The opinion of the Court was delivered by
[523]*523O’HERN, J.
The central question in this capital appeal is whether a jury may impose a sentence of death on the basis that the murder was committed in the course of a felony without being permitted to consider, in the guilt-innocence phase of the capital trial, the non-capital verdict of felony murder. We find such a procedure to be constitutionally defective. The right to trial by jury includes the right to have the jury consider “all of the possible offenses that might reasonably be found” from the facts of a case. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 271 n. 62, 524 A.2d 188 (1987). The State is not free to select which verdict it will permit a capital jury to return. By seeking a sentence of death predicated on an underlying felony committed in concert with the murder, the State necessarily affirms that there is a rational basis in the evidence for the jury to have considered the non-capital verdict of felony murder. Here, however, the State did not submit felony murder to the jury. Because the jury was not permitted to consider “all of the possible offenses,” defendant was denied the right to a fair trial on the issue of his death-eligibility. The sentence of death must be vacated. The convictions of murder and related offenses entered in the guilt-phase of the trial are otherwise affirmed.
I
A.
In a long series of cases, we have explained that a jury must decide the death-eligibility of capital defendants. The fact-finding role of a jury is especially crucial when, as in this case, the State and the defendant disagree on almost every fact alleged. The State asserts that defendant killed the victim, Lawrence Talley, during the course of a drug transaction and that defendant then stole drugs from the body of the victim. In that regard, the case evokes the pattern that we saw in State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 590 A.2d 624 (1991), in which the defendant killed his drug supplier. The case differs markedly [524]*524from Perry, though, in that defendant denies any involvement at all in the killing of the victim. Recall that in Perry the defendant admitted that he had grabbed the victim “by the neck” and that “the pressure of my grip strangled him.” Id. at 140, 590 A.2d 624.
Although the State sought to impose a capital sentence on the basis of a murder committed in the course of a robbery, it did not indict defendant for the robbery. Nevertheless, at the guilt phase the State offered evidence that on the night of the murder defendant had possessed an amount of cocaine packaged in ziploc bags, known to be used by the victim in his drug trade. Having denied any involvement whatsoever in the killing of Lawrence Talley, defendant was not in a position to argue to the jury that an uncharged robbery provided the basis for a felony-murder verdict. Nevertheless, the court had a nondelegable responsibility to insure a fair trial.
B.
The evidence clearly implicated defendant in the killing of Lawrence Talley in West Ateo, New Jersey, on Friday, August 26, 1988. For purposes of review, we shall largely incorporate defendant’s version of the facts. It was the State’s theory that defendant had stabbed Talley during the course of an attempted drug transaction and had hidden the body in a hedgerow in defendant’s backyard, where it was found two days later. Because no one ever saw defendant stab Talley and because there was no physical evidence connecting defendant with the crime, the State’s case was entirely circumstantial.
The drug transaction.
A prosecution witness, Marie Simmons, testified that defendant would come to her house “two to three to four times out [of] the week” to “get high” on cocaine and that he usually brought with him a “twenty,” meaning an amount of cocaine valued at $20. She testified that on Friday, August 26, at approximately 6:00 p.m., defendant had come to her home and [525]*525had wanted “a sixteenth,” meaning approximately one and one-half grams of cocaine. On defendant’s request she went to a neighborhood playground where she met with Talley to negotiate a drug transaction with him. They disagreed over the purchase price, but Talley said that he would stop by her house later. Instead, Talley sent a confederate, Jeffrey Davis, to sell a $20 bag of cocaine to defendant and Simmons. Defendant refused that deal because, as Davis testified, defendant “wanted a bigger quantity.” After Davis left the apartment defendant went to the playground himself to meet with Talley. Witnesses at the playground testified that defendant, Talley, and Davis left the playground together. According to Davis, although he had initially walked with defendant and Talley, he did not accompany them to defendant’s house, due to defendant’s objections to his presence.
The fight in defendant’s backyard.
The scene now shifts to defendant’s home on Pine Avenue. Shortly before 9:00 p.m., defendant’s daughter, Dia, heard “a lot of noise, a lot of hollering” in their backyard. Dia ran outside accompanied by her two brothers, Dennis and Lord Tee. (Defendant is the natural father only of Dia and not of her brothers. Gretchen Shaw is the natural mother of all three children and is defendant’s fiancee.) Dennis.carried a machete outside with him. Once outside, Dia heard “[sjomebody running through the woods” and a person yelling, “don’t leave me Jeff.” As she approached the backyard, Dia saw her father grappling with another man. Eventually, the two men fell to the ground, with her father on top. Dia saw her father hit the man approximately two times. Dennis and Lord Tee saw defendant chase two men into the woods. Dennis heard “scuffling in the woods” and someone saying, “Jeff, he’s trying to kill me.” Both Dia and Dennis testified that the man with whom defendant was fighting was not Lawrence Talley.
As soon as they saw what was happening, Dia and Lord Tee ran to a neighbor’s house to call the police. In her transcribed [526]*526call to the police, Dia stated that “[s]omebody is trying to break in my house and now two guys are jumping my dad.”
The neighbor ran to defendant’s house, saw Dennis, and asked him, “where was they fighting at?” Dennis gave him the machete, and then the neighbor went “halfway back” to the rear of the house. He saw “back there on his knees” a man who told him that he was alright but that “they got away.” As the man began to stand, the neighbor recognized him as defendant. He did not notice any bruises or marks on defendant.
Dennis then returned to the neighbor’s house and told his sister that they did not need the police “because it was over.” The police were called and told not to go to defendant’s house. Nonetheless, the police arrived, spoke briefly with Dia, and performed a cursory search of the backyard. Soon afterward, Jeffrey Davis went to defendant’s house and spoke with Dennis, asking for Talley. When told that Talley was not there, Davis went to Marie Simmons’s house. After Davis explained to her what had happened, Simmons called the Winslow Township Police Department and local hospitals trying, without success, to locate Talley.
At trial, defendant attempted to prove that two people, Arthur Ellison and Gary Bey, had seen the victim alive late on the evening of August 26. Ellison testified that he had seen the victim speaking with Bey at the Maple Lake Inn, but indicated that he had seen them soon after dusk and not late that night. Bey did not testify.
The remaining events of the evening.
That night, Theresa Daniels, a co-worker of Gretchen Shaw, drove Gretchen home from work. Daniels testified that at about 10:00 p.m., after they had entered the house, “Lawrence, [defendant], and Gretchen started talking” in the kitchen and then went into the bedroom. (Neither the defense counsel nor the prosecutor questioned Daniels on her reference to the victim. Thus, we assume that “Lawrence” is an error in the transcript or refers to someone other than Talley.) Gretchen [527]*527testified that defendant had told her he was “okay” but that he “almost had one.” She did not notice any marks or scratches on defendant. As Daniels was getting ready to leave, defendant asked her if she could drop him off at the Maple Lake Inn.
Once at the Inn, Daniels decided to stay for a few minutes. Defendant borrowed her car. Marie Simmons testified that defendant had arrived at her house sometime between 10:00 and 10:30 that evening, driving “a little brown car, hatchback,” presumably Daniels’ tan 1981 Toyota Corolla. Simmons described defendant as having a cut on his right arm that “was oozing with blood.” Another person who was at Simmons’s house noticed that defendant had “a bruise right underneath his eye.” According to Simmons, defendant gave her “a sixteenth” of cocaine that he had obtained in Camden. She described the cocaine as being in a “clear ziploc bag,” the same sort used by Lawrence Talley. Defendant then allegedly injected himself with some of the cocaine while Simmons smoked some of it. Other people came in and out of the house. Defendant left, but later returned and gave Simmons “another sixteenth and a couple of twenties.” Simmons testified that defendant had stayed at her house until 3:30 a.m., although members of his family claim that he was home much earlier than that.
The discovery of the body.
On Sunday, August 28, Talley’s sister, Charlotte, spoke with Jeffrey Davis and learned that her brother had not been seen for two days. She and Davis went to defendant’s house to inquire about her brother. After looking around the outside of the house, they spoke with defendant. Defendant told them that “two guys came and jumped out the car and went chasing [the victim] * * * through the woods.” Feeling uneasy about defendant’s story and noting a “big black and blue mark” on his face and “all these scratches on his arms,” Charlotte decided to go to the neighbor’s house to check out the story. After speaking with the neighbors, Charlotte and Davis returned to [528]*528search further defendant’s property. Soon after they arrived at the Purnell house, Davis noticed a foot sticking out of a hedgerow. It was Talley’s body.
A medical examination disclosed that Talley had been killed by fifteen stab wounds to the neck, chest, and abdomen. There were scratches on the victim’s back, which, according to the medical examiner, were consistent with the body having been dragged. Although, according to Davis, on the night of the murder Talley had been carrying “a sixteenth or more” of cocaine, no drugs were found on the victim and, except for a quarter lying underneath the body, no cash was found.
The investigation.
The Winslow Township Police went to the Purnell house and spoke with defendant. Defendant first told them that he had not seen Talley since 6:30 on Friday evening. He said that Talley had come to his house then, but he had been “busy” and had told Talley to come back later. He said that at 8:30 p.m. he had seen two men fighting in the backyard and that when he hollered “call the police,” they had run off. He did not indicate that he had been in a fight with the two men. The police saw scratches on defendant’s arms and a puncture wound on his upper arm. They discovered a long, shallow hole approximately twelve feet from the body. Conflicting information was presented about whether the potential grave site was intended for the victim or for a dog that had been buried elsewhere on the property.
Defendant’s daughter, Dia, gave the police a taped statement in which she did not implicate her father in a fight with the men in the backyard. On September 1, the police obtained a tape of the call made by Dia to the police on the night of the murder in which she had said, “two guys are jumping my dad.” Later that day, Dia gave another taped statement to the police and admitted for the first time that her father had been one of the men involved in the fighting. On that same day, the police arrested defendant. After the police advised him of his rights [529]*529and of some aspects of a self-defense claim, defendant admitted that he had been involved in a fight in his backyard with one of the two unknown men.
Defendant voluntarily appeared before the Camden County grand jury. He told the jurors that he had not seen Talley at all on the night of August 26, that he had not gone to Marie Simmons’s house, and that he had not used drugs. He said that he had been confused when he told the police that Talley had been at his house that evening. He related the incident with the two men in his backyard. He emphasized that initially he had not told the police that he had been involved in the fight because “there’s a body involved in this” and he was afraid that he might be incriminated.
Examinations of physical evidence, including hair, blood, and fiber samples, failed to establish any clear connection between defendant and the crime. Nor did the investigation corroborate the allegation that defendant had used drugs at Marie Simmons’s home.
The trial.
The Camden County grand jury indicted defendant on five counts: knowing and/or purposeful murder, hindering his own apprehension by concealing the victim’s body, hindering his own apprehension by intimidating a witness into giving a false report, possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, and perjury. A jury convicted defendant on all charges, except the hindering charge concerning concealment, which had been dismissed at trial. In the sentencing phase, the State asserted two aggravating factors: that defendant had been convicted of a prior murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(4)(a), and that the murder had been committed during the course of a robbery from Talley. N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(4)(g). Defense witnesses set forth redeeming aspects of defendant’s character and personality, the good works that he had done for other people, and the fact that he had not been using drugs.
[530]*530Although three jurors found the existence of mitigating factor 2C:ll-3c(5)(b), that the victim had participated in the conduct that resulted in his death, and two jurors found the catch-all mitigating factor, 2C:ll-3c(5)(h), the jury unanimously found the existence of the two aggravating factors and that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, defendant was sentenced to death on the murder count. After merger of the weapons charge, the court imposed sentences on the non-capital counts. Defendant appeals to us as of right under Rule 2:2-l(a).
II
In Schad v. Arizona, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), the Supreme Court held that it was not harmful error that Arizona did not require a jury to distinguish between premeditated murder and felony murder in returning a conviction of capital murder that was death-eligible. The plurality in that decision reasoned that the dissent’s focus on the “risks of different punishment” for premeditated and felony murder ignored the fact that the Arizona sentencing statute applicable to the defendant authorized the same maximum penalty, death, for both means of committing first-degree murder. — U.S. at-n. 9, 111 S.Ct. at 2504 n. 9, 115 L.Ed.2d at 573-74 n. 9. Although no opinion in Schad commanded five votes on the issue of separately submitting the felony-murder verdict to the jury, its corollary would appear to be that under a capital-sentencing scheme like New Jersey’s that does not make felony murder death-eligible, to sentence a defendant to death based on an underlying felony without allowing the jury to consider the non-capital verdict of felony murder would be constitutionally impermissible.
We have consistently held that all forms of homicide rationally supported by the evidence, whether they be lesser-included or alternative offenses, should be placed before the jury. To truncate the definitions of the murder statute and thus deny a [531]*531jury the mechanism to decide which of the forms of murder has been proven is unacceptable. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 462, 575 A.2d 435 (1990). In that respect, defendant’s claim of entitlement to a felony-murder charge is similar to a request for a lesser-included offense charge. We have regularly held that a defendant is entitled to such a charge if there is any evidence “that would have afforded the jury a rational basis for convicting” the defendant of the lesser-included offense. State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 290, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188, we held that a trial court must charge the jury regarding “all of the possible offenses that might reasonably be found from such facts.” Id. at 271 n. 62, 550 A.2d 117. Although strictly speaking felony murder is not a lesser-included offense of murder in the sense that its elements are different, the statutory definition of lesser-included offenses, as we noted in State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 300, 544 A.2d 826 (1988), is not “all-encompassing,” nor are the statutory categories “water-tight compartments.” As Justice Stein has noted, Sloane suggests that in certain circumstances, subject to the requirements of fair notice, an offense, if supported by the evidence, should be charged to the jury even though it does not meet the Code’s definition of lesser-included offense. State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 265, 590 A.2d 1107 (1991) (Stein, J., concurring). That principle “comports with our general view that subject to fair notice the jury should resolve the degree of an actor’s guilt on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury.” Sloane, supra, 111 N.J. at 300, 544 A.2d 826.
We have held that at the very core of the guarantee of a fair trial in a criminal case is the judicial obligation to insure that the jury’s impartial deliberations are based solely on the evidence and are made in accordance with proper and adequate instructions. State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206, 398 A.2d 861 (1979). Indeed, “so paramount is the duty to insure a fair trial that a jury must deliberate in accordance with correct instructions even when such instructions are not requested by coun[532]*532sel.” State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 148, 506 A.2d 708 (1990); see State v. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 288, 550 A.2d 117 (trial court’s failure to charge on diminished capacity constitutes reversible error although charge was never requested by defense counsel). Obviously, there may be circumstances in which a defendant will specifically request that a jury not be charged on a lesser-included offense as a matter of trial strategy. Whether such a request can or should be acceded to, especially in a capital case, raises concerns regarding the interests of the public (represented by the jury) in being presented with “all of the facts and all of the possible offenses that may reasonably be found from such facts.” State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299, 486 A.2d 833 (1985). We need not debate that issue in this case, for there is nothing in the record to indicate that a specific request not to charge felony-murder was made here.
New Jersey defendants cannot be subjected to the death penalty for murder if their intent is found to be anything less than knowingly or purposefully to cause death. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988). If, within the body of evidence presented at trial, proofs exist that provide a rational basis for a jury verdict of a lesser-included offense, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to have that alternative offered for jury deliberation. State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 222-23, 574 A.2d 951 (1990); see also State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 276, 508 A.2d 167 (1986) (trial court should charge on a lesser-included offense if there is rational basis in the evidence to support conviction of that offense). By relying on the robbery as an aggravating factor, the State necessarily affirmed that proofs existed that provided a rational basis for the jury to choose the death-ineligible option of finding defendant guilty of felony murder. To deprive a capital defendant of a lesser-included alternative murder charge, which arguably would have affected the deliberation of a death sentence, is not constitutionally permissible.
[533]*533The cases cited by the State in its supplemental brief do not stand for the proposition that a New Jersey defendant may be sentenced to death on the basis of an unindicted felony that was not found as part of its guilt verdict without submitting the non-capital felony-murder issue to the jury. Since, as we have seen in Schad v. Arizona, supra, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555, in some jurisdictions felony murder is a death-eligible alternative form of first-degree murder, there is no reason to submit to the jury a separate verdict on felony murder. In that statutory context (when both forms of murder, intentional murder and felony murder, are death-eligible), the aggravating factor serves as an independent sentencing guide for consideration by the sentencing jury just as, for example, the prior murder factor would. That type of factor need not be established in the guilt phase of a trial.
Obviously, our Legislature did not intend, nor does constitutional principle require, that every aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c that renders a murder death-eligible be the subject of an indictment and a guilt-phase verdict. For example, although factors c(4)(f), killing to escape detection, and factor c(4)(h), killing a police officer, can constitute separate criminal offenses, neither principles of constitutional law nor of fundamental fairness require that the factors be tried as separate indictable offenses in the guilt phase. If proper notice were given, the sentencing-phase jury could make its unanimous finding of such a factor without a prior guilty verdict and without unfairness in the trial.
While it is true, as our concurring member notes, post at 556, 601 A.2d at 194 that if notice of an aggravating factor has not been given to a defendant before trial, that factor may not provide the basis for a death sentence in that same trial, it is also true that death-eligibility functions not as a freeze-frame or snapshot but rather as a moving picture. Once established, that aggravating factor might form the basis of a death sentence in a later proceeding if proper notice were given. State v. Biegenwald, 110 N.J. 521, 542 A.2d 442 (1988) (Biegenwald III).
[534]*534But when the separate offense encompassed by the aggravating factor is, in itself, a basis for an alternative form of murder that is non-capital, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to have that alternative offered for jury deliberation in the guilt phase. Because defendant was denied the right to have the jury decide “all of the possible offenses [capital and non-capital] that might reasonably be found” in the evidence, State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 271 n. 62, 524 A.2d 188, we vacate the sentence of death.
Ill
Because our decision on the felony-murder issue renders moot many of the other issues raised in defendant’s appeal, we shall not address them in detail, except to the extent that they may recur in any further proceedings or affect the validity of the verdicts that remain.
A. Was defendant tried by a fair and impartial jury?
Defendant raises various challenges to the selection of his jury. He asserts that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in the death-qualification of the jurors. Those issues have been mooted by our disposition and have been discussed extensively by this Court. See State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 594 A.2d 172 (1991) (Biegenwald IV); State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 593 A.2d 266 (1991); State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988) (Williams II). No further discussion is required. We are satisfied as well that the use of an unsworn jury questionnaire as a preliminary basis for selecting jurors does not violate our jury-selection procedures. See State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 454, 585 A.2d 864 (1991) (discussing use of questionnaire). Each of the jurors was sworn and examined under oath in respect of the answers set forth in the questionnaire. A trial court should take care to assure that in an individual voir dire, a juror affirms that his or her statements on the questionnaire are true. Finally, defendant argues that [535]*535the trial court’s failure to question potential jurors concerning possible racial prejudice against defendant constituted plain error. Yet, no one has suggested that this crime was of an “interracial nature,” State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 554, 577 A.2d 419 (1990), and nothing in the record indicates that racial issues were “ ‘inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.’ ” State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 246, 524 A.2d 188 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1021, 47 L.Ed.2d 258, 264 (1976)). Under those circumstances, we find that the voir dire on racial bias was adequate.
B. Was defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney had previously represented a State’s witness?
The stated issue was raised before trial. The law firm of defendant’s trial counsel had previously represented James Berry, who was a State’s witness in this case, on a drug offense. Defendant argues that because the firm’s interests would prohibit his lawyer from sharply cross-examining the firm’s former client, the trial counsel’s interest would be materially adverse to those of defendant. Before the trial began, the prosecutor informed the court of the potential conflict. Defendant was subsequently brought into the courtroom. He then stated that he was aware of his attorney’s firm’s prior representation of Berry, and he consented to the attorney’s continued representation.
Defendant’s argument is highly speculative. Nothing in the record suggests that defense counsel was prevented from serving as a “vigorous partisan” of defendant’s interests. See State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531, 541, 410 A.2d 666 (1980). Berry’s case was wholly unrelated to defendant’s case. There is no indication that defense counsel was forced to choose between betraying Berry’s confidences or compromising his duty to defendant by not cross-examining Berry fully and uninhibitedly. Defense counsel was not prevented from cross-examining Berry fully and he appears to have conducted his cross-examination [536]*536ably. Moreover, defendant consented in open court to counsel’s continued representation. Defendant now claims that his consent was thrust on him at the last moment and was neither knowing nor voluntary. However, defendant’s consent appears on the record, and there is no suggestion that he was coerced or deceived into consenting.
C. Was defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s failure to issue a subpoena to a key witness concerning the victim’s whereabouts or to request a continuance when the witness failed to appear for trial?
ín a recent series of capital cases, we have set forth the standards for determining whether a capital defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel at both phases of a trial. See State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 538-39, 585 A.2d 916 (1991) (Handler, J., concurring). “Capital defendants are guaranteed competent capital counsel.” State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 356, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that the attorney’s performance was “so deficient as to create a reasonable probability that [that] deficiency materially contributed to defendant’s conviction * * State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A.2d 336 (1987). Matters of strategy or trial tactics are almost always unassailable when they are based on a proper understanding of the law and evaluation of all the facts in a case. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 165, 586 A.2d 85 (1991).
In this case, one of the critical issues was when the murder occurred. Defendant asserts that a potential witness, Gary Bey, would have placed the victim at the Maple Lake Inn, alive, sometime after 11:00 p.m. on August 26, 1988. Defense counsel presented one witness, Arthur Ellison, who testified that he had seen the victim talking with Bey at the Maple Lake Inn some time that evening, but he did not specify the time. It was obviously critical whether Talley had been killed shortly before [537]*5379:00 p.m. on August 26 in a fight in defendant’s backyard or whether he, in fact, had still been alive later that evening and, therefore, was killed by someone else. In his opening statement, defense counsel said that he intended to produce two witnesses who would place the victim alive at the Inn at midnight. Following Ellison’s testimony, which was far from definitive, defense counsel asked the court for a few minutes to find out whether Bey was available. Bey had assured him that he would appear, but he did not. Later that day, defense counsel put on the record that “we did wait for Gary Bey until 11:30,” and then rested his case.
The question is whether to fail to request a continuance at that time in order to subpoena the witness or to fail to have previously issued a warrant for the production of the witness was ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant argues that counsel’s failure to subpoena Gary Bey or to seek a continuance to serve a subpoena was not “reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984). We are unable, however, to evaluate fully the claim because we are unable to ascertain what effect the production of the witness would have had on this case. Defendant suggests that Bey would have corroborated his theory, but of course that is not known. The record is insufficient to determine whether any prejudice ensued from the foregoing circumstance. See State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 259-62, 593 A.2d 266 (discussion of hearing requirement in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).
D. Did the prosecutor’s comments deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial?
Defendant contends that comments made by the prosecutor during the proceedings violated his right to a fair trial. Specifically, defendant asserts that the prosecutor acted improperly when he “criticized and disparaged” defense counsel by implying that defense counsel had joined with defendant and his [538]*538witnesses and fabricated a story, he described defendant as being “despicable” for involving his children in the case, he told the jury that in order to acquit defendant it must believe that all of the State’s witnesses had lied, and he referred to defendant’s failure to take the stand.
We have had to reverse capital sentences when the State has exceeded the bounds of fairness in prosecuting capital cases. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 508-24, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988). Obviously, a prosecutor may make a “vigorous and forceful presentation of the State’s case.” State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56, 138 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 910, 78 S.Ct. 1157, 2 L.Ed.2d 1160 (1958). In each of the instances of alleged misconduct attributed to this prosecutor, his comments were reasonably related to the scope of the evidence before the jury.
Over time, the defense witnesses made significant changes in their versions of the events. The prosecutor was free to comment that witnesses had “chang[ed] their versions 180, 360 degrees, whatever, about significant events that happened in this case,” and it was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to suggest that the numerous conflicting and contradictory accounts given by the family members were motivated by an attempt to assist defendant. That could have been achieved, however, without the prosecutor vouching his personal opinion on the truth or falsity of any testimony of defendant or his witnesses. See Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 518-19, 548 A.2d 1058. Defendant argues that the prosecutor was accusing trial counsel of being a principal in the plot to deceive the jury when the prosecutor said in his closing argument, “defense was obviously hurt by Dia’s prior testimony and prior statements and they have to come up with some way to try to explain that away. * * * But now they come up with this story, well, you know, I was mad. I was mad at Braynard.” Even if that statement could be read to refer to defense counsel, it is much too oblique to support defendant’s claim that the prosecutor “improperly criticized and disparaged defense counsel.” In [539]*539contrast, the prosecutor in Rose explicitly said that defense witnesses “were explained the law by the lawyers, as to what he’s being charged with, what he faced and how he could beat the penalty that the law provides for him.” 112 N.J. at 518, 548 A.2d 1058.
By referring to defendant as “despicable” for involving his children in the matter, the prosecutor made at least a tangential suggestion that defendant had involved his children in his attempt to disassociate himself from the crime. The State argues that the use of the word “despicable” is understandable when viewed in the context of this case, that the word was used only once, and that the rest of the prosecutor’s summation was devoted to a fair review of the evidence. We agree. Immediately after the reference, the prosecutor added: “[a]nd let me explain that,” proceeding to detail the evidence that suggests an improper influence on the children. Given the fact-specific context, the prosecutor’s remark was less inflammatory than the remark made in State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 159, 586 A.2d 85, which the Court found was not reversible error.
With respect to the comment that the jury would have to find all of the State’s witnesses to be liars, we agree with the State that that comment was made in response to defense counsel’s repeated attacks on the veracity of the State’s witnesses, particularly Marie Simmons and Jeffrey Davis. Thus, in the context of this case, the comment did not constitute misconduct.
Finally, defendant points to three instances in which he contends that the prosecutor improperly remarked on his failure to testify. In one comment the prosecutor referred to defendant’s failure to explain how his sweatshirt was found at Marie Simmons’s house, and in the other two comments the prosecutor referred to the various statements of defendant and his family. The comment on the sweatshirt was not a direct comment on defendant’s failure to testify, but was at least [540]*540partially in response to defense counsel’s assertion during summation that Simmons had lied when she testified that defendant had come to her house Friday night. The two other comments were appropriate in the circumstances of this case. In short, there is no indication that the prosecutor sought to take advantage of defendant’s failure to testify in this case.
Prosecuting attorneys are afforded considerable leeway, within limits, in making their summations. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 447, 550 A.2d 1172. “The determination of whether prosecutorial misconduct denied defendant the right to a fair trial must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties.” State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 153, 586 A.2d 85. The remarks complained of came during the prosecutor’s summation, and defense counsel did not object to them. Although some of the remarks may have approached the limits of permissible advocacy on the part of a prosecutor, none of the remarks was “so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.” Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322, 524 A.2d 188.
E. Was it error not to have charged passion/provocation manslaughter?
Although the trial court charged the jury with the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter, the court did not provide a charge on passion/provocation. Defendant argues that the record tells the story of a “drug deal gone sour,” and that “[e]vidence of a fight was all over this record.” If the record warrants a passion/provocation manslaughter charge, the defendant is entitled to such an instruction, whether or not manslaughter is consistent with the theory of the defense. State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 317, 419 A.2d 406 (1980). However, we have not required the trial court to meticulously sift through the entire record in every murder trial to determine if some combination of facts and circumstances might rationally sustain a man[541]*541slaughter charge. The duty of the trial court to provide that charge arises only when the facts “ ‘clearly indicate’ ” the appropriateness of that charge. State v. Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 299, 486 A.2d 833 (quoting State v. Powell, supra, 84 N.J. at 318, 419 A.2d 406).
Despite the lengthy list of evidence that defendant contends supports a passion/provocation charge, the record provides only a few fragments of evidence that might suggest that the victim started the fight or engaged in mutual combat: (1) Dia Shaw’s statement to the police dispatcher that “two guys are jumping my dad”; (2) defendant’s request while in police custody to be provided with an explanation of self-defense; and (3) testimony concerning defendant's scratches and bruises. However, there are reasons to view that evidence skeptically. Dia’s subsequent statements spoke of only two men fighting in the yard, one of whom she acknowledged to be defendant, and in two of those statements, including the one given during her trial testimony, she said that she saw defendant throw the other man to the ground and fall on top of him. Defendant’s request to be provided with an explanation of self-defense was self-serving. Several scratches and bruises when compared to fifteen stab wounds do not suggest mutual combat.
This case is far from State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 568 A.2d 879 (1990), in which we held that the failure to charge passion/provocation at the request of the defendant constituted reversible error. The record in Mauricio contained evidence that shortly before killing his victim, the defendant had been unfairly subjected to “two violent physical confrontations.” Id. at 414, 568 A.2d 879. This case is also far from State v. Powell, supra, 84 N.J. 305, 419 A.2d 406. In Powell, we held that the trial court should have charged passion/provocation because from the evidence “the jury could easily have concluded that a lovers’ quarrel occurred in which Powell was provoked by [his victim’s] attempt on his life, which attempt deprived him of his senses, and caused him to kill her in a fit of rage.” Id. at 323, 419 A.2d 406.
[542]*542This case is closer to those cases in which we held that the defendant was not entitled to a passion/provocation charge. Even in State v. Perry, supra, 124 N.J. 128, 590 A.2d 624, where there was evidence that the victim, angered in a dispute over drug money, spoke harshly to the defendant, walked toward him, and pointed at him while the defendant was trying to inject himself with drugs, we held that that evidence “provided no basis for a passion/provocation manslaughter charge.” Id. at 160, 590 A.2d 624. Further evidence showed that once the fighting started, the victim “broke on” the defendant, so that the defendant believed the choice “was either me or him.” Id. at 141, 590 A.2d 624. In State v. Oglesby, supra, 122 N.J. at 536, 585 A.2d 916, in which there was controverted evidence that the victim had struck the defendant before he killed her, this Court held that the trial court did not err in not charging passion/provocation manslaughter.
As in Perry and Oglesby, the record here did not clearly indicate the need for a passion/provocation charge. Even viewed in the light most positive to defendant, that evidence does not clearly indicate the appropriateness of a passion/provocation charge.
F. Does failure to charge felony murder constitute grounds for reversal of the murder conviction?
In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized that charging a jury on lesser-included offenses can be beneficial to the defendant because “it affords the jury a less drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal.” Id. at 633, 100 S.Ct. at 2387, 65 L.Ed.2d at 400. Defendant argues that because the court charged the jury only on the lesser-homicide offenses of aggravated murder and reckless manslaughter, charges defendant now asserts were “virtually irrelevant to the present case since there was absolutely no evidence that Lawrence Talley had been killed recklessly,” the jury was faced with acquitting defendant of all [543]*543charges or convicting him of capital murder. As the State notes, that is a somewhat exaggerated view because defendant was also charged on serious-bodily-injury murder, a non-capital offense, as provided by State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792. In addition, defense counsel had objected to the State’s reference, in its opening statement, to drugs and money missing from Talley’s body on the basis that the indictment had not charged theft.
To be reversible error, the failure to charge must have been capable of bringing about an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. Defendant asserts that a felony-murder charge would have given the jury the option of convicting defendant of a non-capital murder. Because we have vacated the death sentence on that basis, there is, in the present posture of the case, no other prejudicial effect prior to a capital retrial. See State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 256, 593 A.2d 266 (“Because the sentence for felony murder is the same as the sentence for knowing or purposeful murder where the death penalty is not imposed, there is no prejudice to defendant in the circumstances of this case”). If the State seeks a sentence of death, the conviction of murder must be vacated and the murder count retried. See State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 504-05, 575 A.2d 435 (1990) (discussion concerning effect of partial criminal reversal and whether reversal of capital-murder count requires reversal of any other related count prior to retrial).
G. Did the charge to the jury impermissibly dilute the State’s burden to prove defendant’s guilt on all counts beyond a reasonable doubt?
Defendant contends that the trial court’s charge regarding the prosecution’s obligation to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was improper and constitutes reversible error. The point is raised as plain error before us since defense counsel did not object to the charge at trial. He focuses on the court’s definition of reasonable doubt, which cautioned the jurors against viewing the State’s evidence with skeptical minds [544]*544or “ignoring” an interpretation of the evidence that might favor the State or searching for doubt instead of the truth. Defendant argues that the charge inflated the degree of doubt that would qualify as reasonable, suggesting that the jurors must be more than skeptical about the State’s case. In the defense view, the charge narrowed the circumstances that would have entitled defendant to have the benefit of a reasonable doubt and placed inferences consistent with guilt on an equal footing with inferences consistent with innocence.
Taken in the abstract, the challenged portions of the charge may have that tendency. However, we have repeatedly stated that' “ ‘portions of a charge alleged to be erroneous cannot be dealt with in isolation but the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect.’ ” State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 135, 586 A.2d 85 (quoting State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422, 307 A.2d 608 (1973)). Our review of the court’s charge to the jury convinces us that its overwhelming tenor was to convey to the jury that the State bore the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the case.
While telling jurors “to search for the truth,” the court, in the same sentence, told them “to give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt, if it arises in your mind, after you have considered all of the evidence in the case.” In addition, the court correctly charged the jury on the presumption of innocence and on the State’s burden of proof. Furthermore, the State’s burden of proving each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt was restated without qualification in the context of the separate instructions concerning the various charges in the indictment, so that “[t]he concept of the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt permeates the trial court’s jury charge.” State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 136, 586 A.2d 85.
Nonetheless, we repeat the admonition that we expressed in State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130 [545]*545(1987), in which we cautioned our trial courts against using any charge that has a tendency to “ ‘understate’ ” or “ ‘trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to determine whether the defendant’s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 41, 524 A.2d 130 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 364 N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (1977)). Any instruction that suggests that the concept of reasonable doubt is a simple search for truth may run the risk of detracting from both the seriousness of the decision and the State’s burden of proof. Because the degree of certainty required to convict is unique to the criminal law, we discourage the resort to any language that tends to minimize the indispensable nature of the reasonable doubt standard.
We are satisfied that the trial court’s clear statement of the presumption of innocence and its repeated emphasis on the continuing burden of proof on the State with respect to each of the individual charges fully and accurately apprised the jury of the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Read in their entirety, the challenged portions of the charge do not constitute grounds for reversal of the convictions.
IV
We advert only briefly to other issues that we have considered and disposed of without further discussion. The introduction into evidence of photographs of the decomposed body of the victim was within the discretion of the trial court. There was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the hindering-apprehension charge. The trial court’s charge to the jury concerning the definition of reasonable doubt did not unnecessarily dilute the State’s burden of proof or deprive defendant of due process of law.
In respect of sentencing-phase errors charged, we do not address those except to note that the prosecutor should not have appealed to jurors to “have the courage” to vote for death. See State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 521, 548 A.2d 1058 [546]*546(prosecutor should not divert jury “from its duty to determine defendant’s punishment based on the evidence and in accordance with the trial court’s charge”). The trial court should carefully explain the mitigating factors. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 169, 548 A.2d 887 (1988) (Bey II). The court did not err in failing to sequester the jury during its penalty-phase deliberations. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to undertake the proportionality review requested by defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3e. We have considered whether any departure should be made from our prior rulings on the constitutionality of the death penalty in New Jersey and have concluded that no departure is warranted. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for post-trial questioning of the jurors.
V
To sum up, defendant has been found guilty of murder. Defendant may not be sentenced to death without having a jury make the choice between all available verdicts of capital and non-capital murder. In this case, the State affirmed that the murder had been committed in the course of a felony. Despite that affirmance by the State, the jury was not allowed to deliberate on the non-capital verdict of felony murder. There is no substitute for a jury verdict on this essential question of death-eligibility. The death sentence must be vacated because the State did not afford the defendant this fair-trial right.
To explain the reasons why a free society should elect to afford fair-trial rights to even the seemingly most reprehensible of its members remains difficult. Justice Frankfurter once wrote that “[l]aw triumphs when the natural impulses aroused by a shocking crime yield to the safeguards which our civilization has evolved for an administration of criminal justice at once rational and effective.” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1350, 93 L.Ed. 1801, 1807 (1949). That answer may not be enough for those who regard society as the loser when these safeguards produce unpalatable results. Per[547]*547haps it is only the experience of an unjust system of laws, as has occurred in other parts of the world, that will nurture respect for law.
Except with respect to death-eligibility, the convictions of murder and other counts are otherwise affirmed and the matter remanded to the Law Division for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.