State v. Reppucci
This text of 2017 Ohio 1313 (State v. Reppucci) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[Cite as State v. Reppucci, 2017-Ohio-1313.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 16CA0047-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE LOUIS A. REPPUCCI MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 14 TRC 00609
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: April 10, 2017
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} Louis Reppucci appeals from his conviction in the Medina Municipal Court. This
Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} In February 2014, Mr. Reppucci was charged with operating a vehicle under the
influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). He was also
charged with an OVI refusal to submit to a chemical test while having a previous OVI conviction
within the past twenty years in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). Both charges were first-degree
misdemeanors.
{¶3} On February 20, 2014, Mr. Reppucci filed a motion to suppress. The State
requested a pretrial prior to an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The trial court
denied the State’s request noting: “The [m]otion to [s]uppress only raised two issues, reasonable
suspicion for the initial detention and probable cause for the OVI arrest. The [c]ourt does not 2
need to conduct a pretrial for a motion containing such limited issues.” On June 27, 2014, the
trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. On December 14, 2015, the court issued its
decision denying the motion to suppress.
{¶4} Thereafter, Mr. Reppucci moved to dismiss the case based on a violation of his
speedy trial rights. More particularly, he argued that the motion to suppress remained pending
for 535 days after the hearing on the motion. The trial court acknowledged that this time period
“is lengthier than would be desired.” Nonetheless, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss
finding the delay was “not unreasonable under all the circumstances considering the nature of the
issues raised in the motion and the voluminous caseload handled in this single-judge municipal
court.”
{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial in February 2016. The jury found Mr. Reppucci
not guilty of the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) charge and guilty of the R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) charge. In
June 2016, the trial court sentenced Mr. Reppucci.
{¶6} Mr. Reppucci appeals raising one assignment of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING DEFENDANT- APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS AND UNREASONABLE DELAY.
{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Reppucci argues that the trial court’s
unreasonable delay in ruling on his motion to suppress violated his speedy trial rights. This
Court agrees.
{¶8} R.C. 2945.71 to 2945.73 impose a mandatory duty on the prosecution and the trial
court to bring a defendant to trial in a timely fashion. See State v. Martin, 56 Ohio St.2d 289, 3
297 (1978). For a first-degree misdemeanor, a defendant shall be brought to trial within 90 days
of the person’s arrest or the service of summons. R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). This time period may be
extended by any period of delay necessitated by a defendant’s motion. R.C. 2945.72(E). “Upon
motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged with an offense shall be
discharged if he is not brought to trial within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72
of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2945.73(B).
{¶9} A defense motion tolls speedy-trial time for a reasonable period to allow the State
to respond and the court to rule on the motion. See State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-
Ohio-4478, paragraph two of the syllabus. “This does not imply * * * that a trial court has
unbridled discretion in taking time to rule on a defense motion.” Id. at ¶ 27. Rather, a trial judge
is required to rule on motions “‘in as expeditious a manner as possible.’” Id., quoting Martin at
297. In determining whether a trial court disposed of a motion within a reasonable time, this
Court considers the complexity of the facts, the difficulty of the legal issues, and the demands on
the time and schedule of the trial court judge. State v. Kolvek, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21808,
2004-Ohio-2515, ¶ 8; Accord State v. Miles, 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0102-M, 2013-Ohio-
4272, ¶ 8.
{¶10} In the present case, Mr. Reppucci filed his motion to suppress on February 20,
2014. The trial court heard the motion to suppress on June 27, 2014. The trial court issued its
decision denying the motion to suppress on December 14, 2015. From the time of the hearing
until the trial court’s decision on the motion, 535 days elapsed. Mr. Reppucci moved to dismiss
based on this delay.
{¶11} By the trial court’s own assessment, Mr. Reppucci’s motion was not complex
either factually or legally. Prior to the hearing, the trial court noted that it was faced with only 4
two limited issues. In its decision denying the motion to suppress, the trial court reiterated those
two issues were reasonable suspicion for detaining Mr. Reppucci and probable cause for his
arrest.
{¶12} The entry denying the motion to dismiss refers vaguely to “the nature of the issues
raised in the motion [to suppress,]” but it does not specifically discuss those issues. Rather, the
focus of the denial was the size of the trial court’s docket. While this Court is not unsympathetic
to the time demands on trial court judges, this factor alone does not justify a delay of over 17
months in ruling on a simple suppression motion.
{¶13} This case is distinguishable from State v. Krzemieniewski, 9th Dist. Medina No.
15CA0015-M, 2016-Ohio-4991. In Krzemieniewski, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion
to dismiss based on a delay in ruling on a motion to suppress in this same “‘one-judge court.’”
Id. at ¶ 6, 25. The time from the hearing until the decision in Krzemieniewski was approximately
10 months. Id. at ¶ 5. More importantly, Mr. Krzemieniewski waived his right to a speedy trial
on multiple occasions. Id. at ¶ 25. In the present case, Mr. Reppucci never waived his speedy
trial rights.
{¶14} Because the trial court unreasonably delayed in ruling on Mr. Reppucci’s motion
to suppress, that time period did not toll Mr. Reppucci’s speedy trial clock. See Kolvek, 2004-
Ohio-2515, at ¶ 7. Mr. Reppucci’s argument focuses on this 535-day period. This Court finds it
unnecessary to calculate the time periods prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress or after
the ruling on that motion although those periods are part of the speedy trial time. The 535 days
that are at issue here far exceeded the 90-day statutory time period within which Mr. Reppucci
was to be brought to trial. Even taking into consideration that some portion of this time may
have been reasonable, Mr. Reppucci’s speedy trial rights were clearly violated under the facts of 5
this case. Consequently, Mr. Reppucci was entitled to be discharged upon the filing of his
motion to dismiss. See R.C. 2945.73(B).
{¶15} Mr. Reppucci’s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶16} Mr. Reppucci’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Medina
Municipal Court is reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court with instructions to
discharge Mr. Reppucci.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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