State v. Richard Reagan

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: July 26, 1999
• Docket: 03C01-9901-CC-00019
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED AT KNOXVILLE July 26, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr. MAY 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt Clerk

STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9901-CC-00019

Appellee, * Blount County

VS. * Honorable D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge

RICHARD D. REAGAN, * (Probation Revocation)

Appellant. *

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JULIE A. RICE PAUL G. SUMMERS Contract Appellate Defender Attorney General & Reporter P.O. Box 426 Knoxville, TN 37901-0426 ERIK W. DAAB Assistant Attorney General RAYMOND MACK GARNER 425 Fifth Avenue North District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493 419 High Street Maryville, TN 37804 MICHAEL L. FLYNN District Attorney General

EDWARD P. BAILEY, JR. Assistant District Attorney General 363 Court Street Maryville, TN 37804-5906

OPINION FILED: _______________

AFFIRMED - RULE 20

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, Judge OPINION

The defendant, Richard D. Reagan, appeals the revocation of his

probation, arguing that he was physically unable to comply with the terms

thereof. We AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

On April 22, 1998, the defendant pleaded guilty to public intoxication, a

third offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), violation of the

Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act (HMVO), and two counts of aggravated

assault. The trial court sentenced him to ten days for the public intoxication,

eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI, one year for the HMVO, and

three years for each aggravated assault. The trial court ordered these sentences

to run consecutively except that the DUI and HMVO sentences were to run

concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other sentences. Thus, the

defendant received an effective sentence of seven years and ten days.1 The trial

court granted immediate intensive probation on all counts.

On June 11, 1998, the trial court executed a probation violation warrant

and the defendant was arrested. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant’s

probation officer testified that the defendant failed to comply with the terms of his

probation on at least three occasions: he failed to meet with his probation officer

as directed April 25, 1998; he failed to report for hospital treatment as his

probation required; and, after he did later report to the hospital, he failed to

report to his probation officer upon being discharged. The proof further showed

that the defendant has severe mental and physical difficulites that may contribute

to his inability to comply with the terms of his probation.

In their briefs to this Court, both the state and the defendant calculate an effective sentence of four years. Although the state does not expound on its calculation, the defendant’s Statement of the Ca se reveals his misconc eption that the two aggravated assault sentences w ere to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the concurrent DUI and HMVO sentences. The record reveals that the trial judge at the revocation hearing also believed that the defend ant’s effe ctive sen tence w as four ye ars.

-2- The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that he

serve the remainder of his sentences in the Tennessee Department of

Correction. In doing so, the trial judge observed the defendant’s physical and

mental limitations and expressed hope that the defendant would be admitted to

the Special Needs Unit where he could get the physical, psychiatric, and

emotional treatment he needs.

The defendant does not contest that he violated his probation. He

argues, however, that his mental and physical state precluded his compliance

and that any violations were not willful.

On appeal of probation revocation proceedings, this Court will not disturb

the trial court’s judgment unless the record shows that the trial court abused its

discretion. See State v. Leach, 914 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In order to find that the trial court abused its discretion, we must conclude that

the record contains no substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s

conclusion. See id. “Proof of a probation violation need not be established

beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it allows the trial judge to make a

conscientious and intelligent judgment.” See State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79,

82 (1991).

The evidence supports the findings of the trial court, and we find no error

of law mandating reversal. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of

Criminal Appeals, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

_____________________________ JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge

-3- CONCUR:

_______________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge

_______________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, Judge

-4-