Callahan, J.
On March 3, 1983, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 and one count of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122. Both charges arose from [53]*53the armed robbery of the Fidelity Savings and Loan Association in East Haven on November 20,1981. East Haven police officers apprehended the defendant shortly after the robbery.
At the time the defendant’s pleas were entered there existed an understanding between him and the state’s attorney for the judicial district of New Haven that the defendant would cooperate with law enforcement officials and furnish information concerning the offenses for which he had been arrested and any other crimes of which he had knowledge. In pursuance of that agreement, the state’s attorney informed the court, which canvassed and accepted the defendant’s pleas, that, at the time of sentencing, the state would recommend a sentence of “between fifteen to eighteen years,” with the right reserved to defense counsel to argue for less. Subsequent to the entry of his pleas, the defendant did furnish information to state and federal law enforcement officials which led to the successful prosecution of numerous serious crimes.
The defendant did not appear for sentencing on the state robbery and larceny charges until January 30, 1986. In the meantime, he was serving a sentence for a federal parole violation. Prior to and at the time of sentencing, federal and state law enforcement agents, the United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, and the state’s attorney involved, all expressed satisfaction with the degree of the defendant’s cooperation. The state’s attorney, as a result, recommended a sentence of fifteen years, the minimum sentence offered under the plea agreement expressed on March 3,1983. The sentencing judge, who was not the judge who had accepted the defendant’s pleas in 1983, did not adhere to the plea agreement, however, but imposed concurrent sentences of twenty years on each count, to be suspended after the defendant had served ten years, and also imposed a five year period of probation.
[54]*54The defendant, apparently feeling that his extensive cooperation with law enforcement officials entitled him to greater consideration on his sentence, took this appeal. In a letter to the sentencing judge, just prior to sentencing, the defendant informed the judge that it was his understanding that, if he fully cooperated with the authorities, he would receive a state sentence that was concurrent and coterminous with the federal sentence he was serving as a parole violator. That is also his position on this appeal. At the time of his state sentencing on January 30, 1986, the defendant had served approximately four years on the parole violation and his sentence for the violation was due to expire approximately one month after that date.
There is absolutely nothing in the record, other than the defendant’s own letter, to justify his expectations. To the contrary, the sentencing judge immediately prior to pronouncing sentence, without rebuttal from either the defendant or his counsel, stated, “there was in fact no commitment made that the sentence would not exceed the parole time that you owed.”1
[55]*55It is clear from the record before us, therefore, that, although the defendant had hoped to do better, he had bargained for a sentence of “between fifteen to eighteen years” and was induced to enter guilty pleas in anticipation that the sentence he received would be within the agreed upon range, or possibly less, if counsel had been able to persuade the court. Patently, the state’s attorney lived up to his agreement with the defendant when he recommended a sentence at the low end of the agreed upon scale. There is, therefore, no merit to the defendant’s claim that his state sentence should be coterminous with his sentence as a federal parole violator.
That, however, does not end the matter. The sentence imposed, while it carried a lesser period of immediate incarceration than the sentence recommended by the state’s attorney, potentially required the defendant to serve five years more than he had bargained for. Further, the plea agreement did not include a period of probation and there is nothing to indicate that a period of probation had been agreed to or anticipated by the defendant.
A suspended sentence and a period of probation are not inconsequential adjuncts of the sentence imposed that can be ignored or, like castor oil, be considered to have been administered for the defendant’s own good. Probation is a criminal sentence and the conditions attached to probation involve serious restraints on a probationer’s life-style, associations, movements and activities.2 United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, [56]*561387-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819, 107 S. Ct. 80, 93 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1986); see General Statutes §§ 53a-293 and 53a-304; W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.3 (a). Violations of those conditions, [57]*57furthermore, would expose the defendant to a sentence substantially in excess of the agreed upon sentence which induced his guilty pleas. See General Statutes § 53a-32.5 Therefore, the plea agreement, while [58]*58honored by the state’s attorney, was not implemented by the sentencing judge. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the sentencing judge gave the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his pleas when he determined that he was not going to impose the agreed upon sentence. Under the existing circumstances, the court had an affirmative duty to do so. State v. Schaeffer, 5 Conn. App. 378, 389-91, 498 A.2d 134 (1985); Moore v. Florida, 489 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. App. 1986); Jackson v. Florida, 483 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. App. 1986); Dunkel v. Florida, 432 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1983).
On March 3, 1983, when the defendant entered his pleas, he was informed by the court which accepted them that if, at the time of sentencing, the court was unable to “go along with [the] recommendation that the State’s Attorney is going to make to the Court which you agreed to,” the defendant would have a right to withdraw his pleas. “When a guilty plea is induced by promises arising out of a plea bargaining agreement, [59]*59fairness requires that such promises be fulfilled by the state. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). The same concept of fairness ordinarily impels the court, in its discretion, either to accord specific performance of the agreement or to permit the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea.” State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 644, 508 A.2d 1376 (1986).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Callahan, J.
On March 3, 1983, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 and one count of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122. Both charges arose from [53]*53the armed robbery of the Fidelity Savings and Loan Association in East Haven on November 20,1981. East Haven police officers apprehended the defendant shortly after the robbery.
At the time the defendant’s pleas were entered there existed an understanding between him and the state’s attorney for the judicial district of New Haven that the defendant would cooperate with law enforcement officials and furnish information concerning the offenses for which he had been arrested and any other crimes of which he had knowledge. In pursuance of that agreement, the state’s attorney informed the court, which canvassed and accepted the defendant’s pleas, that, at the time of sentencing, the state would recommend a sentence of “between fifteen to eighteen years,” with the right reserved to defense counsel to argue for less. Subsequent to the entry of his pleas, the defendant did furnish information to state and federal law enforcement officials which led to the successful prosecution of numerous serious crimes.
The defendant did not appear for sentencing on the state robbery and larceny charges until January 30, 1986. In the meantime, he was serving a sentence for a federal parole violation. Prior to and at the time of sentencing, federal and state law enforcement agents, the United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, and the state’s attorney involved, all expressed satisfaction with the degree of the defendant’s cooperation. The state’s attorney, as a result, recommended a sentence of fifteen years, the minimum sentence offered under the plea agreement expressed on March 3,1983. The sentencing judge, who was not the judge who had accepted the defendant’s pleas in 1983, did not adhere to the plea agreement, however, but imposed concurrent sentences of twenty years on each count, to be suspended after the defendant had served ten years, and also imposed a five year period of probation.
[54]*54The defendant, apparently feeling that his extensive cooperation with law enforcement officials entitled him to greater consideration on his sentence, took this appeal. In a letter to the sentencing judge, just prior to sentencing, the defendant informed the judge that it was his understanding that, if he fully cooperated with the authorities, he would receive a state sentence that was concurrent and coterminous with the federal sentence he was serving as a parole violator. That is also his position on this appeal. At the time of his state sentencing on January 30, 1986, the defendant had served approximately four years on the parole violation and his sentence for the violation was due to expire approximately one month after that date.
There is absolutely nothing in the record, other than the defendant’s own letter, to justify his expectations. To the contrary, the sentencing judge immediately prior to pronouncing sentence, without rebuttal from either the defendant or his counsel, stated, “there was in fact no commitment made that the sentence would not exceed the parole time that you owed.”1
[55]*55It is clear from the record before us, therefore, that, although the defendant had hoped to do better, he had bargained for a sentence of “between fifteen to eighteen years” and was induced to enter guilty pleas in anticipation that the sentence he received would be within the agreed upon range, or possibly less, if counsel had been able to persuade the court. Patently, the state’s attorney lived up to his agreement with the defendant when he recommended a sentence at the low end of the agreed upon scale. There is, therefore, no merit to the defendant’s claim that his state sentence should be coterminous with his sentence as a federal parole violator.
That, however, does not end the matter. The sentence imposed, while it carried a lesser period of immediate incarceration than the sentence recommended by the state’s attorney, potentially required the defendant to serve five years more than he had bargained for. Further, the plea agreement did not include a period of probation and there is nothing to indicate that a period of probation had been agreed to or anticipated by the defendant.
A suspended sentence and a period of probation are not inconsequential adjuncts of the sentence imposed that can be ignored or, like castor oil, be considered to have been administered for the defendant’s own good. Probation is a criminal sentence and the conditions attached to probation involve serious restraints on a probationer’s life-style, associations, movements and activities.2 United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, [56]*561387-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819, 107 S. Ct. 80, 93 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1986); see General Statutes §§ 53a-293 and 53a-304; W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.3 (a). Violations of those conditions, [57]*57furthermore, would expose the defendant to a sentence substantially in excess of the agreed upon sentence which induced his guilty pleas. See General Statutes § 53a-32.5 Therefore, the plea agreement, while [58]*58honored by the state’s attorney, was not implemented by the sentencing judge. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the sentencing judge gave the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his pleas when he determined that he was not going to impose the agreed upon sentence. Under the existing circumstances, the court had an affirmative duty to do so. State v. Schaeffer, 5 Conn. App. 378, 389-91, 498 A.2d 134 (1985); Moore v. Florida, 489 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. App. 1986); Jackson v. Florida, 483 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. App. 1986); Dunkel v. Florida, 432 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1983).
On March 3, 1983, when the defendant entered his pleas, he was informed by the court which accepted them that if, at the time of sentencing, the court was unable to “go along with [the] recommendation that the State’s Attorney is going to make to the Court which you agreed to,” the defendant would have a right to withdraw his pleas. “When a guilty plea is induced by promises arising out of a plea bargaining agreement, [59]*59fairness requires that such promises be fulfilled by the state. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). The same concept of fairness ordinarily impels the court, in its discretion, either to accord specific performance of the agreement or to permit the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea.” State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 644, 508 A.2d 1376 (1986). Certainly, in this instance, where the defendant was explicitly informed by the court that if, at the time of sentencing, the court was unable to “go along with” the state’s attorney’s recommendations he would have the right to withdraw his pleas, the court abused its discretion in failing to afford the defendant an opportunity to do so when the court determined it was not going to accord specific performance of the plea agreement. See United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1983).
Fairness, therefore, requires that the defendant be given the option to retain his present sentence or to be resentenced in accordance with the plea agreement as expressed at the time of sentencing, i.e., fifteen years imprisonment, reserving to defense counsel the right to argue for less.6 Santobello v. New York, supra, 263; People v. Mancheno, 32 Cal. 3d 855, 860-61, 654 P.2d 211, 187 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1982); Van Buskirk v. State, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Nev. 1986).
There is error in part, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.