State v. Reaves

Opinions

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-153

Filed 20 August 2025

Craven County, Nos. 19CRS053427-240, 19CRS053428-240, 19CRS053429-240, 20CRS000589-240, 22CRS000571-240

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

SAMAN TAMBURRO REAVES.

Appeal by Defendant from Judgments entered 12 July 2023 by Judge Bob R.

Cherry in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 January

2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Haley A. Cooper, for the State.

John W. Moss for Defendant-Appellant.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

Saman Tamburro Reaves (Defendant) appeals from Judgments entered 12

July 2023 after pleading guilty to Cruelty to Animals, Dog Fighting, Restraining Dogs

in a Cruel Manner, Trafficking in Heroin by Possession, Possession of

Opinion of the Court

Methamphetamine, Possession of Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA),

Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, Possession of a Stolen Firearm, and Habitual

Felon Status. The Record before us tends to reflect the following:

Early on 16 October 2019, “[a] passerby” reported to the New Bern County

Police Department they had heard a “verbal disturbance” coming from a home on the

block, and “it sounded like items were being thrown around.” Officer Jeff Weaver

was dispatched to investigate. Officer Weaver parked his vehicle “about a house

away” and made his initial approach alone. Officer Weaver observed two access

points to the residence: the front door and a side door. He “determined at the time

that the best approach to begin with would be to the side and not directly at the front

door[,]” so he approached a window located on the side of the residence, between the

front and side doors. The window had an air-conditioning unit installed in it. At the

window, Officer Weaver heard “male voices” and smelled “the strong odor of

marijuana.” Hearing no disturbance, Officer Weaver “felt safe enough to approach

the front door.”

There was a dog lying in front of the door, so Officer Weaver “went back around

to the window and knocked on it, yelled, ‘police,’ ” and asked if someone could come

to the front door. An unidentified individual opened the door and stepped outside.

According to Officer Weaver, the individual “opened [the door] just far enough to slide

out the door, then he pulled it closed behind him real quick.” Officer Weaver,

standing in the front yard below the steps, “got hit in the face with the odor of

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marijuana again.” The individual allegedly “said he would put the dog up and come

right back, and then he walked off with the dog, around the house.”

The individual did not come back. Officer Weaver walked along the side of the

house, now accompanied by a back-up officer, and observed the shoes the individual

had been wearing left in the grass but no other sign of the individual or the dog. The

officers walked back to the front door and knocked again. This time, Aaron Inman

answered the door. Officer Weaver smelled marijuana again. The officers spoke to

Inman who confirmed there had been a dispute in the house but “everything was

fine[.]”

The officers left the residence. Officer Weaver subsequently obtained a search

warrant for the residence “based off the odor of marijuana and the behavior [he had

witnessed].” Officer Weaver, along with a “tactical team” of officers, executed the

warrant the following day; Officer Weaver breached the door and the rest of the

officers began to search the residence, seizing heroin, methamphetamine, MDMA,

wallets containing “a significant amount of cash,” cell phones, and two firearms.

Officer Weaver was later brought out to the backyard, where officers had seized

multiple dogs found on the property. Various medications for the dogs and a treadmill

were also seized from inside the residence.

On 2 March 2020, Defendant was indicted for Cruelty to Animals, Dog

Fighting, and Restraining Dogs in a Cruel Manner. On 3 August 2020, Defendant

was indicted for Trafficking in Heroin by Possession, Possession of

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Methamphetamine, Possession of MDMA, Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, and

Possession of a Stolen Firearm. Lastly, on 8 August 2020, Defendant was indicted as

a Habitual Felon.

On 27 February 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence on the

basis the search warrant was overbroad and not particularized to the probable cause

affidavit. On 28 February 2023, Defendant filed an Addendum to suppress the

contents of his cell phone, arguing his phone should not have been searched without

a separate warrant. On 3 July 2023, Defendant filed a second Motion to Suppress,

arguing probable cause for the warrant was obtained through unconstitutionally

seized evidence.

At the hearing on the Motions, Defendant explained he did not live in the

residence full-time, but he had been “renting a room” in the two-bedroom home

because of tensions with the mother of his child. However, he did not have a

designated room, and as many as seven people could be “passing through” at any

point. Defendant also explained the residence was primarily used to house dogs:

other individuals “had their dogs there” or “would pay to house their dog in [the]

yard.” Defendant testified he had “paid for [his] dogs to be there before [he] even

decided to even get a room.” The cost to keep a dog on the property was “$25 or $30[.]”

According to Defendant, there were “several kennels” in the yard, two of which

belonged to him, and he had one dog on the property when the officers executed the

search warrant. When questioned as to why he had two kennels with only one dog,

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Defendant stated he “had other dogs” and also had been planning to “do a breeding[.]”

Papers from the “American Dog Breeders Association,” which Defendant confirmed

were for his dog, were found under a mattress in a bedroom during the search.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied both Motions. The trial

court denied the 3 July 2023 Motion based on a conclusion Officer Weaver did not

exceed the lawful scope of a knock and talk and because the smell of marijuana at the

front door created probable cause for the warrant—independent of the smell of

marijuana at the side window. The trial court denied the 27 February 2023 Motion

on the bases the warrant was not overbroad, Defendant’s cell phone was lawfully

searched pursuant to the warrant, and the dog fighting evidence was lawfully seized

from plain view. The trial court entered its written Orders on 1 September 2023.

Defendant pleaded guilty to all charges in exchange for the State applying

Defendant’s habitual felon status to only five of the eight other charges. Defendant

also reserved his right to appeal the denial of his Motions to Suppress. The trial court

entered Judgments in accordance with the pleas on 12 July 2023. Defendant gave

oral Notice of Appeal in open court.

Issues

The issues on appeal are whether the trial court properly denied: (I)

Defendant’s 3 July 2023 Motion to Suppress; and (II) Defendant’s 27 February 2023

Motion to Suppress on the bases (A) the warrant was not overbroad, (B) a second

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warrant was not required to search the contents of Defendant’s cell phone, and (C)

the dog fighting evidence was lawfully seized from plain view.

Analysis

“Our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is strictly limited

to a determination of whether [the trial court’s] findings are supported by competent

evidence, and in turn, whether the findings support the trial court’s ultimate

conclusion.” State v. Reynolds, 161 N.C. App. 144, 146-47, 587 S.E.2d 456, 458 (2003)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are binding

on appeal.” State v. Byrd, 287 N.C. App. 276, 279, 882 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2022) (citation

omitted). “We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.” Id. (citation

omitted). Whether the trial court describes its conclusions as findings of fact or

conclusions of law makes no difference to our review: “We will review conclusions of

law de novo regardless of the label applied by the trial court.” State v. Jackson, 220

N.C. App. 1, 8, 727 S.E.2d 322, 329 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

I. 3 July 2023 Motion to Suppress

Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his 3 July 2023 Motion to

Suppress. Specifically, Defendant argues Officer Weaver’s initial approach to the

side window exceeded the lawful scope of a knock and talk, and thus the trial court’s

Findings do not support its Conclusion Officer Weaver did not exceed the permissible

scope of a knock and talk. The State argues Officer Weaver’s actions were lawful

under the “community caretaker doctrine.” We disagree with the State’s rationale

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but nonetheless conclude the trial court did not err in concluding Officer Weaver acted

within the permissible scope of a knock and talk.

“The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the ‘right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’ ” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5, 133

S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L. Ed. 2d. 495 (2013) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV); see also

State v. Weaver, 231 N.C. App. 473, 480, 752 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2013) (“The fourth

amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment protects

citizens from unlawful searches and seizures committed by the government or its

agents.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). “To give full practical effect to that

right, the Court considers curtilage—the area immediately surrounding and

associated with the home—to be part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment

purposes.” Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 592, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670, 201 L. Ed.

2d 9 (2018) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6, 133 S. Ct. at

1414).

“In North Carolina, however, no search of the curtilage occurs when an officer

is in a place where the public is allowed to be, such as at the front door of a house.”

State v. Lupek, 214 N.C. App. 146, 151, 712 S.E.2d 915, 919 (2011). This sort of

interaction has come to be known as a “knock and talk.” See, e.g., State v. Marrero,

248 N.C. App. 787, 790, 789 S.E.2d 560, 564 (2016) (“A ‘knock and talk’ is a procedure

by which police officers approach a residence and knock on the door to question the

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occupant, often in an attempt to gain consent to search when no probable cause exists

to obtain a warrant.” (citation omitted)). “If law enforcement goes beyond the bounds

of a knock and talk and, in so doing, sees or smells contraband, then, absent an

applicable exception to the warrant requirement, they do not have the right to seize

that evidence.” State v. Falls, 275 N.C. App. 239, 249, 853 S.E.2d 227, 235 (2020)

(citing Collins, 584 U.S. at 595, 138 S. Ct. at 1672).

We adopted “community caretaking” as an exception to the warrant

requirement in State v. Smathers, 232 N.C. App. 120, 128-29, 753 S.E.2d 380, 386

(2014). “Under this test, . . . the State has the burden of proving that: (1) a search or

seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, that

under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for a

community caretaking function is shown; and (3) if so, that the public need or interest

outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual.” Id. (citations omitted).

The exception generally applies when there is an apparent public emergency. See,

e.g., id. (officer witnessed vehicle run into a large animal); State v. Sawyers, 247 N.C.

App. 852, 860-61, 786 S.E.2d 753, 758 (2016) (officer observed the defendant “and

what appeared to be a homeless male dragging a female who seemed to ‘either be very

intoxicated or drugged’ ” into a vehicle).

Here, Officer Weaver approached the residence to determine whether there

was an ongoing emergency, not in response to one that was almost certain. “Thus,

this situation is unlike one in which the facts point unquestionably to some public

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emergency, such as a door that has been broken open, or signs that someone inside

the home needs emergency medical attention.” State v. Huddy, 253 N.C. App. 148,

154, 799 S.E.2d 650, 655-56 (2017).

Still, we conclude the trial court did not err in concluding Officer Weaver acted

within the permissible scope of a knock and talk. “Certainly it would be unreasonable

to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their

duties.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1881, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

The Supreme Court of the United States in Pennsylvania v. Mimms noted officer

safety is “both legitimate and weighty.” 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.

Ed. 2d 331 (1977).

The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security. Reasonableness, of course, depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.

Id. at 108-09, 98 S. Ct. at 332 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the evidence tends to show Officer Weaver was following prudent

procedures motivated by legitimate safety concerns. See Rodriguez v. United States,

575 U.S. 348, 372, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1625, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015) (Alito, J.,

dissenting). The only information available to Officer Weaver on his initial approach

to the residence was that someone had heard “a verbal disturbance” and it had

“sounded like items were being thrown around.” Moreover, Officer Weaver was alone

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on his initial approach, without backup. Thus, Officer Weaver had reason to believe

entering the curtilage first would be safer than immediately knocking on the front

door. See State v. Gentile, 237 N.C. App. 304, 309, 766 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2014) (entry

into curtilage violates Fourth Amendment only “where officers have no reason to

believe that entering a homeowner’s curtilage will produce a different response than

knocking on the residence’s front door” (citation omitted)). Indeed, Officer Weaver

testified he tailored his response to the “worst case scenario until” he had reason to

believe there was no imminent danger. Accordingly, the trial court found:

(7) Weaver, on both direct and cross examination, explained in great detail why, on October 16, 2019, he first approached the side window of the Residence instead of the front door:

A. initially, he was the only responding law enforcement officer on scene, and

B. the nature of the report of a disturbance, which could have been a domestic disturbance, through his training and experience dictated, for purposes of officer safety, that he obtain as much information regarding persons in the Residence, that he could obtain from both the front and unobstructed side of the Residence, before making contact at the front door, and

C. he made the decision to park his patrol car down the road, a couple houses away, and approached the Residence from the side of the house.

(8) . . . the side window that Weaver first visited was more easily accessible from where he parked his patrol vehicle than the front door, the side window was not protected by a fence or other structure and was certainly not located around the back of the house.

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(9) Weaver testified that when he visited the side window (which contained a window [unit] style air conditioner), he smelled what he determined was an odor of marijuana, he heard male voices, and decided to proceed to the front door to make initial contact but was met by an unleashed dog lying in front of the front door on the small porch.

(10) Weaver testified that he was bitten by a dog before, and for his safety, he returned to the side window to announce his presence and request that one of the occupants meet him at the front door due to the presence of the untethered dog.

(11) . . . even if Weaver had first approached the Residence via the front door, that he would have visited the side window to announce his presence once he discovered the untethered dog on the porch in front of the front door.

These unchallenged Findings support the trial court’s Conclusion Officer Weaver was

at all relevant times in a place where he had a right to be.

Furthermore, even if Officer Weaver’s first perception of marijuana at the side

window was the result of an unconstitutional search, “the dispositive question is

whether the search warrant in the case sub judice was based on, or prompted by,

information obtained from the officers’ warrantless entry, or . . . based on information

acquired independently of the warrantless entry so as to purge the search warrant of

the primary taint.” State v. Robinson, 148 N.C. App. 422, 430, 560 S.E.2d 154, 160

(2002). Here, the trial court concluded the smell of marijuana at the front door

created independent probable cause to support the warrant.1 In support of this

1 In its Order denying Defendant’s 3 July 2023 Motion to Suppress, the trial court found “the

opening of the front door was occasioned not once, but twice, with the strong odor of marijuana, thus

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Conclusion, the trial court found “the opening of the front door was occasioned not

once, but twice, with the strong odor of marijuana[.]” This Finding is unchallenged

by Defendant and, thus, binding on appeal. See Byrd, 287 N.C. App. at 279, 882

S.E.2d at 440.

Defendant argues this Conclusion conflicts with our holding in State v. Falls.

There, this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress because the

officers “lacked a warrant supported by probable cause and no other exception to the

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applied[.]” 275 N.C. App. at 254-55, 853

S.E.2d at 238. The officers in Falls, approaching the defendant’s home for a knock

and talk, saw the defendant getting into his car and “cut into [the defendant’s] front

yard and between the trees to go straight to the vehicle.” Id. at 240-41, 853 S.E.2d at

230 (quotation marks omitted). The officers approached the car as it was reversing

out of the driveway; they observed a firearm in plain view and smelled marijuana

emanating from the driver’s side of the vehicle. Id. at 241. Based on this interaction,

the officers obtained a search warrant for the home, upon execution of which they

recovered additional evidence of illegal activity. Id. Thus, probable cause for the

the probable cause for the search warrant was based not just from such odor emanating from a side window of the house, nor from the first person to exit the Residence via the front door, but from inside the Residence itself twice, via front door.” This statement is a mixed determination of fact and law— the latter half of the “finding” is more properly regarded as a conclusion of law and, thus, we review it as such. See Jackson, 220 N.C. App. at 8, 727 S.E.2d at 329; State v. Gerard, 249 N.C. App. 500, 505, 790 S.E.2d 592, 595 (2016) (reviewing probable cause determination as conclusion of law, despite trial court’s label as finding of fact).

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warrant to search the home in Falls was based solely on the unconstitutional search

of the vehicle. See id.

Here, by contrast, the trial court concluded the warrant was supported by

probable cause created by the smell of marijuana at the front door as well as the side

window. Thus, even if Officer Weaver’s perception of marijuana at the side window

was the product of an unconstitutional search, the search warrant was supported by

independent grounds for probable cause: the smell of marijuana at the front door. See

State v. Corrothers, 295 N.C. App. 192, 200, 905 S.E.2d 237, 244 (2024) (“It is plain

that the affidavit attached to the initial search warrant application provides

abundant support for the issuance of a search warrant, even absent an allegation

regarding [law enforcement’s] observation of [evidence from the curtilage].”).

Therefore, the trial court’s Findings support its Conclusion the search warrant was

supported by probable cause “based upon observations that were lawful[.]”

Consequently, the trial court properly denied Defendant’s 3 July 2023 Motion to

Suppress.2

II. 27 February 2023 Motion to Suppress

2 Because we conclude the trial court properly determined the search warrant was supported

by probable cause, we do not address Defendant’s arguments as to whether he has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. See State v. Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 377, 440 S.E.2d 98, 110 (1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1224, 114 S. Ct. 2716, 129 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1994) (“A person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, and only those persons whose rights have been infringed may assert the protection of the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).

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In his 27 February 2023 Motion to Suppress and accompanying Addendum,

Defendant raises three separate arguments related to the search warrant. He

contends: (A) the warrant was overbroad, (B) a second warrant was required in order

to search the contents of his cell phone, and (C) the dog fighting evidence was

unlawfully seized. We address each argument in turn.

A. Scope of Warrant

Defendant argues the search warrant was overbroad and allowed officers to

search for evidence of a crime for which they did not have probable cause.

Specifically, Defendant contends the warrant permitted the officers to seize evidence

of trafficking, when the probable cause affidavit only alleged possession of a

controlled substance.

“[T]he scope of a lawful search is defined by the object of the search and the

places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1016, 94 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1987) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, probable cause “means a reasonable

ground to believe that the proposed search will reveal the presence upon the premises

to be searched of the objects sought and that those objects will aid in the apprehension

or conviction of the offender.” State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 128-29, 191 S.E.2d

752, 755 (1972) (citation omitted). The probable cause affidavit supporting a search

warrant “must establish a nexus between the objects sought and the place to be

searched.” State v. Eddings, 280 N.C. App. 204, 210, 866 S.E.2d 499, 504 (2021)

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(alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-

244(3) (2023) (an application for a search warrant must “particularly [set] forth the

facts and circumstances establishing probable cause to believe that the items are in

the places . . . to be searched”).

Here, the application for the warrant was based on suspected possession of

marijuana. At the hearing on the Motions to Suppress, Officer Weaver testified the

list of items to be seized was created based on “things that are commonly found with

marijuana”:

[Defense Counsel]: Is this a form type list of items to be seized that your department uses?

....

[Officer Weaver]: No, it is not a standardized state form or agency form.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So you went down and filled out each one of these paragraphs of property to be seized from paragraph 1 to paragraph 12?

[Officer Weaver]: Yes, sir.

[Defense Counsel]: In each one of these paragraphs, the property to be seized was based off your probable cause because of the smell of marijuana?

[Officer Weaver]: It -- it’s a generalized list of what’s associated property to be seized, a list of things that are commonly found with marijuana, yes, sir.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay.

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[Officer Weaver]: Or the illegal, illicit activities surrounding marijuana.

Although the probable cause affidavit only specified the crime as possession of

a controlled substance, Officer Weaver alleged activity related to trafficking in the

affidavit itself and explained the nexus to the items sought:

Applicant in this matter knows through previous investigations that users and sellers of controlled substances will often utilize other person’s property to conduct day to day business to limit their exposure to law enforcement and conceal their identities. Applicant in this matter also knows that users and sellers of controlled substances also maintain a supply or “stash” of narcotics and or U.S. currency secreted in nearby locations both when conducting business at third party locations and when on their own property to limit exposure to arrest and seizure of funds by law enforcement and from rival competition. It is further known that individuals involved in the use and sale of controlled substances often possess firearms to protect themselves from robbery and violence from rival competition and customers.

(emphasis added). Thus, the probable cause affidavit alleged grounds to believe

Defendant was involved in the sale and distribution of marijuana.

The trial court concluded: “The search warrant itself was not overbroad, but

authorized the search for evidence of the transportation, ordering, purchase and

distribution of controlled substances, particularly marijuana.” In support of this

Conclusion, the trial court found “the opening of the front door was occasioned not

once, but twice, with the strong odor of marijuana[.]” Therefore, the trial court’s

Findings support its Conclusion the warrant was not overbroad because it authorized

the search for evidence of transportation, ordering, purchase, and distribution of

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marijuana. Consequently, the trial court properly denied Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress on the grounds the warrant was not overbroad.

B. Cell Phone Search

Next, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress

evidence obtained from his cell phone. Defendant contends the contents of his cell

phone should not have been searched without a separate warrant.

Defendant cites no authority—and we know of none—for his argument a cell

phone seized pursuant to a valid warrant cannot be lawfully searched. Rather,

Defendant cites Riley v. California, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States

held, absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement must generally secure a

warrant before searching a cell phone seized incident to arrest. 573 U.S. 373, 134 S.

Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014). We applied this principle in State v. Ladd, 246

N.C. App. 295, 303-04, 782 S.E.2d 397, 402-03 (2016) (applying Riley in holding a

warrant was required to search external hard drives). Here, by contrast, Defendant’s

cell phone was seized pursuant to a valid warrant—which listed “media that has the

ability to store and process electronic data” as property to be seized. Thus,

Defendant’s cell phone was lawfully searched pursuant to the warrant. Therefore,

the trial court properly denied Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the contents of his cell

phone.

C. Seizure of Evidence in Plain View

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Lastly, Defendant argues the evidence relating to the dog fighting and animal

cruelty charges was not lawfully seized. Defendant contends Finding of Fact 14, the

sole Finding related to this evidence, is not supported by competent evidence. We

agree with Defendant that Finding 14 is not wholly supported by the evidence but

nonetheless conclude the trial court did not err in concluding the evidence was

lawfully seized.

The trial court concluded the dog fighting evidence was lawfully seized from

plain view. “Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure is lawful if (1) the

officer views the evidence from a place where he has a legal right to be, (2) it is

immediately apparent that the items observed constitute evidence of a crime, are

contraband, or are subject to seizure based upon probable cause, and (3) the officer

has a lawful right of access to the evidence itself.” State v. Alexander, 233 N.C. App.

50, 55, 755 S.E.2d 82, 87 (2014) (citation omitted).

Defendant challenges only the second element: whether it was immediately

apparent to Officer Weaver the items seized were evidence of a crime. “The term

‘immediately apparent’ in a plain view analysis is satisfied only if the police have

probable cause to believe that what they have come upon is evidence of criminal

conduct.” State v. Graves, 135 N.C. App. 216, 219, 519 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1999) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

In support of its Conclusion, the trial court found:

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(14) Weaver testified that upon entering the Residence to execute the search warrant, he immediately viewed evidence in plain view that, [through] his training and experience, he knew was associated with the crime of dog fighting, including a dog “treadmill” and other such evidence.

Contrary to the trial court’s Finding, Officer Weaver did not testify he knew the

treadmill and other items were evidence of dog fighting through his training and

experience. Rather, Officer Weaver testified, “I had initially seen a -- or observed a -

- what I was later to be told was a treadmill for dogs, which is commonly used to build

up cardio endurance for dogs.” (emphasis added). It is true, Officer Weaver testified

he saw the treadmill in plain view, but to the extent the Finding states Officer Weaver

immediately knew through his training and experience it was evidence of dog

fighting, it is unsupported by the evidence.

However, as the State argues, there was evidence to support a Finding the dog

fighting evidence was lawfully seized from plain view based on the officers’ collective

knowledge. An officer may effect a search or arrest without personal knowledge of

probable cause if “the various officers who participate in [the] investigation and

arrest have the probable cause information between them.” State v. Coffey, 65 N.C.

App. 751, 756-57, 310 S.E.2d 123, 127 (1984). “Stated another way, ‘when a group of

agents in close communication with one another determines that it is proper to arrest

an individual, the knowledge of the group that made the decision may be considered

in determining probable cause, not just the knowledge of the individual officer who

physically effected the arrest.’ ” State v. Bowman, 193 N.C. App. 104, 109, 666 S.E.2d

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831, 835 (2008) (quoting United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1072 n.3 (4th

Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S. Ct. 3018, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1117 (1980)). This

principle has been applied in varying contexts, including searches and seizures. See,

e.g., id. (warrantless search of vehicle by officer with no personal knowledge of the

defendant’s illegal activity); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996)

(seizure of firearm by officer who had no personal knowledge the defendant was a

convicted felon); State v. Gray, 55 N.C. App. 568, 286 S.E.2d 357 (1982) (stop of vehicle

for expired license tags by officer who did not personally observe the tags).

Here, in the course of their search, the officers discovered dogs restrained in

the yard, medications for the dogs, pedigree papers for at least one of the dogs, and a

dog treadmill—all in plain view. Although Officer Weaver may not have personally

known the treadmill was a “treadmill for dogs,” that information was clearly

communicated to Officer Weaver. Moreover, Officer Weaver testified if he hadn’t

searched a room “specifically,” he “walked through and was shown exactly what was

located.” Thus, the knowledge the items were evidence of illegal activity was

appropriately communicated from the tactical team to Officer Weaver such that the

knowledge may be imputed to Officer Weaver. See Coffey, 65 N.C. App. at 756-57,

310 S.E.2d at 127. Likewise, the individual officers to whom it was apparent the

items were dog fighting evidence did not need to testify at the suppression hearing

because this knowledge is imputed to Officer Weaver. See Bowman, 193 N.C. App.

at 110-11, 666 S.E.2d at 835-36 (“The fact that the officer who actually initiated the

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search of the vehicle and the officer who ordered defendant’s arrest did not testify at

the suppression hearing is unavailing because the knowledge of [those officers] as

part of the team investigating [the defendant’s] illegal activity was imputed to . . . the

officer who initiated the search.”).

Thus, Officer Weaver and the other officers effecting the search “between them

had sufficient information to reasonably justify the belief” the dogs, treadmill, and

medications were evidence of criminal conduct. See Coffey, 65 N.C. App. at 757, 310

S.E.2d at 128; Graves, 135 N.C. App. at 219, 519 S.E.2d at 772. Therefore, the seizure

of the dog fighting evidence was proper under the plain view doctrine. Consequently,

the trial court properly denied Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the dog fighting

evidence.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Judgments of the trial

court.

AFFIRMED.

Judges GORE and FREEMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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