State v. Ramsey

358 S.W.3d 589, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 185, 2012 WL 512577
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 16, 2012
DocketNo. SD 30846
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 358 S.W.3d 589 (State v. Ramsey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Ramsey, 358 S.W.3d 589, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 185, 2012 WL 512577 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

DANIEL E. SCOTT, Judge.

We consider whether the state proved Earl Ramsey’s constructive possession of drugs hidden in a house that he shared with another. On this record, under well-settled law, the answer is “no.”

Background

Ramsey and a woman lived in what was, in effect, a one-bedroom home.1 Police arrived with a search warrant one day as Ramsey came home. They took his key, entered the empty house, searched, and found 1.31 grams of cocaine in a bedroom wastebasket, hidden under an opaque trash bag liner.

The slender transcript (only 22 pages of trial testimony) of a one-witness bench trial, nearly four years later, offers no other meaningful information about the search.2

Standard of Review

Our review for sufficiency of evidence is as in jury-tried cases. State v. Buford, 309 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Mo.App.2010). We accept all evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the state and disregard all those to the contrary. However, we cannot supply missing evidence or give the state the benefit of unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences. State v. Moses, 265 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Mo.App.2008); State v. Cushshon, 218 S.W.3d 587, 589 (Mo.App.2007).

Constructive Possession/NonExclusive Premises

Ramsey did not actually possess the cocaine,3 so the state had to show, at least circumstantially, his knowing, constructive [591]*591possession thereof. Moses, supra; Cushshon, supra. These could be inferred if Ramsey had exclusive use or control of the house, but “where use and control of the premises is not exclusive,” additional evidence is needed to link an accused to drugs found there. State v. Nobles, 699 S.W.2d 581, 533 (Mo.App.1985).4

Despite the state’s puzzling argument to the contrary, this is not an exclusive possession case. The state established that two persons lived at the house, then seemingly forgot this,5 which may explain the paucity of that evidence normally seen in successful prosecutions of this type. At any rate, “the State offered no evidence of exclusive control, but did offer evidence of at least joint control,” so it had to adduce “some further evidence” of Ramsey’s knowledge of and control over these drugs. Cushshon, 218 S.W.3d at 592. An observation from Moses, with light editing, might fit this case as well:

While it was reasonable for the jury to conclude Moses did reside at the trailer given all the evidence, it was not reasonable to infer he had exclusive possession of the premises. Thus, the additional inference that Moses possessed the drugs therein is unwarranted, and the State must show additional evidence connecting Moses with the contraband in order to constructively prove possession.

265 S.W.3d at 866 (internal citation omitted).

Additional or Further Evidence

Non-exclusive examples of “additional” or “further” evidence have included paraphernalia found on a defendant, flight from police or other acts suggesting consciousness of guilt, drugs commingled with a defendant’s personal effects, strong drug odor on premises, a defendant’s proximity to contraband, drugs in plain view, or a defendant’s incriminating statements. See, e.g., Michaels v. State, 346 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Mo.App.2011); State v. Richardson, 296 S.W.3d 21, 24-25 (Mo.App.2009); State v. Power, 281 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Mo.App.2009); State v. Wurtzberger, 265 S.W.3d 329, 337 (Mo.App.2008). The state proved none of these, but claims that two other matters tie Ramsey to these drugs.

One involves Ramsey’s alleged cocaine sale to a confidential informant. At trial, however, the state declined to offer this hearsay for its truth.6 Since it was not [592]*592offered or admitted as substantive evidence, the state cannot now treat or rely on it as such.

Also, the state claims Ramsey had “routine access” to the drugs because he slept in the bedroom.7 This is not persuasive where the state’s witness proved that a man and woman shared a house, with one bedroom, and it looked like no one slept elsewhere. That Ramsey slept in the only bedroom does not reasonably suggest, on this record, that his female cohabitant did not, or that either enjoyed exclusive or even superior control of the room, or to whom the hidden drugs belonged. We reiterate the state’s failure — in stark contrast to reported cases affirming such convictions — to show these drugs were visible, or were found among or near Ramsey’s belongings, or that clothes and the like suggested this was only “his” room, etc. This failure to develop details linking Ramsey to these drugs aligns this case with Moses, Cushshon, Janson, Nobles, Funk, and others8 where constructive possession was not proved and consigns it to a similar fate.

Conclusion

Ramsey’s well-taken, dispositive, first point moots his remaining claim. As the state had an opportunity to fully develop its case, we do not remand for a new trial. See Janson, 964 S.W.2d at 555. We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court enter a judgment of acquittal and order Ramsey discharged.

BARNEY and BATES, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

The state’s sole witness testified as follows regarding the search:

Q. If you could, describe the floor plan of this residence. When you walk in the front door, what room are you entering?
A. The living room.
Q. And then how many bedrooms are there?
A. Two.
Q. Were both of those bedrooms being used as bedrooms?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Can you describe which one was being used as a bedroom?
A. The room on the northeast corner of the house had a bed in it and was a normal bedroom. The room on the northwest corner of the house had basically a storage room, had just stuff piled up in it.
Q. But there was no bed in that room?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Where did you begin the search?
A. Initially right in the living room as we walked through. Just did a [593]*593walk through the whole house to see what was out in plain view, then went directly in the bedroom.
Q. In the bedroom, what was found?
A. In the trash — there was a small trash can.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
358 S.W.3d 589, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 185, 2012 WL 512577, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ramsey-moctapp-2012.