State v. . Pritchard

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . Pritchard

41 S.E.2d 287, 227 N.C. 168, 1947 N.C. LEXIS 362

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedFebruary 26, 1947

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 41 S.E.2d 287 (State v. . Pritchard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . Pritchard, 41 S.E.2d 287, 227 N.C. 168, 1947 N.C. LEXIS 362 (N.C. 1947).

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Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Tbe record reveals an unusual proceeding — manifestly difficult to conduct. Tbe defendant insisted on trying bis own case, which be bad a right to do under tbe statute. G. S., 1-11. He proved to be a poor lawyer and an unwise client. After conviction, be employed counsel to prosecute an appeal. This has been done with as much skill as tbe record would permit.

It appears that tbe defendant took tbe witness stand and admitted tbe publication and circulation of tbe reports as alleged in tbe warrant. They are derogatory on their face. Tbe jury found that they were false and were circulated willfully, with intent to affect tbe chances for nomination of tbe candidate named. This resulted in a conviction under tbe statute, G. S., 163-196, subsection 11, and judgment as abové indicated.

Apparently tbe defendant sought to defend tbe publication and circulation of tbe reports on tbe ground that they were supported by personal transactions which be previously bad with tbe candidate. Tbe jury did not accept bis version of tbe matter. In fact, all tbe evidence was to tbe contrary, save that of tbe defendant’s own expression of belief.

Tbe exceptions addressed to tbe statement of contentions are pointed in tbe main to matters other than tbe truthfulness of tbe charges. Even if inexact in some particulars, they would seem to be without material significance on tbe record as presented.

Tbe failure to provide tbe defendant with counsel cannot be held for error in tbe light of tbe trial. He was able to pay counsel, but preferred “to go it alone.” Abernethy v. Burns, 206 N. C., 370, 173 S. E., 899. Indeed, tbe court sought to assign tbe defendant counsel, showed him every consideration, and gave him a wide latitude in tbe introduction of evidence. This liberality, it is now suggested, while otherwise intended, was in reality hurtful to tbe defendant. Gibbs v. Russ, 223 N. C., 349, 26 S. E. (2d), 909; Midgett v. Nelson, 212 N. C., 41, 192 S. E., 854; Morgan v. Benefit Society, 167 N. C., 262, 83 S. E., 479. Tbe point was *170 seriously pressed at bar, but we are unable to perceive wherein the defendant was prejudiced by the action of the trial court. His conviction was induced by his own testimony.

No irregularity sufficient to upset the verdict or the judgment has been made to appear. Hence the result:

No error.

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Stacy, C. J.

Tbe record reveals an unusual proceeding — manifestly difficult to conduct. Tbe defendant insisted on trying bis own case, which be bad a right to do under tbe statute. G. S., 1-11. He proved to be a poor lawyer and an unwise client. After conviction, be employed counsel to prosecute an appeal. This has been done with as much skill as tbe record would permit.

It appears that tbe defendant took tbe witness stand and admitted tbe publication and circulation of tbe reports as alleged in tbe warrant. They are derogatory on their face. Tbe jury found that they were false and were circulated willfully, with intent to affect tbe chances for nomination of tbe candidate named. This resulted in a conviction under tbe statute, G. S., 163-196, subsection 11, and judgment as abové indicated.

Apparently tbe defendant sought to defend tbe publication and circulation of tbe reports on tbe ground that they were supported by personal transactions which be previously bad with tbe candidate. Tbe jury did not accept bis version of tbe matter. In fact, all tbe evidence was to tbe contrary, save that of tbe defendant’s own expression of belief.

Tbe exceptions addressed to tbe statement of contentions are pointed in tbe main to matters other than tbe truthfulness of tbe charges. Even if inexact in some particulars, they would seem to be without material significance on tbe record as presented.

Tbe failure to provide tbe defendant with counsel cannot be held for error in tbe light of tbe trial. He was able to pay counsel, but preferred “to go it alone.” Abernethy v. Burns, 206 N. C., 370, 173 S. E., 899. Indeed, tbe court sought to assign tbe defendant counsel, showed him every consideration, and gave him a wide latitude in tbe introduction of evidence. This liberality, it is now suggested, while otherwise intended, was in reality hurtful to tbe defendant. Gibbs v. Russ, 223 N. C., 349, 26 S. E. (2d), 909; Midgett v. Nelson, 212 N. C., 41, 192 S. E., 854; Morgan v. Benefit Society, 167 N. C., 262, 83 S. E., 479. Tbe point was *170 seriously pressed at bar, but we are unable to perceive wherein the defendant was prejudiced by the action of the trial court. His conviction was induced by his own testimony.

No irregularity sufficient to upset the verdict or the judgment has been made to appear. Hence the result:

No error.

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41 S.E.2d 287, 227 N.C. 168, 1947 N.C. LEXIS 362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-pritchard-nc-1947.

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