State v. Reynolds

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Reynolds, 2026-Ohio-2718.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115694 v. :

ERICKA REYNOLDS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 16, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-25-701072-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Halie Turigliatti, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant Ericka Reynolds (“Reynolds”) appeals the

sentence she received for her fourth-degree misdemeanor conviction. She claims

the following error: The trial court’s imposition of a community control condition ordering Appellant to resume her studies at Cleveland State University and graduate on schedule, in addition to numerous other sanctions consequent to her conviction for a fourth[-]degree misdemeanor is unreasonable because it is not related to rehabilitation, administering judgment or ensuring good behavior.

We find that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Reynolds

to reenroll in undergraduate studies at Cleveland State University as a condition of

community control when the record indicated that she could not afford the tuition.

We, therefore, vacate that condition from the list of community-control sanctions

but otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In April 2025, Reynolds was charged with one count of felonious

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). The single count included a forfeiture

specification as well as one- and three-year firearm specifications. The charge

resulted from an incident wherein Reynolds fired a single shot from her handgun

into the air outside of a bar in Euclid, Ohio. Reynolds maintained that she fired the

weapon in self-defense after she was pinned against a car by M.D., a man who had

repeatedly threatened her and her family.

Following Reynolds’s arrest, the prosecutor viewed surveillance video

of the incident and agreed that the surveillance footage corroborated her self-

defense claim. The State nevertheless determined that a criminal charge was still

warranted because the surveillance footage showed that Reynolds initiated a verbal

altercation with the man who later assaulted her, the man did not use deadly force or any weapon, and Reynolds initially denied firing the gun but later admitted it

after a shell casing and the surveillance video were discovered. As a result, the State

amended the charge, and Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of improper

discharge of a firearm, a fourth-degree misdemeanor with no firearm specifications.

Following the guilty plea, the court proceeded immediately to

sentencing. Reynolds informed the court that although she had been employed as

the administrative officer in Mayor Bibb’s Office of Capital Projects for 14 years, she

was suspended without pay as a result of the criminal charges, and it was not clear

whether she could return to that position. (Tr. 20-21 and 25.) The suspension of

her employment created a financial hardship, and Reynolds withdrew funds she had

saved in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (“OPERS”) to cover her

expenses. (Tr. 25.) During the plea hearing, Reynolds informed the court that she

had an associate’s degree from Tri-C and that she had been working toward a

bachelor’s degree in public administration at Cleveland State University. (Tr. 9.)

However, as a result of the criminal charge against her and subsequent loss of her

employment, Reynolds did not reenroll in the current semester. (Tr. 10.)

Defense counsel advised that on the night of the incident, Reynolds

confronted M.D. because his cousin allegedly assaulted Reynolds’s daughter.

According to defense counsel, M.D. is “a former MMA fighter” who is approximately

6′2″ and weighs 230 pounds. M.D. not only pinned Reynolds against the car, but

he also caused her injuries that necessitated a visit to the emergency room. (Tr. 23

and 26.) Defense counsel further noted that Reynolds, who was 46 years old, had no prior record of felonies or misdemeanors of any kind. (Tr. 20.) Finally, defense

counsel produced several letters from Reynolds’s work colleagues, who described

her as having “excellent character and excellent work.” (Tr. 21.)

The State conceded that it substantially reduced Reynolds’s charge

based on the surveillance-video evidence. It argued, however, that it did not

completely dismiss the charge because Reynolds approached the victim and “started

the altercation to begin with.” (Tr. 28.) According to the prosecutor, Reynolds

approached the victim who was in his vehicle, the victim did not use deadly force,

and Reynolds initially lied about having fired the weapon. (Tr. 29.)

The court sentenced Reynolds to a three-year term of community-

control sanctions, with six days of jail-time credit. The community-control

conditions required Reynolds to perform 100 hours of community service, obtain

and maintain employment, and complete an anger-management and concealed

carry CCW program. The conditions also required Reynolds to resume her studies

at Cleveland State University and to graduate on schedule. The court advised

Reynolds that any violation of the conditions could result in a 30-day jail term and

a $250 fine. (Tr. 36.)

Reynolds’s trial counsel objected to the three-year term of community

control. (Tr. 36-38.) Counsel argued that a three-year term of community control

was excessive for a single fourth-degree misdemeanor, particularly since Reynolds

was the real victim in the case. The trial court was not persuaded by counsel’s argument, and it did not change the sentence. Reynolds now appeals the trial court’s

judgment.

II. Law and Analysis

In the sole assignment of error, Reynolds argues the trial court’s

imposition of a community-control condition requiring her to resume her studies at

Cleveland State University and to graduate on schedule is an abuse of discretion.

Reynolds further argues that her trial counsel’s failure to object to this community-

control condition constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must

demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonable representation and that he or she was prejudiced by that deficient

performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). To

establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694.

Trial courts have broad discretion when sentencing a defendant on a

misdemeanor conviction. Cleveland v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-459, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). We,

therefore, will not disturb the trial court’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion.

Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an

unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. A trial court is authorized to impose a sentence of community-control

sanctions on misdemeanor convictions pursuant to R.C. 2929.27(A).

R.C. 2929.27(C) instructs that in addition to the sanctions listed in R.C. 2929.27(A),

a court “may impose any other sanction that is intended to discourage the offender

. . . from committing a similar offense if the sanction is reasonably related to the

overriding purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing.” The overriding

purposes of misdemeanor sentencing are “‘to protect the public from future crime

by the offender and others and to punish the offender.’” Lakewood v. Dobra, 2018-

Ohio-960, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2929.21.

R.C. 2929.22(B) enumerates factors the trial court must consider in

misdemeanor sentencing, and failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse

of discretion. Dobra at ¶ 10, citing Maple Hts. v. Sweeney, 2005-Ohio-2820, ¶ 7

(8th Dist.). Nevertheless, “the trial court is not required to make factual findings on

the record related to these factors.” Dobra at ¶ 10, citing Sweeney at ¶ 7. So long as

the misdemeanor sentence is within the statutory limits, the trial court is presumed

to have considered the required factors enumerated in R.C. 2929.22 absent a

showing to the contrary by the defendant. Dobra at ¶ 10, citing Sweeney at ¶ 7.

In State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53 (1990), the Ohio Supreme Court

held that in determining whether community-control conditions reasonably relate

to the goals of misdemeanor sentencing, courts should consider whether the

condition is (1) reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some

relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct that is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the

statutory ends of probation. “All three prongs of the Jones test must be satisfied for

the reviewing court to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Mahon

at ¶ 8, citing State v. White, 2015-Ohio-3844, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). Furthermore, the

conditions “‘cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge upon the

[offender’s] liberty.’” State v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 13, quoting Jones at 52.

The Ohio General Assembly revised the misdemeanor-sentencing

statutes after Jones was decided and enumerated a list of residential, nonresidential,

and financial sanctions that courts may impose. State v. Ballish, 2026-Ohio-503,

¶ 15. In Ballish, the Court held that the Jones test does not apply to these statutorily

enumerated conditions. Id. at ¶ 24. An appellate court must instead review the

imposition of these statutorily enumerated conditions for an abuse of discretion,

keeping in mind that the sanctions must be “‘[i]n the interests of doing justice,

rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the offender’s good behavior.’” Id. at ¶ 15,

quoting R.C. 2929.25(C)(2).

R.C. 2929.27(A) provides a nonexhaustive list of nonresidential

sanctions a trial court may impose as part of a criminal sentence.

R.C. 2929.27(A)(11) allows a trial court to require “that the offender obtain

education or training[.]” R.C. 2929.01(M) defines the phrase “education or training”

to include “study at, or in conjunction with a program offered by, a university,

college, or technical college or vocational study and also includes the completion of

primary school, secondary school, and literacy curricula or their equivalent.” Therefore, a condition requiring education at a university such as Cleveland State

University is authorized by law provided the condition is not imposed in an abuse of

discretion. Ballish at ¶ 24.

Even if a sanction is statutorily authorized, the imposition of the

sanction constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is imposed on a defendant who

cannot realistically comply with it. Community-control conditions must be

reasonably related to the goals of community control, namely “‘rehabilitation,

administering justice, and ensuring good behavior.’” Mahon, 2018-Ohio-295, at ¶ 7

(8th Dist.), quoting State v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, at ¶ 16.

Reynolds informed the court that she had lost her job in the Mayor’s

Office and that she was forced to liquidate her OPERS savings to pay her living

expenses. (Tr. 25.) Reynolds also advised the court that she was providing for her

children. (Tr. 25.) Although Reynolds was seeking other jobs and sources of income,

she had not yet found employment at the time of sentencing that could cover all of

her living expenses, including those of her children, and the cost of college tuition.

The trial court imposed a condition that the record demonstrated was likely

impossible — or at minimum impractical — for Reynolds to satisfy. Because

successful compliance was likely unattainable, the condition could not further

rehabilitation, ensure good behavior, or reduce future criminality. To the contrary,

the condition would operate as a predetermined basis for future violation

proceedings, which is the opposite of ensuring good behavior. Imposing a statutorily authorized sanction under circumstances in

which compliance is impossible is unreasonable and arbitrary and, therefore,

constitutes an abuse of discretion under Ballish. Had counsel explained to the court

the likelihood that Reynolds would not be able to comply with the condition, the trial

court would likely not have imposed it.

Therefore, the sole assignment of error is sustained.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part. The

community-control sanction requiring Reynolds to resume her college education at

Cleveland State University and to graduate on time is vacated. All other aspects of

Reynolds’s sentence remain in effect.

It is ordered that appellee and appellant share costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR