Justice KITTREDGE.
In
State v. Reid,
383 S.C. 285, 679 S.E.2d 194 (Ct.App.2009), the court of appeals affirmed Petitioner Jamey Allen Reid’s convictions for attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor and criminal solicitation of a minor. We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ analysis and disposition of Petitioner’s conviction and sentence for attempted second-degree CSC with a minor. The single issue before us is whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s directed verdict motion. We affirm.
I.
The underlying facts are detailed in the court of appeals’ excellent opinion. In essence, Petitioner entered an Internet chat room (under the screen name “Fine_Ass_Seminoles_Fan”) believing he was chatting with a fourteen-year-old female. The supposed minor was, in fact, Westminster Police Officer Mark Patterson. Officer Patterson used the screen name “Skatergurl.” Petitioner quickly turned the conversation to one of a sexual nature, as he desired a sexual encounter ■with Skatergurl. Skatergurl asked, “You don’t care I am 14?” to which Petitioner responded, “No.” Petitioner suggested a meeting place and time, specifically the parking lot of the
Westminster Middle School between 2:00 and 2:15 a.m. Skatergurl agreed. Petitioner’s stated intention was to take Skatergurl to his apartment.
Officer Patterson and a fellow officer traveled to the Westminster Middle School parking lot. At approximately 2:30 a.m., Petitioner arrived in the parking lot, driving his vehicle. The officers stopped Petitioner and arrested him.
Petitioner was indicted and tried for attempted second-degree CSC with a minor and criminal solicitation of a minor. At the close of the State’s case, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict in connection with the attempted CSC charge, arguing that the State had failed to present evidence of an overt act as required by the attempted CSC charge. Because the trial court held there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question, the directed verdict motion was denied. The jury convicted Petitioner on both charges, and he was sentenced. Petitioner appealed the attempted CSC conviction, which was affirmed by the court of appeals in a scholarly opinion.
II.
We granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether Petitioner’s traveling to a predetermined location constituted sufficient evidence of an overt act, which is an essential element in establishing an “attempt” to commit the underlying crime. Petitioner contends the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient on the question of specific intent and further rose only to the level of “mere preparation,” entitling him to a directed verdict of acquittal on the attempted CSC charge. Under the facts of this case, we agree with the court of appeals that because a jury question was presented, the directed verdict motion was properly denied.
Turning to the substance of Petitioner’s argument, South Carolina law provides that “[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree if ... the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim who is
fourteen years of age or less but who is at least eleven years of age.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-655(B)(l) (Supp.2010). A person guilty of attempt is punishable as if he had committed the underlying offense.
State v. Sutton,
340 S.C. 393, 396 n. 3, 532 S.E.2d 283, 285 n. 3 (2000). To prove attempt, the State must prove that the defendant had the
specific intent
to commit the underlying offense, along with some
overt act,
beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent.
State v. Nesbitt,
346 S.C. 226, 231, 550 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ct.App.2001).
A.
In the context of an attempt crime, specific intent means the defendant intended to complete the acts comprising the underlying offense.
Sutton,
340 S.C. at 397, 532 S.E.2d at 285 (“In the context of an attempt crime, specific intent means that the defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising the choate offense.”). The evidence here presented a jury question on the element of specific intent. As detailed by the court of appeals, Petitioner clearly indicated his desire to have a sexual encounter with Skatergurl, whom he believed to be fourteen years old.
B.
Beyond the evidence of specific intent, we find that Petitioner’s actions also presented a jury question as to whether he committed an overt act in furtherance of the underlying crime. To prove attempt, the State must prove that the defendant committed an overt act, beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent to commit the crime.
Nesbitt,
346 S.C. at 231, 550 S.E.2d at 866 (citing
State v. Evans,
216 S.C. 328, 57 S.E.2d 756 (1950);
State v. Quick,
199 S.C. 256, 19 S.E.2d 101 (1942));
see also State v. Rallo,
304 S.C. 258, 269, 403 S.E.2d 653, 659 (1991) (Toal, J., dissenting) (“In order to constitute an attempt to commit a crime, it is essential that, coupled with the intent to commit the offense, there be some overt act, beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent.... ”).
In
Quick,
this Court stated,
No definite rule as to what constitutes an overt act can safely be laid down in cases of this kind. Each case must depend largely upon its particular facts and the inferences
which the jury may reasonably draw therefrom, subject to general principles applied as nearly as can be, with a view to working substantial justice.
It is well settled that the “act” is to be liberally construed, and in numerous cases it is said to be sufficient that the act go far enough toward accomplishment of the crime to amount to the commencement of its consummation. While the efficiency of a particular act depends on the facts of the particular case, the act must always amount to more than mere preparation, and move directly toward the commission of the crime. In any event, it would seem, the act need not be the last proximate step leading to the consummation of the offense.
199 S.C. at 259, 19 S.E.2d at 102.
The Court further stated, “The preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the crime; the attempt or overt act is the direct movement toward the commission, after the preparations are made.”
Id.
at 260, 19 S.E.2d at 103.
We agree with the court of appeals that the
Quick
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Justice KITTREDGE.
In
State v. Reid,
383 S.C. 285, 679 S.E.2d 194 (Ct.App.2009), the court of appeals affirmed Petitioner Jamey Allen Reid’s convictions for attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor and criminal solicitation of a minor. We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ analysis and disposition of Petitioner’s conviction and sentence for attempted second-degree CSC with a minor. The single issue before us is whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s directed verdict motion. We affirm.
I.
The underlying facts are detailed in the court of appeals’ excellent opinion. In essence, Petitioner entered an Internet chat room (under the screen name “Fine_Ass_Seminoles_Fan”) believing he was chatting with a fourteen-year-old female. The supposed minor was, in fact, Westminster Police Officer Mark Patterson. Officer Patterson used the screen name “Skatergurl.” Petitioner quickly turned the conversation to one of a sexual nature, as he desired a sexual encounter ■with Skatergurl. Skatergurl asked, “You don’t care I am 14?” to which Petitioner responded, “No.” Petitioner suggested a meeting place and time, specifically the parking lot of the
Westminster Middle School between 2:00 and 2:15 a.m. Skatergurl agreed. Petitioner’s stated intention was to take Skatergurl to his apartment.
Officer Patterson and a fellow officer traveled to the Westminster Middle School parking lot. At approximately 2:30 a.m., Petitioner arrived in the parking lot, driving his vehicle. The officers stopped Petitioner and arrested him.
Petitioner was indicted and tried for attempted second-degree CSC with a minor and criminal solicitation of a minor. At the close of the State’s case, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict in connection with the attempted CSC charge, arguing that the State had failed to present evidence of an overt act as required by the attempted CSC charge. Because the trial court held there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question, the directed verdict motion was denied. The jury convicted Petitioner on both charges, and he was sentenced. Petitioner appealed the attempted CSC conviction, which was affirmed by the court of appeals in a scholarly opinion.
II.
We granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether Petitioner’s traveling to a predetermined location constituted sufficient evidence of an overt act, which is an essential element in establishing an “attempt” to commit the underlying crime. Petitioner contends the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient on the question of specific intent and further rose only to the level of “mere preparation,” entitling him to a directed verdict of acquittal on the attempted CSC charge. Under the facts of this case, we agree with the court of appeals that because a jury question was presented, the directed verdict motion was properly denied.
Turning to the substance of Petitioner’s argument, South Carolina law provides that “[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree if ... the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim who is
fourteen years of age or less but who is at least eleven years of age.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-655(B)(l) (Supp.2010). A person guilty of attempt is punishable as if he had committed the underlying offense.
State v. Sutton,
340 S.C. 393, 396 n. 3, 532 S.E.2d 283, 285 n. 3 (2000). To prove attempt, the State must prove that the defendant had the
specific intent
to commit the underlying offense, along with some
overt act,
beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent.
State v. Nesbitt,
346 S.C. 226, 231, 550 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ct.App.2001).
A.
In the context of an attempt crime, specific intent means the defendant intended to complete the acts comprising the underlying offense.
Sutton,
340 S.C. at 397, 532 S.E.2d at 285 (“In the context of an attempt crime, specific intent means that the defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising the choate offense.”). The evidence here presented a jury question on the element of specific intent. As detailed by the court of appeals, Petitioner clearly indicated his desire to have a sexual encounter with Skatergurl, whom he believed to be fourteen years old.
B.
Beyond the evidence of specific intent, we find that Petitioner’s actions also presented a jury question as to whether he committed an overt act in furtherance of the underlying crime. To prove attempt, the State must prove that the defendant committed an overt act, beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent to commit the crime.
Nesbitt,
346 S.C. at 231, 550 S.E.2d at 866 (citing
State v. Evans,
216 S.C. 328, 57 S.E.2d 756 (1950);
State v. Quick,
199 S.C. 256, 19 S.E.2d 101 (1942));
see also State v. Rallo,
304 S.C. 258, 269, 403 S.E.2d 653, 659 (1991) (Toal, J., dissenting) (“In order to constitute an attempt to commit a crime, it is essential that, coupled with the intent to commit the offense, there be some overt act, beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent.... ”).
In
Quick,
this Court stated,
No definite rule as to what constitutes an overt act can safely be laid down in cases of this kind. Each case must depend largely upon its particular facts and the inferences
which the jury may reasonably draw therefrom, subject to general principles applied as nearly as can be, with a view to working substantial justice.
It is well settled that the “act” is to be liberally construed, and in numerous cases it is said to be sufficient that the act go far enough toward accomplishment of the crime to amount to the commencement of its consummation. While the efficiency of a particular act depends on the facts of the particular case, the act must always amount to more than mere preparation, and move directly toward the commission of the crime. In any event, it would seem, the act need not be the last proximate step leading to the consummation of the offense.
199 S.C. at 259, 19 S.E.2d at 102.
The Court further stated, “The preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the crime; the attempt or overt act is the direct movement toward the commission, after the preparations are made.”
Id.
at 260, 19 S.E.2d at 103.
We agree with the court of appeals that the
Quick
framework remains viable in the emerging area of Internet sex crimes. While we have not previously had occasion to address the mere preparation — overt act distinction in the context of an alleged attempted sex crime stemming from use of the Internet, the court of appeals canvassed the law from other jurisdictions. The majority of jurisdictions that have confronted this issue have concluded that an agreement to meet a fictitious minor at a designated place and time, coupled with traveling to that location, may constitute evidence of an overt act.
We agree with the majority approach and hold that an agreement to meet a fictitious minor at a designated
place and time, coupled with traveling to that location, may constitute evidence of an overt act, beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the crime. We do not, however, create a categorical rule.
Given Petitioner’s express desire for a sexual encounter with a fourteen-year-old minor, coupled with his designation of
a vacant parking lot in the middle of the night as the clandestine meeting place — and his travel to that place — we concur with the court of appeals that a jury question was presented on whether Petitioner had the specific intent to commit CSC with a minor and whether his conduct constituted an overt act.
AFFIRMED.
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur.