[Cite as State v. Reichelderfer, 2025-Ohio-899.]
COURT OF APPEALS HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Andrew J. King, J. Hon. David M. Gormley, J. -vs-
AMANDA REICHELDERFER Case No. 24CA009
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Holmes County Municipal Court, Case No. 22CRB115
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 17, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ROBERT K. HENDRIX AMANDA REICHELDERFER Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Pro Se Holmes County, Ohio 889 Magnolia Street 164 E. Jackson Street Coshocton, Ohio 43812 Millersburg, Ohio 44654
HAYLEY R. MCELROY Miller, Mast & Mason, Ltd. 121 N. Market Street, Suite 300 Wooster, Ohio 44691 Hoffman, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Amanda Reichelderfer appeals the February 27, 2024
Probation Violation entered by the Holmes County Municipal Court, which revoked her
probation and sentenced her to thirty (30) days in the Holmes County Jail. Plaintiff-
appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶2} On July 7, 2022, Captain Kim Herman of the Millersburg Police Department
filed a complaint in the Holmes County Municipal Court, charging Appellant with one count
of theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the first degree. At her
arraignment on July 11, 2022, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.
Appellant appeared before the trial court on November 15, 2022, withdrew her former
plea of not guilty and entered a plea of no contest. The trial court sentenced Appellant to
a jail term of 30 days, but suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on probation for
a period of one (1) year. The trial court ordered Appellant to complete a drug and alcohol
abuse counseling program.
{¶3} Appellant signed a probation agreement on November 15, 2022. Rule 11
of the probation agreement required Appellant to “keep all appointments with probation
officer unless otherwise directed.” Probation Agreement, p. 2. In addition, Appellant was
ordered to report monthly or as otherwise directed by her probation officer. The probation
agreement expressly provided:
If you do not report on the correct day DURING BUSINESS HOURS,
you may face revocation of your probation and jail time. YOU MAY NOT
REPORT BY LEAVING A VOICE MESSAGE AFTER BUSINESS HOURS. Id.
{¶4} Further, Rule 5 provided:
You are not permitted to possess, consume, or have under your
control, any controlled substance or their accessories, except those
prescribed by a physician. You shall not visit or remain at a place where
illegal drugs are being used, possessed or sold. You will be required to
submit to whatever type of test the probation officer feels is necessary to
enforce this rule. You shall not possess, consume, or use any substance or
item that is specifically designed or advertised to interfere with the results
of a valid drug test. You shall not possess or consume any synthetic drug
of abuse.
Id. at p. 3.
{¶5} George Crone, Appellant’s original probation officer, did not require
Appellant to submit to drug tests or report in person. In March, 2023, Appellant was
assigned a new probation officer, Tabitha Hemenway, who required Appellant to report
in person to her appointments. Appellant missed her in person probation appointment on
March 20, 2023. Appellant attempted to report via a phone call. Hemenway informed
Appellant a warrant would be issued for her arrest.
{¶6} On March 24, 2023, the State filed a motion to revoke/modify community
control/probation after Appellant failed to abide by the terms of her probation. The trial court issued a warrant for Appellant’s arrest on March 27, 2023. Appellant failed to have
any communications with her probation officer between March, 2023, and December 19,
2023. The warrant was served on December 19, 2023, after Appellant was arrested on
unrelated charges. That day, Appellant was drug tested. She admitted using
amphetamines. The results of the drug test were positive for methamphetamines. On
January 4, 2024, Appellant tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines,
but denied any drug use. Appellant missed a second in person probation appointment on
January 9, 2024.
{¶7} On January 10, 2024, the State filed a second motion to revoke/modify
community control/probation based upon Appellant’s two failed urine screens and failure
to report for a scheduled probation appointment. Appellant filed a memorandum in
opposition to the State’s motion to revoke.
{¶8} At the initial hearing on the probation violation on January 24, 2024, the trial
court set a $25,000.00 bail. The trial court conducted a pretrial on February 6, 2024, and
an adjudicatory hearing on February 27, 2024. The adjudicatory hearing addressed both
the March 24, 2023, and January 10, 2024 motions to revoke.
{¶9} At the adjudicatory hearing, Tabitha Hemenway, Appellant’s probation
officer, testified Appellant was transferred to her supervision in early March, 2023.
Hemenway instructed Appellant to report in person on March 20, 2023. Appellant did not
appear for the appointment. Hemenway advised Appellant she would be issuing a warrant
for her arrest due to her failure to report. Appellant was arrested on the warrant as well
as on another charge on December 19, 2023. Hemenway noted Appellant did not report
during those nine (9) months. Once Hemenway made contact with Appellant, Appellant was drug screened. Appellant admitted to using methamphetamines. Appellant failed the
drug screen. The test was positive for methamphetamines.
{¶10} Appellant was drug screened a second time on January 4, 2024, and tested
positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines, but denied any drug use at the time.
Hemenway instructed Appellant to report in person on January 9, 2024. Appellant failed
to report.
{¶11} Appellant testified on her own behalf. She admitted she missed her March
20, 2023 in person probation appointment, but explained she was working out of town
and had no transportation. Appellant stated she called Hemenway to try to reschedule
the appointment. With respect to her missed appointment on January 9, 2024, Appellant
explained she was ill and had fallen asleep due to her medication. Appellant claimed she
called Hemenway later in the day. Appellant explained George Crone, her original
probation officer, allowed her to report via telephone due to the fact she lived a distance
from Holmes County then she was “told it’s something else and it was never gone over
with me how she [Hemenway] wanted things done versus how he [Crone] had things set
up for me.” Transcript of February 27, 2024 Adjudicatory Hearing at p.18.
{¶12} Via Probation Violation/Adjudicatory Hearing, the trial court terminated
Appellant’s probation and sentenced her to thirty (30) days in the Holmes County Jail,
finding Appellant had violated the terms and conditions of her probation.
{¶13} Appellate counsel for Appellant has filed a Motion to Withdraw and a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), rehearing den., 388 U.S. 924,
indicating the within appeal is wholly frivolous. {¶14} Counsel sets forth two potential assignments of error which could arguably
support the appeal:
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATE APPELLANT’S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS WHEN IT FAILED TO CONDUCT A PROBABLE
CAUSE HEARING?
II. WAS THE APPELLANT PREJUDICED BY HER TRIAL
COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE AT THE PROBATION VIOLATION
HEARING?
{¶15} Counsel for Appellant included a Certificate of Service, verifying she served
Appellant with a copy of the brief. This Court issued a judgment entry notifying Appellant
her counsel filed an Anders brief, and informing Appellant she could file a pro se brief
within 60 days of the entry. Appellant filed a pro se brief on November 5, 2024, setting
forth the following assignments of error:
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN REVOKING MY PROBATION BASED ON IMPROPERLY
OBTAINED DRUG TEST EVIDENCE, AND MY COUNSEL FAILED TO
CHALLENGE THESE ERRORS. ALSO FAILING TO PROVIDE
DOCUMENTATION OF HEALTH ISSUES, FAMILY, [SIC] TIES, AND THE
MENTION OF LACK OF CRIMINAL RECORD. AMANDA’S COUNSEL
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE INCORRECT DATES IN PROBATION DOCUMENTS, RESULTING IN
PREJUDICE AGAINST AMANDA.
II. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS: MY DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED BY THE LACK OF NOTICE, ABSENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE HEARING, AND DENIAL OF ACCESS TO CRITICAL EVIDENCE.
III. EXCESSIVE BAIL AND LACK OF ALTERNATIVE SENTENCES:
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED EXCESSIVE BAIL WITHOUT
CONSIDERING LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES, VIOLATING MY
EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. THE 30-DAY JAIL SENTENCE
IMPOSED IS DISPROPORTIONATE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING MY
COMPLIANCE WITH PROBATIONS TERMS AND LACK OF PRIOR
CRIMINAL HISTORY. (SEE APPENDIX H LETTER WRITTEN TO JUDGE
ASKING FOR SENTENCING MODIFICATION)
VI. PREJUDICE AND BIAS COMMENTS MADE BY PROBATION
OFFICER, JUDGE, AND PUBLIC DEFENDER SHOW THAT A
PREDETERMINED NOTION OF THE OUTCOME OF MY CASE HAD
BEEN MADE DEPRIVING MY OF A FAIR AND JUST OUTCOME.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DELAYING THE OPPORTUNITY
FOR THE [SIC] MS. REICHELDERFER TO ADDRESS HER PROBATION
REVOCATION, RESULTING IN PROCEDURAL DELAYS AND THE
FAILURE TO ACCURATELY DOCUMENT THE CHRONOLOGY OF
HEARINGS AND BOND PROCEEDINGS. VI. THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON INCORRECT PROBATION
START DATES AND INCORRECT PROBATION OFFICER’S REPORT.
RELIANCE ON INACCURATE DATE AFFECTED THE FAIRNESS OF
THE REVOCATION PROCESS. FURTHERMORE, AFFECTING THE
ACCURACY OF THE PROBATION TERM AND THE VALIDITY OF
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.
{¶16} The State did not respond to the assignments of error set forth in Appellant’s
pro se brief, but merely remarked:
The State adopts in it’s [sic] entirety the excellent arguments put forth
by former assigned counsel Hayley McElroy. There is no colorable claim
for appeal in this case, and Defendant’s assignments of error are baseless
and should be overruled. The judgement [sic] of the trial court should be
affirmed.
Brief of Appellee at p. 3.
Anders v. California
{¶17} In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held if, after a conscientious
examination of the record, a defendant's counsel concludes the case is wholly frivolous,
then he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. Id. at 744.
Counsel must accompany his request with a brief identifying anything in the record that
could arguably support his client's appeal. Id. Counsel also must: (1) furnish his client with a copy of the brief and request to withdraw; and, (2) allow his client sufficient time to raise
any matters that the client chooses. Id. Once the defendant's counsel satisfies these
requirements, the appellate court must fully examine the proceedings below to determine
if any arguably meritorious issues exist. If the appellate court also determines that the
appeal is wholly frivolous, it may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the
appeal without violating constitutional requirements, or may proceed to a decision on the
merits if state law so requires. Id.
{¶18} Accordingly, we will proceed to review the proposed assignments of error
to determine if any arguably meritorious issues exist, keeping in mind:
Anders equates a frivolous appeal with one that presents issues
lacking in arguable merit. An issue does not lack arguable merit merely
because the prosecution can be expected to present a strong argument in
reply or because it is uncertain whether a defendant will prevail on the issue
on appeal. “An issue lacks arguable merit if, on the facts and law involved,
no responsible contention can be made that it offers a basis for reversal.”
State v. Pullen, 2002-Ohio-6788, ¶ 4 (2nd Dist.); State v. Marbury, 2003-
Ohio-3242, ¶ 7-8 (2nd Dist.); State v. Chessman, 2005-Ohio-2511, ¶ 16-17
(2nd Dist.).
State v. Moore, 2009-Ohio-1416, ¶4 (2nd Dist.). I
{¶19} Counsel for Appellant raises a potential argument the trial court violated
Appellant’s due process rights by failing to conduct a probable cause hearing.
{¶20} “Before a defendant's probation can be revoked, a two-part due process
requirement must be met.” State v. Grove, 2016-Ohio-4818, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.), citing
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). First, the trial court must conduct a
preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant
violated the terms of his probation. (Citation omitted.) Id. Next, the court must hold a final
hearing to determine whether probation should be revoked. Id. The purpose of such a
hearing is to inquire into whether the probationer's conduct comported with the terms of
his court-ordered probation. State v. Richard, 2016-Ohio-8562, ¶ 5 (7th Dist.). However,
“the judgment of a trial court revoking probation or community control sanctions will not
be reversed where two separate hearings have not been held unless it appears from the
record that the defendant was prejudiced by the failure to hold a preliminary hearing”.
State v. Kiser, 2009-Ohio-1337, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.)
{¶21} Appellant did not object to the claimed due process violations. Generally,
failure to object to due process violations during a probation revocation waives all but
plain error. State v. Klosterman, 2016-Ohio-232, ¶ 15 (2nd Dist.). Under the plain error
standard of review, Appellant bears the burden of “showing that but for a plain or obvious
error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise, and reversal must be
necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556,
¶22. An appellate court has discretion to notice plain error and is not required to correct
it. Id. {¶22} Upon review of the record, we find Appellant was not prejudiced by the trial
court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing. We further find no error, plain or
otherwise, as the result of the trial court’s failure to hold separate hearings.
{¶23} We agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion there is no merit to an
argument Appellant was denied due process.
II
{¶24} Counsel also raises a potential argument Appellant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
{¶25} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37
Ohio St.3d 153 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonable representation and, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984); State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). In other words, Appellant must show counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process the trial cannot
be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.
{¶26} We have reviewed the record and do not find trial counsel committed any
error which, but for, would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceedings.
Appellant’s trial counsel zealously advocated for her by filing a memorandum in
opposition, arguing Appellant’s term of probation was tolled by the filing of the March 24,
2023 motion to revoke. Trial counsel further asserted the January 10, 2024 motion to
revoke was not actionable because the conditions of Appellant’s probation did not require
her to report in person or submit to drug testing. At the revocation hearing, trial counsel cross-examined Tiffany Hemenway, Appellant’s probation officer, about the violations.
Trial counsel also called Appellant to the stand to explain her failure to report and her
understanding of the terms and conditions of her probation. Trial counsel also moved the
trial court to extend Appellant’s supervision in lieu of jail time.
{¶27} We agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion there is no merit to an
argument Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
{¶28} In her first assignment of error, Appellant raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant maintains trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to submit key evidence, including a doctor’s note and work orders, which would
have explained her missed appointments, failing to object to the use of the January 4,
2024 drug screen which was obtained during an unrelated matter, and failing to challenge
the “unauthorized changes” made to the terms and conditions of her probation by Officer
Hemenway. Appellant concludes she was prejudiced as a result of these omissions.
{¶29} We addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in Appellate
Counsel’s second potential assignment of error. Upon review of the record, we find no
evidence to establish trial counsel committed any error which, but for, would have resulted
in a different outcome in the proceedings.
{¶30} At the revocation hearing, Appellant testified and explained her reasons for
missing her probation appointments. Appellant has failed to establish the admission of
evidence supporting her explanations, such as a doctor’s note or work orders, would have
resulted in a different outcome. {¶31} With respect to trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the results
of the drug screen, we note, “[t]he failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 347
(1999), quoting State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244 (1988). A defendant must also
show he was materially prejudiced by the failure to object. Holloway, supra at 244.
Appellant is unable to make such a demonstration.
{¶32} Finally, even if trial counsel challenged Officer Hemenway’s “unauthorized
changes” to Appellant’s probation, such challenge would not have been successful.
Pursuant to her probation agreement, Appellant was required to report monthly or as
otherwise directed by her probation officer. Although Officer Crone did not require
Appellant to report in person, Officer Hemenway specifically required Appellant to report
in person. Officer Hemenway had the authority to make changes to the terms and
conditions of Appellant’s probation.
{¶33} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶34} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court violated
her right to due process by failing to conduct a probable cause hearing, during which she
could have explained her understanding of the terms of her probation as told to her by
her original probation officer, George Crone.
{¶35} We addressed the trial court’s failure to conduct a probable cause hearing
under Appellate Counsel’s first potential assignment of error, and found Appellant was
not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing. We also found no error, plain or otherwise, as the result of the trial court’s failure to hold separate
hearings.
{¶36} We further note, pursuant to the terms of her probation agreement,
Appellant was required to report monthly or as otherwise directed by her probation officer.
Officer Crone did not require Appellant to report in person. Appellant’s case was
subsequently transferred to Officer Hemenway, who explicitly informed Appellant she
would have to report in person. Appellant’s actions based upon Officer Crone’s initial
terms and conditions is irrelevant to whether she violated the terms and conditions as
required by Officer Hemenway. A probable cause hearing would not have affected the
outcome.
{¶37} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶38} In her third assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court’s
imposition of a $25,000 bail, without considering alternative measures, violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against excessive bail.
{¶39} “Bail is security for the appearance of an accused to appear and answer to
a specific criminal or quasi-criminal charge.” R.C. 2937.22(A). The Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Section 9, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution contains identical language.
{¶40} As set forth supra, Appellant failed to have any communications with her
probation officer between March, 2023, and December 19, 2023. She did not initiate the communication with her probation officer on December 19, 2023. Rather, she was
arrested on an unrelated charge. Given Appellant’s repeated failure to attend her in
person probation appointments which resulted in the issuance of a warrant for her arrest,
we find the amount of bail was necessary to secure Appellant’s appearance at court
{¶41} Within this assignment of error, Appellant further asserts the 30-day jail
sentence was disproportionate in light of her compliance with the terms of her probation
and lack of a prior criminal history. “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences
that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368,
373 (1999), quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and in judgment). “[W]here none of the individual sentences imposed
on an offender are grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses, an aggregate
prison term resulting from consecutive imposition of those sentences does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.” State v. Hairston, 2008-Ohio-2338, syllabus.
{¶42} Appellant was found guilty of one count of theft, in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the first degree. After revoking Appellant’s probation,
the trial court imposed the original 30-day suspended sentence. The sentence was within
the statutory range for misdemeanors of the first degree. Accordingly, we find Appellant’s
sentence was not disproportionate and did not violate the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
{¶43} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. IV
{¶44} In her fourth assignment of error, Appellant claims comments made by her
probation officer, her public defender, and the trial court show the outcome of her case
had been predetermined thereby depriving her of a fair and just outcome.
{¶45} Appellant posits the following comments illustrate a bias which influenced
the outcome of the revocation hearing. During the administration of a drug screen on
December 19, 2023, Officer Hemenway remarked, “You came to this town to steal from
our stores, but you couldn’t seem to make it back here to turn yourself in on the warrant I
issued?” Brief of Appellant at p. 13. Judge Hyde stated, “You came to this town to commit
the crime, but you couldn’t seem to make it back here to finish your probation.” Id. In
response to an email Appellant sent to her public defender, Attorney Baserman
responded, “You think I caused your probation to be revoked? * * * Well, I think you
caused your probation to be revoked.” Id.
{¶46} While these comments suggest a frustration with Appellant’s failure to abide
by the terms and conditions of her probation, the evidence presented at the revocation
hearing, as set forth supra, supports the trial court’s decision to revoke Appellant’s
probation. We find the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. See, State v.
Miller, 2017-Ohio-5801, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.); State v. Arm, 2014-Ohio-3771, ¶22 (3rd Dist.).
{¶47} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
V, VI
{¶48} Because Appellant addresses her fifth and sixth assignments of error
together in her Brief to this Court, we shall do likewise. In her fifth assignment of error,
Appellant submits the trial court erred in delaying the revocation hearing which resulted in her not being afforded a timely opportunity to address the probation violations. In her
sixth assignment of error, Appellant maintains the trial court relied upon incorrect
probation start dates and an incorrect probation officer’s report which affected the fairness
of the revocation hearing.
{¶49} In her Brief to this Court, Appellant states she appeared before Judge
Mason on January 24, 2024. Judge Mason “did not take any substantive action on the
issues related to [her] probation revocation but instead rescheduled [her] case stating it
would be reassigned to Judge Hyde who was the judge who was overseeing [her] case.”
Brief of Appellant at p. 12. Appellant asserts the continuance “effectively delayed [her]
opportunity to address and clarify the probation related issues raised against [her].” Id.
{¶50} Appellant has failed to establish how she was prejudiced by any of the
alleged shortcomings of the trial court. {¶51} Appellant’s fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶52} The judgment of the Holmes County Municipal Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J. King, J. Gormley, J. concur