[Cite as State v. Relf, 2013-Ohio-2089.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION Nos. 98798 and 98799
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAMIL RELF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-554305 and CR-554764
BEFORE: Keough, J., Stewart, A.J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 23, 2013 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Katrice McCrae 5403 Detroit Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44102
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor By: Holly Welsh Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jamil Relf, appeals from the trial court’s judgment
denying his presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Finding no merit to the appeal, we
affirm.
I. Background
{¶2} Relf was indicted in Case No. CR-554305 on (1) two counts of aggravated
robbery, each with one- and three-year firearm specifications, and notice of prior
conviction and repeat violent offender specifications; (2) one count of petty theft; (3) two
counts of felonious assault, each with one- and three year firearm specifications, and
notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specifications; and (4) one count of
having a weapon while under a disability.
{¶3} In Case No. CR-554764, Relf was indicted on (1) one count of attempted
murder, with one- and three-year firearm specifications, and notice of prior conviction
and repeat violent offender specifications; (2) two counts of felonious assault, with one-
and three-year firearm specifications, and notice of prior conviction and repeat violent
offender specifications; and (3) one count of having a weapon under disability.
{¶4} At a plea hearing on February 29, 2012, Relf, represented by assigned
counsel, entered guilty pleas as follows: in Case No. CR-554305, one count of aggravated
robbery with three-year firearm and notice of prior conviction specifications, and one count of having a weapon while under a disability; in Case No. CR-554764, one count of
felonious assault with three-year firearm and notice of prior conviction specifications, and
one count of having a weapon while under a disability. The remaining counts and
specifications were nolled.
{¶5} On March 9, 2012, prior to sentencing, counsel filed a motion to withdraw
the plea. In addition, counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel due to irreconcilable
differences with Relf. On March 20, 2012, the trial court assigned new counsel.
{¶6} On April 30, 2012, upon the recommendation of the court psychiatric clinic,
the trial court referred Relf for a 20-day inpatient competency evaluation. Subsequently,
on June 28, 2012, the parties stipulated to a report from Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare
finding Relf competent to stand trial, and the court set the matter for a hearing on Relf’s
motion to withdraw his plea.
{¶7} At the hearing, counsel for Relf argued that the motion should be granted
because Relf had told him that he was innocent of the charges, he only gave the answers
at the plea hearing that his lawyer had advised him to give, and his mother had pressured
him to take the plea.
{¶8} Defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge then asked Relf
questions about his recollection and understanding of the plea hearing. Relf testified that
he remembered the judge explaining the charges and possible penalties, as well as the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. He testified that he also remembered telling the judge that he understood his rights and did not have any questions about the plea
proceedings, and that he had not been threatened or promised anything to take the plea.
{¶9} The court denied Relf’s motion to withdraw his plea and proceeded to
sentencing. Counsel for Relf asked the court to take into consideration at sentencing that
Relf was only 21 years old and had a serious substance abuse problem, and counsel’s
belief, based on his contacts with Relf, that “he’s fairly low functioning from a cognitive
standpoint.”
{¶10} The trial court sentenced Relf to an aggregate term of ten years incarceration
in each case. In ordering the sentences to be served concurrently, the trial judge stated,
“[t]he only reason I’m showing you any kind of leniency, and I do think it’s leniency, is
because I do believe you do have a lower cognitive functioning than the average person.”
II. Analysis
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Relf argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Relf contends that the trial court
should have granted his motion because presentence motions to withdraw are to be freely
granted and, in light of his low cognitive abilities, the trial court erred in relying on his
testimony that he understood his rights when he waived them and pleaded guilty.
{¶12} Under Crim.R. 32.1, “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest
may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to
withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶13} In general, “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely
and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). It
is well established, however, that “[a] defendant does not have an absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. A trial court must conduct a hearing to
determine whether there is a reasonable legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.”
Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶14} The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw is within the trial court’s
discretion. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial
court’s decision must be affirmed. Id. at 527. An abuse of discretion requires a finding
that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). This court has held that
[i]t is not an abuse of discretion to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea when a defendant: (1) is represented by competent counsel; (2) is given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before entering a plea; and (3) is given a hearing on the motion to withdraw that plea during which the court considers the defendant’s arguments in support of the motion.
State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. No. 87633, 2006-Ohio-6280, ¶ 5; see also State v. Peterseim,
68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶15} Our review of the record demonstrates that Relf was represented by
competent counsel throughout the proceedings. Additionally, prior to entering his plea,
he was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing at which the court went to great lengths to ensure that his plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The record also reflects
that Relf was given a full and impartial hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. At
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[Cite as State v. Relf, 2013-Ohio-2089.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION Nos. 98798 and 98799
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAMIL RELF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-554305 and CR-554764
BEFORE: Keough, J., Stewart, A.J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 23, 2013 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Katrice McCrae 5403 Detroit Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44102
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor By: Holly Welsh Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jamil Relf, appeals from the trial court’s judgment
denying his presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Finding no merit to the appeal, we
affirm.
I. Background
{¶2} Relf was indicted in Case No. CR-554305 on (1) two counts of aggravated
robbery, each with one- and three-year firearm specifications, and notice of prior
conviction and repeat violent offender specifications; (2) one count of petty theft; (3) two
counts of felonious assault, each with one- and three year firearm specifications, and
notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specifications; and (4) one count of
having a weapon while under a disability.
{¶3} In Case No. CR-554764, Relf was indicted on (1) one count of attempted
murder, with one- and three-year firearm specifications, and notice of prior conviction
and repeat violent offender specifications; (2) two counts of felonious assault, with one-
and three-year firearm specifications, and notice of prior conviction and repeat violent
offender specifications; and (3) one count of having a weapon under disability.
{¶4} At a plea hearing on February 29, 2012, Relf, represented by assigned
counsel, entered guilty pleas as follows: in Case No. CR-554305, one count of aggravated
robbery with three-year firearm and notice of prior conviction specifications, and one count of having a weapon while under a disability; in Case No. CR-554764, one count of
felonious assault with three-year firearm and notice of prior conviction specifications, and
one count of having a weapon while under a disability. The remaining counts and
specifications were nolled.
{¶5} On March 9, 2012, prior to sentencing, counsel filed a motion to withdraw
the plea. In addition, counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel due to irreconcilable
differences with Relf. On March 20, 2012, the trial court assigned new counsel.
{¶6} On April 30, 2012, upon the recommendation of the court psychiatric clinic,
the trial court referred Relf for a 20-day inpatient competency evaluation. Subsequently,
on June 28, 2012, the parties stipulated to a report from Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare
finding Relf competent to stand trial, and the court set the matter for a hearing on Relf’s
motion to withdraw his plea.
{¶7} At the hearing, counsel for Relf argued that the motion should be granted
because Relf had told him that he was innocent of the charges, he only gave the answers
at the plea hearing that his lawyer had advised him to give, and his mother had pressured
him to take the plea.
{¶8} Defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge then asked Relf
questions about his recollection and understanding of the plea hearing. Relf testified that
he remembered the judge explaining the charges and possible penalties, as well as the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. He testified that he also remembered telling the judge that he understood his rights and did not have any questions about the plea
proceedings, and that he had not been threatened or promised anything to take the plea.
{¶9} The court denied Relf’s motion to withdraw his plea and proceeded to
sentencing. Counsel for Relf asked the court to take into consideration at sentencing that
Relf was only 21 years old and had a serious substance abuse problem, and counsel’s
belief, based on his contacts with Relf, that “he’s fairly low functioning from a cognitive
standpoint.”
{¶10} The trial court sentenced Relf to an aggregate term of ten years incarceration
in each case. In ordering the sentences to be served concurrently, the trial judge stated,
“[t]he only reason I’m showing you any kind of leniency, and I do think it’s leniency, is
because I do believe you do have a lower cognitive functioning than the average person.”
II. Analysis
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Relf argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Relf contends that the trial court
should have granted his motion because presentence motions to withdraw are to be freely
granted and, in light of his low cognitive abilities, the trial court erred in relying on his
testimony that he understood his rights when he waived them and pleaded guilty.
{¶12} Under Crim.R. 32.1, “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest
may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to
withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶13} In general, “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely
and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). It
is well established, however, that “[a] defendant does not have an absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. A trial court must conduct a hearing to
determine whether there is a reasonable legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.”
Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶14} The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw is within the trial court’s
discretion. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial
court’s decision must be affirmed. Id. at 527. An abuse of discretion requires a finding
that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). This court has held that
[i]t is not an abuse of discretion to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea when a defendant: (1) is represented by competent counsel; (2) is given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before entering a plea; and (3) is given a hearing on the motion to withdraw that plea during which the court considers the defendant’s arguments in support of the motion.
State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. No. 87633, 2006-Ohio-6280, ¶ 5; see also State v. Peterseim,
68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶15} Our review of the record demonstrates that Relf was represented by
competent counsel throughout the proceedings. Additionally, prior to entering his plea,
he was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing at which the court went to great lengths to ensure that his plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The record also reflects
that Relf was given a full and impartial hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. At
this hearing, the court again made extensive inquiry of Relf to determine whether there
was any basis for withdrawing his plea. The record reflects, as the court determined, that
Relf understood the rights he was waiving in entering his plea and the effect of his waiver
of those rights.
{¶16} Relf’s argument that the trial court could not rely on his representations
about his understanding of his rights and his waiver of those rights due to his low
cognitive ability is without merit. Low cognitive abilities do not necessarily render an
individual incapable of understanding the proceedings against them. State v. Bays, 2d
Dist. No. 95-CA-118, 1998 Ohio App LEXIS 227 (Jan. 30, 1998). Here, the totality of
the record does not support Relf’s claim that he did not possess sufficient mental capacity
to know, understand, and voluntarily waive his rights. He gave responsive answers
during both the plea hearing and the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, and there
is nothing in the record to indicate that he could not process and understand the questions
asked of him. Despite Relf’s claim otherwise, the record reflects that he understood his
rights and the effect of his waiver of those rights. As the prosecutor argued, Relf’s
attempt to withdraw his plea was due to nothing more than a change of heart.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
{¶17} The first assignment of error is therefore overruled. {¶18} In his second assignment of error, Relf contends that both his original and
subsequent counsel were ineffective so as to deny him his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. He contends that his original lawyer was ineffective because he
told Relf what to say even though he did not want to plead guilty. He contends that his
subsequent lawyer was ineffective because he did not supplement the motion to withdraw
filed by the original lawyer and did not call any witnesses at the hearing. Relf argues
that his subsequent counsel was also ineffective because counsel allowed him to testify at
the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea and did not argue that Relf’s cognitive
delays affected his ability to understand the proceedings.
{¶19} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable performance
and that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, such that, but for counsel’s
error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio
St.3d 150, 151, 2002-Ohio-350, 761 N.E.2d 18. A reviewing court will strongly presume
that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538
N.E.2d 373 (1989).
{¶20} Relf’s arguments have no merit. There is nothing in the record that
substantiates Relf’s claim that he was coached and/or coerced to plead guilty by his
original counsel even though he did not want to. Instead, the record of the plea hearing demonstrates that there was an extensive Crim.R. 11 colloquy between the judge and Relf
during which Relf was given every opportunity to ask questions and indicate that he did
not understand the proceedings. With respect to subsequent counsel, our review of the
record demonstrates that counsel adequately argued the motion to withdraw, despite not
calling any witnesses. Furthermore, counsel properly allowed Relf to testify about his
understanding of the plea proceedings in an attempt to demonstrate that his plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made. And finally, the court was aware of Relf’s
cognitive abilities. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the court had a
competency report in which Relf was deemed competent to stand trial. The court also
inquired fully of Relf regarding his understanding of the plea proceedings. And the trial
judge’s comment at sentencing that she was showing Relf leniency because of his low
cognitive ability demonstrated that the court was well aware of Relf’s intellectual
function. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for not arguing that Relf’s cognitive delay
made it impossible for him to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.
{¶21} The second assignment of error is therefore overruled.
{¶22} Affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein
taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., and KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR