State v. Price

2026 Ohio 688

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 27, 2026
• Docket: 2025 CA 00048
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Price, 2026-Ohio-688.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025 CA 00048

Plaintiff – Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024 CR 2418 ALONZO DAVID PRICE Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: February 27, 2026

BEFORE: ANDREW J. KING, P.J., WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J.; Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: KYLE STONE, CHRISTOPHER PIEKARSKI, for Plaintiff-Appellee; D. COLEMAN BOND, for Defendant-Appellant

OPINION

Popham, J.,

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Alonzo David Price (“Price”) appeals his conviction

after a jury trial in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons below, we

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On January 3, 2025, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Price on one

count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)/(D)(1)(a), a felony of the

second degree; two counts of abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(1)/(C) and

(A)(2)/(C), felonies of the third degree; one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A)/(D)(4), a felony of the third degree; and one count of criminal damaging or

endangering in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1)/(B), a misdemeanor of the second degree.

{¶3} Price proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found him not guilty of the abduction

charges, domestic violence, and criminal damaging or endangering. The jury was unable

to reach a verdict on the felonious assault charge, and the trial court declared a mistrial

as to that count. Price was subsequently retried on the felonious assault charge.

{¶4} The evidence at retrial established the following.

Testimony of the victim, M.L.

{¶5} M.L. testified that she had been in a relationship with Price and lived with

him for slightly more than one year. On November 18, 2024, the couple argued throughout

the day. When M.L. attempted to leave the residence, Price forcibly intervened. M.L.

testified that she called 9-1-1, but Price took her phone during the call and removed its

battery and SIM card. 1T. at 179-180, 198.

{¶6} M.L. testified that, as she moved toward the exit, Price pulled her backward

to the ground and “stomped” on her knee. M.L. heard her knee crack and immediately

experienced severe pain. 1T. at 180. Unable to stand, she crawled into the bathtub and

asked Price to call for an ambulance, which he refused. 1T. at 181.

{¶7} Later that day, after Price fell asleep, M.L. used Price’s phone to text her

mother, stating: “Call police. Being held hostage. He broke my leg.” 1T. at 166; State’s

Exhibit 1.

{¶8} M.L. testified that she was transported to Aultman Hospital, where she

learned her knee was broken. She underwent surgery on December 2, 2024, and was unable to walk for an extended period. At the time of trial, she continued to wear a brace

and attend physical therapy. 1T. at 184-185.

{¶9} M.L. also testified that she continued to communicate with Price in the

months following the incident and that she still cared for him. Recorded jail calls between

M.L. and Price discussing the incident were admitted into evidence. 1T. at 187-190.

Testimony of M.L.’s mother

{¶10} S.C., M.L.’s mother, testified that although the message did not originate

from M.L.’s phone number, she recognized it as coming from her daughter based on the

reference to Price’s nickname. 1T. at 164-166. S.C. testified that the message also

instructed her not to call back so as not to wake Price. S.C. immediately had her son call

9-1-1. 1T. at 167-171; State’s Exhibit 3.

The Investigation

{¶11} Canton Police officers responded to the residence in the afternoon of

November 18, 2024. Officer Elvis Drevon testified that Price initially gave a false name,

refused to open the door, and communicated only through a window. Although officers

heard moaning inside the apartment, they were unable to make visual contact with M.L.

1T. at 139. Officer Alva Watkins, whose prior testimony was read into the record, testified

that he briefly saw M.L. through a window, but she did not respond to questions and

turned away.1 1T. at 265-267.

{¶12} Later that evening, officers returned to the residence. Officer Christian Paris

testified that M.L. reported she had been unable to speak to officers earlier because Price

held a pillow over her head. 1T. at 220-221. Detective Robert Hubner testified that M.L.

1 Officer Watkins was not available to testify in person during Price’s retrial. The trial court allowed

Officer Watkins testimony from the first jury trial to be read into evidence. was found seated with her leg elevated, in visible distress, and that even slight movement

caused her intense pain. Id. at 231-232. Detective Hubner testified that inside the

apartment he found a cell phone without a battery. Id. at 233. He later spoke with M.L. at

the hospital, where she reported that Price had thrown her to the ground and “stomped”

on her knee. Id. at 236. Photographs of her injuries taken at the hospital were admitted

into evidence. Id. at 236-241.

Disposition

{¶13} Price did not testify or present witnesses. The jury found Price guilty of

felonious assault. The trial court sentenced Price to an indefinite prison term with a

minimum sentence of eight years and a potential maximum sentence of twelve years.

Assignments of Error

{¶14} Price raises two assignments of error for our consideration,

{¶15} “I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO

SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST APPELLANT, AND THE CONVICTION MUST BE

REVERSED.”

{¶16} “II. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND MUST BE REVERSED.”

I.

{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Price argues the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction for felonious assault. He contends the State failed to prove that

he knowingly caused serious physical harm to M.L. We disagree. Standard of Review — Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶18} Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v.

Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30. The inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

259, paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). This review does not involve weighing

evidence or assessing credibility. Id. A conviction will be reversed on sufficiency grounds

only where reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion—acquittal. State v.

Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 94.

Governing Law and Application

{¶19} R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) – Felonious Assault - provides that no person shall

knowingly cause serious physical harm to another. “Serious physical harm” includes harm

involving substantial incapacity, prolonged or intractable pain, or acute pain resulting in

substantial suffering. R.C. 2901.01(A)(5).

{¶20} Price does not dispute that M.L. suffered serious physical harm. He argues

only that the evidence failed to establish he acted knowingly, asserting instead that the

evidence showed recklessness and that M.L.’s testimony was inconsistent.

{¶21} A person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct will probably

cause a certain result. R.C. 2901.22(B). By contrast, recklessness involves awareness of

a risk that the result may occur. R.C. 2901.22(C). If the result is probable, the conduct is

knowing; if merely possible, it is reckless. In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against

Emrich, 75 Ohio St.3d 1517 (1996); State v. Hardman, 2016-Ohio-498, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.). {¶22} Criminal intent is a question for the jury and may be inferred from the act

itself and surrounding circumstances. State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (1995); State

v. Ashcraft, 2023-Ohio-2378, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.).

{¶23} Here, M.L. testified that Price grabbed her from behind as she attempted to

leave, threw her to the ground, and “stomped on her knee.” She immediately experienced

severe pain, required hospitalization and surgery, and suffered prolonged incapacity. To

“stomp” means to strike the ground - or an object - forcefully with the foot, often in anger.

https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/stomp (accessed Feb. 12, 2026). From this

evidence, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Price was aware his conduct of

stomping on M.L.’s knee would probably cause serious physical harm to M.L. Whether

M.L.’s testimony contained inconsistencies goes to weight and credibility, not sufficiency,

and is beyond the scope of this review.

{¶24} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient

evidence supports the jury’s finding that Price knowingly caused serious physical harm to

M.L.

{¶25} Price’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II.

{¶26} In his second assignment of error, Price argues that his conviction is against

the manifest weight of the evidence, contending that M.L.’s testimony was inconsistent

and therefore not credible. We disagree.

Standard of Review- Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶27} A manifest-weight challenge addresses the persuasive force of the

evidence. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. The reviewing court considers whether the greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of the case rather

than the other. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).

{¶28} In this role, an appellate court acts as a “thirteenth juror,” reviewing the

entire record, weighing the evidence and reasonable inferences, and considering witness

credibility to determine whether the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17; Thompkins at 387.

{¶29} This standard is deliberately deferential. Because the jury directly observes

the witnesses’ demeanor, tone, and manner of testifying, its credibility determinations are

entitled to great weight. Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d

77, 80 (1984). Accordingly, reversal is reserved for the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against conviction. Thompkins at 387. Moreover, all three judges

on the panel must concur before a conviction may be reversed on manifest-weight

grounds. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3).

Analysis

{¶30} Price argues that M.L.’s testimony was unreliable because she could not

recall every detail of the incident and provided inconsistent accounts. The record does

not support this claim.

{¶31} M.L. consistently testified that Price grabbed her from behind as she

attempted to leave the apartment, threw her to the ground, and “stomped” on her knee,

causing immediate and severe pain. Her testimony was corroborated by medical

evidence establishing that she suffered a broken knee requiring hospitalization, surgery,

and prolonged rehabilitation. Price does not dispute that he caused the injury; rather, he

claims it was accidental - an argument the jury was free to reject. {¶32} The jury, as the trier of fact, was entitled to evaluate the credibility of the

witnesses and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. It could believe all, part, or none of

the testimony presented. State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). Minor inconsistencies

do not render testimony incredible, nor do they transform a conviction into a manifest

miscarriage of justice. See State v. Craig, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1138, *10 (10th Dist.

Mar. 23, 2000).

{¶33} Although the State’s case that Price acted “knowingly” relied in part on

circumstantial evidence, such evidence is entitled to the same probative value as direct

evidence. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶34} After independently reviewing the record and weighing the evidence, we

find no indication that the jury lost its way or that Price’s conviction represents a manifest

miscarriage of justice.

{¶35} Price’s second assignment of error is overruled. For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Stark County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to be paid by Appellant, Alonzo David Price.

By: Popham, J.

King, P.J. and

Hoffman, J., concur