State v. Puchta

786 S.W.2d 154, 1990 Mo. App. LEXIS 224, 1990 WL 9618
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 6, 1990
DocketNo. 56248
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 786 S.W.2d 154 (State v. Puchta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Puchta, 786 S.W.2d 154, 1990 Mo. App. LEXIS 224, 1990 WL 9618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinion

KAROHL, Judge.

Defendant challenges sufficiency of evidence to support guilty verdicts on three charges of neglect of three nursing home patients, felonies defined in § 198.070.11 RSMo 1986. Defendant was sentenced to pay fines on each charge and concurrent prison sentences on two charges.

Defendant was the administrator of Mercy Convalescent Center from October 17, 1982 until he was discharged on August 16, 1986. His college training was as a business student. He had no medical or nursing training.

Mercy Convalescent Center is located in the City of St. Louis. It is an intermediate care facility as defined in § 198.006(8) RSMo 1986. Residents are housed on the top six of seven floors. It has a capacity of 254 patients.

The grand jury indicted James Schmidt [owner], Matthew Puchta [administrator], Lily Tiller [director of Nursing], and Alice Brown [Assistant Director of Nursing] charging they committed the class D felony of neglect of a resident of a facility because they: (1) “knowingly neglected Mar-dell Ogle,” between August 1, 1986 and August 18, 1986, Count I; (2) “knowingly neglected Patty Herosy,” between January 1,1985 and July 29,1986, Count II; and, (3) “knowingly neglected Dotsey Nelson,” between April 1,1986 and May 4,1986, Count III. [Dotsey sometimes also spelled Dot-sy]. In response to a motion for bill of particulars the -state filed the following response which constitutes the pleadings on which the case was tried:

The State hereby incorporates by all counts, charges, allegations, writings, and endorsements contained in the indictment heretofore filed in the above entitled cause.
As to Count One: Defendant knowingly neglected Mardell Ogle who was at that time a resident of the Mercy Convalescent Center, a facility as defined in Chapter 198 RSMo., in that said defendant failed to provide reasonable and necessary services to insure adequate treatment and maintenance of a halo brace and to prevent and treat infection on the body of Mardell Ogle at the pin sites of the halo brace and to prevent loosening of the halo brace on the body of said Mardell Ogle which presented an imminent danger to the health, safety or welfare of said Mardell Ogle.
As to Count Two: Defendant knowingly neglected Patty Herosy who was at that time a resident of the Mercy Convalescent Center, a facility defined in Chapter 198 RSMo, in that said defendent [sic] failed to provide reasonable and necessary services to insure adequate nutrition and hydration of Patty Herosy and to prevent and treat decubitus ulcers on [156]*156the body of said Patty Herosy which presented an imminent danger to the health, safety, or welfare of said Patty Herosy.
As to Count Three: Defendant knowingly neglected Dotsy Nelson who was at that time a resident of Mercy Convalescent Center, a facility as defined in Chapter 198 RSMo., in that said defendant failed to provide reasonable and necessary services to insure adequate supervision and maintenance of the body of Dot-sy Nelson while restrained and failed to monitor said restraints on the body of Dotsy Nelson or provide adequate monitoring or supervision of said restraints which presented an imminent danger to the health, safety, or welfare of said Dotsy Nelson.

“The state must establish every element of the offense charged by substantial evidence ... We of course consider the evidence from the state’s vantage point without reweighing and give the state the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” State v. Dale, 775 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Mo. banc 1989); State v. Brown, 660 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Mo. banc 1983). It is for the trier of fact to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. State v. Brown, 660 S.W.2d at 698. Our review is therefore limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Mo. banc 1987). In making this decision we must accept as true all legally admitted, probative evidence and inferences that tend to support the verdict and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Brown, 660 S.W.2d at 699.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of knowing neglect of a resident. Section 198.070.11 RSMo 1986 provides:

11. Any person who knowingly abuses or neglects a resident of a facility shall be guilty of a class D felony.

The indictment and bill of particulars do not charge abuse. Defendant is charged with neglect, as defined in § 198.006(11):

The failure to provide, by those responsible for the care, custody and control of a resident in a facility, the services which are reasonable and necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of the resident, when such failure presents either an imminent danger to the health, safety or welfare of the resident or a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm would result;

The Supreme Court recently determined in State v. Dale, 775 S.W.2d at 133, “§ 198.-070.11 is violated only if Class I violations are shown.” Class I violations are defined in § 198.050.1(1) RSMo 1986 as those which present an imminent danger to health, safety or welfare of any resident or a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm would result.

The state must prove that defendant acted “knowingly” with respect to the counts on which he was convicted as that term is defined in § 562.016.3 RSMo 1986. Proof of supervisory authority is not sufficient to convict. State v. Dale, 775 S.W.2d at 133.

The state bore the burden of proving: (1) neglect as defined in § 198.006(11) RSMo 1986; (2) defendant acted “knowingly” as that term is defined in § 562.016.3 RSMo 1986; (3) acts for which defendant is criminally liable presented imminent danger to the health, safety or welfare of a resident or substantial probability of death or serious physical harm; and, (4) defendant acted with a co-defendant with a common purpose to neglect a resident, or, he acted or encouraged others to neglect a resident. Within the framework of the noted principles and rules of review we consider defendant’s claim of absence of sufficient proof to support a verdict on each count.

Count I — Mardell Ogle

Mardell Ogle, age 63, testified for the state. She was a resident of Mercy from August 1, 1986 to August 18, 1986. Prior to admission she was treated at St. Louis University Hospital for a “cracked vertebrae” sustained in a fall at her home. Dr. Kraft prescribed a halo brace which was installed on June 24,1986. Four metal pins pierced the skin and attached the halo brace to the outer table of the skullbone. [157]*157The device included a vest secured at the waist and shoulders. It weighed eight and one half pounds. Dr. Kraft testified patients wearing halo braces frequently return home, but Ogle lived alone, had a history of cerebral palsy, and had a balance problem causing several recent falls.

Ogle was transferred to Bethesda Hospital on June 26, 1986. Nurse Moore saw her there on August 1, 1986. Moore testified she saw no infection of the pin sites at this time. Later that day Ogle was transferred to Mercy.

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Bluebook (online)
786 S.W.2d 154, 1990 Mo. App. LEXIS 224, 1990 WL 9618, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-puchta-moctapp-1990.