State v. Prouty

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 15, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-57
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Prouty, 2026-Ohio-2239.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-25-57 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

RANDY D. PROUTY, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR2024 0256

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: June 15, 2026

APPEARANCES:

William T. Cramer for Appellant

John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee Case No. 1-25-57

WALDICK, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Randy D. Prouty (“Prouty”), brings this appeal

from the September 5, 2025, judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court

sentencing him to life in prison without parole after he was convicted by a jury of,

inter alia, Rape of a child under ten years old. For the reasons that follow, we affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} After D.K.’s mother had a debilitating heart attack, D.K. and his

younger brother went to live with Prouty while children’s services completed a

home-study on D.K.’s relatives in Kentucky. Prouty was D.K.’s neighbor.

{¶3} In the fall of 2024, D.K. was in first grade and Prouty walked him to

school. On October 28, 2024, a school social worker spoke with Prouty because

D.K. really wanted to attend an after-school party, but D.K. was not brought back

for the party.

{¶4} The next morning, on October 29, 2024, D.K. was overheard in class

talking about “putting [a] penis in girls’ mouths.” D.K. was sent to speak with the

school social worker, and during that conversation, D.K. disclosed that Prouty had

put his penis in D.K.’s mouth the prior evening. D.K. also disclosed that Prouty had

shown him pornography on Prouty’s phone.

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{¶5} The school social worker called children’s services and D.K. was taken

to a forensic interview at a child advocacy center. The interview was conducted

without law enforcement present. During the interview, D.K. disclosed that the prior

night Prouty had shown him “what boys do” with each other. More specifically,

D.K. indicated that Prouty put his “private” in D.K.’s mouth, that Prouty directed

D.K. to “massage” Prouty’s “private,” and that Prouty directed D.K. to massage his

“butt.” D.K. indicated that “privates” were what boys “used to pee.”

{¶6} Prouty was interviewed three times by law enforcement, and all of those

interviews were recorded. Prouty initially adamantly denied that anything

happened. Next, he claimed that D.K. approached Prouty and indicated some

homosexual tendencies, so Prouty showed D.K. homosexual pornography to

illustrate “what boys do with each other.” Prouty later changed his story and

admitted that he was the one that brought up “what boys do” with each other to

D.K., and he admitted showing D.K. the pornography.1

{¶7} Prouty initially maintained he did not touch D.K. and that he did not

have D.K. touch him. However, Prouty eventually admitted that he had D.K. touch

his penis, but he said that was all that happened. At the conclusion of the third

interview, Prouty wrote the following letter of apology to D.K.

1 An analysis of Prouty’s phone established that Prouty had searched for multiple homosexual pornography videos around the time he was alleged to have shown the videos to D.K.

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Dear [D.K.]

Uncle [Prouty] is so so sorry about having you touch my taliwaker [sic] and showing you the porn video. I had some Beer that day, so I wasn’t thinking straight. So I’m writing you this letter to tell you that I’m not mad at you at all. I love you and [other child] very much. You two are like my owen [sic] kids. Like I said I’m so so sorry. I’ll never ever do this again.

Your Uncle [Prouty]

(State’s Ex. 25).

{¶8} The detective investigating the matter collected Prouty’s shorts after the

first interview because they were the same shorts Prouty had been wearing the day

prior when the sexual assault allegedly occurred. Prouty had indicated he had not

showered since the alleged event. The shorts were sent to BCI for testing and a

mixture of DNA was found on the interior crotch region of the shorts. The mixture

of DNA contained Prouty’s DNA and D.K.’s DNA.

{¶9} On December 12, 2024, Prouty was indicted for Disseminating Matter

Harmful to Juveniles in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(1), a fourth degree felony, two

counts of Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), both third

degree felonies, and Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a first degree

felony. Prouty pled not guilty to the charge.

{¶10} A jury trial was held September 2-4, 2025. At trial, the State presented

testimony from the school social worker, the nurse who conducted the sexual assault

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exam of D.K., the forensic interviewer who interviewed D.K., a BCI forensic

scientist who did the DNA analysis, and the detective investigating the matter. A

redacted version of the forensic interview with D.K. was introduced into evidence,

as were the recorded interviews with D.K. Ultimately the jury found Prouty guilty

of all charges.

{¶11} The case proceeded immediately to sentencing. With regard to the

Rape conviction, Prouty was sentenced to life in prison without parole pursuant to

R.C. 2907.02(B). He received prison terms on his other charges, but those terms

were ordered to be served concurrently with the prison term for the Rape conviction.

A judgment entry memorializing Prouty’s sentence was filed the next day,

September 5, 2025. It is from this judgment that Prouty appeals, asserting the

following assignments of error for our review.

First Assignment of Error

The trial court violated appellant’s confrontation rights under the federal and state constitutions, and the hearsay rule, by admitting into evidence the child-victim’s forensic interview.

Second Assignment of Error

Appellant’s sentence of life without parole for a single act of rape violates the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.

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{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Prouty argues that his federal and state

rights to confront witnesses against him were violated by the admission of a redacted

video recording of the forensic interview of D.K., who did not testify at trial. Prouty

also separately argues that the video recording constituted inadmissible hearsay.

Standards of Review

{¶13} We review Prouty’s challenge to the admission of the forensic

interview under the Confrontation Clause de novo. See State v. McKelton, 2016-

Ohio-5735, ¶ 172 (stating that challenges to Sixth Amendment rights are reviewed

de novo). By contrast, hearsay challenges are typically reviewed under the abuse of

discretion standard, giving deference to the trial court’s decision. State v. Wilson,

2026-Ohio-1178, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.). Under an abuse of discretion standard, we will not

reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the judgment was arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Notably,

the Confrontation Clause may bar the admission of evidence that would otherwise

be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Issa, 2001-Ohio-1290.

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Analysis

{¶14} The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Section 10,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which includes the right “to meet face to face”

provides “no greater right of confrontation than the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Self,

56 Ohio St.3d 73, 79 (1990).

{¶15} Under the Confrontation Clause, testimonial out-of-court statements

are prohibited, unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had

a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36, 53-54 (2004); State v. Tench, 2018-Ohio-5205, ¶ 17. Crawford did not define

“testimonial,” but it is generally understood that testimonial statements are those

made for “a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial

testimony.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011); State v. Maxwell, 2014-Ohio-

1019, ¶ 40.

{¶16} In State v. Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, the Supreme Court of Ohio

addressed whether recorded statements made by a child at a child advocacy center

were testimonial and thus inadmissible pursuant to the Confrontation Clause when

the child was unavailable for cross-examination at trial. The Court noted that child

advocacy centers are unique in that multidisciplinary teams cooperate so that the

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child is interviewed only once. Arnold at ¶ 33. Generally, the interviews at child

advocacy centers serve dual purposes: (1) to gather forensic information needed by

the team for investigation and potential prosecution, and (2) to elicit information

necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment. Id.

{¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio held that statements made to the

interviewer that served primarily a forensic or investigative purpose were

testimonial, whereas those made for medical diagnosis and treatment were not. Id. at

paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, ¶ 44. The Supreme Court noted that “the

fact that police officers watched the interview and that it was recorded does not

change the fact that the statements were necessary for [the child’s] medical

diagnosis and treatment. Similarly, the fact that information gathered for medical

purposes is subsequently used by the state does not change the fact that the

statements were made for medical diagnosis and treatment." Id. at ¶ 43.

{¶18} Shortly after Arnold was issued, this Court affirmed a trial court’s

exclusion of a child’s statements that were made in an interview with a social worker

with Logan County Children Services. State v. Goings, 2012-Ohio-1793 (3d Dist.).

In Goings, the social worker testified that the purpose of the interview was to

determine the veracity of the allegations and whether the child required medical or

emotional treatment. Based on the child’s statements during the interview, the social

worker recommended that the child be taken to the hospital, but indicated it was not

an emergency to do so. No information was forwarded to a medical facility or

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medical professional, and the social worker was not working with a medical

professional; to the contrary, the social worker contacted the police following the

interview. We concluded that “nothing in the interview supports a conclusion that

any part of the interview was directed to medical diagnosis or treatment[.]” Goings

at ¶ 34.

{¶19} However, Goings is markedly different from the case sub judice. This

case is more similar to State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-1613 (3d Dist.), wherein a child

was interviewed by a licensed social worker/forensic interviewer at a child advocacy

center, and the interviewer was attempting to gather information about suspected

abuse or neglect for medical diagnosis and treatment. The interviewer interacted

with doctors regarding the allegations prior to the interview and received feedback

from them during the interview. There was no law enforcement presence at the

interview. In such circumstances, we determined that the child’s statements during

the interview were for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, and there

was no indication the forensic interviewer was acting on behalf of law enforcement.

Smith at ¶ 39. Therefore, we concluded that entering a recording of the interview

into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id.

{¶20} The instant case is very similar to Smith. In this case, D.K. was

interviewed by a social worker trained in conducting forensic interviews. The

interview was also done at a child advocacy center with no law enforcement officers

present.

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{¶21} Moreover, the interview, particularly the portions presented to the

jury, covered questions related to determining what medical treatment or medical

evaluations the child might need. Furthermore, also like Smith, the interview with

D.K. was redacted so that only portions pertinent to medical treatment were

included in the recording presented to the jury. Just as in Smith, the statements in

this case were made primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and evaluation;

therefore, we find that their inclusion into evidence does not violate the

Confrontation Clause because they were not testimonial in nature.

{¶22} Having determined that the recording as redacted did not violate the

Confrontation Clause, we must still address whether the recording constituted

inadmissible hearsay. Evidence Rule 801(C) defines “hearsay” as “a statement,

other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered

in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Hearsay is

generally not admissible unless an exception applies. Evid.R. 802.

{¶23} Evidence Rule 803 contains exceptions to the general rule that hearsay

is not admissible. As relevant to this case, Evidence Rule 803(4), reads as follows:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

...

(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present

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symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

{¶24} Here, we have already determined that the interview of D.K. that was

introduced into evidence contained statements made for purposes of medical

diagnosis or treatment. As there is a clear exception to the general hearsay rule for

this purpose, we can find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in this matter in

determining that the redacted interview was admissible under Evid.R. 803(4). Thus

Prouty’s argument is not well-taken.

{¶25} Having rejected both of Prouty’s challenges to the recorded interview

of D.K., his first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶26} In his second assignment of error, Prouty argues that his sentence of

life in prison without parole for a single act of rape of a child under ten violates state

and federal prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.

Standard of Review

{¶27} Prouty did not object to his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment

at the trial court level, thus we review the matter for plain error. State v. Blanton,

2025-Ohio-1192, ¶ 60 (1st Dist.).

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{¶28} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held, “As a general rule, a sentence

that falls within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and unusual

punishment.” McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69 (1964). Because the

sentence imposed in this case is consistent with what is required by R.C. 2907.02,

the sentence generally cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v.

Kidd, 2021 Ohio App. LEXIS 3803 (1st Dist.).

{¶29} Notwithstanding the first point, Ohio Appellate Courts have

repeatedly rejected arguments that sentences to life in prison without parole

constitute cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of raping a child under ten.

Kidd, supra, (1st Dist.); State v. Driscoll, 2009-Ohio-6134, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.); State v.

Glaze, 2019-Ohio-53, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.); State v. Gladding, 66 Ohio App.3d 502, 513

(11th Dist.1990). These Ohio Appellate Courts repeatedly refer to the nature of

raping a child under ten as particularly “heinous,” and then find that life

imprisonment without parole for such a “heinous” crime is not “shocking to the

moral sense of the community.” We agree with the other Ohio Appellate Districts.

{¶30} Given the heinous nature of the crime, the age of the child, seven at

the time of the Rape, and the consistent case authority finding that the sentence

imposed herein does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for the crime

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committed, we find no error with the trial court’s sentence in this matter. Therefore,

Prouty’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶31} Having found no error prejudicial to Prouty in the particulars assigned

and argued his assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Allen

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

Mark C. Miller, Judge

DATED: /jlm

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