State v. R. D.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: A188558
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

No. 583 June 24, 2026 889

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of R. D., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. R. D., Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 25CC04829; A188558

Erin E. Kirkwood, Judge. Submitted June 3, 2026. Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant. Daniel Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. 890 State v. R. D.

PER CURIAM Appellant appeals a judgment of civil commitment. The trial court ordered that appellant be committed to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, based on appellant being a “person with mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5.1 Specifically, the trial court deter- mined that appellant, because of a mental disorder, is dan- gerous to others. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 4. We affirm. To meet the legal standard for a danger to others commitment, the state must prove that the person has a men- tal disorder that makes the person “highly likely to engage in future violence toward others, absent commitment.” State v. S. E. R., 297 Or App 121, 122, 441 P3d 254 (2019). “A sin- gle violent act may be sufficient to establish that a person is dangerous to others, if the circumstances of the act, the per- son’s history, or other contextual evidence allows the court to rely on the act to predict future dangerousness.” State v. J. G., 302 Or App 97, 100-01, 458 P3d 721 (2020). However, “overt acts of violence are not necessary to establish danger- ousness to others. Verbal threats may be enough in appro- priate circumstances.” Id. at 101 n 3. Generally, when verbal threats are at issue, the state will have “to provide evidence that shows that the appellant’s threats of future violence are accompanied by an overt act demonstrating an intention and ability to carry out the threats or other circumstances indicating that actual future violence is highly likely.” State v. L. R., 283 Or App 618, 625, 391 P3d 880 (2017). The state must establish that “actual future violence is highly likely,” given “the serious deprivation of liberty and social stigma that are attendant to a civil commitment, and the fact that such a preventive confinement is predicated on a prediction of future behavior.” State v. S. R. J., 281 Or App 741, 749, 386 P3d 99 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court determined the legal standard to be met here. On appeal, in a preserved claim of error, appellant 1 The legislature recently made significant amendments to the civil com- mitment statutes, which became operative on January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 66. Appellant was committed under the previous version of the statutes, so our analysis is based on the previous version of the statutes. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 889 (2026) 891

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law. Our task, therefore, is to view the evidence and all reason- able inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support civil commitment. L. R., 283 Or App at 619. “Whether the evidence presented by the state is legally sufficient to support a civil commitment is a question of law.” State v. A. D. S., 258 Or App 44, 45, 308 P3d 365 (2013). “Ultimately, in view of the clear-and-convincing- evidence standard of proof that applies in civil commitment proceedings, the question for us as the reviewing court is whether a rational factfinder could have found that it was highly probable that appellant was a danger to * * * oth- ers because of a mental disorder.” State v. S. A. R., 308 Or App 365, 366, 479 P3d 618 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, having considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with the state that the evidence was legally suffi- cient for the trial court to determine that appellant’s mental disorder—schizophrenia—makes him dangerous to others. Appellant lacks insight into his mental disorder, does not believe that he has schizophrenia, and has been noncompli- ant with medication outside the hospital. He has a history of violence, physical aggression, and threats toward family members; a history of starting fires; and a history of destroy- ing walls, furniture, and belongings with machetes, knives, and other weapons to try to get imaginary people to leave his room. Appellant’s symptoms had gotten worse in the six months prior to the commitment hearing, with destructive incidents occurring every day. The current hospital admis- sion was precipitated by an incident during which appellant destroyed his room, threatened to stab his uncle, and threw a barbell through a glass door. On this record, the trial court permissibly deter- mined that appellant is a danger to others as a result of his mental disorder. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of civil commitment. Affirmed.