HARRIS, Justice.
Defendant has brought separate appeals after entering pleas of guilty in two separate charges brought against him in Scott County. In cause # 17274 defendant was charged with the crime of breaking and entering in violation of § 708.8, The Code. He twice entered guilty pleas to the charge. After first entering a plea of guilty he was sentenced to a ten-year term at the men’s reformatory. Thereafter he was permitted to withdraw the guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty. Thereafter he withdrew the plea of not guilty and again entered a plea of guilty. The second guilty plea proceeding is challenged in this appeal.
In a separate cause # 17919 defendant was charged with larceny of a motor vehicle in violation of § 321.82, The Code. He was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser-included offense of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent in violation of § 321.76, The Code.
Defendant assigns the same propositions as grounds for reversal in both appeals. He claims: “The trial court erred in failing to inform the defendant that one of the essential elements of the crime of breaking and entering and of the crime of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent is intent.”
The present question excepted, our review of the record discloses the trial court exhaustively complied with the suggestions contained in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969) and Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974). In the proceeding in which defendant pleaded guilty to breaking and entering the record discloses the following:
“THE COURT: “* * * The essential elements of the charge to which you are pleading are as follows: that the occurrence took place on or about June 25, 1974; that it took place in Scott County, Iowa; and that you broke and entered the Five Cities Tool Company at 723 Schmidt Road. By break and enter, doesn’t mean you took a sledge hammer and broke in a window or door. If you simply opened the door without authority and went into the premises, this, in law, is breaking and entering. Do you understand?
[490]*490“MR. REAVES: Yes, I do.
“THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are admitting that you are, in fact, guilty of the crime of breaking and entering as charged against you in this case?
“MR. REAVES: Yes, I do.
“THE COURT: Did you commit the offense charged against you in this case?
“MR. REAVES: Yes.
“THE COURT: Will you tell me just briefly in your own words what you did?
“MR. REAVES: I went through the front door of Five Cities Tool Company and took out four large tool boxes.
“THE COURT: How did you get into the place?
“MR. REAVES: Through the front door.
“THE COURT: Did you open it or break it in?
“MR. REAVES: I opened it.
“THE COURT: Was it locked?
“MR. REAVES: Yes.
“THE COURT: And how did you open it?
“MR. REAVES: Pried it open.
“THE COURT: Then there is no question in your mind that you did break and enter this particular place of business and take from them the property you just mentioned?
“MR. REAVES: Yes.
“THE COURT: You did it?
“MR. REAVES: Yes.
“THE COURT: Mr. Metcalf, as defense counsel do you know of any reason why defendant should not plead guilty?
“MR. METCALF: I’ve considered this case very carefully, Your Honor, and I know of no reason why the defendant should not pleacT guilty.”
In the proceeding in which defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle without owner’s consent the record discloses the following:
“THE COURT: Insofar as that included offense of operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent is concerned, you are now being charged actually with the crime of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, which is alleged, occurred as follows: that you did on or about the 17th day of June 1975 in Scott County, Iowa operate a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. The essential elements of that crime are that the incident occurred on or about June 17, 1975 and that it occurred in Scott County, Iowa and that you operated or drove the car without the consent of the owner of the car.
“THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are admitting that you are in fact guilty of the. crime charged against you of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent?
“MR. REAVES: Yes, I do.
“THE COURT: Did you commit the offense against you in this case?
“MR. REAVES: Yes.
“THE COURT: Just tell me briefly in your own words just what you did in this case.
“MR. REAVES: I was down on High Street and I turned the corner on Rocking-ham and was going east and there was a car in this tavern and I jumped in and took it.
“THE COURT: And this car was not owned by you, was it?
“MR. REAVES: No, sir.
“THE COURT: According to the minutes of testimony that you were presented with at your trial, the car belonged to a man by the name of Richard 0. Korte. Do you know him?
“MR. REAVES: No, I don’t.
“THE COURT: Did you have permission from him to use his car?
“MR. REAVES: No, sir.
“THE COURT: Did you have permission from anyone that you might think was the owner of it to take the car and drive it?
“MR. REAVES: No, sir.”
Of course intent is an essential and necessary element of the crime of [491]*491breaking and entering. State v. Berenger, 161 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Iowa 1968). It is equally clear intent is an essential element of the crime of operating a motor vehicle without consent. State v. Drummer, 254 Iowa 324, 330, 117 N.W.2d 505, 507-508 (1962).
It is clear defendant possessed in each case the required criminal intent. But it is less clear he understood intent was an element of each of the two crimes. The trial court omitted any specific reference to intent when listing the elements of the offenses. The question is whether, under these circumstances, the failure vitiated the guilty plea. Notwithstanding language in some of our prior opinions we now believe and hold it did not.
I. This case provides a graphic example of how even the most careful trial court can be charged with omitting some part of a guilty plea litany. Both guilty pleas were the result of a plea bargain. No questions are raised as to defendant’s awareness of the penal consequences of his pleas. It is not contended the pleas were involuntary or lacked a factual basis. Defendant’s sole claim is that the trial court failed to determine he understood the charge. The claimed error is based entirely on the trial court’s failure to inform him that one of the essential elements of each crime was intent. The record discloses that when the trial court recited the elements of the two offenses to the accused no mention of intent was included. The county attorney’s information contained no allegation of intent. Such was not required. § 773.14, The Code.
Throughout the period of time we have applied the Sisco principles we have refused to reverse judgments based on a guilty plea on the grounds the trial court failed specifically to explain each element if under all the circumstances it is apparent the accused understood the nature of the charge. We have recognized “understanding the charge” did not inevitably require a complete listing by the trial court of the legal elements of the offense. State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1976); State v. Oberbreckling, 235 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1975); State v. Watts, 225 N.W.2d 143, 144-145 (Iowa 1975); State v. Hansen, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1974); State v. Bedell, 220 N.W.2d 891, 892 (Iowa 1974).
What is meant by the term “understood the nature of the charge?” Obviously it cannot mean the accused should be able to write a bar examination question on the subject. Neither can the expression mean merely that the accused was generally aware of the practical realities of the situation. The required level of an accused’s understanding must lie somewhere between the two extremes. The question is only part of a broader one.
II. In reviewing guilty plea proceedings justice and logic now require us to turn our focus from courtroom litanies to the accused’s awareness of the requisites outlined in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) and McCarthy v. U. S., 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). Our approach to these requisites has been explained in many cases principally State v. Sisco, supra, and Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974).
These and a host of other authorities point out the crucial importance of guilty pleas and as a consequence require: The trial court must determine the accused understands the charge. The accused must be aware of the penal consequences of the plea. The plea must be voluntary. Before the plea is accepted the trial court must find a factual basis for the plea.
The first three of these principles (defendant’s understanding of the charge, his awareness of the plea’s penal consequences, and the voluntariness of his plea) are subjective matters relating to the accused’s state of mind. Problems are encountered in proving a subjective understanding. Tension developed between the necessity of the understanding and the difficulty of showing it.
In Sisco and especially in Brainard, relying upon the ABA Standards, we seized [492]*492upon a colloquy between the trial judge and the accused as the tool for demonstrating understanding. Use of such a colloquy for this purpose has at least two disadvantages. It, duplicates an advisory function that should be provided, often at great public expense, by defendant’s own counsel. It proceeds on the highly doubtful premise an accused can thoughtfully assimilate and act upon the information given him in the emotionally charged circumstances existing in the courtroom. The colloquy’s saving advantage rests in its being objective rather than subjective. The colloquy can be shown. Once shown we conclusively presume it was assimilated and then it becomes ipso facto sufficient to show compliance with the Sisco requirements.
But while the colloquy is sufficient the question recurs whether it is necessary. Most of our cases, especially since Brainard, have demanded the complete colloquy. Accordingly form has increasingly taken control over substance.
We are besieged with appeals after guilty pleas by persons (such as defendant Reaves) who do not even claim they were unaware of the particular right they urge the trial judge failed to mention in the challenged colloquy.
Under existing rules attorneys, whose sworn professional responsibility it is to advise their clients, can with impunity take part in a guilty plea proceeding, even expressly approve it, and then assign error in the trial court’s failure to make a record of advice on some particular item. This makes it possible for attorneys to base an appeal upon an error in the proceedings which they recognized but failed to disclose at the time the plea was taken.
We continue to be called upon to review guilty plea proceedings with no apparent diminution in the rate, notwithstanding our detailed explanation of acceptable proce- • dure. In the following cases since Sisco we have undertaken such review: State v. Vantrump, 170 N.W.2d 453 (1969); State v. Lindsey, 171 N.W.2d 859 (1969); State v. Mehuys, 172 N.W.2d 131 (1969); State v. Jackson, 173 N.W.2d 567 (1970); State v. Abodeely, 179 N.W.2d 347 (1970); State v. Helter, 179 N.W.2d 371 (1970); State v. Weekman, 180 N.W.2d 434 (1970); State v. Stoddard, 180 N.W.2d 448 (1970); State v. Watts, 186 N.W.2d 611 (1971); State v. Zacek, 190 N.W.2d 415 (1971); Young v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 434 (1971); Melka v. Haugh, 190 N.W.2d 834 (1971); Herman v. Brewer, 193 N.W.2d 540 (1972); State v. Kelley, 195 N.W.2d 702 (1972); Foster v. Brewer, 197 N.W.2d 366 (1972); State v. Quinn, 197 N.W.2d 624 (1972); Benton v. State, 199 N.W.2d 56 (1972); State v. Bledsoe, 200 N.W.2d 529 (1972); State v. Lynch, 200 N.W.2d 896 (1972); State v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457 (1972); State v. Slawson, 201 N.W.2d 460 (1972); State v. Hackett, 201 N.W.2d 487 (1972); State v. Kephart, 202 N.W.2d 62 (1972); State v. Clary, 203 N.W.2d 382 (1973); State v. Thomas, 205 N.W.2d 717 (1973); State v. Bell, 210 N.W.2d 423 (1973); State v. Cliburn, 210 N.W.2d 440 (1973); State v. McGee, 211 N.W.2d 267 (1973); State v. York, 211 N.W.2d 314 (1973); State v. Goodwin, 212 N.W.2d 399 (1973); State v. Kobrock, 213 N.W.2d 481 (1973); State v. Stakenburg, 215 N.W.2d 265 (1974); State v. Reppert, 215 N.W.2d 302 (1974); Ogden v. State, 215 N.W.2d 335 (1974); Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528 (1974); State v. Bedell, 220 N.W.2d 891 (1974); State v. Hansen, 221 N.W.2d 274 (1974); State v. Marsan, 221 N.W.2d 278 (1974); Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (1974); State v. Williams, 224 N.W.2d 17 (1974); State v. Dowis, 224 N.W.2d 467 (1974); State v. Watts, 225 N.W.2d 143 (1975); State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36 (1975); State v. Greene, 226 N.W.2d 829 (1975); State v. Vogel, 228 N.W.2d 8 (1975); State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21 (1975); State v. Bunge, 228 N.W.2d 35 (1975); State v. Tillman, 228 N.W.2d 38 (1975); State v. Dentler, 231 N.W.2d 594 (1975); State v. Frazier, 232 N.W.2d 480 (1975); State v. Parrish, 232 N.W.2d 511 (1975); State v. Johnson, 234 N.W.2d 878 (1975); State v. Oberbreckling, 235 N.W.2d 121 (1975); State v. Harvey, 236 N.W.2d 47 (1975); State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351 (1976); State v. Wall, 239 N.W.2d 548 (1976); State v. Findley, 239 [493]*493N.W.2d 852 (1976); State v. Barlow, 240 N.W.2d 448 (1976); State v. Rhodes, 243 N.W.2d 544 (1976); State v. Buhr, 243 N.W.2d 546 (1976); Hauser v. State, 244 N.W.2d 807 (1976); State v. Schultz, 245 N.W.2d 316 (1976); Wallace v. State, 245 N.W.2d 325 (1976).
The foregoing list does not include a number of unreported cases which raised the same issues. We have failed to realize the promise of Sisco and Brainard to reduce the number of guilty plea appeals.
Such effort, with the consequent expenditure of public funds might be justified if there were some reasonable hope it realistically contributed toward one of the goals mentioned in McCarthy: “* * * [T]o assist the * * * judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant’s guilty plea is truly voluntary. * * However we no longer think it realistic to hope our rigid colloquy requirements serve that purpose.
We have also woefully failed to achieve the other goal stated in McCarthy as justification for our procedure: “[T]o * * * help reduce the great waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions * 394 U.S. at 472, 89 S.Ct. at 1174, 22 L.Ed.2d at 428. See Brainard, 222 N.W.2d at 713-714. Those “frivolous attacks” continue unabated.
It appears other states do not uniformly require a court record similar to the one we have come to demand. Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 549s, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 423, pp. 1181-1186; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 486-489, pp. 477-480. It is and should be required of a judge, before accepting a guilty plea, to be satisfied defendant has the requisite awareness, the plea is voluntary, and that a factual basis for the plea exists. The colloquy specified in Sisco and Brainard remains a proper way to show such awareness. But it has proven unwise to blindly require the trial judge to fulfill a prescribed colloquy to represented defendants. Such a requirement goes far beyond what is demanded by the United States Supreme Court. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Wallace v. State, 245 N.W.2d 325 (Iowa 1976).
We therefore hold the Sisco requirements may be shown in the manner specified in Brainard. However the search for satisfaction of those requirements need not begin and end with the trial court’s colloquy. This holding is not without precedent. In Reppert, supra, 215 N.W.2d at 307 we said: “The question is not whether defendant learned of such penalty from the judge in a formal proceeding but whether he had knowledge as to such matter, whether it was from the judge, his lawyer or from some other source. Tucker v. United States, 5 Cir., 409 F.2d 1291, 1295.” See also Satchfield v. United States, 450 F.2d 284, 285 (5 Cir.1970).
Unless something causes, or reasonably should cause, the trial judge to believe otherwise he may rely on defense counsel’s assurances that an accused has been advised of, and is aware of, everything required by Sisco. See Wallace, supra. It would seem an accused can assimilate and consider the necessary information more effectively in private conversation with his attorney than upon a public colloquy by the trial court. While it remains the burden of the State to show an accused’s awareness it may be shown by the colloquy specified in Brainard, by defense counsel’s assurances, or by anything shown of record which establishes such awareness.
In any appeal taken after the filing of this opinion an accused challenging the adequacy of his guilty plea proceeding must:
A. first present such claim to the trial court in a motion in arrest of judgment under chapter 788, The Code.1
B. hereafter claim to have been unaware, as well as not advised, of the claimed omission.
[494]*494Defense counsel have been previously admonished of their duty beyond merely advising their clients. They have a clear professional responsibility to assist the making of a record showing the plea to be intelligent, voluntary, and accurate. State v. Williams, supra, 224 N.W.2d at 19. Defense counsel are again advised of this responsibility and admonished a failure to discharge it reflects unfavorably upon the quality and value of their professional services.
III. Turning to the case at hand we believe defendant understood the nature of the charges against him. Participation in the proceedings by defense counsel casts light on the question of whether defendant understood the charge. Defendant’s counsel did not specifically state he had advised defendant of the elements. However his assurances in both cases that he knew of no reason why a guilty plea could not be accepted is significant. It is an indication he had discharged his professional responsibilities to his client.
There is no indication in the record defendant’s counsel had failed in his professional responsibilities to defendant. Through plea bargaining he obtained a most favorable disposition of the charges. He successfully prevailed upon the trial court to impose six month jail sentences rather than prison terms. He even managed to secure for defendant a better disposition than the one for which he bargained. The sentences were in fact imposed to run concurrently rather than, as sought in the bargain, consecutively.
Finally we can take judicial notice of the fact defendant’s counsel was known to the trial court to be an attorney of ability and experience. His experience included several years as judge of Davenport Municipal Court.
Taking the record as a whole we believe it is abundantly clear defendant understood the nature of each charge to which he entered his guilty plea. Since we believe defendant’s awareness and not precise recitations by the trial judge should control we hold his convictions both should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur except LeGRAND, J., who concurs specially, and McCORMICK, MASON, RAWLINGS and REYNOLD-SON, JJ., who dissent.