04/22/2025
DA 23-0059 Case Number: DA 23-0059
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 79N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RICHARD LAMAR RUTLEDGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Roosevelt, Cause No. DC-19-4 Honorable David Cybulski, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Tammy Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Charlotte Lawson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Thomas J. Bleicher, Roosevelt County Attorney, Selene Koepke, Meghan Paddock, Special Deputy County Attorneys, Wolf Point, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 26, 2025
Decided: April 22, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Richard Rutledge appeals his Roosevelt County conviction on two counts of incest,
claiming that the Fifteenth Judicial District Court should have appointed substitute counsel
when Rutledge made complaints to the court about his lawyers following the entry of his
guilty plea. At minimum, Rutledge alleges, the court improperly failed to conduct an
adequate initial inquiry into whether Rutledge was entitled to substitute counsel before it
proceeded to sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶3 Rutledge and the State entered a plea agreement that called for Rutledge to plead
guilty to two counts of felony incest. The plea agreement provided that the State would
recommend concurrent sentences of fifty years on each count, with a twenty-five-year
parole restriction. Rutledge would be free to argue “for a lesser sentence which results in
a net sentence no lower than sixty (60) years with fifty-five (55) years suspended and [a]
five (5) year parole restriction.”
¶4 During the change of plea hearing, from which lead defense counsel was absent, the
District Judge noticed something wrong with Rutledge’s eyes. The court asked, “if you
can’t read or see very well, did [co-counsel] read everything in that thing to you?” Rutledge
2 said, “yes, I trust him.” The plea agreement stated explicitly that Rutledge had ample time
to discuss the case with counsel, fully understood their advice, and was “completely
satisfied” with their services. It stated further that Rutledge understood the maximum
sentence for the offenses and that if the court imposed a greater sentence he would not be
able to withdraw his plea. The court conducted a thorough plea colloquy, during which
Rutledge confirmed that he understood the plea agreement, had enough time “in the big
picture” to meet with his attorneys, and understood their answers. He also acknowledged
that the District Court was not bound by any sentencing recommendations. The court
accepted Rutledge’s guilty pleas.
¶5 Soon after he pleaded guilty, Rutledge sent the court an ex parte letter complaining
about his lawyers, saying they lied to him about the substance of his plea agreement and
during court and provided ineffective assistance. He also complained that lead counsel
was not present in court and asked the court to order both defense counsel to be at the next
court date in person “so all of this can be addressed.” The court had the letter filed and set
a case management conference, directing counsel to “be prepared to address the procedure
to be used to resolve the issues raised in the handwritten communication.” At the
conference, defense counsel indicated they were waiting for an updated psychosexual
evaluation to see if they could work it out with Rutledge and then let the court know if he
wanted new counsel or to withdraw his plea. The court advised Rutledge that it would set
another conference and then see if he wanted to go forward with taking the plea agreement
or back out of it. The court told Rutledge it wanted him to be well informed and to be able
3 to make an informed decision. Rutledge expressed concern about what he was told about
the sentence, saying it didn’t add up. Rutledge complained about a lack of communication
with his lawyers (who were from out of town) but told the court, “If they come up and see
me and they don’t bull crap me, I’m good to go.” After additional discussion about getting
the case moving forward and setting a date for the next status hearing, Rutledge finally
said, “I mean as it stands right now, your Honor, I am not going to withdraw my guilty
plea . . . . And that will be that way until I am explained every detail.”
¶6 The court held another status hearing the following month. Defense counsel
confirmed they had met with Rutledge in person. After discussion about the status of the
psychosexual evaluation, the court discussed sentencing dates, asking Rutledge directly,
“Better, Richard?” Rutledge told the court he would prefer to have lead counsel present in
court in person. At the sentencing hearing about a month later, both defense counsel were
present in person; they pointed out errors Rutledge had seen in the PSI, cross-examined the
state’s two witnesses, and called four witnesses on Rutledge’s behalf.
¶7 Prior to Rutledge’s allocution, the District Court advised him, “If there is something
you think has been left out, missed, lost, not said right, now would be a really good time to
tell me.” Rutledge voiced no concerns with his attorneys or the voluntariness of his plea
but responded, “Your Honor I am a 49-year-old man and I’ve accepted responsibility for
these two charges.” He took responsibility and apologized to the court for his actions.
Rutledge told the court, “You know, my life is literally in your hands. I know I’ve been in
front of you so many times that you are sick of seeing me.” The District Court replied,
4 “No, not really. If you remember every time we’ve been here, I’ve asked you about it,
haven’t I?” Rutledge agreed. When the court asked if he was aware of “any legal reason
why sentencing shouldn’t be imposed at this time[,]” Rutledge replied, “No sir. I’m ready.”
The court imposed the sentence the State recommended, fifty years on each count, with a
twenty-five-year parole restriction, to run concurrently.
¶8 Rutledge appeals, claiming that the court should have appointed substitute counsel
after his letter made allegations that raised the prospect of an unavoidable conflict of
interest with his trial counsel with respect to advice and further action regarding potentially
withdrawing his guilty plea. Rutledge claims that his allegations accused counsel of failing
to make him fully aware of the terms of the plea agreement, particularly the exchange of
promises concerning sentences that could and would be recommended by the parties.
Without the advice of conflict-free counsel, he claims, Rutledge was faced with substantial
potential prejudice in proceeding to sentencing instead of considering a motion to withdraw
his plea.
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04/22/2025
DA 23-0059 Case Number: DA 23-0059
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 79N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RICHARD LAMAR RUTLEDGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Roosevelt, Cause No. DC-19-4 Honorable David Cybulski, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Tammy Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Charlotte Lawson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Thomas J. Bleicher, Roosevelt County Attorney, Selene Koepke, Meghan Paddock, Special Deputy County Attorneys, Wolf Point, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 26, 2025
Decided: April 22, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Richard Rutledge appeals his Roosevelt County conviction on two counts of incest,
claiming that the Fifteenth Judicial District Court should have appointed substitute counsel
when Rutledge made complaints to the court about his lawyers following the entry of his
guilty plea. At minimum, Rutledge alleges, the court improperly failed to conduct an
adequate initial inquiry into whether Rutledge was entitled to substitute counsel before it
proceeded to sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶3 Rutledge and the State entered a plea agreement that called for Rutledge to plead
guilty to two counts of felony incest. The plea agreement provided that the State would
recommend concurrent sentences of fifty years on each count, with a twenty-five-year
parole restriction. Rutledge would be free to argue “for a lesser sentence which results in
a net sentence no lower than sixty (60) years with fifty-five (55) years suspended and [a]
five (5) year parole restriction.”
¶4 During the change of plea hearing, from which lead defense counsel was absent, the
District Judge noticed something wrong with Rutledge’s eyes. The court asked, “if you
can’t read or see very well, did [co-counsel] read everything in that thing to you?” Rutledge
2 said, “yes, I trust him.” The plea agreement stated explicitly that Rutledge had ample time
to discuss the case with counsel, fully understood their advice, and was “completely
satisfied” with their services. It stated further that Rutledge understood the maximum
sentence for the offenses and that if the court imposed a greater sentence he would not be
able to withdraw his plea. The court conducted a thorough plea colloquy, during which
Rutledge confirmed that he understood the plea agreement, had enough time “in the big
picture” to meet with his attorneys, and understood their answers. He also acknowledged
that the District Court was not bound by any sentencing recommendations. The court
accepted Rutledge’s guilty pleas.
¶5 Soon after he pleaded guilty, Rutledge sent the court an ex parte letter complaining
about his lawyers, saying they lied to him about the substance of his plea agreement and
during court and provided ineffective assistance. He also complained that lead counsel
was not present in court and asked the court to order both defense counsel to be at the next
court date in person “so all of this can be addressed.” The court had the letter filed and set
a case management conference, directing counsel to “be prepared to address the procedure
to be used to resolve the issues raised in the handwritten communication.” At the
conference, defense counsel indicated they were waiting for an updated psychosexual
evaluation to see if they could work it out with Rutledge and then let the court know if he
wanted new counsel or to withdraw his plea. The court advised Rutledge that it would set
another conference and then see if he wanted to go forward with taking the plea agreement
or back out of it. The court told Rutledge it wanted him to be well informed and to be able
3 to make an informed decision. Rutledge expressed concern about what he was told about
the sentence, saying it didn’t add up. Rutledge complained about a lack of communication
with his lawyers (who were from out of town) but told the court, “If they come up and see
me and they don’t bull crap me, I’m good to go.” After additional discussion about getting
the case moving forward and setting a date for the next status hearing, Rutledge finally
said, “I mean as it stands right now, your Honor, I am not going to withdraw my guilty
plea . . . . And that will be that way until I am explained every detail.”
¶6 The court held another status hearing the following month. Defense counsel
confirmed they had met with Rutledge in person. After discussion about the status of the
psychosexual evaluation, the court discussed sentencing dates, asking Rutledge directly,
“Better, Richard?” Rutledge told the court he would prefer to have lead counsel present in
court in person. At the sentencing hearing about a month later, both defense counsel were
present in person; they pointed out errors Rutledge had seen in the PSI, cross-examined the
state’s two witnesses, and called four witnesses on Rutledge’s behalf.
¶7 Prior to Rutledge’s allocution, the District Court advised him, “If there is something
you think has been left out, missed, lost, not said right, now would be a really good time to
tell me.” Rutledge voiced no concerns with his attorneys or the voluntariness of his plea
but responded, “Your Honor I am a 49-year-old man and I’ve accepted responsibility for
these two charges.” He took responsibility and apologized to the court for his actions.
Rutledge told the court, “You know, my life is literally in your hands. I know I’ve been in
front of you so many times that you are sick of seeing me.” The District Court replied,
4 “No, not really. If you remember every time we’ve been here, I’ve asked you about it,
haven’t I?” Rutledge agreed. When the court asked if he was aware of “any legal reason
why sentencing shouldn’t be imposed at this time[,]” Rutledge replied, “No sir. I’m ready.”
The court imposed the sentence the State recommended, fifty years on each count, with a
twenty-five-year parole restriction, to run concurrently.
¶8 Rutledge appeals, claiming that the court should have appointed substitute counsel
after his letter made allegations that raised the prospect of an unavoidable conflict of
interest with his trial counsel with respect to advice and further action regarding potentially
withdrawing his guilty plea. Rutledge claims that his allegations accused counsel of failing
to make him fully aware of the terms of the plea agreement, particularly the exchange of
promises concerning sentences that could and would be recommended by the parties.
Without the advice of conflict-free counsel, he claims, Rutledge was faced with substantial
potential prejudice in proceeding to sentencing instead of considering a motion to withdraw
his plea. At minimum, Rutledge argues, his allegations triggered the District Court’s duty
to conduct further inquiry regarding whether Rutledge was entitled to substitute counsel
based on conflicts of interest and/or an irreparable breakdown in his attorney-client
relationships.
¶9 We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s request for
substitute counsel. State v. Aguado, 2017 MT 54, ¶ 8, 387 Mont. 1, 390 P.3d 628 (citations
omitted). If a defendant asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and requests
the appointment of new counsel, the “district court must conduct an ‘adequate initial
5 inquiry’ to determine whether the defendant’s claim is ‘seemingly substantial.’” State v.
Happel, 2010 MT 200, ¶ 14, 357 Mont. 390, 240 P.3d 1016 (quoting State v. Gallagher,
1998 MT 70, ¶ 15, 288 Mont. 180, 955 P.2d 1371). “In determining whether a district
court abused its discretion, we consider both the procedures employed by the trial court
during the initial inquiry into defendant’s complaints, and the court’s analysis of whether
a defendant’s claims are seemingly substantial, necessitating a further hearing.” State v.
Patina, 2024 MT 257, ¶ 8, 418 Mont. 523, 558 P.3d 799.
¶10 As a threshold matter here, Rutledge never requested the District Court for substitute
counsel. Contrary to his written plea agreement and statements in open court, he
complained that his attorneys both had lied to him about the plea agreement and did not
explain the sentence that would be recommended. Rutledge said he had not had effective
assistance from them and asked the court to direct both counsel to appear in person “so all
of this can be addressed.” The court honored his request and convened an initial inquiry
to explore Rutledge’s complaints. When a defendant does not request substitute counsel,
“the defendant ‘fails to implicate the “seemingly substantial” analysis and the need for a
subsequent hearing’ on his complaints about his lawyer.” State v. Crawford, 2016 MT 96,
¶ 42, 383 Mont. 229, 371 P.3d 381 (quoting State v. Clary, 2012 MT 26, ¶ 28, 364 Mont.
53, 270 P.3d 88).
¶11 The court did convene a hearing, however, at which it heard from his counsel and
explained to Rutledge the proposal for moving forward with the psychosexual evaluation
and meeting with his attorneys before deciding if he wanted to withdraw his plea. Rutledge
6 confirmed that what he really wanted was to meet with them face-to-face and get adequate
information about what sentence he was facing. He told the court that he did not intend to
withdraw his plea but wanted to be “explained every detail.”
¶12 Rutledge got what he requested during that hearing. Both of his co-counsel came
to see him in person, and the evaluation was completed. Though Rutledge now complains
that the court did not allow him to develop the record concerning his complaints, he
affirmatively told the court that what he wanted was to meet with his lawyers and have
them explain “every detail” of the plea agreement. Rutledge argues that he should have
had objective legal advice before the hearing so he could be advised of his options by
conflict-free counsel. But a defendant is not entitled to the appointment of additional
counsel during an initial inquiry on his complaints. State v. Gazda, 2003 MT 350, ¶ 32,
318 Mont. 516, 82 P.3d 20. “The initial inquiry only serves to establish whether a
defendant has a substantial claim; it is not a hearing on the merits of that claim.” Gazda,
¶ 32. “If a district court’s initial inquiry reveals a seemingly substantial complaint, the
court must hold a hearing to address the validity of the complaints, and appoint separate
counsel to represent the defendant.” Happel, ¶ 14.
¶13 Based on the colloquy between the court, counsel, and Rutledge in open court, we
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding without another
hearing to address the validity of his complaints. Rutledge at no time requested substitute
counsel but only an opportunity to communicate with the counsel he had. Rutledge assured
the court that he was “good to go” if his attorneys came to see him and gave him a truthful
7 explanation. “Absent ‘a request for another attorney, the District Court was not required
to conduct further inquiry into the matter.’” Crawford, ¶ 43 (quoting Clary, ¶ 28). By the
time of sentencing, despite the District Court’s express invitation to “tell me” if there was
anything “left out, missed, lost, not said right,” Rutledge raised no further concerns about
counsel’s representation and no lack of understanding about the terms of the plea
agreement.
¶14 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review. The District Court adequately explored with Rutledge his
concerns with appointed counsel. The court did not abuse its discretion when it did not
appoint another attorney to advise him or conduct another hearing.
¶15 The judgment is affirmed.
/S/ BETH BAKER
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON