State v. Reed.

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 3, 2024
• Docket: 9911018706
• Status: Published

Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CRAIG A. KARSNITZ 1 The Circle, Suite 2 RESIDENT JUDGE GEORGETOWN, DE 19947

April 3, 2024

Ralph Reed SBI #00320813 James T. Vaughan Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19977

Re: State of Delaware v. Ralph Reed Def. ID# 9911018706 Third Motion for Postconviction Relief (R-3)

Dear Mr. Reed:

You were convicted of First Degree Murder and Possession of a Firearm

During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) by a jury on May 16, 2000 and

sentenced to life without parole on January 19, 2001. Your direct appeal to the

Delaware Supreme Court was denied on August 1, 2001.

You have filed two (2) previous Petitions for Postconviction Relief under

Delaware Superior Court Rule 61 (“Rule 61”). On July 8, 2004, you filed your first

Rule 61 Petition, which was supplemented on July 15, 2004. This Petition was

denied by this Court on October 5, 2005. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this denial on June 20, 2006.

On June 26, 2013, you filed your second Petition for Postconviction Relief,

which was dismissed by this Court on July 1, 2013. The Delaware Supreme Court

affirmed this denial on October 25, 2013.

On November 8, 2023, you filed your third Petition for Postconviction Relief.

That same day you requested the appointment of postconviction counsel to represent

you. On December 22, 2023, you requested an evidentiary hearing on the issues

raised in your third Rule 61 Petition. This is my decision on your third Petition.

In your third Petition, you state four grounds for relief: (1) the pre-2014

version of Rule 61(i)(5)’s exceptions to the procedural bars should apply to the

Petition, allowing relief for a “miscarriage of justice;” (2) your counsel at trial (“Trial

Counsel”) was ineffective for failure to challenge the sentence after the first degree

murder statute1 was amended when the death penalty was declared unconstitutional;

(3) Trial Counsel was ineffective for failure to bring a Batson2 claim with respect to

the treatment of potential black jurors; and, (4) because of your age at the time of

the murder (18), you should not have been sentenced to life without the possibility

of parole.3

1 11 Del. C. § 4209. 2 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 3 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2 Before addressing the merits of your Rule 61 Motion, I must first address the

four procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).4 If a procedural bar

exists, as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim. 5

Under the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for post-

conviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, procedural

default, or former adjudication.6

First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed

more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or if it asserts a retroactively

applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final,

more than one year after the right was first recognized by the Supreme Court of

Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.7 Your conviction became final for

purposes of Rule 61 on August 1, 2001, the date on which the Delaware Supreme

Court issued its mandate finally determining your case on direct review.8 Thus, you

filed your third Petition long after this one-year period had run. Therefore,

4 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 5 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super. April 28, 2009). 6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i). 7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2).

3 consideration of your Rule 61 Motion is procedurally barred by the one-year

limitation.

Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief shall be

summarily dismissed, unless you were convicted after a trial and the motion either

pleads with particularity that either (i) new evidence exists that creates a strong

inference of actual innocence in fact, or (ii) a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court,

applies to your case and renders your conviction invalid.9 This is your third Rule 61

Petition. Neither of these two conditions applies. Therefore, consideration of your

Rule 61 Petition is procedurally barred by this provision.

Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction” are barred unless the movant can show “cause for relief from

the procedural default” and “prejudice from a violation of [movant’s] rights.”10 Your

second and third grounds for relief are based on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. It is well settled under Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are properly raised for the first time in postconviction

9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

4 proceedings.11 Thus, this bar would not apply to Grounds 2 and 3 if they were not

otherwise procedurally barred.

Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including

“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.12 Your first and fourth

grounds for relief have already been adjudicated in your first and second Rule 61

Petitions. You cannot use a third Rule 61 Petition as a vehicle to relitigate these issues.

Grounds 1 and 4 are barred by this provision.

Finally, the four procedural bars do not apply to a claim that pleads with

particularity that either (i) new evidence exists that creates a strong inference of actual

innocence in fact, or (ii) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive by the

United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to your case

and renders your conviction invalid. 13 You make no such pleadings, thus this

exception does not apply.

I find that, based on your Petition and my thorough review of the record of

11 State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State, 2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at *2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”). 12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).

5 the prior proceedings in this case, you are not entitled to relief. I am therefore

entering an order for summary dismissal under Rule 61.14

Your Rule 61 Petition is DENIED.

Since your Rule 61 Petition is procedurally barred, your Motion for the

Appointment of Postconviction Counsel to represent you, and your Motion for an

Evidentiary Hearing, are moot.

Your Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED.

Your Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

/s/Craig A. Karsnitz Craig A. Karsnitz, Resident Judge

cc: Prothonotary

14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).