State v. Ravensford Lumber Co.
This text of 180 S.E. 696 (State v. Ravensford Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The parties have assumed that by reason of the attempted reservation in paragraph seven of the final judgment entered at the November Special Term, 1933, the court retained jurisdiction to dispose of said alleged reserved matters by motion or subsequent petition in the cause. Moses v. Morganton, 195 N. C., 92, 141 S. E., 484; 34 C. J., 825. The assumption is a non sequitur. Sloan v. Hart, 150 N. C., 269, 63 S. E., 1037.
In the first place, the attempted reservation is in direct conflict with paragraph five of the judgment, which became immediately operative upon acceptance by the respondents of the moneys paid under the judgment, and thereby cut off any supposed reservation.
Secondly, the court was without authority to entertain either motion of the petitioner or the counter-petition of the respondent, former cannot be regarded as an action to remove cloud from title, the latter as a suit upon the judgment. the The nor
No rights were determined by the proceedings upon said motion counter-petition, and none can be adjudicated here. The appeal again be dismissed. and will
Petition allowed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
180 S.E. 696, 208 N.C. 347, 1935 N.C. LEXIS 412, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ravensford-lumber-co-nc-1935.