State v. Rentex Inc.
This text of 365 N.E.2d 1274 (State v. Rentex Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This case involves the construction of R. C. 4735.01, et seq., which provide a licensing scheme for the real estate brokerage industry. Plaintiff (appellee), the Ohio Real Estate Commission, filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on February 19, 1974, 1 requesting the court to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting defendants (appellants), Rentex, Inc., and its agents, servants, employees, and representatives, from engaging in the practice of real estate without first being licensed pursuant to R. C. 4735.01, et seq. Following a hearing on all issues, the court ruled that appellants were acting as real estate brokers within the meaning of R. C. 4735.01 et .seq., and that they were therefore enjoined from further operation until they conformed with the licensing requirements of the statute. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.
Rentex, Inc., franchises approximately fifty offices throughout the United States and Canada. The franchises charge a fee- to the customer and in return provide a list of prospective rental properties. The. franchises acquire rental information to develop such lists by contacting landlords, property management companies, realtors, and any other likely source. The information is solicited, collected, and listed prior to acquiring a customer but in the expectation that there will be a buyer who will pay a fee for the list. The compiling of the information cdntinues after a fee is paid to update the listings. The information solicited . from prospective lessors and made available to franchise customers includes: (a) the nature of the property for rent; (b) the dates available; (c) a general description of the area of town* where the property is located; (d) the amount of the rent; (e) the *59 number of bedrooms; (f) whether the property is furnished or unfurnished; (g) whether children or pets are permitted; (h) whether the rental is an apartment, up or down duplex, or other form of property; (i) the address of the property and the lessor’s phone number (as well as other miscellaneous items of information).
The appellants receive from the customers their requirements for housing, and give them lists of available rentals that correspond to the dictated requirements.
The appellants do not act as a fiduciary or agent, do not negotiate or draft rental contracts, do not receive payments from the prospective lessors of property, and do not appraise any of the realty.
All the Rentex franchises offer substantially the same service.
I.
The appellants’ assignments of error are set out in footnote 2. The first poses the dispositive issue in the case.
That issue in question form is:
Does R. C. 4735.01, et seq., reach and regulate the real estate information service performed by the appellants? 1 2
For reasons assessed below the question is answered “No.”. This disposition makes it unnecessary to reach the constitutional challenges raised by the second and third assignments of error.
II.
The real estate brokerage business is specialized. The legislation designed to regulate it employs the technical language developed in the specialty. Language so deployed in the statute requires a technical interpretation 3 in the light of the statutory purpose.
*60 HI.
There are only a few words in the statute that have the slightest conceivable reference to the business of appellant Rentex or its franchises. This fragile reference is destroyed when the technical meanings of the terms are considered.
Por instance, the definitional listings in R. C. 4735.01 (A)(3) and (7) 4 provide that listing, offering or agreeing to list or assisting in the procuring of prospects for sale, rent, or exchange of real estate is characteristic of covered real estate brokering. These provisions come closest to the appellants’ activity but fall short of it in any realistic or technical sense. 5 The terms “listing” and “procuring” *61 are words of art in the real estate business. Both imply an agency relationship between the seller and broker with the purpose of effecting a juncture between buyers and sellers of real property with an ultimate pecuniary reward to the broker for his part in bringing the parties together. A successful sale (or rental) is desired but not necessarily essential in every situation for the broker to earn his fee.
In contrast, the appellants have no agency relationship to anyone, nor concern with any aspect of the sale of anything but the information which they gather. When that sale is concluded so is appellants’ interest. They offer nothing else for sale and nothing for rent. Thus, it is clear that the appellants’ services closely parallel the function of newspaper want ads but have no connection with real estate brokering. Their only nexus with real estate at all is to sell somewhat elaborate descriptions of available rental property. There it ends.
A conclusion of non-coverage is underwritten by the *62 obvious irrelevance to appellants’ business of the complex regulations applicable , to brokers under the statute. 6
IV.
The conclusion that R. C. 4735.01, et seq., does not govern service of the kind Rentex and its franchises render reflects a very narrow “no coverage” interpretation. The decision does not reach the question of the constitutionally permissible scope of the police power should the legislature determine to exercise it to regulate the service industry involved in this case.
Reversed and judgment entered for the defendant-appellants.
Judgment reversed.
The ease was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County upon defendant’s motion for a change of venue. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the claim for a permanent injunction were consolidated for hearing which was held on April 16,1975.
I. The trial court erred in ruling, that the appellants’ business constitutes-the practice'of real estate as defined by R. C. §4735.01.
“II. The trial court erred in not holding that R. C. §4735.01 et seq. are unconstitutional as applied to Rentex.
“A. The statutes as applied to Rentex are unconstitutional in that *60
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
365 N.E.2d 1274, 51 Ohio App. 2d 57, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 173, 1977 Ohio App. LEXIS 6919, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-rentex-inc-ohioctapp-1977.