The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: March 25, 2021
NO. S-1-SC-37570
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICKY QUINTANA,
Defendant-Petitioner.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI Gerald Baca, District Judge
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender Albuquerque, NM
for Petitioner
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Maha Khoury, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM
for Respondent OPINION
BACON, Justice. {1} This appeal requires us to resolve whether the Legislature intended that the
determination of a maximum term of criminal commitment under Section 31-9-
1.5(D)(2) of the New Mexico Mental Illness and Competency Code (NMMIC),
NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1 to -1.6 (1988, as amended through 1999), may include
enhancement due to aggravating circumstances under Section 31-18-15.1 of the
Criminal Sentencing Act (CSA), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-12 to -26 (1977, as
amended through 2020). The Court of Appeals applied State v. Chorney, 2001-
NMCA-050, ¶¶ 11-12, 130 N.M. 638, 29 P.3d 538, in determining that the
enhancement in this case serves the legislative purposes underlying the NMMIC.
State v. Quintana, 2019-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 15-16, 446 P.3d 1168. The Court of Appeals
consequently affirmed the ruling of the district court that extended Defendant Ricky
Quintana’s term of commitment based on aggravating circumstances from fifteen
years to twenty years. Id. ¶ 2. We affirm and issue this opinion to clarify that a term
of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 may be increased under Section 31-18-15.1
due to aggravating circumstances that bear a direct relation to a defendant’s
dangerousness and that are supported by clear and convincing evidence.
1 I. BACKGROUND {2} In 2003, the decedent’s body was discovered lying on the living room floor of
Defendant’s residence. The decedent had been stabbed multiple times, and his body
had been subjected to mutilation, both before and after death. Defendant was charged
with an open count of murder and tampering with evidence.
{3} In 2006, the parties filed stipulations including that Defendant remained
incompetent to stand trial and remained dangerous, that clear and convincing
evidence supported the charge of second-degree murder against Defendant, and that
aggravating circumstances existed warranting the addition of three years to his
statutory fifteen-year term of commitment.
{4} In 2014, following his ensuing commitment to the New Mexico Behavioral
Health Institute (NMBHI) subject to attainment of competency, pursuant to Section
31-9-1.5, “[D]efendant was found competent to stand trial[,] . . . and criminal
proceedings resumed.” However, defense counsel raised competency concerns prior
to trial, and in 2016 “the parties again stipulated that . . . [D]efendant was
incompetent and dangerous as defined by Section 31-9-1.2.”
{5} An evidentiary hearing was held to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
for commitment pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5. Following the hearing, the district
court acquitted Defendant of tampering with evidence and “found that clear and
2 convincing evidence existed to show that . . . [D]efendant committed the crime of
second degree murder.” A subsequent evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to
Section 31-18-15.1, at which additional evidence was presented on both aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.
{6} Following the second evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an order
of commitment pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5 enhancing Defendant’s fifteen-year
term by five years, for a total commitment period at NMBHI of twenty years. This
term of commitment “represent[ed] the maximum time that . . . Defendant would
have been subject had . . . Defendant been convicted of the [charged] offense[].”
{7} The district court based its order of commitment on findings by clear and
convincing evidence from both hearings relating to two “valid aggravating
factor[s].” First, the district court found that the murder had been committed with
extreme viciousness and brutality, including “the near decapitation of the body, the
removal of the genitals, the stabbing of the anus, as well as the numerous wounds to
[the decedent’s] head and torso.” Second, the court found that Defendant represented
a threat to community safety because, “[i]f released without supervision, there [wa]s
a danger that Defendant would be medically non-compliant and his psychosis would
return[.]” Evidence had been presented at the hearings that Defendant had been in a
state of psychosis when committing the murder charged and when previously
3 attacking another victim in a separate incident, and that Defendant was not reliable
to take his antipsychotic medications without supervision.
{8} Defendant appealed on the ground that enhancing a term of commitment
based on aggravating circumstances is not permitted under the NMMIC. Quintana,
2019-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 2, 9. The Court of Appeals held that a maximum term of
commitment under the NMMIC can include an enhancement that is invoked by
“‘specific marker[s] of dangerousness’” as determined and defined by the
Legislature. Id. ¶¶ 16-17 (alteration in original) (quoting Chorney, 2001-NMCA-
050, ¶ 21). The Court of Appeals concluded that the brutality of Defendant’s conduct
and his history of prior violent conduct were such markers of dangerousness, and the
Court affirmed the district court’s order of commitment. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.
{9} Pursuant to Rule 12-502 NMRA, Defendant petitioned this Court for
certiorari, which we granted. The parties agree that the central issue before this Court
is the legislative intent underlying a maximum term of criminal commitment under
Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2).
{10} We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the Legislature intended for
Section 31-18-15.1 to be applicable in determining a maximum term of commitment
under Section 31-9-1.5 where aggravating and mitigating factors bear directly on a
defendant’s dangerousness. We further hold that the enhancement of a term of
4 commitment imposed under the NMMIC must meet the same clear and convincing
evidentiary standard that is required for commitment under Section 31-9-1.5(D).
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Legislature Lawfully Intended for the CSA to Be Applied in Determining a Maximum Term of Commitment Under the NMMIC
1. Standard of review {11} “This case presents an issue of statutory construction, which we review de
novo.” State v. Barela, 2021-NMSC-001, ¶ 5, 478 P.3d 875.
{12} Our guiding principle when construing statutes is “to determine and give
effect to legislative intent.” Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d
1047 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A statute’s plain language is
“the primary indicator of legislative intent.” State v. Young, 2004-NMSC-015, ¶ 5,
135 N.M. 458, 90 P.3d 477 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under
the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, when a statute contains language
which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain
from further statutory interpretation.” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134
N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted).
{13} “In addition to looking at the statutory language, we also consider the history
and background of the statute[, and w]e examine the overall structure of the statute
and its function in the comprehensive legislative scheme.” State v. Smith, 2004-
5 NMSC-032, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “[A] statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but
must be considered in reference to the statute as a whole and in reference to statutes
dealing with the same general subject matter.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “In considering the statute’s function in
relation to related statutes passed by the Legislature, whenever possible . . . we must
read different legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one
another.” Barela, 2021-NMSC-001, ¶ 6 (omission in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
2. Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) is unambiguous and lawfully allows application of Section 31-18-15.1 to enhance a term of criminal commitment {14} Defendant argues that Section 31-9-1.5 is unclear in not specifically defining
maximum sentence and in not specifically addressing aggravation. Defendant also
argues that aggravation of a criminal sentence is inherently punitive and related to
culpability and thus “not contemplated” to enhance a term of criminal commitment.
Defendant as well argues that aggravating a term of commitment “intended for
[Defendant’s] treatment to competency” misapplies Chorney. Finally, Defendant
argues that the Legislature has failed to address whether a jury must “hear the
question of aggravating factors” before a judge may enhance an order of
6 commitment. This legislative silence, Defendant asserts, indicates a lack of
legislative intent to permit any aggravation of a term of commitment. We address
these arguments in turn.
a. Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) is clear under plain language and context analysis {15} The NMMIC has a legislative purpose “to protect an incompetent defendant
from indefinite and unjust commitment to a mental health institution without due
process of law and to protect society from dangerous criminals.” Chorney, 2001-
NMCA-050, ¶ 11. Section 31-9-1.5 of the NMMIC governs evidentiary hearings to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence for commitment of an incompetent
defendant who has been charged with a felony that involves infliction of great bodily
harm or with other enumerated felonies. Section 31-9-1.5(D) governs such hearings
in which the district court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
did commit the alleged felony and enters a finding that the defendant remains
incompetent to stand trial and remains dangerous. For a felony that involves
infliction of great bodily harm, “‘dangerous’ means that, if released, the defendant
presents a serious threat of inflicting great bodily harm on another.” Section 31-9-
1.2(D).
{16} Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) mandates that the duration of a term of criminal
commitment shall be “the period of time equal to the maximum sentence to which
7 the defendant would have been subject had the defendant been convicted in a
criminal proceeding.” This plain language requires the court in a Section 31-9-1.5
hearing to determine the length of the maximum sentence that would have been
reached had the committed felony been adjudicated in a criminal proceeding. Such
a criminal sentence would necessarily be reached under the CSA, as the legislated
mechanism for determining sentences from criminal proceedings. See § 31-18-
13(A).
{17} The CSA encompasses all sentencing provisions for criminal convictions
under the laws of New Mexico, except where otherwise provided. See id. Section
31-18-15 specifies the basic sentence for each enumerated, noncapital felony.
Section 31-18-15.1 governs the alteration of a basic criminal sentence due to
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Upon a determination that aggravating
circumstances exist, a judge may alter a basic sentence by increasing the length of
the sentence by up to one-third. Section 31-18-15.1(B), (G).
{18} Aggravation or mitigation of a basic criminal sentence is a normal and
appropriate component of the CSA when the district court finds qualifying
circumstances surrounding a criminal offense. See, e.g., State v. Fuentes, 1994-
NMCA-158, ¶¶ 19-21, 119 N.M. 104, 888 P.2d 986. As such, calculating the
hypothetical maximum sentence for a particular defendant under the CSA would
8 include an enhanced sentence where aggravating circumstances exist and where the
judge appropriately increases the basic sentence by up to one-third. See § 31-18-
15.1(B), (G).
{19} We presume that the Legislature was aware of the framework and terminology
of the CSA when it enacted the NMMIC. See State v. Marquez, 2008-NMSC-055, ¶
7, 145 N.M. 1, 193 P.3d 548 (“When the Legislature enacts a statute, we presume
that it is aware of existing statutes.”); accord. Inc. Cnty. of Los Alamos v. Johnson,
1989-NMSC-045, ¶ 4, 108 N.M. 633, 776 P.2d 1252 (“We presume that the
[L]egislature is well informed as to existing statutory and common law . . . when it
enacts a new statute.”). As such, we presume that the Legislature did not use the
term maximum sentence where it in fact meant basic sentence. See § 31-9-1.5(D)(2).
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the CSA plainly distinguishes between the
provisions describing basic sentences in Section 31-18-15 and those describing
“enhanced or maximum sentences” in Section 31-18-15.1. Quintana, 2019-NMCA-
030, ¶ 12. The fact that the Legislature is directing the use of a calculation of a
maximum criminal sentence to set a term of commitment does not change the
calculation itself. Thus, the language of Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) clearly indicates that
determination of a term of criminal commitment should correspond to the maximum
9 sentence that would have been reached under the CSA, including potential
enhancement based on aggravating circumstances.
{20} As the essential and default framework for criminal sentencing in New
Mexico, the CSA would only be inapplicable to such a determination as a matter of
statutory construction if the NMMIC indicated accordingly. For example, the
NMMIC would only need to further define “maximum sentence” in Section 31-9-
1.5(D)(2) or to address aggravation specifically if those were issues to be treated
differently under the NMMIC than under the CSA. As we discuss below, the
Chorney Court held that certain enhancements under the CSA would not apply in
determining a term of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 if those enhancements
were not based on the defendant’s dangerousness. See 2001-NMCA-050, ¶ 20. In
that case, the Chorney Court concluded that the habitual offender enhancement could
not be used to increase a term of commitment because the purpose of the habitual
offender statute did not align with the purpose of Section 31-9-1.5(D). Id. ¶¶ 13-14,
20. To wit, the habitual offender statute was aimed at reducing recidivism, not
protecting society from dangerous conduct. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. For this reason, the
habitual offender statute was an exception to the general rule that Section 31-18-
15.1 may be applied under the NMMIC where the aggravating circumstances of the
incompetent defendant under Section 31-9-1.5(D) are based on dangerousness. Id.
10 {21} Even if the plain language of Section 31-9-1.5 were ambiguous, the statutory
language in question manifests clear policy underpinnings. “Maximum sentence,”
which contemplates aggravation, is consistent with legislative intent for the duration
of a term of commitment to be as long as constitutionally permissible. See § 31-9-
1.5(D)(2); State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131
(“[A]s long as [incompetent defendants] remain dangerous, the State has an interest
in committing them to protect the defendants and the public.”). Such legislative
intent serves the State’s compelling interests “to provide care to its citizens when
necessary” and “to provide its citizenry a safe community in which to live.” Id. ¶ 52.
These compelling interests arise, respectively, from the State’s parens patriae powers
and its police power. Id.
{22} As we next discuss, this Court concluded in Rotherham that the NMMIC is
constitutional in correlating the duration of a term of commitment with the duration
of a maximum criminal sentence when safeguards exist to protect against the
constitutional violations identified in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See
Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 60 (holding it would be unconstitutional to commit
an incompetent defendant “for more than a ‘reasonable period of time’ . . . necessary
to determine whether [the defendant] will be rendered competent to stand trial in the
foreseeable future” (quoting Jackson, 406 U.S. at 733)). Such safeguards include
11 continued treatment to achieve competency, a hearing conducted at least every two
years regarding trial competency and dangerousness, and continuation of the
criminal process if at any point the defendant regains competency, consistent with
Section 31-9-1.5. See id. ¶ 34.
{23} For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s argument as to the NMMIC’s lack of
clarity fails.
b. Enhancing a term of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 comports with Rotherham {24} In Rotherham, in addition to the conclusion discussed above, this Court
established the constitutionality of the NMMIC as a comprehensive statutory
scheme. See id. ¶ 62. The Rotherham Court noted that the NMMIC was enacted
subsequent to Jackson, which had established greater constitutional protections for
incompetent defendants against indefinite and unreasonable commitment. See id. ¶¶
13-15. Whereas the Rotherham Court had no occasion to address enhancing a term
of commitment, the case stands for the proposition that the NMMIC satisfies
Jackson in its protections for incompetent defendants. See id. ¶¶ 15, 28, 40, 60;
accord, State v. Chavez, 2008-NMSC-001, ¶ 15, 143 N.M. 205, 174 P.3d 988.
{25} Defendant’s argument suggests that a court applying Section 31-9-1.5 cannot
consider aggravating circumstances, much less apply them to enhance a term of
12 commitment, without the proceeding unconstitutionally prosecuting an incompetent
defendant. Defendant cites Rotherham’s reminder that “[t]he law has long
recognized that it is a violation of due process to prosecute a defendant who is
incompetent to stand trial.” 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 13. While Defendant does not argue
such a constitutional violation where a basic sentence under Section 31-9-1.5 is used
to set a term of commitment, he alleges that the corresponding use of an enhanced
sentence based on aggravating circumstances represents such a violative prosecution
because enhancement is inherently punitive. Defendant also quotes our observation
in Rotherham that a Section 31-9-1.5 “hearing is not a trial to establish criminal
culpability.” Id. ¶ 58. Defendant asserts that “culpability is at the heart of
aggravation,” but presents no authority from cases involving an incompetent
defendant.
{26} We find this line of argument misconstrues and misapplies Rotherham. First,
the Rotherham Court was clear that commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 “serves a
regulatory rather than a punitive function” because the state “seeks to treat an
incompetent [defendant] and to protect the community from danger.” Id. ¶ 53 (citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 747 (1987) (“[P]reventing danger to the
community is a legitimate regulatory goal.”)). Second, the Court found that the
NMMIC’s requirement of a finding of dangerousness satisfies Jackson’s
13 requirement that “‘the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.’” Id. ¶¶ 41-42 (quoting
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738). While, as discussed hereinabove, enhancement was not
an issue before the Court, our analysis in Rotherham of Section 31-9-1.5 indicates
that a term of commitment is neither punitive nor about culpability where it directly
serves the proper regulatory purposes. See id. ¶ 53 (“[T]he State cannot release into
society an incompetent defendant who has demonstrated a capacity for serious,
violent conduct.”).
{27} Thus, analysis of circumstances surrounding a criminal offense under Section
31-18-15.1 should bear a direct relation to determining dangerousness when applied
to commitment under Section 31-9-1.5. See id. ¶ 58 (citing State v. Werner, 1990-
NMCA-019, ¶ 8, 110 N.M. 389, 796 P.2d 610 (advising reading Section 31-9-1.5 in
view of “the object sought to be accomplished and the wrong to be remedied”)).
Where aggravating circumstances bear a direct relation to dangerousness,
enhancement of a term of commitment is unrelated to culpability and comports with
Jackson and Rotherham. See id. ¶ 53 (stating that a term of commitment “does not
inexorably mean the State has imposed punishment”).
14 c. Enhancing a term of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 comports with Chorney {28} The Court of Appeals in Chorney directly addressed a district court’s statutory
authority to enhance a term of criminal commitment based on habitual offender
aggravating circumstances. See 2001-NMCA-050, ¶¶ 1-3. The Court held that the
habitual offender statute could not be applied under Section 31-9-1.5 as it does not
bear a reasonable relation to dangerousness and thus does not serve the legislative
purposes underlying the NMMIC. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. The Court explained those purposes
as being “to protect an incompetent defendant from indefinite and unjust
commitment to a mental health institution without due process of law and to protect
society from dangerous criminals.” Id. ¶ 11. In analyzing dangerousness as the “sole
reason” for the maximum sentence requirement under the NMMIC, the Court
reasoned that a term of commitment “can consist only of basic sentences for the
crimes that trigger commitment, and any enhancements of those basic sentences that
are expressly based on inherently dangerous criminal conduct as set out in Section
31-9-1.5(D) or defined in Section 31-9-1.2.” Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis added).
{29} Defendant argues that the conclusion in Chorney regarding enhancements
based on dangerousness was dicta, as only the habitual offender enhancement was
before the Court. Thus, Defendant alleges, the Court of Appeals in the instant case
erred by relying on that reasoning. See Quintana, 2019-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 13-14.
15 Defendant also argues that dangerousness cannot be applied both as a predicate
finding to criminal commitment and as a basis to increase that commitment.
Alternatively, Defendant argues that aggravating circumstances may, as with prior
offenses under the habitual offender statute, bear no reasonable relation to
dangerousness, and thus aggravating circumstances generally cannot be applied to
criminal commitments.
{30} We agree with the Court of Appeals that the holding in Chorney extends to
the applicability of enhancements based on inherently dangerous criminal conduct
under Section 31-9-1.5. See id. ¶ 13 (citing Chorney, 2001-NMCA-050, ¶¶ 12, 14).
In order to reach its holding regarding the habitual offender enhancement, the
Chorney Court had to determine first what types of enhancements could be applied
to serve the purposes of the NMMIC. See 2001-NMCA-050, ¶ 14. This analysis was
necessary in order for the Court to determine that the inapplicable enhancement was
an exception to the legislative purposes of the statute. See id. ¶¶ 18, 20. Because this
analysis was essential to the court’s determination, Chorney’s conclusion regarding
enhancement based on dangerousness was not dicta, and the Court of Appeals did
not err in relying on it. See Ruggles v. Ruggles, 1993-NMSC-043, ¶ 22 n.8, 116 N.M.
52, 860 P.2d 182 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed. 1990) (defining dicta
in an opinion as language “not essential to determination of the case in hand”)).
16 {31} Defendant provides no authority for his claim that dangerousness cannot be
used both as a predicate qualification for commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 and as
a basis for enhancement of the term of commitment. For this reason, “we presume
that no such authority exists” and decline to address this argument. See State v. King,
2013-NMSC-014, ¶ 10, 300 P.3d 732; see also State v. Paul T., 1999-NMSC-037, ¶
27, 128 N.M. 360, 993 P.2d 74 (acknowledging that “arguments not supported by
authority need not be addressed”).
{32} We also find unavailing Defendant’s argument that Chorney’s exclusion of
the habitual offender enhancement precludes enhancement based on aggravating
circumstances. The Chorney Court specifically considered whether the Legislature
intended the habitual offender statute to be applied under Section 31-9-1.5 “even
where its application bears no reasonable relationship with dangerousness as defined
in the [NMMIC].” 2001-NMCA-050, ¶ 13. While holding against broad application
of the habitual offender statute “in all cases,” the Court did not categorically dismiss
the use of prior criminal acts to enhance a term of commitment. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
{33} To the contrary, the Chorney Court concluded that enhancement of a term of
criminal commitment is proper under the NMMIC where “the conduct invoking the
enhancement is a specific marker of dangerousness as determined and defined by
the Legislature.” Id. ¶ 21; see § 31-9-1.2(D) (defining dangerousness under the
17 NMMIC). Specific prior criminal acts that would satisfy the habitual offender statute
in a criminal proceeding would be applicable under Section 31-9-1.5 if they bore a
direct relation to dangerousness; equally, specific aggravating circumstances that
would satisfy Section 31-18-15.1 in a criminal proceeding would be applicable under
Section 31-9-1.5 if they bore a direct relation to dangerousness.
d. Jury findings of aggravation {34} Defendant relies on legislative silence in the NMMIC regarding the jury
requirement addressed in State v. Frawley to argue that the Legislature did not intend
for aggravation to be applied under the NMMIC. 2007-NMSC-057, ¶¶ 20, 25, 143
N.M. 7, 172 P.3d 144 (following Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274
(2007) (holding that placing sentence-elevating factfinding within the judge’s
province violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury)), superseded by statute
on other grounds as recognized by State ex rel. Sugg v. Oliver, 2020-NMSC-002, ¶
19, 456 P.3d 1065; see State v. Rudy B., 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 23, 149 N.M. 22, 243
P.3d 726 (recognizing that “[t]he result in Frawley was, as a practical matter,
dictated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham”). After Frawley held
Section 31-18-15.1 to be facially unconstitutional, 2007-NMSC-057, ¶ 1, the
Legislature revised the aggravation statute in 2009 to clarify a defendant’s right to
jury determination of aggravating circumstances. See § 31-18-15.1(B); see also State
18 v. Radosevich, 2018-NMSC-028, ¶ 16, 419 P.3d 176 (recognizing the “Sixth
Amendment . . . guarantee[] that all facts essential to a defendant’s sentence must be
determined by a jury” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Defendant
argues that the lack of similar revision to the NMMIC regarding the right to jury
findings of aggravating circumstances reflects a lack of legislative intent for
enhanced sentencing to apply to the NMMIC at all.
{35} This argument is obviated by our foregoing discussion. First, because the
Legislature intended for the potential application of the CSA under the NMMIC,
post-Frawley revision of Section 31-18-15.1 satisfied that issue and no revision to
the NMMIC itself was necessary. Second, since commitment determinations are
inherently different from criminal proceedings to render punishment, the Sixth
Amendment reasoning in Cunningham and Frawley does not apply equally to
commitment proceedings. Cf. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 53-55. Although
here we do not reach the issue of the jury requirement in Frawley applying to the
NMMIC, we note that Defendant explicitly waived his right to jury determination of
aggravation and mitigation.
19 B. Application of Section 31-18-15.1 Under Section 31-9-1.5 Requires Clear and Convincing Evidence That Bears Directly on Dangerousness {36} Under Section 31-9-1.5, evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances must meet the standard of “clear and convincing evidence” and, as
discussed above, must bear directly on “dangerousness.” These requirements serve
the regulatory goals and legislative purposes of commitment proceedings under the
NMMIC. See Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 55-56; Chorney, 2001-NMCA-050,
¶ 21.
{37} The “clear and convincing evidence [standard] strikes a fair balance between
the defendant’s interest in avoiding an erroneous deprivation of liberty and the
State’s interest in treating the defendant, protecting the defendant from himself [or
herself], and protecting society in general.” Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 56
(emphasis added). The risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty combined with
“purposes of rendering punishment” and “the concern of possible risk of error” in a
criminal proceeding justifies the heavier standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶¶ 54-56 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1979)); see § 31-18-
15.1(A)(2), (B). However, we have recognized that the full force of the concern of
erroneous deprivation of liberty is not present where the NMMIC provides
additional safeguards and sufficient means by which an error may be corrected.
Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 55. “Thus, the concern of possible risk of error that
20 warrants a higher standard of proof for criminal prosecution does not apply here.”
Id.
{38} The instant case offers a useful model for the proper application of Section
31-18-15.1 to enhance a term of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5. The district
court’s order of commitment identifies that clear and convincing evidence supports
all requisite findings for the corresponding term of commitment. The order’s
findings include those meeting the requirements for commitment under Section 31-
9-1.5(D): (1) Defendant committed the underlying felony offense of murder in the
second degree, (2) Defendant remained incompetent to proceed to trial, and (3)
Defendant remained dangerous as defined by Section 31-9-1.2(D). The order’s
findings also include those meeting the requirements for aggravation when Section
31-18-15.1 is applied under Section 31-9-1.5: aggravating circumstances that relate
to the dangerousness of Defendant, including clear and convincing evidence of
brutality, viciousness, and threat to community safety.
III. CONCLUSION {39} We conclude that a term of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5(D) may
include an enhancement due to aggravating circumstances which relate to a
defendant’s dangerousness and that the application of Section 31-18-15.1 requires
21 clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s enhanced term
of commitment.
{40} IT IS SO ORDERED.
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice