State v. Ramey

60 S.E.2d 66, 217 S.C. 132, 1950 S.C. LEXIS 104
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJune 14, 1950
Docket16370
StatusPublished

This text of 60 S.E.2d 66 (State v. Ramey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Ramey, 60 S.E.2d 66, 217 S.C. 132, 1950 S.C. LEXIS 104 (S.C. 1950).

Opinion

GASTON, Acting Associate Justice.

The appellant states that the questions involved in this appeal are:

1. JJid the trial judge err in refusing to direct a verdict for the appellant on the grounds that there was no corn-petent evidence circumstantial or otherwise to establish that the appellant was guilty of murder or any lesser crime? (Exceptions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9.)

II. Did the trial Judge commit prejudicial error in refusing to dismiss the defendant as an accessory before the fact? (Exceptions 2 and 6.)

We are called upon to review the evidence in this case. The only issue arising on appeal is that there was no corn-petent evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to convict the appellant of manslaughter, and that the Court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty. She and her son by a former marriage were tried together on the charge of the murder of her husband. Both were convicted of manslaugh- [134]*134ter. She alone appeals. She was also charged in the indictment as being an accessory before the fact and as accessory after the fact. The charge of accessory after the fact was dismissed by the trial Judge. No verdict was found against her on the count of accessory before the fact. Appellant also claims that it was prejudicial error to submit the issue of accessory before the fact to the jury. By the verdict, she was acquitted in law of the alternative offense of an accessory before the fact. This eliminates the theory that she was absent when the crime was committed. The verdict of manslaughter as to her is a finding by the jury that she was present and participated in the crime as a principal.

The record is voluminous. There are some seventeen photographs of the exterior of the residence and of certain portions of the interior where the killing took place, with a floor plan or diagram of the inside.

On the evening of the fateful night the defendant and her son, who was twenty-five years old, were engaged in riding by automobile for several hours with no apparent purpose. They started at about 5 :00 o’clock on the afternoon of December 27, 1948, from the Abbeville Cotton Mill, drove around the City for some time, then stopped at “The Rock” where they picked up Dot Hammond, a sixteen year old girl, and her male companion. They next drove to Greenwood where they visited appellant’s sister and her husband, then they went by “The Fairway” near the city limits of Greenwood and returned to Abbeville after 11:00 o’clock that night. We shall not put undue stress on this ride.

At about 20 minutes to twelve o’clock at night, the defendant, Eunice D. Ramey, was first seen by the witness for the State in the road flagging him down with a flashlight. She seemed to be upset and worried. This witness, on his way to work, stopped his car and asked her what was wrong. She repeatedly said, “My husband has shot himself, please, please get an ambulance.” She did not have all of her clothes on; her hair was all torn up; she was barefooted. She re[135]*135plied to the inquiry, who is your husband and where do you live? “Ramey.” “You just go up and tell Mr. Harrison to bring the ambulance, he knows us and where we live, go on, please, please.” This witness, C. C. Simmons, was in his car with his wife and niece on their way to work. They did not stop at the ambulance place but reported to the policemen, and they went on to the mill to work. It was ten minutes to twelve when they got to the mill by the mill clock.

The officers of the law reached the scene very soon after this report. They found Mrs. Ramey out in the road, between the highway and their home. The officers stopped, picked her up in their car and went on down to the house. “She was talking and going on and kind of crying.” She apparently was drinking. She first said, “Dit (her husband) shot himself.” “Lord have mercy, Sing, Dit shot himself. What in the world will I do.” The officers then went with her into the house. On going into the house, she said, “Is he dead, do something, you all do something.”

Ramey himself was found in the little bedroom lying on his left side beside the bed, pretty close to the bed. A pistol was lying near his feet. His head was from the door. Ramey was conscious and said to the officers, “Dickey shot me and took off.” The officer went into the room where Mrs. Eunice Ramey was and said, “Mrs. Ramey, Dit says that Dickey shot him.” She replied “Oh no, no, Sing, no, he didn’t, he does not know what he is saying.”

The ambulance arrived. Dickey also showed up and appeared to be drinking and said to the officers, “Do something, goddammit, do something.” Again Ramey said as he was being put in the ambulance, “Dickey shot me. Watch him, he’s got a gun.”

The officers were first going on the theory that he shot himself because of Mrs. Ramey’s statements and they tried to comfort or console her.

The pistol had two empty shells, the others were loaded. The voluntary statements by the appellant to the officers so [136]*136soon after the tragedy that he shot himself may well have been taken by the jury as dispelled by the accusations by Ramey himself that Dickey shot him and made off. Also it could hardly be true that Ramey would shoot twice either accidentally or intentionally to injure or kill himself. Even in a struggle this was unreasonable. Evidently the jury believed that he did not shoot himself. Mrs. Ramey that night insisted that lie did not know what he was saying. Either she was shielding herself or her son. Her excitement did not render her incapable of seeing and knowing what went on in her own home, alone with her husband and her son, at the well-nigh midnight hour. Ramey thought Dickey went off with the pistol. Dickey says he left Ramey being supported by Mrs. Ramey. No doubt the jury believed that the pistol near Ramey’s feet was mute evidence that it was placed there after Ramey fell, at which time only Mrs. Ramey was present. The evidence as to the place and condition of the pistol is an established fact. There was only the one pistol in the hands of the defendants. Mrs. Ramey told the officer, “That’s the only one.” She knew that Dickey had not made off with it. There it was with two bullets gone and two empty shells in the chambers lying under the ankle near the feet of the helpless, wounded man, whose only relief was a pillow under his head.

The Sheriff came into the house that night shortly after Ramey had been taken to the hospital. No blood was on the floor nor on the linoleum rug where Ramey had been lying when the officers arrived. Mrs. Ramey told the Sheriff that Ramey did not bleed after he was shot which the Sheriff told her was strange as he was shot through the body from one part to the other. Her statement at least shows that she was alert and well aware of what went on before the arrival of anyone while she and Davis were the only ones present in the house with Ramey. She also told the Sheriff that night that she “supposed Ramey shot himself for he was lying on the floor shot when we got there”, [137]*137when she got home. This statement was repeated several times when the Sheriff first talked to her at the hospital that night. She said he shot himself because he was lying on the floor shot when we got home. Her concealment of the facts was self-evident. No bullet holes were found by the Sheriff in his search of the floor, walls, and ceiling of the bedroom where Ramey had been lying. The Sheriff next talked at the hospital that night to Ramey who was in a normal state of mind.

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Related

State v. Wilkins
59 S.E.2d 853 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1950)
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55 S.E.2d 696 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1949)
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11 S.E. 624 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1890)
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Bluebook (online)
60 S.E.2d 66, 217 S.C. 132, 1950 S.C. LEXIS 104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ramey-sc-1950.