconvincingly
attempts to mitigate his accountability for the crimes by conveying to the trial court, “I
wasn’t bothering nobody. I got a job. I go home. I do my drugs. I do my drugs at
home.”
2. {¶ 7} It is not persuasive that a dangerous, high-speed motor vehicle police chase
of appellant in a densely populated urban area did not “bother” anyone, in addition to the
lack of legal relevancy of such a position as it relates to criminal culpability.
{¶ 8} Contrary to appellant’s unsupported assertions on appeal that the trial court
failed to properly inform appellant of his rights in connection to the change of plea so as
to ensure the plea to have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the record reflects
that the trial court undertook exhaustive measures to address appellant’s questions, affirm
appellant’s understanding, and conform with Crim.R. 11 in the course of accepting the
negotiated change of plea.
{¶ 9} Appellant was facing a maximum potential term of incarceration of 54
months. Appellant was sentenced to a total term of incarceration of 36 months,
discretionary post release control, and restitution. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 10} In the sole assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court
failed to comply with the Crim.R. 11(C) requirements in the course of the change of plea
proceedings. This position is counter to the record of evidence.
{¶ 11} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c) establishes that the acceptance of a plea in a felony
case requires the trial court to determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,
understands the nature of the charges, the maximum penalties, understands the effect of
the plea, and understands all of the constitutional implications of the plea.
{¶ 12} It is well-established that substantial compliance is the threshold of
sufficiency with respect to the non-constitutional requirements set forth in Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a) and (b). As succinctly defined in State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-
3. Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, the test for substantial compliance is whether, “[U]nder the
totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of
his plea and the rights he is waving * * * To demonstrate prejudice in this context, the
defendant must show that the plea would not have otherwise been entered.” Veney at ¶
14-15.
{¶ 13} In support of this appeal, appellant asserts without evidentiary support that,
“[I]t was or should have been evident to the trial court that appellant was unsure of and
did not fully understand what was taking place in court.” In support, appellant
unilaterally maintains that he, “[H]ad not been on his medication for his bipolar mental
health condition.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 14} For clarity, the record is devoid of any evidence that appellant has ever
been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, or that appellant has ever been prescribed
medications by a medical healthcare provider for the treatment of bipolar disorder.
{¶ 15} As stated above, this appeal centers on the propriety of the change of plea.
Thus, our review focuses on the transcripts of the plea proceedings. The record reflects
that the trial court upheld the Crim.R. 11 conformity of the proceedings.
{¶ 16} As the change of plea hearing began, appellant demanded to be provided
with the grand jury evidence presented against him. In an effort to ascertain appellant’s
concerns, the trial court inquired, “You’re asking for transcripts from the grand jury
about what evidence was presented to them to indict you?” Appellant responded, “Yes,
you got me indicted over there at common pleas.”
4. {¶ 17} In turn, the trial court thoroughly explained to appellant the need for
secrecy of grand jury proceedings and carefully explained that nothing in those
proceedings prejudiced appellant given that appellant was entitled to a public jury trial if
he so chose to proceed in that fashion.
{¶ 18} The trial court next proceeded to advise appellant in response to appellant’s
concerns that he had not seen the dash cam video footage reflecting his crimes that the
arresting officer was prepared to testify that the officer directly observed appellant
driving the subject vehicle in the course of committing the underlying offenses.
{¶ 19} The record shows that the trial court went to great lengths to accommodate
appellant’s questions and concerns. The trial court also made timely arrangements for
appellant to privately view the police video in the adjacent jury room with his counsel
prior to making any decision on how to proceed.
{¶ 20} Appellant appeared to mistakenly discern legal relevance in his
unsupported claim that he could not be found guilty because, “I never knew how to drive.
I never knew how to drive. I get in the car right now, I’d crash. I would go to get me
some drugs, that’s -- I’m going to be honest. Really, I was intoxicated. I was going to
get me some drugs.” Again, the record reflects that the arresting officers directly
observed appellant driving the vehicle, in addition to the dash cam video evidence.
{¶ 21} Ultimately, appellant was furnished an opportunity to review the dash cam
video and have detailed discussions with counsel regarding the considerable evidence of
appellant’s guilt that would be presented if the matter proceed to a jury trial.
5. {¶ 22} After extended discourse with the trial court, extended discourse with trial
counsel, ample opportunity to review all of the evidence implicating him, and further
considering the matter during a recess, appellant voluntarily elected to accept the above-
described plea agreement.
{¶ 23} Upon inquiry from the trial court, appellant succinctly explained that he
was accepting the plea deal, “[B]ecause I don’t want to go to trial.” Appellant then
reviewed and executed the plea agreement paperwork, and affirmed that his signatures
were affixed to same.
{¶ 24} The record reflects that the trial court methodically reviewed all Crim.R. 11
matters with appellant in the course of accepting the subject plea agreement. The record
reflects no evidence supportive of the notion that appellant’s plea was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made.
{¶ 25} The trial court affirmed on the record that appellant was clearheaded, not
under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or medication potentially compromising decision
making skills, was aware that he was currently on post release control for past offenses,
was aware that the state was not asking for imposition of the outstanding time, was aware
that he had unrelated pending municipal court cases, affirmed that he had adequate time
to discuss all matters with counsel and that counsel adequately answered all questions,
affirmed that he understood the effect of the guilty plea, understood the potential
maximum sentence, affirmed that he understood there was discretionary potential post
release control, affirmed that he understood the firearms ramifications, affirmed that he
6. understood and specifically discussed all of the constitutional rights being waived, and
affirmed that he understood the nature of the charges and the associated penalties.
{¶ 26} At the conclusion of the change of plea colloquy, the trial court then
affirmed that appellant had adequate time and opportunity to discuss the plea agreement
documentation with counsel prior to executing the plea bargain, affirmed that appellant
had no final questions, and affirmed that appellant was entering the plea voluntarily.
{¶ 27} Based upon the foregoing, the trial court then concluded and summarized:
Then the record shall reflect the defendant is making a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary decision to waive his constitutional rights,
withdraw his former not guilty pleas and tender a guilty plea * * * The
court finds that the defendant has been informed of all applicable
constitutional rights, orally and in writing; he understands the nature of the
charges, the effect of the pleas and the possible penalties which could be
imposed. Therefore, the court accepts his pleas and finds him guilty of
those charges.
{¶ 28} We find that the record demonstrates that appellant properly understood the
implications of the plea, the rights being waived, and failed to demonstrate any
deficiencies but for which the plea would not have been entered. The record reflects that
the respective substantial and strict Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c) compliance standards were
met by the trial court in this case.
7. {¶ 29} On consideration whereof, we find appellant’s assignment of error not
well- taken. Accordingly, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is
hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________ Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
8.